Bank liabilities channel

The financial intermediation sector is important not only for channeling resources from agents in excess of funds to agents in need of funds (lending channel). By issuing liabilities it also creates financial assets held by other sectors of the economy for insurance or liquidity purpose. When the intermediation sector creates less liabilities or their value falls, agents are less willing to engage in activities that are individually risky but desirable in aggregate (bank liabilities channel). The paper shows how financial crises driven by self-fulfilling expectations about the liquidity of the banking sector are transmitted to the real sector of the economy. Since the government could also create financial assets by borrowing, the paper analyzes how public debt affects the issuance of liabilities by the financial intermediation sector.     

Bank Liquidity Creation and Risk‐Taking: Does Managerial Ability Matter?

This study investigates the impact of managerial ability on banks' liquidity creation and risk‐taking behavior. We find that higher ability managers create more liquidity and take more risk. During times of financial crisis, however, higher ability bank managers reduce liquidity creation as a way to de‐leverage their balance sheets. Our findings inform recent theoretical and empirical studies that investigate determinants of liquidity creation and risk by introducing managerial ability as a prominent antecedent of the banks' intermediation and risk‐transforming service. Moreover, this study has policy‐related implications, since managerial ability can be quantified as a key performance indicator for prudential supervision of banks and could help regulators to target intervention efforts more purposefully during times of crisis.     

The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed Intermediation

I show that when an issuer has superior information about thevalue of its assets, it is better off selling assets separatelyrather than as a pool due to the information destruction effectof pooling. If, however, the issuer can create a derivativesecurity that is collateralized by the assets, pooling and "tranching"may be optimal. If the residual risk of each asset is not highlycorrelated, tranching allows the issuer to exploit the riskdiversification effect of pooling to create a low-risk and highlyliquid security. In contrast, for an uninformed seller, purepooling reduces underpricing and is preferred to separate assetsales. These results lead to a dynamic model of financial intermediation:originators sell pools of assets, some of which are purchasedby informed intermediaries who then further pool and tranchethem. Pooling and tranching allow intermediaries to leveragetheir capital more efficiently, enhancing the returns to theirprivate information.     

Flight to liquidity and the Great Recession

This paper argues that counter-cyclical liquidity hoarding by financial intermediaries may strongly amplify business cycles. It develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which banks operate subject to agency problems and funding liquidity risk in their intermediation activity. Importantly, the amount of liquidity reserves held in the financial sector is determined endogenously: Balance sheet constraints force banks to trade off insurance against funding outflows with loan scale. A financial crisis, simulated as an abrupt decline in the collateral value of bank assets, triggers a flight to liquidity, which strongly amplifies the initial shock and induces credit crunch dynamics sharing key features with the Great Recession. The paper thus develops a new balance sheet channel of shock transmission that works through the composition of banks’ asset portfolios.     

A model of unconventional monetary policy

We develop a quantitative monetary DSGE model with financial intermediaries that face endogenously determined balance sheet constraints. We then use the model to evaluate the effects of the central bank using unconventional monetary policy to combat a simulated financial crisis. We interpret unconventional monetary policy as expanding central bank credit intermediation to offset a disruption of private financial intermediation. Within our framework the central bank is less efficient than private intermediaries at making loans but it has the advantage of being able to elastically obtain funds by issuing riskless government debt. Unlike private intermediaries, it is not balance sheet constrained. During a crisis, the balance sheet constraints on private intermediaries tighten, raising the net benefits from central bank intermediation. These benefits may be substantial even if the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate is not binding. In the event this constraint is binding, though, these net benefits may be significantly enhanced.     

Financial intermediation and the supply of liquidity

I study the role of financial intermediaries in supplying liquidity to the real economy. Firms hold liquid assets to meet unanticipated expenses. Financial intermediaries supply liquidity by pooling partially liquid assets, but their ability to commit future funds depends on their capital. When liquidity is scarce, there is a positive liquidity premium and investment is inefficiently low. Bank losses raise the liquidity premium and reduce investment. I analyze the optimal supply of public liquidity and find that when private liquidity is scarce the government should issue bonds for their liquidity properties, providing justification for countercyclical budget deficits.     

Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability

We develop a macroeconomic model in which commercial banks can offload risky loans to a “shadow” banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. The model can account both for the business cycle comovement between output, traditional bank, and shadow bank credit, and for the behavior of macroeconomic variables in a liquidity crisis centered on shadow banks. We find that following a liquidity shock, stabilization policy aimed solely at the market in securitized assets is relatively ineffective.     

On reaching for yield and the coexistence of bubbles and negative bubbles

We develop a model of financial intermediation wherein bank managers “reach for yield” – by overinvesting in risky assets and underinvesting in safer assets – provided they do not face much cost from liquidity shortfalls. The managers follow a pecking order in which their first preference is to invest in risky assets; their second preference is to hoard liquid assets; and their last preference is to invest in safer assets. This behavior is conducive to the formation of bubbles and “negative” bubbles in the market for risky and safer assets, respectively. Monetary loosening, by reducing the cost of liquidity shortfalls, induces further reach for yield and amplifies the bubbles.     

Do stress tests affect bank liquidity creation?

We examine the impact of Federal Reserve stress tests from 2009 to 2016 on U.S. bank liquidity creation. Empirical results show that regulatory stress tests have a negative effect on both on-and off-balance sheet bank liquidity creation and asset-side liquidity creation. As banks enter the stress tests, they reduce their liquidity creation to avoid failing the stress tests. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks manage their risk exposures to meet higher capital requirements. The negative effect of stress testing on liquidity creation continues to persist in the quarters after the stress tests. Finally, stress test banks appear to increase liability-side liquidity creation. These findings highlight that the enhanced financial stability from greater regulatory scrutiny may be achieved at the expense of financial intermediation.     

A lost century in economics: Three theories of banking and the conclusive evidence

How do banks operate and where does the money supply come from? The financial crisis has heightened awareness that these questions have been unduly neglected by many researchers. During the past century, three different theories of banking were dominant at different times: (1) The currently prevalent financial intermediation theory of banking says that banks collect deposits and then lend these out, just like other non-bank financial intermediaries. (2) The older fractional reserve theory of banking says that each individual bank is a financial intermediary without the power to create money, but the banking system collectively is able to create money through the process of ‘multiple deposit expansion’ (the ‘money multiplier’). (3) The credit creation theory of banking, predominant a century ago, does not consider banks as financial intermediaries that gather deposits to lend out, but instead argues that each individual bank creates credit and money newly when granting a bank loan. The theories differ in their accounting treatment of bank lending as well as in their policy implications. Since according to the dominant financial intermediation theory banks are virtually identical with other non-bank financial intermediaries, they are not usually included in the economic models used in economics or by central bankers. Moreover, the theory of banks as intermediaries provides the rationale for capital adequacy-based bank regulation. Should this theory not be correct, currently prevailing economics modelling and policy-making would be without empirical foundation. Despite the importance of this question, so far only one empirical test of the three theories has been reported in learned journals. This paper presents a second empirical test, using an alternative methodology, which allows control for all other factors. The financial intermediation and the fractional reserve theories of banking are rejected by the evidence. This finding throws doubt on the rationale for regulating bank capital adequacy to avoid banking crises, as the case study of Credit Suisse during the crisis illustrates. The finding indicates that advice to encourage developing countries to borrow from abroad is misguided. The question is considered why the economics profession has failed over most of the past century to make any progress concerning knowledge of the monetary system, and why it instead moved ever further away from the truth as already recognised by the credit creation theory well over a century ago. The role of conflicts of interest and interested parties in shaping the current bank-free academic consensus is discussed. A number of avenues for needed further research are indicated.     

Banking and commerce: A liquidity approach

This paper looks at the advantages and disadvantages of mixing banking and commerce, using the “liquidity” approach to financial intermediation. Bringing a nonfinancial firm into a banking conglomerate may be advantageous because it makes it easier for the bank to dispose of assets seized in a loan default. The conglomerate's internal market increases the liquidity of such assets and improves the bank's ability to perform financial intermediation. More generally, owning a nonfinancial firm may act either as a substitute or a complement to commercial lending. In some cases, a bank will voluntarily refrain from making loans, choosing to become a non-bank bank in an unregulated environment.     

Capital markets,financial intermediaries,and liquidity supply

We study a dynamic economy endowed with a sequence of overlapping generations of consumers and production processes, and where productive assets are illiquid and consumption preferences are subject to uninsurable demand for liquidity. We characterize the steady states that can be achieved with alternative financial systems. We show that infinitely lived financial intermediaries offering a liability with age-dependent restrictions may implement a social optimum with full insurance. If, instead, they offer anonymous, unrestricted contracts, then only second-best consumption allocations with partial insurance obtain. We also examine the consumption allocations available when agents can trade shares in competitive stock markets. While allowing for trade across generations may or may not improve upon generational autarky, we show that this competitive equilibrium is not a social optimum, and is dominated by a system of infinitely lived, unrestricted intermediaries.     

ESG投资能够促进银行创造流动性吗?——兼论经济政策不确定性的调节效应

当前在我国致力于实现“碳达峰、碳中和”目标的大背景下,银行能否通过ESG投资促进流动性创造,进而推动高质量发展具有重大战略意义。本文利用2009年第一季度至2020年第二季度中国36家上市银行的面板数据,实证分析ESG投资对银行流动性创造的影响,并将其置于经济政策不确定性条件下予以讨论。研究发现:第一,ESG投资整体上促进流动性创造,表现为对资产端和负债端流动性创造的促进作用,以及对表外流动性创造的抑制作用。从ESG投资结构看,环境保护投资和社会责任投资均抑制流动性创造,而公司治理投资则促进流动性创造。异质性分析表明,地方性银行和资本短缺银行的ESG投资对流动性创造具有更强的促进作用。第二,中介机制分析发现,ESG投资主要通过“盈利”和“风险”渠道促进流动性创造。第三,在经济政策不确定性上升时期,ESG投资对流动性创造的促进作用更加显著。从ESG投资分项看,经济政策不确定性会增强环境保护投资和社会责任投资对流动性创造的抑制作用,以及公司治理投资对流动性创造的促进作用。本文结论为充分发挥ESG投资作用并以此推动高质量发展提供了政策启示。     

The international division of assets as determined by comparative advantage

By developing a diagrammatical 2 x 2 model of international asset diversificationm the paper undertakes to build a bridge between trade theory and international finance. The firms' production possibilities for assets are derived from the manager's risk preferences. Asset demand is derived from risk preferences of households. Financial intermediaries modify asset supply by transforming one type of asset into another. It is shown how the resulting composition of international gross assets and liabilities, within a given net indebtedness, is affected by changes in risk preferences and in the efficiency of intermediation.     

Liquidity, Transaction Costs, and Reintermediation in Electronic Markets

Relationships between trading cost, technology, and the nature of intermediation in the trading services industry are discussed. Electronic markets are linked to reductions in trading costs. Lower explicit costs are related to system development and operating costs. Electronic order book information is identified as a means of realizing implicit cost savings. The concept of liquidity management in electronic environments is introduced, and its potential is empirically illustrated. The empirical results suggest new roles for brokerage and exchange operations, and competition between the two. Competitive advantage with respect to the provision of liquidity management services is compared across types of intermediaries.     

Valuation,Capital Structure,and Shareholder Unanimity for Depository Financial Intermediaries

The theory of corporate finance is not directly applicable to financial intermediary decision-making. The lack of applicability stems largely from the particular conditions that distinguish intermediary operations from those of the nonfinancial firm. First, when intermediaries accept deposit financing, they must produce services such as liquidity and convenience at considerable expense for real resources. Second, the introduction of intermediation is likely to be accompanied by incomplete markets so that shareholder unanimity is not in general valid. In this paper, a model with incomplete markets is developed and a shareholder approved rule for intermediary capital structure decisions is derived.     

Can banks individually create money out of nothing? — The theories and the empirical evidence

This paper presents the first empirical evidence in the history of banking on the question of whether banks can create money out of nothing. The banking crisis has revived interest in this issue, but it had remained unsettled. Three hypotheses are recognised in the literature. According to the financial intermediation theory of banking, banks are merely intermediaries like other non-bank financial institutions, collecting deposits that are then lent out. According to the fractional reserve theory of banking, individual banks are mere financial intermediaries that cannot create money, but collectively they end up creating money through systemic interaction. A third theory maintains that each individual bank has the power to create money ‘out of nothing’ and does so when it extends credit (the credit creation theory of banking). The question which of the theories is correct has far-reaching implications for research and policy. Surprisingly, despite the longstanding controversy, until now no empirical study has tested the theories. This is the contribution of the present paper. An empirical test is conducted, whereby money is borrowed from a cooperating bank, while its internal records are being monitored, to establish whether in the process of making the loan available to the borrower, the bank transfers these funds from other accounts within or outside the bank, or whether they are newly created. This study establishes for the first time empirically that banks individually create money out of nothing. The money supply is created as ‘fairy dust’ produced by the banks individually, "out of thin air".     

Banking fragility and liquidity creation: options as a substitute for deposits

Diamond and Rajan (J Finance 55:2431–2465, 2000; Am Econ Rev Papers Proc 91:422–425, 2001a; Carnegie–Rochester Conf Series Public Policy 54:37–71, 2001b; J Pol Econ 109:287–327, 2001c) have shown in a series of papers that it is precisely the fragility of their capital structure which allows banks to create liquidity. This is because the threat of runs by depositors forces bankers to extract full repayment on otherwise illiquid assets. This result has important implications for financial regulation, such as for capital requirements and deposit insurance. This note shows that put options held by bank owners dominate deposit financing in that they also discipline bankers but do not give rise to inefficient runs. Fragility is thus not necessary for liquidity creation in the Diamond–Rajan framework. This paper has substantially benefitted from the comments and suggestions of an anonymous referee.     

Intermediation and the equilibrium allocation of investment capital : Implications for economic development

We investigate several common assertions about intermediation and how it affects the allocation of investment capital. We use a model with adverse selection and costly state verification in which both debt contracts and credit rationing are observed. Intermediaries arise due to a comparative advantage in information acquisition. Relative to the situation absent intermediation, intermediaries reduce credit rationing and (inefficient) interest rate differentials. The model also shows how large interest rate differentials can be observed when financial markets are not integrated and how the volume of intermediation is affected by changes in the environment.     

On the Positive Role of Financial Intermediation in Allocation of Venture Capital in a Market with Imperfect Information

This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation that highlights the contribution of intermediaries as informed agents in a market with imperfect information. We consider a venture capital market where the entrepreneurs select the qualities of projects and their perquisite consumptions, about which the investors are imperfectly informed. It is shown that when all investors have positive search costs, the entrepreneurs are induced to offer the unacceptable inferior projects (“lemons” only), and the investors will not enter the venture capital market, but put their funds in other low return investments–an undesirable allocation of resources. Beginning with an initial undesirable situation, the financial intermediaries may evolve as informed agents that induce a Pareto-preferred allocation, leading the investors to a higher welfare state. We focus our analysis on the existence of intermediation equilibra when the market for intermediation services is competitive. The distribution of returns on projects, the fees charged by intermediaries, and the fraction of institutional holdings are all endogenous in equilibrium. It is shown that (i) there cannot be a competitive intermediation equilibrium with very high institutional holdings, and (ii) in other cases multiple equilibra may exist, but the one with the highest institutional holdings dominates the others in a Pareto sense.