Buyer power and exclusion in vertically related markets

Suppliers and consumer organizations have become increasingly concerned by the build-up of buyer power of retailers in many markets. A major concern is that strong retailers will abuse their power to exclude products and rival retailers from the market to be able to increase prices to consumers. As a consequence, remedies to limit buyer power are discussed and implemented in many countries. In this paper we compare the incentives for exclusion, and the effect on consumers prices, under both buyer and seller power. We study a model with a dominant upstream manufacturer and a competitive fringe of producers offering their products to two differentiated downstream retailers. We compare the equilibrium outcome of this model when i) the dominant supplier holds all the bargaining power, and (ii) the retailers have all the bargaining power. We show that full or partial exclusion of either the competitive product or downstream retailers occurs when inter and intrabrand competition are strong. This is true both under seller and buyer power. However, in contrast to the received literature, we find that buyer power weakly enhances welfare compared to seller power because buyer power will lead to both more product variety (less exclusion) and lower retail prices.     

Purchasing alliances and product variety

We analyze the impact of purchasing alliances on product variety and profit sharing in a setting, in which capacity constrained retailers operate in separated markets and select their assortment in a set of differentiated products offered by heterogeneous suppliers (multinationals vs. local SMEs). Retailers may either have independent listing strategies or build a buying group, thereby committing to a joint listing strategy. This alliance may cover the whole product line (full buying group) or only the products of large suppliers (partial buying group). We show that a buying group may enhance the retailers’ buyer power and reduce the overall product variety to the detriment of consumers. Our most striking result is that partial buying groups do not protect the small suppliers from being excluded or from bearing profit losses; they may even be more profitable for retailers than full buying groups.     

Cartelization Through Buyer Groups

Retailers may enjoy stable cartel rents in their output market through the formation of a buyer group in their input market. A buyer group allows retailers to commit credibly to increased input prices, which serve to reduce combined final output to the monopoly level; increased input costs are then refunded from suppliers to retailers through slotting allowances or rebates. The stability of such an ‘implied cartel’ depends on the retailers’ incentives to source their inputs secretly from a supplier outside of the buyer group arrangement at lower input prices. Cheating is limited if retailers sign exclusive dealing or minimum purchase provisions. We discuss the relevancy of our findings for antitrust policy.     

Why Do Suppliers Charge Larger Buyers Lower Prices?

The phenomenon of input suppliers charging larger buyer firms, relative to smaller buyer firms, lower prices is commonly explained in terms of supplier economies of scale, supplier competition for larger buyers, and the larger bargaining power of larger buyers. This paper provides an alternative explanation, and shows that the observed direction of differential pricing can benefit the supplier by lowering the level of tacit collusion its buyers can sustain in their output market. This result also provides a new mechanism through which a ban on price discrimination by input suppliers may lower consumer welfare.     

Merger review with intermediate buyer power

Buyer power features prominently in antitrust cases and debates, particularly as it relates to the potential for a merger among suppliers to harm a buyer. Using a Myersonian mechanism design approach, Loertscher and Marx (2019b) provide a framework for merger review for markets with buyer power, assuming that buyer power is a zero-one variable. In the present paper, we extend this analysis by treating buyer power as a continuous variable (technically, as a Ramsey weight) that ranges from zero to one. This generalization is relevant because, among other reasons, the Ramsey weight can be interpreted as a conduct parameter that can be estimated. Moreover, we establish the robustness of prior results to an alternative way of modelling merger-related cost synergies, and we show that when an acquiring firm’s choice of target is endogenous, its profit-maximizing choice depends on the buyer’s power.     

Intermediaries in power-laden retail supply chains: An opportunity to improve buyer–supplier relationships and collaboration

Despite the benefits of buyer and seller collaboration and hence relationships extolled in extensive studies, issues of relationship power inhibit implementation of collaborative and relational approaches, particularly in some parts of the retail sector. Further, most research regards buyer–supplier collaboration and relations as dyadic or focal relationships, or perhaps in a network context, and typically investigates buyer–supplier collaboration and relations from a power-dependency perspective; and within vertical supply integration. Little attention has been given to the potential role of supply chain intermediaries, such as logistics service providers, in objectively and independently determining and managing the course of buyer–supplier collaboration and relations in a business-to-business context. This article appraises the potential role of buyer–supplier collaboration and relations and their relevant opportunities in the power-laden, contentious environment of the retail grocery sector. With an interdisciplinary approach, drawn from supply management, relationship management, and logistics and supply chain management, this article emphasises the importance of horizontal collaboration using fourth-party logistics structures as horizontal intermediary conduits, who act independently between retailers and suppliers to facilitate collaborative and relational activity.     

Power,buyer trustworthiness and supplier performance: Evidence from the Armenian dairy sector

The paper presents a Multiple Indicators and MultIple Causes (MIMIC) model for explaining the relationships between buyer-seller power, buyer trustworthiness and supplier satisfaction / performance. The model draws on an organizational supply chain perspective of power and is verified using data relating to dairy farmers’ relationships with their main buyer in Armenia. The analysis indicates that buyers are more trustworthy where there is greater competition for supplies. Buyer trustworthiness is also positively correlated with both the size of a supplier, as well as a supplier being a member of a marketing cooperative. Buyer trustworthiness has a positive impact on suppliers’ satisfaction (regarding their relationship with their main buyer) and enhances the quality and quantity of suppliers’ output.     

The relationship between network governance and unilateral governance in dynamic consumer demand

An important question for retailers is the extent to which control over suppliers should be maintained when there is uncertain consumer demand. This paper proposes that the level of network governance (high or low) affects retailers' level of unilateral control in uncertain consumer demands. The empirical results indicate that when there is a low level of network governance, retailers tend to increase the level of unilateral control over suppliers as consumer demand uncertainty increases. On the other hand, retailers who feel a high level of network governance may rely on unilateral governance to a lesser extent regardless of consumer demand uncertainty.     

The Impact of Upfront Payments on Assortment Decisions in Retailing

There is a contentious debate about the exclusionary effects of upfront payments to be made by manufacturers to place their products on retailers’ shelves. Analyzing a two-stage bargaining process with one downstream retailer and a pool of upstream manufacturers, we find that upfront payments lead to a smaller assortment if the retailer’s bargaining power is high enough and the suppliers’ products are close substitutes.     

“I want you back”: On the strategic roles of boundary spanners in supplier switching-back processes

This paper builds upon literature addressing boundary spanners and switching suppliers in order to explore an under-examined aspect of buyer–supplier relationships: how different individuals at multiple organisational levels affect processes by which firms return, or “switch back”, to former suppliers after breaches in their relationships. Our study followed a qualitative approach by applying an abductive research methodology to make sense of 85 semi-structured interviews with executives involved in the erstwhile buyer–supplier relationships that we investigated. We found that supplier switching-back processes (SSBPs) can be understood as constituted by a set of alignments and misalignments between boundary spanners (i.e. top management, purchasing and sales agents, engineers and technicians) in the organisations involved. Thus, peoples' interactions, or lack thereof, directly affect the possibility for buyers and suppliers to restore their severed relationships. We conclude that boundary spanners pursue seven distinct roles during different periods in SSBPs, roles that relate to three identified functions of boundary spanners in such processes. The paper closes by highlighting what our findings imply for business managers, limitations and some possible directions for future research.     

Should leading brand manufacturers supply private label brands to retailers: Calibrating the trade-offs

The consolidation of retailers across markets has considerably altered the competitive dynamics between leading brand manufacturers and retailers. The era in which brand manufacturers dictate the game to compliant retailers is long gone. Nowadays, with more equal negotiation power retailers are no longer just channel partners but rather business partners with whom to build business-to-business relationships. This has become apparent especially since retailers have developed their own private label brands (PLB) and actively seek brand manufacturers to supply them. For brand manufacturers supplying PLB may bring potential benefits but may also harm profits. Thus, this research investigates conditions under which a leading brand manufacturer would be better or worse off in terms of profitability producing PLB for retailers. Using a game theoretic model, we calibrate the trade-offs between the shelf space devoted by the retailer to the manufacturer brand and the amount of profit required from supplying the PLB necessary to counteract cannibalization and to generate profits for the manufacturer, under different levels of uncertainty regarding the availability of alternative suppliers. Calibrating these trade-offs provides brand manufacturers clear guidelines for negotiations with retailers regarding shelf space allocation and wholesale prices to be profitable supplying PLB.     

Anti-competitive effects of resale-below-cost laws

We show that resale-below-cost laws enable producers to impose industrywide price-floors to retailers. This mechanism suppresses downstream competition but also dampens upstream competition, leading to higher prices. Price-floor may be more profitable for producers than resale price maintenance contracts and, while resale price maintenance may have ambiguous effect on welfare, price-floors always harm welfare. Retailers' buyer power appears as a key element for a price-floor to work out.     

Structuring and contracting in competing supply chains

This paper considers two competing supply chains, each with multiple upstream suppliers producing complementary products and selling to a single buyer (e.g., assembler or retailer), who then sells the finished assembled product to a market that involves both demand uncertainty and competition. Our main research questions focus on what supply chain structure (integration vs. decentralization) and which contracting strategy a business should choose. We find that supply chains that decentralize perform better under strong market competition (i.e., high degree of product substitution between supply chains). However, when a large number of suppliers exist, supply chains that integrate perform better. When decentralized structures are used for both supply chains, a consignment with revenue sharing contract generally outperforms a wholesale price contract from the downstream retailer's point of view. Interestingly, for a supplier, a wholesale price contract, which pushes all demand risks to the downstream retailer, might not be preferred. For the entire supply chain, one contract strategy can outperform another depending on the degree of competition, the cost share of the buyer, and the number of suppliers.     

Buyer Power and Industry Structure

This paper investigates the exercise of market power by a large buyer who emerges via growth, merger, or group purchasing. It explores the efficiency and redistributive effects of such an event when a competitive fringe of small buyers remains in the market. Terms of trade, including those for small buyers, depend on structural conditions on the supply side of the market and the nature of interactions between the newly emerged dominant buyer and suppliers. Predicted aggregate welfare effects have implications for antitrust.     

Motivating a Supplier to Test Product Quality

This paper considers a supplier that offers a buyer a new product of unknown quality. The supplier can run a test that partially reveals unverifiable information concerning the quality, and the buyer can learn the actual quality after agreeing to buy the new product. I identify two main features of a contract for motivating the supplier to run the test. First, the contract may specify an upward or downward quantity distortion. Second, the contract may include slotting allowances, which may be welfare reducing when they discriminate against financially constrained suppliers.     

Buyer Market Power and Innovative Activities

This empirical paper deals with the effects of supplier and buyer market concentration on the innovative behavior of suppliers within the German automobile industry. The data set contains firms from all size classes and covers measures of innovation input as well as innovation output. It can be shown that (a) firms' innovation and R & D-employment intensity will decline (increase) in buyer concentrations if supplier markets are low (high) concentrated; (b) buyers' pressure on input prices reduces suppliers' innovation expenditures and their incentive to develop new products; (c) a small number of competitors in suppliers markets and a large stock of customers stimulates innovative behavior; (d) small and medium sized suppliers invest more in their innovative activities but have less probability of realizing innovations than larger firms; and (e) higher technological capabilities lead to higher innovation input and output.     

The Influence of Knowledge Accumulation on Buyer-Supplier Codevelopment Projects

This article investigates innovation across a supply chain and considers how knowledge accumulation as a consequence of buyer‐supplier codevelopment projects can influence the projects' specifications. The setting is the semiconductor industry, and the players are chip producers who cooperate with their suppliers to modify their manufacturing equipment used to produce new semiconductor devices. Two detailed case studies were undertaken to determine the tradeoffs encountered by the buyer and supplier when setting the parameters that govern codevelopment projects. The findings from the case studies inform a conceptual framework that outlines the net payoffs to buyers when deciding whether to “make” or “buy” their production equipment. If buyers pursue the “make” option, they then have to decide the degree to which they sponsor modifications tailored to their production processes or modifications more generally applicable across the industry. More generally applicable modifications likely would prompt suppliers to invest relatively more in follow‐on knowledge creation for upgrades and field support while leading to lower equipment costs due to economies of scale from larger production runs of the new equipment. The framework suggests that when making this sequence of decisions, an innovative buyer also weighs the importance of codevelopment for securing intellectual property rights, guaranteeing early access to new equipment enabling early product launch, and achieving high production yields quickly due to “previewing” the equipment. The conceptual framework leads to a multi‐period model that focuses on the importance of knowledge accumulation for project parameterization. As captured by the model, buyers may prefer generally applicable modifications to customized ones, because generally applicable modifications may lead to greater knowledge accumulation at the supplier. This knowledge accumulation may be either “embodied” in equipment upgrades or “unembodied” in improved field support. In addition to shaping the nature of particular codevelopment projects, knowledge accumulation also may have profound implications for long‐run industry structure. As seen in the semiconductor industry, knowledge accumulation at equipment suppliers has contributed to the rise of contract manufacturers, because these manufacturers can outfit their production facilities with equipment that embodies the accumulated knowledge. These findings suggest that for both short‐run and long‐run reasons, the dynamics of knowledge accumulation merit thorough attention when members of a supply chain cooperate during the course of new product development.     

One‐Stop Shopping Behavior,Buyer Power and Upstream Merger Incentives

We analyze how consumer preferences for one‐stop shopping affect the (Nash) bargaining relationships between a retailer and its suppliers. One‐stop shopping preferences create ‘demand complementarities’ among otherwise independent products which lead to two opposing effects on upstream merger incentives: first a standard double mark‐up problem and second a bargaining effect. The former creates merger incentives while the later induces suppliers to bargain separately. When buyer power becomes large enough, then suppliers stay separated which raises final good prices. We also show that our result can be obtained when wholesale prices are determined in a non‐cooperative game and under two‐part tariffs.     

Private voluntary standards in the food system: The perspective of major food retailers in OECD countries

The paper examines the main economic and institutional incentives which have driven major OECD food retailers in their use of private voluntary standards and discusses their growing role in shaping the agri-food system. It is based on interviews with quality and safety directors of major OECD retailers and a brief survey of retailers’ actual buyer practices. Though not all retailers are included, these firms account for over 70% of retail food sales in OECD countries. We find that the growing voice of civil society, changing legal and institutional frameworks, increased market concentration and buying power as well as their integration with financial markets has provided the setting for development of private standards. While food safety and quality standards are seen as key to maintaining and improving reputation as well as against legal liabilities, additional standards such as labour, environmental and animal welfare are also gaining ground as strategies for customer loyalty and market shares. The grass-roots retailer move in the harmonization of food safety standards is seen as an initial step towards a global approach to managing the food system, with harmonization of other standards likely in the future. Given their buyer power, these developments can be viewed as a way of governing the food system and will be important for both OECD and non-OECD food and agricultural sector evolution in the coming years.     

(Non-)Insurance Markets,Loss Size Manipulation and Competition: Experimental Evidence*

The common view that insurer buyer power may effectively counteract provider market power critically rests on the idea that consumers and insurers have a joint interest in pushing for price and cost reductions. We develop theory and provide experimental evidence that the interests of insurers and consumers may be misaligned when insurers have the power to influence the service supplier’s cost. Insurers with such buyer power may benefit from increasing initial loss sizes to create demand for insurance. Insurer competition eliminates their profits but markets do not return to the initial non-insurance state. This constitutes a welfare loss.