Does ESG matter to investors? ESG scores and the stock price response to new information

We examine how a third-party assessment of a firm's relative ESG attractiveness affects investor demand for the firm's equity in the presence of new information. Utilizing an event-study methodology, with credit-rating change events as proxies for new positive and negative information, we find evidence supporting a high ESG score as a significant factor in determining how investors respond to new positive information. Specifically, after controlling for relevant fixed effects, we find that the highest quartile of ESG scores amplifies the positive stock-price reaction to credit-rating upgrades by 130 basis points, providing evidence of confirmation bias.     

Do Delaware CEOs get fired?

Critics have charged that state competition in corporate law, which Delaware dominates, leads to a “race to the bottom” making management unaccountable. We argue that Delaware corporate law attracts firms with particular financial and governance characteristics. We find that Delaware attracts growth firms in industries with more takeover activity. Delaware firms have smaller boards, and their directors are paid more and serve on more boards. In addition, Delaware firms attract greater institutional ownership. We also provide a bottom-line test of the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis by examining forced CEO turnover. After controlling for differences in firm characteristics, we find that firms incorporated in Delaware are more likely to terminate CEOs. We also find that that termination decision is less sensitive to poor performance. Overall, we see no clear pattern supporting the “race to the bottom” hypothesis.     

Do government preferences matter for tax competition?

This paper explores how government preferences affect capital tax decisions of a country. We develop a model in which governments, differentiating in their preferences for economic development and income equality, compete for mobile capital over corporation taxes. The key prediction of the model, borne out in data from OECD countries over the years 1990–2012, is that an increase in government preferences for pursuing economic development relative to income equality makes countries’ horizontal tax reactions stronger. Unlike the existing studies, our result contributes to the tax competition literature by highlighting the importance of government preferences in determining the extent of tax competition among countries and so offering a novel explanation for the widely observed heterogeneous tax policies across countries.     

Do CEOs Matter? Evidence from Hospitalization Events

Using variation in firms’ exposure to their CEOs resulting from hospitalization, we estimate the effect of chief executive officers (CEOs) on firm policies, holding firm-CEO matches constant. We document three main findings. First, CEOs have a significant effect on profitability and investment. Second, CEO effects are larger for younger CEOs, in growing and family-controlled firms, and in human-capital-intensive industries. Third, CEOs are unique: the hospitalization of other senior executives does not have similar effects on the performance. Overall, our findings demonstrate that CEOs are a key driver of firm performance, which suggests that CEO contingency plans are valuable.     

Do idiosyncratic jumps matter?

We show that idiosyncratic jumps are a key determinant of mean stock returns from both an ex post and ex ante perspective. Ex post, the entire annual average return of a typical stock accrues on the four days on which its price jumps. Ex ante, idiosyncratic jump risk earns a premium: a value-weighted weekly long-short portfolio that buys (sells) stocks with high (low) predicted jump probabilities earns annualized mean returns of 9.4% and four-factor alphas of 8.1%. This strategy’s returns are larger when there are greater limits to arbitrage. These results are consistent with investor aversion to idiosyncratic jump risk.     

The quest for non-resource-based FDI: Do taxes matter?

Using manufacturing and services firm-level data for 30 African countries, we show that taxation is not a significant driver for the location of foreign firms in Africa, while other investment climate factors, such as infrastructure, human capital, and institutions, are. By analysing disaggregated foreign direct investment (FDI) data, we establish that, while there is considerable contrast in behaviour between vertical FDI and horizontal FDI, taxation is not a key determinant for either type of FDI. Horizontal FDI is affected more by financing and human capital constraints, and less by infrastructure and institutional constraints, than is vertical FDI.     

Do ESG funds make stakeholder-friendly investments?

Review of Accounting Studies - Investment funds that claim to focus on socially responsible stocks have proliferated in recent times. In this paper, we verify whether ESG mutual funds actually...     

Do policies and institutions matter for pre-tax income inequality? Cross-country evidence

International Tax and Public Finance - Do policies and institutions matter for pre-tax income inequality? I build an annual panel of 43 countries for the period 1980–2016 to document...     

Board diversity reforms: Do they matter for EU bank performance?

We examine the impact of governance reforms related to board diversity on the performance of European Union banks. Using a difference‐in‐difference approach, we document that reforms increase bank stock returns and their volatility within the first 3 years after their enactment. The type of reform matters, with quotas increasing return volatility. The effectiveness of reforms depends on a country's institutional environment. The impact of reforms on return volatility is found to be beneficial in countries more open to diversity, with common law system and with greater economic freedom. Finally, reforms play a bigger role in banks that have ex ante less heterogeneous boards.     

Do corporate governance mechanisms matter for cash holdings and firm value?

This paper examines the relationships between firm-level corporate governance mechanisms and cash holdings; along with their combined effects on firm value for a sample of firms listed in Singapore and Malaysia. Firms with less effective governance attributes are found to be more inclined to accumulate cash than those with more effective governance. The results support the flexibility hypothesis in that an increase in agency conflicts between managers and minority shareholders leads to entrenched managers having more discretion to hoard cash reserves. In addition, the incremental value of holding excess cash is shown to be negative for firms with a single leadership structure, firms with a pyramidal ownership structure, as well as family-controlled firms. The discounts associated with these firms may reflect investors’ recognition of the possibility of managerial entrenchment.     

Do Muslim CEOs and Muslim stakeholders prefer Islamic debt financing?

This study examines the relationship between religiosity and Islamic debt financing based on Malaysian non-financial listed firms from 2012 to 2018. We find that Muslim CEOs allocate more Islamic financing in their debt financing compared to non-Muslim CEOs, which support the upper echelons theory. However, we find that the sociological pressure from Muslim Stakeholders display no significant effect on Islamic financing. Interestingly, we further find that Islamic debt financing will incline no matter whether the Muslim population is high or low if the CEO was a Muslim. This implies that our findings support the upper echelon theory, but not the stakeholder orientation theory.     

Spillover of stock price crash risk: Do environmental,social and governance (ESG) matter?

This study measures the static and dynamic crash risk connections across ESG networks from 2015 to 2020, using the generalized vector autoregressive framework. In particular, it highlights the mixed results of the crash risk connections across ESG three pillars and the different spillover performance when firms with different ownership structures and qualification of margin-trading and short-selling. Our results reveal that stocks with higher ESG ratings display more negative net spillover effects, which is consistent with the ideas that stock groups with good ESG performance experience lower crash risk, and thus transmitting smaller crash risk to other ESG levels. Among the three ESG pillars, good social performance (S) significantly lowers the total crash risk connections. In contrast, firms with well environment performance (E) do not transmit lower crash risk. Moreover, SOEs and firms with qualification of margin-trading and short-selling have lower total crash risk connections among ESG ratings. Using propensity score matching to match companies with high ESG and low ESG quarterly, we find the results are still robust. When dividing the sample according to the outbreak of COVID-19, we find the crash risk connections across ESG networks are stronger during crisis.     

Do CEOs gain more in foreign acquisitions than domestic acquisitions?

This paper examines the impact of domestic and foreign acquisitions on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation packages using a sample of 147 completed bids by UK companies from 1999 to 2005. We find that foreign acquisitions lead to higher CEO compensation than domestic acquisitions. Overall, our findings suggest that CEOs have strong incentives to do foreign acquisitions rather than domestic acquisitions since they receive larger compensation following a foreign acquisition regardless of how poor firm performance is. Furthermore, we observe a positive and significant relation between CEO compensation and firm size during the pre-acquisition period for firms involved in foreign acquisitions, thus their CEOs would expect to increase their compensation package through foreign acquisitions. However, our results show that there is no significant link between firm size and CEO compensation during the pre-acquisition period for firms involved in domestic acquisitions.     

Do regulatory policies matter to corporate innovation?

This paper examines the relationship between regulation and innovation from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. The theoretical model focuses on the role of competition policy (measured by increases in the number of firms) and the strength of intellectual property rights in fostering cost-reducing R&D, under both R&D competition and R&D cooperation. It is shown that, theoretically, competition policy and intellectual property rights are complements under R&D competition, while they are substitutes under R&D cooperation. Moreover, under R&D competition, innovation is maximized through strict competition policy and strong intellectual property rights; whereas under R&D cooperation, innovation is maximized through strict competition policy and weak intellectual property rights. The empirical model tests the effect of several regulatory policies on innovation in several MENA countries. The results of dynamic panel data regressions point that competition policy and intellectual property rights are complements. In addition to competition policy and intellectual property rights protection, the following country/regulation characteristics are considered: human capital, government efficiency, foreign direct investment, natural resources dependence, labor market regulations, and GDP level. The paper finds that the extent of regulations in all categories has statistically significant effects on R&D, except FDI. One explanation is that most FDI to the MENA region flows to natural resources and non-tradable sectors, which are less relevant to R&D than other sectors (e.g., manufacturing and information and communications technology sectors).     

Do security breaches matter? The shareholder puzzle

This article analyzes the effect of computer breaches on publicly traded equities from 2005 to 2017. An event study is performed and breaches analyzed conditioned on whether the breach announcement has been made in the mainstream media or through other channels. We find that in the period prior to the announcement date in the media, the mean abnormal return is negative, reflecting a likely leakage of information. In the period following the announcement date, the mean abnormal return is positive, often more than offsetting the previous declines. The findings have important implications for analysts, portfolio managers, institutional investors, and regulators.     

Do dividends matter more in declining markets?

We find dividends do matter to shareholders, but more in declining markets than advancing ones. Dividend-paying stocks outperform non-dividend-paying stocks by 1 to 2% more per month in declining markets than in advancing markets. These results are economically and statistically significant and robust to many risk adjustments and across industries. In addition, we find an asymmetric response to dividend changes based on market conditions: dividend increases matter more in declining markets than advancing ones. Tests indicate that results are not due to more profitable firms and appear not to be caused either by free cash flow or signaling explanations. We also find that it is the existence of dividends, and not the dividend yield, that drives returns' asymmetric behavior relative to market movements.     

Are CEOs compensated for value destroying growth in earnings?

Prior research shows that firms generating earnings growth by improving profitability create shareholder value, while firms generating earnings growth through investment destroy value. This paper examines whether compensation committees consider this while determining CEO compensation. We first confirm prior results that growth from increased profitability is perceived by markets to add value while growth from investment does not. While growth from increased profitability is positively associated with compensation, so is growth from investment. The presence of institutional ownership increases the weight on growth from increased profitability, but does not reduce the weight on growth from investment. Further, value-oriented institutional ownership increases the sensitivity of compensation growth to growth from increased profitability and reduces the sensitivity to growth from investment. Contrarily, growth-oriented institutional ownership increases the sensitivity of compensation growth to growth from investment. Our results highlight the importance of understanding the nature of earnings growth in determining executive compensation.     

Zero leverage puzzle: Do labour laws matter?

Exploiting the staggered passage of labour protection laws in the United States, we find that higher labour adjustment costs increased the likelihood of observing zero leverage firms by 22%. This effect is significantly larger in states with stronger unionization, in industries with higher volatility and concentration, and in firms with higher labour intensity. Both within-firm changes in debt policies and higher propensity of newer firms to be debt-free are important in explaining these patterns. Overall, our work contributes to the literature on the relation between financial and labour markets by highlighting the role of labour laws in explaining the zero-leverage puzzle.     

Do younger CEOs really increase firm risk? Evidence from sudden CEO deaths

This study uses sudden deaths of CEOs to provide causal evidence on the relation between CEO age and firm risk. I find that CEO age negatively influences firm risk, measured by stock return volatility, but has no effect on policy choices related to risk taking. These findings contrast prior studies, and suggest that the higher volatility is caused by uncertainty about the younger replacement CEOs' contribution to firm value, rather than changes to risk-related corporate policies.