The effects of China’s split-share reform on firms’ capital structure choice

China’s split-share structure reform in 2005–2006 mitigates agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and thus may bring substantial changes to corporate financing behaviour. This article examines the impact of that reform on the capital structure decisions of firms by applying a variety of trade-off and pecking-order models. Using data from 1176 non-financial Chinese listed firms during the period 2000–2012, we present empirical evidence indicating that equity tracks the financing deficit better than debt in Chinese firms, a finding which is not consistent with pecking-order theory. This phenomenon is more prominent after 2006 as share reform increases trading activity in the secondary stock market and improves the transparency of financial markets. In addition, Chinese firms have an optimal leverage ratio and they adjust below-target leverage ratios faster than above-target leverage ratios after the implementation of share structure reform, although they make symmetric adjustments towards the target leverage ratio before 2007. Finally, recent share reform has prompted Chinese firms to more quickly address the divergence of actual leverage ratios from long-term target levels, but has slowed their response to short-term target leverage divergence.     

Peaks or tails – What distinguishes financial data?

We argue against the view that it is mostly the peaks of the empirical densities of stock returns (and of other risky returns as well) that set such data aside from “normal” variables. We show that peaks depend on sample size and on the way returns are standardized, and that for given data sets of stock returns, both higher peaks and lower peaks than in a standard normal case can be obtained. First version received: March 1998/Final version received: April 2000     

Is there a Laffer curve between aggregate output and public sector employment?

This paper develops a model of the relationship between public sector employment, total output and aggregate real demand in market prices, where public employment has a positive productivity effect on private output. Public employment crowds out private employment and output because its increase induces higher wages and taxes. The valuation of government output is also taken into account. While public employment affects total output and aggregate real demand in an a priori ambiguous way, numerical simulations suggest that the relationship may be nonlinear; positive, when public sector is “small” and negative, when it is “large”. Using the annual data from 22 OECD countries over the period 1960–1996 and estimating and testing for threshold models and more commonly used specifications with multiplicative interaction terms give support to this nonlinearity hypothesis between public employment and private sector output. First version received: October 1996/Final version received: April 2000     

Economic theory and econometric dynamics in modelling wages and prices in the United Kingdom

We show that a “competing claims” model of imperfect competition can explain the movements of wages and prices in the United Kingdom, using quarterly data covering 1976–93. We argue that careful attention both to economic theory and to the interaction between dynamics and identification is crucial in the building of the model and to dynamic econometric models in general. We use a small numerical example with simulated cointegrated data to illustrate the potential pitfalls. First version received: January 1998/final version received: November 1998     

Mean reverting financial leverage: theory and evidence from Pakistan

Grounding concepts of the two competing theories of capital structure (trade-off theory, pecking order theory) are quite opposite to each other. Trade-off theory claims that there is an optimal (target) capital structure and firms try to achieve that optimal (target) point. Whereas pecking order theory argues that there is no optimal (target) capital structure but the firms follow a specific pattern of financing. Using the two competing theoretic frameworks, this study applies Fisher-type panel unit root test to an unbalanced panel data of 13 115 firm-year observations of nonfinancial firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange Pakistan spread over 38 years (1973–2010). Overall panel test results, for short-term, long-term, as well as total leverage support trade-off financing behaviour while individual firm results do not. Individual firm results show that only 16% of the firms have short-term target, 25% of the firms have long-term target and 12% of the firms have total target leverage ratio. Further, industry results explain that most of the industries do have target leverage ratios and classification of data into profitable and lossmaking firm-year observations explains that profitable firms clearly follow trade-off financing behaviour while the results for lossmaking firms do not support trade-off financing behaviour. Our study indicates that it is important for the government to ensure policies to develop well-balanced financial markets and to improve accountability systems.     

Worksharing and Access Discounts in the Postal Sector with Asymmetric Information*

This paper analyzes the optimal worksharing and access amounts granted to mailers and entrants in a liberalized postal sector when there is asymmetric information about the Post Office’s (PO) costs. I show that when the regulator is unable to ascertain which part of the total cost of sorting has to be attributed to each sorting facility, the optimal “access discount” given to entrants is set in a pro-competitive way. This facilitates the entry of firms that are less efficient than the PO. However, the optimal “worksharing discount” may prevent the entry of mailers that are more efficient than the PO.     

Implementing and interpreting indicators of core inflation: the case of France

This paper presents a comparison of alternative indicators of underlying or “core” inflation in the French case. Four broad measures are considered and implemented. The first two are inflation excluding food and energy, and the trimmed inflation indicator. We then implement two methods relying on time-series models: the Dynamic Factor Index and the structural VAR approach.  Each indicator stresses on a particular type of shock on the inflation rate, so that no simple ranking of the measures emerges. Combining the various indicators conveys valuable information for appraising short term inflation developments. As regards theoretical interpretation, no indicator is fully satisfactory, lacking an explicit representation of monetary policy. However, comparing forecast performance with respect to inflation provides some specific support in favor of trimmed mean indicators. First version received: January 2000/Final version received: March 2001     

Contracting out refuse collection

In this paper we seek an explanation for the reservations of local authorities towards contracting out. Although empirical evidence suggests that contracting out results in a significant cost decrease, a majority of Dutch municipalities provides for waste collection services themselves. Based on theoretical insights we model the choice between private, public, in-house, and out-house refuse collection. The models are estimated using a database comprising nearly all Dutch municipalities. We find evidence that the number of inhabitants, the transfer by central government, and interest group arguments are important explanations. Interestingly, ideology seems to play a minor role.  Compared to earlier studies we estimate more general models. Although the same qualitative results are found for parametric and semiparametric models, we find strong statistical evidence that a parametric specification is far too inflexible. Differences between the parametric and the semiparametric marginal effects are substantial. Thus, more attention is needed for the implications of model specification. First version received: November 2000/Final version received: May 2002 We thank two anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier version.     

Firm size and debt maturity as indirect determinants of capital structure: evidence form European panel data

The study aims at verifying whether the firm size and debt maturity affect the relationship between capital structure and its main determinants. Using panel data models, the impact of the primary factors on leverage is compared across three size groups of firms and for different measures of debt in order to identify the size effect and the debt maturity effect in these relationships. The study covers 11 EU countries during the period 2000–2013. Findings provide evidence that financing choices of small firms provide more support for the pecking-order theory, whereas medium and large-sized firms tend to follow the trade-off predictions on leverage. It also appears that the trade-off theory is more applicable for short-term debt, while pecking order – for long-term debt.     

Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information

Summary. We study the core and competitive allocations in exchange economies with a continuum of traders and differential information. We show that if the economy is “irreducible”, then a competitive equilibrium, in the sense of Radner (1968, 1982), exists. Moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the “private core” (Yannelis, 1991). We also show that the “weak fine core” of an economy coincides with the set of competitive allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which the traders information is the joint information of all the traders in the original economy. Received March 22, 2000; revised version: May 1, 2000     

Winner-take-all price competition

Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs. Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit outcomes. Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000     

Recruitment channel use and applicant arrival: An empirical analysis

This paper focuses on the recruitment behaviour of firms at the extensive margin; we empirically explore the relationship between employer search strategies and the number of applicants by means of (reduced form) two-equations simultaneous models. The empirical analysis is carried out on a rich micro data set on Dutch employer recruitment behaviour. Our empirical analysis reveals that the economic conditions prevailing on the labour market influence employer search activity at the extensive margin. In particular, we see that in tight (slack) labour markets characterised by excess demand (supply) of labour, the flow of applicants is smaller (larger). Employers react to the shortage (excess) of applicants by using more (less) often advertisements. This recruitment channel appears to trigger a significantly larger flow of applicants. First version received: December 1997/Final version received: June 2000     

R&;D spillovers and firms’ performance in Italy

Using a translog production function we estimate the impact of R&D spillovers on the output performance of Italian manufacturing firms over the period 1998-2003. Technological flows are measured through an asymmetric similarity index that takes also into account the geographical proximity of firms. Results show that R&D spillovers positively affect firms production and that geography matters in determining the role of the external technology. Moreover, we find that the effect of R&D spillovers is high in the Centre-South of Italy and that the stock of R&D spillovers is Morishima complement to the stock of R&D own-capital. The authors thank Giovanni Anania, Olof Ejermo, Vincenzo Scoppa, Alessandro Sterlacchini and Marco Vivarelli for useful comments on an earlier draft. We are also grateful to the participants at the Workshop on “Spatial Econometrics and Statistics” in Rome (University “Guido Carli, May 2006) and at the 2006 ADRES Conference, “Networks of Innovation and Spatial Analysis of Knowledge Diffusion” in St Etienne for helpful discussion and to an anonymous referee for many detailed and constructive comments on an earlier version. All remaining errors and omissions are our own. Financial support received by MIUR is gratefully acknowledged.     

Firm reputation with hidden information

Summary. An adverse selection model of firm reputation is developed in which short-lived clients purchase services from firms operated by overlapping generations of agents. A firm's only asset is its name, or reputation, and trade of names is not observed by clients. As a result, names are traded in all equilibria regardless of the economy's horizon The general equilibrium analysis links the value of a name to the market for services. This causes a non-monotonicity that precludes higher types from sorting themselves through the market for names, and leads to “sensible” dynamics: reputations, and name prices, increase after success and decrease after failure. Received: July 31, 2001; revised version: December 20, 2001 RID="*" ID="*" I thank Jon Levin, Eric Maskin and Drew Fudenberg for valuable discussions, and Heski Bar-Isaac for comments on an earlier draft. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (NSF grants SBR-9818981 and SES-0079876) is gratefully acknowledged. This paper replaces an older (and incomplete) working paper titled “Reputation with Hidden Information”.     

Conditional correlations in the returns on oil companies stock prices and their determinants

The identification of the forces that drive stock returns and the dynamics of their associated volatilities is a major concern in empirical economics and finance. This analysis is extremely important for determining optimal hedging strategies. This paper investigates the stock prices’ returns and their financial risk factors for several integrated oil companies, namely Bp (BP), Chevron-Texaco (CVX), Eni (ENI), Exxon-Mobil (XOM), Royal Dutch (RD) and Total-Fina Elf (TFE). We measure the actual co-risk in stock returns and their determinants “within” and “between” the different oil companies, using multivariate cointegration techniques in modelling the conditional mean, as well as multivariate GARCH models for the conditional variances. The distinguishing features of this paper are: (i) focus on the determinants of the market value of each company using the cointegrated VAR/VECM methodology; (ii) specification of the conditional variances of VECM residuals with the Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) multivariate GARCH model of Bollerslev [(1990) Review of Economics and Statistics 72:498–505] and the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) multivariate GARCH model of Engle [(2002) Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 20:339–350]; (iii) discussion of the performance of optimal hedge ratios calculated with the DCC estimates. The “within” and “between” DCC indicate time-varying interdependence between stock return volatilities and their determinants. Moreover, DCC models are shown to produce more accurate hedging strategies.     

A resource-based view of Schumpeterian economic dynamics

This paper seeks to offer a theoretical platform where the modern “resource-based view” of the firm might meet with evolutionary economics and the study of entrepreneurship, and with the economics of industrial organization. It does so by proposing the concept of the “resource economy” within which productive resources are produced and exchanged between firms. This is presented as the dual of the mainstream goods and services economy – where the “resource economy” captures the dynamic capital structure of the economy. The paper is concerned to bring out the distinctive principles governing resource dynamics in the resource economy, capturing competitive dynamics in such categories as resource creation, replication, propagation, exchange and leverage; evolutionary dynamics in terms of resource variation, selection and retention; entrepreneurial dynamics in terms of resource recombination and resource imitation, transfer and substitution; and industrial organizational dynamics in terms of resource configuration, resource complementarities and resource trajectories.     

Preference profiles sustaining Arrow's theorem

Summary. Arrow's theorem is proved on a domain consisting of two types of preference profiles. Those in the first type are “almost unanimous": for every profile some alternative x is such that the preferences of any two individuals merely differ in the ranking of x, which is in one of the first three positions. Profiles of the second type are “appropriately heterogeneous”, with preferences similar to those generating the “paradox of voting”. Received: March 9, 2000; revised version: June 7, 2001     

Environmental tax policy in a model of growth cycles

Summary. The purpose of this paper is to consider environmental taxation which would control emissions of firms in a model of growth cycles. In the model presented below, the economy may experience two phases of growth and environmental quality: “the no-innovation growth regime” and “the innovation-led growth regime”. Aggregate capital and environmental quality remain constant in the no-innovation growth regime, while they perpetually increase in the innovation-led growth regime. The paper shows that the tax plays a key role in determining whether the economy stably converges to one of the two regimes or fluctuates permanently between them. It also shows that there is a critical level of the tax and that the economy obtains higher growth rates of capital and environmental quality by raising (or reducing) the tax if the initial tax is below (or above) the critical level. Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 21, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This research reported here was conducted within the research project “Project on Intergenerational Equity” at Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. I am deeply grateful to an anonymous referee for his or her insightful comments, which greatly improved the paper. I also thank Hiroshi Honda, Yasuo Maeda, Yuji Nakayama, and participants in workshops at Hitotsubashi University, Kyoto University, Nagoya University, Osaka University, University of Tsukuba, Yokohama National University, and University of Tokyo for their valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine.     

Commitment to a strategy of uniform pricing in a two-period duopoly with switching costs

This paper studies decisions by firms of whether to attempt “behavior-based” price discrimination in markets with switching costs by using a two-period duopoly model. When both firms commit themselves to a pricing policy and consumers are “sophisticated” and have rational expectations, there is a dominant strategy equilibrium with both firms engaging in uniform pricing. Both firms are better off in the uniform pricing equilibrium, compared with the discriminatory equilibrium.      

Markov perfect equilibria in industries with complementarities

Summary.   This paper considers the existence and computation of Markov perfect equilibria in games with a “monotone” structure. Specifically, it provides a constructive proof of the existence of Markov perfect equilibria for a class of games in which a) there is a continuum of players, b) each player has the same per period payoff function and c) these per period payoff functions are supermodular in the player's current and past action and have increasing differences in the player's current action and the entire distribution of actions chosen by other players. The Markov perfect equilibria that are analyzed are symmetric, not in the sense that each player adopts the same action in any period, but rather in the sense that each player uses the same policy function. Since agents are typically distributed across many states they will typically take different actions. The formal environment considered has particular application to models of industries (or economies) in which firms face costs of price adjustment. It is in this context that the results are developed. Received: November 9, 1999; revised version: February 10, 2000