Hedge fund incentives,management commitment and survivorship

Management ownership in hedge funds sends conflicting signals—signals which reduce investors’ perception of survivorship risk. We document that decisions on management ownership are purposely self-selected. Such decisions are most likely motivated by unique incentive mechanisms imbedded in hedge funds. We examine the impact of managerial ownership decisions on fund survivorship risk by accounting for unobserved fund manager motivations that affect both ownership decisions and survivorship risk. Our findings suggest that the conventional argument that having management commitment can reduce survival risk (and therefore align the interests between managers and investors) is significantly overstated. These results are robust to using alternative ownership measures and controlling for different samples.     

Manager wealth concentration,ownership structure,and risk in commercial banks

Of key importance in the governance structure of firms is the role of financial incentives for each major player. The main contribution of this article is an analysis of how an insider's concentration of wealth in his or her bank investment affects incentives to take risk. Major empirical findings are that, first, bank earnings variation falls when bank managers have more of their wealth concentrated in their banks; second, hired-manager banks become less risky when a person who has significant motivation to monitor bank management has his or her wealth highly concentrated in the bank; and third, stock ownership by hired managers can increase total risk of a bank. Further analysis suggests that community banks in our sample control earnings variation by manipulating idiosyncratic risk, credit risk, and leverage but not systematic risk or the loan-to-asset ratio.     

What do mutual fund managers’ private portfolios tell us about their skills?

I study a registry-based dataset of Swedish mutual fund managers’ personal portfolios. The majority of managers do not invest personal wealth into the very same funds they professionally manage. The managers who do invest personal money into their funds subsequently outperform the managers who do not. The results suggest that fund managers, in contrast to regular investors, are certain about their ability to generate an abnormal return, or lack thereof, and invest their personal wealth accordingly.     

Carrot and stick: A role for benchmark-adjusted compensation in active fund management

Investors delegating their wealth to privately informed managers face not only an intrinsic asymmetric information problem but also a potential misalignment in risk preferences. In this setting, we show that by tying fees symmetrically to the appropriate benchmark investors can tilt a fund portfolio toward their optimal risk exposure and realize nearly all the value of managers’ information. They attain these benefits despite an inherent inefficiency in the choice of the benchmark, and at no extra cost of compensating managers for exposure to relative-performance risk. Under certain conditions, benchmark-adjusted performance fees are necessary to prevent passive alternatives from dominating active management. Our results shed light on a recent debate on the appropriate fee structure of active funds in contexts of high competition from passive funds.     

The effect of sovereign wealth funds on corporations: Evidence of cash policies in Singapore

This paper studies the monitoring role of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). By using unique dataset from one of the largest SWF: Temasek holdings, we find that SWF’s presence has a positive effect on cash holdings of portfolio companies. The effect is more pronounced for well-governed firms, indicating that Temasek increases corporate cash holdings through its active role in corporate governance. We further find supportive evidence that Temasek ownership affects cash holdings by hoarding excess cash and reducing capital expenditure, especially within firms with good governance. Temasek’s discerning effect on cash policies highlights the effective monitoring role of sovereign wealth funds.     

Do Family Owners Use Firm Hedging Policy to Hedge Personal Undiversified Wealth Risk?

We examine whether family ownership affects the value impact of the operational and financial dimensions of firms’ hedging policies. We show that family firms’ market valuations are higher than those of non‐family firms, consistent with the view that family firms benefit from family owners’ long‐term perspectives and ability to monitor managers. In addition, while both operational and financial hedging policies per se are valuable in non‐family firms, they do not create any value in family firms. These results support the notion that the founding families’ need to hedge the risk of their undiversified personal wealth portfolio leads to suboptimal risk management decisions.     

AGENCY CONFLICTS IN DELEGATED PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM NAMESAKE MUTUAL FUNDS

Namesake funds provide a unique sample for studying the two agency conflicts that exist within a mutual fund. The first is between the fund management company and fund shareholders, and the second is between the fund management company and the fund manager. A typical namesake fund manager sits on his or her fund's board, frequently as the chairman, is the majority owner of the fund management company, and has significant investments in the fund he or she manages. Our results indicate that namesake funds charge higher fees, suggesting that the boards of namesake funds are less effective. We find that namesake funds are more tax efficient, consistent with the idea that managerial ownership helps align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Because of fewer career concerns, namesake fund managers herd less while assuming greater unsystematic risk. We find weak evidence that namesake fund managers outperform their benchmarks and peers. Finally, we observe that namesake funds attract higher levels of investor cash flow.     

Do Female Mutual Fund Managers Manage Differently?

We examine the performance and investment behavior of female fixed‐income mutual fund managers compared with male fixed‐income mutual fund managers. We find that male‐ and female‐managed funds do not differ significantly in terms of performance, risk, and other fund characteristics. Our results suggest that differences in investment behavior often attributed to gender may be related to investment knowledge and wealth constraints. Despite the similarities between male and female managers, we find evidence that gender influences the decision making of mutual fund investors. We find that the net asset flows into funds managed by females are lower than for males, especially for the manager's initial year managing the fund.     

Capital market pressure,real earnings management,and institutional ownership stability - Evidence from Poland

This study investigates whether and how institutional ownership stability influences real earnings management. We find that institutional investors holding stable equity stakes play an important monitoring role in reducing real earnings management by managers pressured by capital market forces to “meet or beat” earnings targets. We also document no relationship between institutional ownership stability and real earnings management in companies with entrenched managers protected from capital market pressure by a dual-class ownership structure. Our findings of the negative association between real earnings management and institutional ownership stability also indicate that firms with more stable ownership are engaged in lesser sales manipulation and overproduction. In addition, we reveal that pressureresistant institutions (pension funds and mutual funds) that reduce real earnings management are an essential part of the external governance mechanism in an emerging economy.     

Coskewness timing ability in the mutual fund industry

The ability of mutual fund managers to time coskewness successfully can help them manage their portfolio’s exposure to potential losses and improve their fund’s performance. This study assesses whether mutual fund managers are able to manage the market exposure of their investment portfolios given a change in coskewness. We demonstrate that fund managers investing in Small Blend and Small Growth stocks possess the ability to time coskewness. On average, the fund managers of these two investment objectives increase the market exposures of their portfolios about 2.749 % and 1.340 %, respectively, based on their anticipations on future coskewness. Superiority is driven from the fact that the fund managers in small capitalization stocks are successfully able to manage the tail risk of their funds’ portfolios. The fund-by-fund results confirm that the number of individual funds succeeding in timing market skewness of the Small Blend and Small Growth investment objectives is larger than the remaining types. The main findings are robust when controlling for other types of timing ability, the periods of financial turbulence, and the construction of coskewness.     

Termination Risk, Multiple Managers and Mutual Fund Tournaments

This study analyzes the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds in response to their relative performance over the 1992 to 1999 period. Our results show that managers of funds whose performance is closer to that of the top performing funds have greater incentives to increase their portfolios' risk than managers at the top who exhibit a tendency to lock in their positions. The evidence suggests that termination risk imposes a constraint on the risk taking behavior of under-performing fund managers and the winner takes all phenomenon generates a strong incentive for the fund managers to be the top manager. We also analyze the difference in the risk taking behavior of funds managed by multiple managers and single managers.     

The impact of anti-corruption measures and risk effects on equity incentives and financial misreporting in China

This study examines the effects of anti-corruption and equity incentive risk on financial misreporting in the context of China’s unique corporate ownership structure and governance regime. Using a sample comprising 2,708 cases of financial restatement over the 2007–2017 period. Our key findings suggest that managers’ shareholdings are significantly and positively associated with their firms’ financial misreporting, and certain equity risk factors dramatically alter Chinese corporate governance. Furthermore, managers’ motivation to misreport is significantly more pronounced in non–state owned enterprises (non-SOEs), suggesting that equity incentive risk effects mitigate the “absence of ownership” problem believed to affect SOEs. Managers in highly competitive industries and firms with low institutional ownership are found to be highly motivated to misreport performance.     

THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL STOCK OWNERSHIP: A PROMISE UNFULFILLED

Despite the substantial growth of institutional ownership of U.S. corporations in the past 20 years, there is little evidence that institutional investors have acquired the kind of concentrated ownership positions required to be able to play a dominant role in the corporate governance process. Institutional ownership remains widely dispersed among firms and institutions in large part because of significant legal obstacles that discourage institutional investors both from taking large block positions and from exercising large ownership positions to control corporate managers. Thus, although much of the growth of institutional ownership since 1980 has been accounted for by the growth of mutual funds and private pension funds, there continue to be strong deterrents to the accumulation and use of large ownership positions to influence corporate managers. Another potentially important factor discouraging concentrated investments are incentive schemes that effectively reward money managers for producing returns that do not vary much from the S&P 500 (or whatever sector the manager is supposed to be representing). Using a very different incentive scheme that offers managers a share of the excess returns (as well as penalties for failure to meet benchmarks), a relatively new class of “hedge funds” has emerged that provides both more concentrated ownership positions and higher risk‐adjusted rates of return. To encourage mutual funds to take a more activist corporate governance role and to behave more like hedge funds, the authors recommend that current legal restrictions on mutual funds be relaxed so that mutual funds have a greater incentive to hold large ownership positions in companies and to use those positions to more effectively monitor corporate managers. In particular, the “five and ten” portfolio rules applicable to mutual funds could be repealed and replaced with a standard of prudence and diligence more in keeping with portfolio theory; mutual funds could be given greater freedom to adopt redemption policies that would be more conducive to holding larger ownership positions; and institutional investors could be permitted to employ a variety of incentive fee structures to encourage fund managers to pursue more pro‐active investment strategies. The prospect of actively involving institutional fund managers in the corporate governance process may be our best hope for improving U.S. corporate governance.     

Managerial Self-Interest, Pension Financial Slack and Corporate Pension Funding

This paper examines the impact of managerial self-interest on corporate pension funding decisions. It is postulated that managers with no ownership stake in the firm will have incentives to maintain financial slack in the form of excess pension funding. Pension funding slack may be viewed as a managerial perquisite that decreases the probability of necessary future debt financing. Such a strategy may increase the value of undiversified human capital to the detriment of maximizing shareholder wealth. As managerial ownership increases, the incentives to consume such a perquisite will decrease since the interests of managers and shareholders become more aligned. The results presented in this study strongly support this proposition.     

MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP CHANGE AND FIRM VALUE: EVIDENCE FROM DUAL-CLASS RECAPITALIZATIONS AND INSIDER TRADING

We explore the relation between managerial ownership and firm value by examining a sample of firms that announce dual-class recapitalizations and the insider trading activity that precedes these announcements. Insider trading activity, unlike recapitalization, requires managers to commit their personal wealth and therefore serves as an indicator of the motivation behind the recapitalization. The recapitalization, in effect, allows managers to magnify the increase in vote ownership that results from insider buying and offsets the decrease in vote ownership that results from insider selling. This study adds to our understanding of dual-class recapitalizations by linking the wealth effects and changes in ownership concentration with ***manager-shareholder agency issues that follow from recapitalization and insider trading activity. Results show a positive relation between the change in firm value and ownership for recapitalizations before the 1984 New York Stock Exchange moratorium on delisting dual-class firms when ownership was high and control was firmly established. Results show a negative relation for recapitalizations since 1984 when ownership levels were lower and voting control was not assured. These results support the notion that more recent recapitalizations entrench managers.     

Termination Risk, Multiple Managers and Mutual Fund Tournaments

This study analyzes the risk-taking behavior of mutual fundsin response to their relative performance over the 1992 to 1999period. Our results show that managers of funds whose performanceis closer to that of the top performing funds have greater incentivesto increase their portfolios' risk than managers at the topwho exhibit a tendency to lock in their positions. The evidencesuggests that termination risk imposes a constraint on the risktaking behavior of underperforming fund managers and the winnertakes all phenomenon generates a strong incentive for the fundmanagers to be the top manager. We also analyze the differencein the risk taking behavior of funds managed by multiple managersand single managers. JEL Classification codes: G2 L2     

Split Share Structure Reform,corporate governance,and the foreign share discount puzzle in China

We examine the impact of the Split Share Structure Reform on the well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China. Existing literature confirms that foreign investors are more concerned about insider expropriation because of their information disadvantage relative to domestic investors. The split share structure of the ownership of Chinese listed firms created a conflict of interests between state and private shareholders. Since, before the reform, state shareholders held restricted shares that denied them any wealth effect from share price movements, they had a limited incentive to work with private shareholders to ensure that managers maximized the stock market value of the firm. By abolishing the trading restrictions for state shareholders, this reform has increased the incentive alignment between state and private shareholders, encouraging them to monitor managers. If foreign investors’ concerns over the corporate governance implications of the split share structure at least partly contributed to their discounting of Chinese listed firms, then this discount should be reduced following the reform. Indeed, our evidence confirms this prediction, especially among Chinese listed firms with more state ownership or restricted shares. Our findings imply that this significant institutional reform of the Chinese stock market has benefitted minority investors.     

Gender,style diversity,and their effect on fund performance

This paper examines the performance of 358 European diversified equity mutual funds controlling for gender diversity. Fund performance is evaluated against funds’ designated market indices and representative style portfolios. Consistently with previous studies, proper statistical tests point to the absence of significant differences in performance and risk between female and male managed funds. However, perverse market timing manifests itself mainly in female managed funds and in the left tail of the returns distribution. Interestingly, at fund level there is evidence of significant overperformance that survives even after accounting for funds’ exposure to known risk factors. Employing a quantile regression approach reveals that fund performance is highly dependent on the selection of the specific quantile of the returns distribution; also, style consistency for male and female managers manifests itself across different quantiles. These results have important implications for fund management companies and for retail investors’ asset allocation strategies.     

Bank governance,regulation and risk taking

This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and we show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings show that the same regulation has different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.     

Safe but fragile: Information acquisition,liquidity support and redemption runs

This paper proposes a theory of redemption runs based on strategic information acquisition by fund managers. We argue that liquidity lines provided by third parties can be a source of financial fragility, as they incentivize fund managers to acquire private information about the value of their assets. This strategic information acquisition can lead to inefficient market liquidity dry-ups caused by self-fulfilling fears of adverse selection. By lowering asset prices, information acquisition also reduces the value of funds’ assets-under-management and may spur inefficient redemption runs by investors. Two different regimes can arise: one in which funds’ information acquisition incentives are unaffected by the volume of redemptions, and another where market and funding liquidity risk mutually reinforce each other.