Does insiders share pledging stifle innovation? Evidence from China

We examine the relation between insiders share pledging activities for personal loans and firm innovation. Firstly, we find a negative effect of both the existence of pledging and the intensity of pledging activities on firm innovation, measured by R&D and patent application. Pledging by insiders with decision rights is associated with a 4.6% decline in R&D activities and 0.5% decline in patent applications, respectively, which accounts for 4.0% and 10.6% of the mean of each variable. This result holds using a propensity-score matched sample. In addition, we instrument pledging activities by financing constraints faced by other firms controlled by the same controlling insiders who pledge shares. IV estimation yield similar results. Secondly, we find share pledge activities have more pronounced effect on firm innovations when firms are located in areas with strong property rights protection, when firms are non-SOEs, or when pledging insiders serve on corporate boards. Lastly, we also find a negative effect of share pledging of other firms with common shareholders on firm innovations of interest. Overall, our findings suggest that pledging shares by insiders stifle firm innovation because share pledging reduce insiders' preference for risk taking.     

Do disclosures of selective access improve market information acquisition fairness? Evidence from company visits in China

Following an exogenous regulation change in China, we examine the impact of company visit disclosures on the fairness of market information acquisition. Before July 2012, company visits to Chinese listed firms were vaguely disclosed in annual reports long after they were conducted. After that, they were disclosed in detail within two trading days of their completion. Market reactions around visits are much stronger and more predictive of firms' future earnings if visits occurred after July 2012 and, thus, were disclosed in a timelier and more detailed manner. The timely disclosure of visit details also improves the forecast accuracy of non-visiting analysts, reduces forecast dispersion among analysts, and weakens the relative information advantages of visiting analysts. Because of this, visits are more concentrated on firms with poorer information environments, larger sizes, and manufacturing firms after July 2012, i.e., firms offering visitors larger potential benefits. In summary, the timely disclosure of visit details improves the fairness of information acquisition and decreases information asymmetry while causing information chilling effects for firms that provide fewer potential benefits to visitors.     

Does foreign institutional ownership increase return volatility? Evidence from China

This paper investigates the impact of foreign institutional ownership on firm-level stock return volatility in China, based on our study of a sample of 1458 firms between 1998 and 2008. The empirical results show that share ownership by foreign institutions (both financial and non-financial) increases firm-level stock return volatility, even after controlling for a complete ownership structure, firm size, turnover, and leverage, and correcting for potential endogeneity problems. However, the results also show that foreign individual shareholdings reduce volatility. Furthermore, we document a positive relationship between domestic shareholdings (individual, institutional, and governmental) and firm-level stock return volatility. Empirical results with interaction terms show that foreign institutional ownership increases firm-level return volatility by strengthening the positive impact of liquidity on volatility. The volatility reduction effect of foreign individual ownership is attenuated by government ownership suggests a poor governance environment as a result of the involvement of the Chinese government.     

Do star analysts know more firm-specific information? Evidence from China

Using a unique database in China, we extend the literature to further distinguish the information production role of star vs. non-star analysts. We confirm the general conclusion of a positive association between analyst coverage and stock return synchronicity measured by a firm’s R² in China. The findings from star analysts, however, show that star analyst coverage actually decreases stock return synchronicity. We contend that the firm-specific human capital in star analysts helps the analysts overcome the challenges of information production in an emerging market. The superior firm-specific human capital argument of star analysts is further supported by the negative association of star analysts’ firm-specific experiences and stock return synchronicity. Our conclusions are robust to different specifications of star analyst presence and different definitions of analysts’ firm-specific experiences. We also find that star analysts exhibit a more accurate earnings forecast than non-star analysts.     

Do higher value firms voluntarily disclose more information? Evidence from China

This paper examines the effect of guanxi on the relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure of information about new investment projects in China's institutional setting. We find a negative relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure for firms that rely heavily on guanxi in their value creation (e.g. non-high-tech firms, and firms located in regions with underdeveloped institutions). By contrast, for firms that rely less heavily on guanxi and more on other sources of core competencies (e.g. high-tech firms, and firms in high-marketisation regions), we find a positive relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure. The moderating role of guanxi on the relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure is explained by firms conscientiously balancing the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure relative to guanxi. Specifically, high guanxi-dependence firms refrain from detailed voluntary disclosures for fear of revealing sensitive information that may harm their guanxi. In contrast, low guanxi-dependence firms rely more heavily on voluntary disclosures to reduce information asymmetry and financing cost, with such incentives being particularly strong for high value firms. Our evidence has implications for research on motives for disclosure and regulation of financial reporting.     

Does stock market index adjustment affect environmental information disclosure? Evidence from China

This study empirically investigated the effect of adjustment of the China Securities Index 300 (CSI 300) on environmental information disclosure (EID) by index constituents, based on propensity score matching and difference-in-difference approaches. The results showed that the inclusion in the CSI 300 significantly improved the quality of EID by firms. Moreover, this positive impact was more pronounced among firms with lower agency costs and those located in regions with a stronger legal environment. Further testing of the mediating mechanism revealed that becoming an index constituent served to curb opportunistic behavior by managers arising from shortsightedness. Our results were valid after addressing the potential endogeneity between index adjustment and EID and remained unchanged in various other robustness tests. The findings provide support for the positive impact of stock market index adjustment on non-financial information disclosure and have practical implications for decision-making regarding EID in China and other emerging markets.     

How Does Being Public Affect Firm Investment? Further Evidence from China

What role does the stock market play in the allocation of capital? Few studies have examined how being public affects firm investment in emerging markets. This study fills this gap by comparing investment behavior in public and private Chinese firms over the period 2004–2010. We find an overall improved capital allocation of public firms relative to private firms in China. By disentangling the financial constraints effect from the agency effect, we show that public firms are less likely to underinvest when there is cash flow insufficiency and more likely to overinvest when there is free cash flow. We conclude that both effects coexist and that whether or not being public improves investment behavior depends on the net effect of loosening financial constraints and worsening agency conflicts. Further examination shows that financial information plays a limited role in these effects, implying that the association between being public and firm investment may not be attributed to information asymmetry but, rather, institutional arrangement in China.     

How do agency problems affect firm value? – Evidence from China

Using newly available data, we examine the effects of the agency conflicts between ultimate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in China's publicly listed firms between 2004 and 2009. We measure the severity of these agency problems by the excess control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholders. We show that higher excess control rights are associated with significantly lower firm value. We identify two channels through which the excess control rights affect firm value: (1) related-party loan guarantees, and (2) legal violations. We find that higher excess control rights are associated with significantly larger amounts of related-party loan guarantees (scaled by assets) for non-state and private firms, but not for state-owned firms. We find that, for non-state and private firms, the excess controls rights are associated with (1) significantly higher probability that the firm will issue value-destroying related-party loan guarantees and (2) significantly worse stock market reactions to the announcements of related-party loan guarantees. However, these results do not hold for state-owned firms. We also find that higher excess control rights are associated with significantly higher probability, frequency and severity of legal violations for non-state and private firms, but not for state-owned firms.     

Do foreign institutional investors drive corporate social responsibility? Evidence from listed firms in China

This paper investigates the effect of qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) on corporate social responsibility (CSR) within the context of listed firms in China. We find that QFIIs offer an incisive channel for improving socially responsible practices. In addition, we find that firms with QFIIs are more likely to comply with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines, and that their sustainability reports tend to be longer. We also find that this positive effect is more pronounced in firms with low initial CSR scores than those with high CSR scores at the time when QFIIs enter the sample. Our empirical evidence further confirms that this positive impact is driven by QFIIs from countries with high social awareness, or QFIIs from geographically distant countries, consistent with their motives, and is linked to the ownership of QFIIs, especially when the QFII is among the top ten of the largest shareholders. Finally, our extended analysis reveals that the increase in CSR performance associated with the presence of QFIIs results in greater firm performance and easier access to finance.     

How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.     

Do mutual funds have information advantage? Evidence from seasoned equity offerings in China

By integrating the literature on institutional investors with that on seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), this paper investigates the role played by mutual funds around SEO announcements in China. To the extent that shareholdings already held by mutual funds in a firm prior to the firm's SEO issuance represent funds' information advantage, our first finding suggests a positive association between such information advantage and funds' decision to participate in certain SEOs. Second, we find that certain SEO firms that have attracted fund participation at issuance outperform peer firms without fund involvement when performance is proxied for by accounting-based measures. Collectively, our findings are consistent with the notion that mutual funds have an information advantage over other types of investors, and such an advantage would allow them to be able to invest in the “right” SEOs.     

How do institutional investors influence accounting conservatism in China?

Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2015, we find that domestic mutual funds have negative effects while qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) have positive effects on firm accounting conservatism. These effects become stronger when their ownerships are closer to that of the controlling shareholder, respectively. Furthermore, these results are more pronounced when institutional investors are more able to monitor managers and compete with controlling shareholders. Our findings suggest that the influence of institutional investors on accounting conservatism in China is subject to their identities as well as the control contestability against the controlling shareholders.     

State ownership and banks’ information rents: Evidence from China

In a lending relationship, a bank with an information advantage regarding its client tends to hold up the borrower and charge higher interest rates. We conjecture that state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with worse information asymmetry, are subject to greater information rents. State-owned banks place less emphasis on information production and hence extract lower rents compared to profit-maximizing private banks. We use the decline of loan interest rates around the borrowers’ equity initial public offerings (IPOs) as the proxy of banks’ information rents. We find SOEs in China experience larger declines in loan interest rates around their IPOs; the central government-controlled Big Four banks exhibit smaller declines in rates they charge, and their rate declines concentrate on loans made to SOEs.     

How do US investors perceive the risk of local political corruption? Evidence from acquisition announcement

This study examines the impact of local political corruption on investors’ evaluation of firms’ mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the US. Using the number of corruption convictions of government officials reported by the US Department of Justice, we find that acquirers in more corrupt court districts experience lower acquirer announcement returns, lower combined acquirer and target announcement returns, and are less likely to complete acquisitions. We further find that the relation between local political corruption and acquirer announcement returns is worsened when acquirers operate primarily in the headquarters state. Overall, the results suggest that local political corruption has an adverse impact on investors’ evaluation of a firm’s M&A profitability.     

Is less information better information? Evidence from the credit rating withdrawal

This paper examines the stock market reaction to two different types of credit rating withdrawals by Moody’s. The first type of withdrawal occurs when a firm stops being rated. This happens, for example, when firms choose to no longer pay for a rating. We find that the stock market reaction depends on the information which remains available. The second type of withdrawal is due to Moody’s policy of removing the issuer rating and keeping the corporate family rating for the same firm. The corporate family rating is usually more favorable than the issuer rating. The paper shows that the removal of the issuer rating leads to positive stock market reaction. We conclude that lower disclosure of rating information is not necessarily associated with higher cost of equity. Instead, our findings emphasize the incentive for firms to engage in ratings shopping by publishing only the most favourable ratings.     

How does greater bank competition affect borrower screening? Evidence from China's WTO entry

We analyze the relationship between greater bank competition and the screening of potential borrowers. Using a large sample of Chinese private firms and China's entry into the WTO as a unique setting leading to greater bank competition, we find the following. First, the sensitivity of bank credit to prior borrowing-firm performance increases after China's WTO entry. This sensitivity increase is greater in more bank-dependent industries and smaller in Chinese regions with greater financial sector development. Second, the increase in the sensitivity of bank credit to firm performance is much greater for state-owned firms compared to private firms. Third, the effect of bank credit on subsequent firm productivity and performance is greater for loans given after China's WTO entry compared to those given prior to WTO entry. Overall, the results of our empirical analysis suggest that the stringency of bank screening of borrowers in China increased with greater banking sector competition.     

How Do Various Forms of Auditor Rotation Affect Audit Quality? Evidence from China

The Enron/Arthur Andersen scandal has raised concerns internationally about auditor independence, audit quality, and the need for regulatory action such as mandatory auditor rotation. China's unique institutional features provide a setting in which we can compare comprehensively the various forms of auditor rotation at different levels (partner vs. firm) and in different settings (voluntary vs. mandatory). In addition, institutional conditions vary dramatically across China, which provides us with an opportunity to test whether the development of market and legal institutions affects the impact of rotation on audit quality. We expect that auditors are less (more) constrained by market forces and less (more) self-disciplined to maintain audit quality in regions with less (more) developed market and legal institutions. Therefore, mandatory rotation may play a more (less) important role in less (more) developed regions. Using auditors' propensity to issue a modified audit opinion (MAO) as a proxy for audit quality, we find that firms with mandatory audit partner rotations are associated with a significantly higher likelihood of an MAO than are no-rotation firms. However, this effect is restricted to firms located in less developed regions. We find similar evidence for voluntary audit firm rotation although the significance level is much weaker than for mandatory partner rotation. Other forms of auditor rotations (i.e., mandatory audit firm rotation and voluntary audit partner rotation), have no effect on MAOs.     

Do dividends signal safety? Evidence from China

Our paper examines whether dividends convey information about future cash-flow volatility in the Chinese stock markets. We observe that dividend changes are followed by cash-flow-volatility changes in the opposite direction. Taking advantage of the unique context of China, we show, in both the two-way sorting analysis and the regression analysis, that the strong relation between changes in dividend and cash-flow volatility is robust after controlling for potential confounders, including firm-level financial market frictions, macroeconomic and market conditions, and government intervention in firms' decision-making, and holds after we control for endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, we perform the theoretic mechanism tests of the relation and present supporting evidence on the signaling theory under the setting of asymmetric information, instead of the free cash flow theory based on the assumption of agency conflict. This study enriches our understanding of the source and nature of cash-flow information contained in dividends.     

How Do Institutional Investors Affect Corporate Performance? Evidence from Private Placements in China

Using data on private placements in China from 2007 to 2014, we show that abnormal returns of issuing companies’ stocks are significantly positive on the announcement day, but they become significantly negative during the event window [?20, +20]. Participation by institutional investors has a significant and negative impact on the short-term stock returns. This negative effect is also present in issuing companies’ long-term stock returns and profitability. Furthermore, we find that participation by institutional investors reduces dividend payments after private placements. Overall, our findings do not support the monitoring hypothesis of institutional investors’ role in corporate finance but are consistent with the management entrenchment hypothesis and shareholder pessimism hypothesis.     

Does institutional ownership increase stock return volatility? Evidence from Vietnam

The literature on institutional ownership and stock return volatility often ignores small emerging countries. However, this issue is more profound, due to the large size of institutional investors and small stock market size, in emerging equity markets. This paper examines the effects of the institutional ownership on the firm-level volatility of stock returns in Vietnam. Our data cover most of non-financial firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh City stock exchange for the period 2006–2012. Employing different analysis techniques for panel data and controlling for possible endogeneity problems, our empirical results suggest that institutional investors stabilize the stock return volatility. Moreover, we document that: i) the stabilizing effect of institutional investor ownership is higher in dividend paying firms, and ii) if firms are paying out more dividends, this stabilizing effect is greater. Our results outline the important role of institutional investors in maintaining the stability in emerging stock markets.