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1.
影子银行体系具有特殊的形成机理,是金融抑制制度背景下的博弈产物。目前,影子银行体系在金融市场上以证券化的方式创造流动性,容易在短期内出现从流动性过剩到流动性紧缩的转变,造成宏观经济的不稳定,需要作出必要的监管安排。 相似文献
2.
The broad economic damage of the COVID-19 pandemic poses the first major test of the bank regulatory reforms put in place after the Global Financial Crisis. Our study assesses the U.S. regulatory framework, with an emphasis on capital and liquidity requirements. Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, banks were well capitalized and held ample liquid assets, which partly reflects enhanced requirements. The overall robust capital and liquidity levels resulted in a resilient banking system, which maintained lending and market making through the early stages of the pandemic. Trading activity was a source of strength for banks, reflecting in part a prudent regulatory approach. That said, leverage requirements are associated with more repo position netting by banks, with potential implications for market making. 相似文献
3.
The Basel III accord reacts to the events of the recent financial crisis with a combination of revised micro- and new macroprudential regulatory instruments to address various dimensions of systemic risk. This approach of cumulating requirements bears the risk of individual measures negating or even conflicting with each other which might lessen their desired effects on financial stability. We provide an analysis of the impact of Basel III’s main components on financial stability in a stock-flow consistent agent-based computational economic model. We find that the positive joint impact of the microprudential instruments is considerably larger than the sum of the individual contributions to stability, i.e. the standalone impacts are non-additive. However, except for the buffers, the macroprudential overlay’s impact is either marginal or even destabilizing. Despite its simplicity, the leverage ratio performs poorly, especially when associated drawbacks are explicitly taken into account. Surcharges on SIBs seem to rather contribute to financial regulations complexity than to the resilience of the system. 相似文献
4.
Wolf Wagner 《Annals of Finance》2009,5(1):125-129
Diamond and Rajan (J Finance 55:2431–2465, 2000; Am Econ Rev Papers Proc 91:422–425, 2001a; Carnegie–Rochester Conf Series
Public Policy 54:37–71, 2001b; J Pol Econ 109:287–327, 2001c) have shown in a series of papers that it is precisely the fragility
of their capital structure which allows banks to create liquidity. This is because the threat of runs by depositors forces
bankers to extract full repayment on otherwise illiquid assets. This result has important implications for financial regulation,
such as for capital requirements and deposit insurance. This note shows that put options held by bank owners dominate deposit
financing in that they also discipline bankers but do not give rise to inefficient runs. Fragility is thus not necessary for
liquidity creation in the Diamond–Rajan framework.
This paper has substantially benefitted from the comments and suggestions of an anonymous referee. 相似文献
5.
Theoretically, one rationale for central clearing counterparties is the mitigation of inefficiencies associated with distressed asset sales. With novel archival data, I empirically study the first event in economic history during which a CCP successfully played this role: the global wool crisis of 1900. In the leading wool futures market in France, an inefficient equilibrium with fire sales and cascading defaults could be avoided due to price support provided by surviving CCP members. Cooperation to achieve price support–which is nowadays the main element of CCP auctions–could arise due to family relationships and cultural proximity between traders. 相似文献
6.
This paper examines the interplay among bank liquidity creation (which incorporates all bank on- and off-balance sheet activities), monetary policy, and financial crises. We find that: (1) high liquidity creation (relative to trend) – particularly off-balance sheet liquidity creation – helps predict crises, controlling for other factors; (2) monetary policy has statistically significant, but economically minor effects on liquidity creation by small banks during normal times, and these effects are even weaker during financial crises; (3) monetary policy has very little effects on medium and large bank liquidity creation during both normal times and crises. These findings suggest that authorities may wish to monitor bank liquidity creation closely in order to predict and perhaps lessen the likelihood of financial crises. They might also consider other tools to control bank liquidity creation, such as capital and liquidity requirements. 相似文献
7.
影子银行已经成为系统性金融风险传染的主要因素,当前监管部门在货币政策与宏观审慎政策双支柱调控框架下加强了对影子银行的监管力度,但学术界对监管效果的模拟和评估仍然较少.本文将影子银行系统引入新凯恩斯主义动态随机一般均衡模型(DSGE),以检验双支柱调控框架对影子银行的监管效果.结果表明:在不同外生冲击下,影子银行体系的存在均会加剧系统性风险累积和经济波动程度.在技术冲击下,宏观审慎政策的加入并未与货币政策产生目标冲突;而在住房需求冲击和利率冲击下,双支柱调控框架对影子银行的监管效果显著优于单独采用货币政策.这表明,健全双支柱调控框架需要在影子银行未来发展中体现包容审慎,做到在促发展中防风险,切实维护宏观经济稳定和国家金融安全. 相似文献
8.
本文结合非金融企业影子银行化的形成机制以及中国金融市场发展的特征事实,从“供给侧”和“需求侧”双重视角探究银行竞争如何抑制非金融企业影子银行化。以2003—2019年中国非金融上市企业为研究样本,分析发现,银行竞争能够显著降低非金融企业影子银行化。进一步以放松中小商业银行分支机构市场准入为标志事件构造准自然实验,基于双重差分法的计量结果为识别银行竞争对非金融企业影子银行化的抑制效应提供了稳健的经验证据。机制分析发现,银行业竞争通过弱化“信贷扭曲”和“监管套利”两个维度的作用机制抑制非金融企业影子银行化。异质性分析表明,银行竞争对非金融企业影子银行化的抑制作用在融资约束较高和投资机会较少的样本中尤为明显。 相似文献
9.
银行监管的微观基础和战略监管体系选择 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
韩志萍 《中央财经大学学报》2003,(10):41-45
本探讨了银行监管的微观基础，认为在信息不对称以及银行业不完全竞争的作用下，银行业具有内在的不稳定性，需要外部监管力量的支撑来维护稳健经营，但是政府机构监管作为监管垄断力量会引发一系列新的道德危害从而导致监管失灵。中详细分析了各种重要的监管措施带来的正负影响，在此基础上提出监管的战略体系至少应当包括监管、激励结构、市场约束和公司治理。 相似文献
10.
I discuss changes to bank supervision and regulation since the financial crisis. Microprudential supervision promotes the safety and soundness of individual institutions, while macroprudential supervision focuses on emerging risks to financial system stability. I highlight tools for implementing this macroprudential approach to promoting financial stability, and discuss the interactions and proper relationship between monetary policy and financial stability. While macroprudential tools should be the first line of defense against emerging financial imbalances, in cases where those tools proved to be inadequate to limit risks to financial stability, monetary policy should be considered as a possible defense. 相似文献
11.
自上个世纪末以来,影子银行快速发展,资产规模已接近传统银行体系.影子银行的风险被认为是造成2008年全球金融危机的重要原因,各国和国际金融机构近年纷纷出台加强影子银行监管的措施,试图改变过去监管缺失的状态.和国外影子银行以资产证券化为核心不同,我国影子银行的主要功能是作为融资渠道.因此,我国要借鉴国外影子发展和监管的经验,正确看待影子银行的作用,引导其规范发展并将其作为银行体系的有益补充. 相似文献
12.
The study analyzes the impact of engaging in non-traditional banking activities on bank liquidity creation. This strand of research has almost gone unnoticed by academics so far. Based on a dataset of Vietnamese commercial banks from 2007 to 2018, we document that the liquidity creation function of banks decreases with the income from non-traditional banking segments. This impact is observed in both on- and off-balance sheets across multiple robustness tests of the static and dynamic panels regressed by the ordinary least squares method and the generalized method of moments. Further decomposing the non-interest income sources, we find that banks that engage more in non-traditional activities for fees and commissions tend to reduce the liquidity creation more compared to other counterparts. The findings offer insightful implications for regulatory agencies and bank managers in the determination of liquidity creation behavior in emerging markets. 相似文献
13.
In this paper, we examine how the value of failed bank assets differs between two types of FDIC resolution methods: liquidation and private-sector reorganization. Our findings show that private-sector reorganizations do not deliver the expected cost-savings from 1986 to 1991, a period of industry distress. On a univariate basis, the net loss on assets is lower for a private-sector reorganization than for a liquidation in both a period of industry distress and of industry health. However, institutions with higher quality assets and higher franchise values are more likely to be resolved using a private-sector resolution. Once we control for this selection bias, we find that institutions that are resolved during periods of industry distress result in higher resolution costs than liquidation. During periods of industry health, private-sector resolutions are less costly than liquidations. We show that if a bank that failed during the post-crisis period instead failed during the crisis period, its net loss as a percent of assets would have been 3.232 percentage points higher. Given that the average net loss on assets ratio is 21.42 percent during our sample period from 1986 to 2007, the increase in costs is economically significant. 相似文献
14.
Using hand‐collected data, we creatively construct an ‘on‐balance‐sheet shadow banking business’ (OBS‐SBB) measure to precisely quantify commercial banks’ shadow banking activity concealed on their balance sheets. We show that OBS‐SBB activities could both increase individual and systemic risks. To further test the underlying mechanisms, we use China’s implementation of Basel III as an exogenous shock and employ the difference‐in‐differences approach. We find that banks demand OBS‐SBB in order to bypass capital requirements, previously less‐capitalised banks significantly increase their OBS‐SBB ex‐post, and greater impact is found among small and medium‐sized banks and during loose monetary policy periods. 相似文献
15.
Little progress has been made so far in addressing—in a comprehensive way—the negative externalities caused by excessive maturity transformation and the implications for effective liquidity regulation of banks. The SRL model combines option pricing theory with market information and balance sheet data to generate probabilistic measure of systemic liquidity risk. It enhances price-based liquidity regulation by linking a bank’s maturity mismatch impacting the stability of its funding with those characteristics of other banks, subject to individual changes in risk profiles and common changes in market conditions impacting funding and market liquidity risk. This approach can then be used (i) to quantify an individual institution’s time-varying contribution to expected losses from system-wide liquidity shortfalls and (ii) to price insurance premia that provide incentives for banks to internalize the social cost of their individual funding decisions. 相似文献
16.
New liquidity rules phased in under Basel III define the new net stable funding ratio (NSFR) to promote sustainable funding structures at financial institutions. In this paper, we analyze characteristics and drivers of NSFR for a sample of 921 Western European banks between 1996 and 2010. We find that a majority of banks have historically not fulfilled NSFR minimum requirements, in particular larger and faster growing institutions as well as banks also active in asset management and investment banking. Many of them have started increasing NSFR with the onset of financial crisis 2008 while this ratio had been sliding in earlier years. Interestingly, potential advantages in funding costs for low NSFR banks do not seem to translate into higher profitability and results of these banks are more volatile. 相似文献
17.
European banks became a source of risk to global financial markets during the financial crisis and attention to the European banking sector increased during the sovereign debt crisis. To measure the systemic risk of European banks, we calculate a distress insurance premium (DIP), which integrates the characteristics of bank size, probability of default, and correlation. Based on this measure, the systemic risk of European banks reached its height in late 2011 around €500 billion. We find that this was largely due to sovereign default risk. The DIP methodology is also used to measure the systemic contribution of individual banks. This approach identifies the large systemically important European banks, but Italian and Spanish banks as a group notably increased in systemic importance during the sample period. Bank-specific fundamentals like capital-asset ratios predict the one-year-ahead systemic risk contributions. 相似文献
18.
Matthew Jaremski 《Journal of Financial Economics》2018,127(3):435-458
Operating in individual cities, US clearinghouses were the closest thing to a central bank before 1914, but they only assisted banks that chose to join the association. Using an annual bank-level database for seven states between 1880 and 1910, this paper shows that after the entry of a clearinghouse member banks were less likely and nonmember banks in the same city were more likely to close. The results are driven by the fact that the presence of clearinghouses led all banks to become more exposed to systemic liquidity risk, yet provided liquidity only to member banks during panics. 相似文献
19.
Jean Dermine 《金融市场、机构和票据》2013,22(5):259-281
Following up on the publication of the Walker Report ( 2009 ) in the United Kingdom, international organizations such as the Basel Committee ( 2010 ), the OECD ( 2010 ), and the European Union ( 2010 ) have proposed guidelines to improve bank corporate governance and, more specifically, risk governance. These international reports vary widely on what the prime objective of bank corporate governance should be, with one group recommending a shareholder‐based approach, and the other a stakeholder‐based one. Moreover, the focus of these reports is exclusively on risk avoidance, with little guidance as to how an acceptable level of risk should be defined. Drawing on insights from economics and finance, this paper is intended to contribute to the debate on bank corporate governance. Our four main conclusions are as follows. Firstly, the debate on bank governance should concern not only the boards but also the governance of banking supervision with clearly identified accountability principles. Secondly, since biases for short‐term profit maximization are numerous in banking, boards of banks should focus on long‐term value creation. Thirdly, board members and banking supervisors should pay special attention to cognitive biases in risk identification and measurement. Fourthly, a value‐based approach to risk taking must take into account the probability of stress scenarios and the associated costs of financial distress. Mitigation of these costs should be addressed explicitly in the design of bank strategy. 相似文献
20.
We present a capital regulation policy in a model in which banks can choose to be unregulated, by operating in the shadow banking sector, when the cost of being regulated (restriction on portfolio risk) exceeds the benefit (cheaper funding/insurance). We show that the welfare maximizing capital requirement policy can be procyclical: lower requirement during booms and higher requirement during recessions. Our policy specifies the level of capital requirement as a function of the observed relative size of the unregulated and regulated banking sectors. This specification achieves the optimal aggregate risk exposure by obtaining the right mix of the two sectors. 相似文献