Forecasting ECB monetary policy: Accuracy is a matter of geography

Monetary policy in the euro area is conducted within a multi-country, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual context. How does this heterogeneity affect the ability of economic agents to understand and to anticipate monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB)? Using a database of surveys of professional ECB policy forecasters in 24 countries, we find remarkable differences in forecast accuracy, and show that these have important repercussions on market behaviour. Explaining the differences in forecast accuracy, we provide evidence that they are partly related to geography and clustering around informational hubs, as well as to country-specific economic conditions. In large part this heterogeneity can be traced to differences in forecasting models.     

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NON‐TRADITIONAL MONETARY POLICY MEASURES: THE CASE OF THE BANK OF JAPAN*

This paper summarizes non‐traditional monetary policy measures adopted by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) during the last 2 decades and by other G7 central banks since the start of the current global financial turmoil and analyses the effectiveness of such measures. The paper begins with a typology of policies usable near the zero lower bound on interest rates. They are: (i) forward guidance of future policy rates; (ii) targeted asset purchases; and (iii) quantitative easing. Using this typology, I review the measures adopted by the BOJ and other central banks. I then offer a news analysis of the effects of the measures adopted by the BOJ on asset prices, comparing them with those adopted by the Fed. Many of the measures, with the exception of strategy (iii), are shown to have moved asset prices in the expected directions. Another exception is that most of the monetary easing measures failed to weaken the yen. Despite some effects on asset prices, however, the measures have failed to stop the deflationary trend of the Japanese economy clearly. I discuss some possible reasons for this and more general implications for monetary policy.     

Mumbling with great incoherence: Was it really so difficult to understand Alan Greenspan?

We show how most Humphrey-Hawkins testimonies by Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan were difficult to follow, implying the general public needs information through different, more accessible communications. Still, it is not obvious that Greenspan was increasingly ‘mumbling with great incoherence’.     

Stale forward guidance

Quarterly central bank projections regarding future interest rate decisions may become stale when new information enters the market. Using data from New Zealand, we find the predicted time-varying and state-dependent effects of interest rate projections on market expectations and uncertainty.     

Inflation targeting in emerging economies: Panel evidence

This paper shows there is no evidence that the inflation targeting regime (IT) improves economic performance as measured by the behavior of inflation and output growth in developing countries. The control of common time effects results in less negative and less significant IT impacts on inflation, inflation volatility and output growth volatility than previously found in the literature. Additionally, our analysis shows robust evidence of lower output growth during IT adoption. On balance, although lower long-run mean inflation signals that the central banks of emerging economies with inflation targeting are more inflation-averse, the costs of disinflation have not been lower than under other monetary regimes.     

How have inflation-targeting central banks responded to supply shocks?

This paper examines how inflation-targeting central banks have responded to supply shocks, based on the sign-restriction VAR approach. It is found that inflation-targeting central banks have become accommodative to adverse supply shocks following the adoption of inflation targeting.     

Are monetary-policy reaction functions asymmetric?: The role of nonlinearity in the Phillips curve

This paper investigates the implications of a nonlinear Phillips curve for the derivation of optimal monetary policy rules. Combined with a quadratic loss function, the optimal policy is also nonlinear, with the policy-maker increasing interest rates by a larger amount when inflation or output are above target than the amount it will reduce them when they are below target. Specifically, the main prediction of our model is that such a source of nonlinearity leads to the inclusion of the interaction between expected inflation and the output gap in an otherwise linear Taylor rule. We find empirical support for this type of asymmetries in the interest rate-setting behaviour of four European central banks but none for the US Fed.     

Central Bank Independence and the Cost of Disinflation: Why the Wage Contracts Length Matters?

Recent empirical contributions demonstrate that countries with less independent central banks enjoy lower output losses during disinflationary cycles. To explain these somewhat surprising empirical findings, some authors suggest that independent central banks probably face a flatter short-run Phillips curve. In this paper, we provide both theoretical and empirical arguments to rationalize this intuition. We demonstrate that, since central bank independence reduces the mean inflation rate and its variance, wage setters opt for a lower degree of nominal wage indexation leading to more wage and price inertia and, thus, to a flatter short-run Phillips curve. Consequently, this paper put forward a channel of positive influence of central bank independence on the sacrifice ratio through its impact on nominal wage indexation. Empirical tests, performed using a sample of 19 OECD countries during the 1960–1990 period, show that these theoretical results hold also empirically.     

Household's preferences and monetary policy inertia

Interest rates set by central banks puzzlingly move with a certain inertia. We show that household's preferences can be important determinants of the optimal interest rate inertia due to their impact on the efficiency of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.     

Has the EMU reduced wage growth and unemployment? Testing a model of trade union behavior

Grüner (2010) argues that the introduction of the European Monetary Union (EMU) led to lower wage growth and lower unemployment in participating countries. According to Grüner, monetary centralization increases the amplitude of national business cycles, which leads to higher unemployment risk. In order to counter-balance this effect, trade unions lower their claims for wage mark-ups, resulting in lower wage growth and lower unemployment. This paper uses macroeconomic data on OECD countries and a difference-in-differences approach to empirically test the implications of this model. Although we come up with some weak evidence for increased business cycle amplitudes within the EMU, we neither find a significant general effect of the EMU on wage growth nor on unemployment.     

A two-pillar DSGE monetary policy model for the euro area

The current financial crisis has revived the interest for monitoring both monetary and credit developments. Over the past two decades, consistent with the adoption of inflation targeting strategies by a growing number of central banks and the development of New Keynesian models for which monetary aggregates are largely irrelevant, money and credit have been progressively neglected in the conduct of monetary policy. A striking exception has been the Eurosystem, which has implemented a strategy known as the “two-pillar monetary policy strategy” giving a prominent role for money. In this paper, we develop a small optimizing model based on Ireland (2004), estimated on euro area data and featuring this two-pillar strategy. We evaluate an ECB-style cross-checking policy rule in a DSGE model with real balance effects of money. We find some evidence that indeed money plays a non-trivial role in explaining the euro area business cycle. This provides a rationale for the central bank to factor in monetary developments but also raises some issues regarding the reliability of M3 as an appropriate monetary indicator. We find some evidence that the ECB has systematically reacted to a filtered measure of money growth but weak evidence it has reacted more aggressively during excess money growth periods.     

MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF LENDER OF LAST RESORT FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF PAYMENTS*

We construct a model to clarify the mechanism by which the lender of last resort (LLR) can prevent bank runs. In our model, a bank has both the function of facilitating payments in which inside money is settled using outside money and the function of financial intermediation using a deposit contract. The deposit contract might lead to a bank run, and might even contribute to an efficient allocation. Therefore, to consider the liquidity supply by the LLR, we introduce the deposit contract as a factor of instability in the banking model. We show that the LLR can assist in the recovery of both the efficiency and stability of the financial system.     

Forecasting the Direction of Policy Rate Changes: The Importance of ECB Words

This paper evaluates the predictive power of different information sets for the European Central Bank (ECB) interest-rate-setting behaviour. We employ an ordered probit model, i.e. a limited dependent variable framework, to take into account the discreteness displayed by policy rate changes. The results show that the forecasting ability of standard Taylor-type variables, such as inflation and output gap, is fairly low both in-sample and out-of-sample, and is comparable to the performance of the random walk model. Instead by using broader information sets that include measures of core inflation, exchange rates, monetary aggregates and financial conditions, the accuracy of the forecasts about ECB future actions substantially improves. Moreover, ECB rhetoric considerably contributes to a better understanding of its policy reaction function. Finally, we find that that the ECB has been fairly successful in educating the public to anticipate the overall future direction of its monetary policy, but has been less successful in signalling the exact timing of rate changes.