THE ECONOMICS AND THE NONECONOMICS OF THE WORLD WAR INDUSTRY

The world war industry is defined as the part of human income-earning activity devoted to producing, maintaining, and sometimes utilizing means of destruction. Most of the industry consists of what is purchased with national states' military budgets, which are spent by unilateral national defense organizations. These organizations are basically noneconomical, in the sense that they do not have a balance sheet, do not show a "bottom line" or net worth, and therefore there is no way to estimate their profitability. They have economic aspects in terms of decisions that balance marginal benefits against marginal costs. The benefits, however, are mainly psychological in the minds of the decision makers. Wars of conquest, especially those resulting in empires, have not paid off very well for the conquering power. Military defeat often leads to cultural and economic development. Nuclear weapons and long-range missiles have made national defense essentially obsolete and the greatest enemy of national security. Military leaders may respond to this development as they recognize their traditional culture of courage, heroism, and fighting has been replaced by child roasting and perhaps universal destruction. There seem to be few economies of scale in the national state, and perhaps we should look forward to a world of 500 national states in stable peace with a very limited, functional world government.     

THE DISSAVING OF ANNUITY WEALTH AND MARKETABLE WEALTH IN RETIREMENT

This paper compares the automatic dissaving of annuity wealth with the discretionary dissaving of marketable wealth that would result from life-cycle consumption behavior by retired persons. In simulations of a life-cycle model based on the isoelastic utility function and realistic parameter values, we find that marketable wealth normally would be dissaved more rapidly than annuity wealth. This suggests that empirical findings that show the opposite relation-slow dissaving of marketable wealth being accompanied by faster dissaving of annuity wealth (or total wealth)-should not be interpreted as evidence that supports the life-cycle theory.     

DIFFERENCES IN THE MEASUREMENT OF WEALTH, WEALTH INEQUALITY AND WEALTH COMPOSITION OBTAINED FROM ALTERNATIVE U.S. WEALTH SURVEYS

Since household wealth surveys have been widely used to study saving and other issues, it is important to examine the reliability of the various survey estimates of wealth. In this paper the authors assess the quality characteristics of the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men and the Retirement History Survey, as compared to the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances. We find that the NLS and especially the RHS underreport wealth and wealth concentration. The underestimates of wealth held in the form of common stock, business equity, and investment real estate equity are substantial. The principal problem lies in underrepresentation of both tails of the wealth and income distributions, with the consequences of underrepresenting the upper tail being especially serious for wealth measurement. We examine several potential reasons for the underrepresentation.     

CONSTANT WEALTH NATIONAL INCOME: ACCOUNTING FOR WAR DAMAGE WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE NETHERLANDS, 1940–45

The issue of the proper way to address and document crisis and disaster in the national accounts is brought into focus by analyzing a practical case: the damage caused by the Second World War as discussed at a 1945 Paris reparations conference. It is concluded that "what if" damage e.g. output not produced due to the war should not be included in the national accounts, but factual damage should. The method by which factual damage should be included must then be decided. The option of just showing the damage in the reconciliation accounts is rejected. Instead the introduction of an additional income concept into the accounts, constant wealth national income is proposed. This Hicksian concept deducts from standard national income the damage to all produced goods lasting longer than a year. The concept is illustrated with guesstimates for the Netherlands, 1940–45. Finally, by way of an illustration, the paper employs 1945 estimates of damage in the Netherlands in order to arrive at a constant wealth national income for 1940–45. It is shown that, in 1938 prices, constant wealth national income is very much lower than standard national income and thus far better reflects the decline in prosperity during these years.     

THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH IN CANADA

For estimates of the wealth distribution Canada depends on household surveys taken at 6–7 year intervals. The latest data from this source refer to household balance sheets in the spring of 1977. A comparison with 1970 shows that there is little change in the composition of wealth held by households but that inequality of the wealth distribution has been somewhat reduced. Wealth data by age of family head is presented in order to describe more fully the wealth distribution and composition in Canada.
Weaknesses in the data are discussed as well as the difficulties of making appropriate adjustments to the data at the micro record level. For policy evaluation and formulation purposes the lack of comprehensive estimates inclusive of pension wealth as well as the small sample size (12,700 usable records) have been perceived as greater obstacles to utilizing the data than the underestimate in aggregate assets and debts which affects more the higher than the middle and lower ranges of the wealth distribution.     

THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF INCOME INSURANCE

Precautionary savings models suggest that wealth should rise with income risk. Risk is reduced by means-tested transfers, however, which implies that transfer programs should discourage private wealth accumulation. We offer a comprehensive empirical assessment based on variation across states in the generosity of a number of programs, specifically unemployment insurance and means-tested transfers (Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Food Stamps). We use monthly data on married couples from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to regress wealth on income, income risk, and various measures of transfer generosity. The results support the precaution-ary savings model and reveal moderate negative wealth effects of both unemployment insurance and means-tested transfers, with an elasticity of about −0.18.     

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH IN SWEDEN

This paper is concerned with the distribution of wealth in Sweden in 1975 and its development during the period 1920–75. The paper is based on a large study on wealth undertaken for the Swedish Commission on Wage-Earners and Capital Formation. The first report from this study was presented in 1979 as a book in Swedish: Roland Spånt, Den svenska förmögenhetsfördelningens utveckling (The Development of the Distribution of Wealth in Sweden), SOU 1979:9. That first report will also be published in English. Prior to that the main results can be found in this paper.
During 1980–81 we intend to publish specific reports on the distribution of shareholding, the effects of inflation, the development of the distribution of wealth 1975–78, the importance of pension rights etc.     

人工智能的财富分配效应研究

人工智能对经济不平等的影响引起学术界的广泛重视,但是现有研究以分析其对劳动收入不平等的影响为主,关于人工智能对财富分配从而对财产性收入不平等影响的相关研究尚有欠缺。本文通过构建一个连续时间异质性个体动态一般均衡模型,将人工智能对生产技术的影响看作一揽子偏向性技术进步,研究人工智能技术对财富分配的影响。分析发现,人工智能对财富不平等的影响在短期和长期表现有所不同,短期中人工智能技术的应用会提高经济中财富分配不平等程度,而长期中其财富分配效应则取决于人工智能对不同类型技术进步的促进程度。核心机制在于,人工智能技术进步的多样性在短期和长期中对资本回报率产生不同影响,短期中各类技术进步总是会提高资本回报率,而在长期,不同类型的技术进步对资本回报率的影响出现差异。基于以上结论,本文就我国如何在应用人工智能促进增长的同时预防不平等程度扩大提出了政策建议。     

THE WEALTH DISTRIBUTION WITH DURABLE GOODS*

In the United States, the distribution of houses is less egalitarian than that of earnings for the total population, but these two distributions are remarkably similar for homeowners. Additionally, housing as a fraction of total wealth decreases with the level of wealth. In order to understand the different factors that account for these wealth composition patterns, we introduce illiquid houses and collateral credit in a general equilibrium model of heterogeneous agents with idiosyncratic uncertainty. A combination of very persistent shocks to earnings, frictions in the housing market, and a rental market is necessary to obtain numbers in line with the evidence.     

EDUCATION AND THE NATIONAL WEALTH OF THE UNITED STATES*

Human capital theory has motivated a great many empirical investigations into the relationship between education and earnings potential. These studies test refinements of the theory, but do not attempt to value education for the economy as a whole. This study develops series which track human wealth and its educational components for the United States from 1946 to 1980. Three related educational time sequences emerge: (1) schooling wealth, the present value of the current and future contributions of the existing schooling stock to national income; (2) net change in schooling wealth, the amount added to present value in that year; and (3) schooling investment, the present value of the future contributions of the new schooling conducted in that year. One important lesson of this exercise is that the last two series can be quite different as a result of the pattern of appreciation and depreciation of human wealth over the lifetimes of individuals. Moreover, education increases the age of peak human wealth and thus should shorten the period during which individuals save for retirement. This phenomenon may induce a demographic cycle in the nation's savings rate, especially evidenced with the aging of the baby-boom cohort. The magnitudes of the human and schooling wealth estimates are large when compared to financial wealth. For a 4 percent rate, the period-wide average for human wealth is five times-and schooling wealth 2.6 times-the Federal Reserve Board's measure of household net worth. These estimates are naturally sensitive to the discount rate chosen, but show that the gap between human and financial wealth has been widening and that the value of schooling provided in any year greatly exceeds its cost. Schooling represents a form of saving whose value is several times the conventional measure of saving.     

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AFTER THE COLD WAR

Political scientists and policy‐makers agree that democratic states were less likely to engage each other in militarized disputes than were other states during the Cold War. Most among them attribute this to their domestic political structures. Some, however, believe that the common and conflicting interests that the East–West conflict induced explain the relatively low democratic‐dispute rate. Evidence from the post‐Cold War world can help to arbitrate between these very different claims, as the collapse of the Soviet Union destroyed the bipolar system, precipitated a sharp rise in the number of democracies, and shifted dispute‐rate patterns. The analyses in this paper show that dyadic dispute rates converge after the Cold War, casting doubt on the existence of a democratic peace.