Controlling capital? Legal restrictions and the asset composition of international financial flows

How effective are capital account restrictions? We provide new answers based on a novel panel data set of capital controls, disaggregated by asset class and by inflows/outflows, covering 74 countries during 1995–2005. We find the estimated effects of capital controls to vary markedly across the types of capital controls, both by asset categories, by the direction of flows, and across countries' income levels. In particular, both debt and equity controls can substantially reduce outflows, with little effect on capital inflows, but only high-income countries appear able to effectively impose debt (outflow) controls. The results imply that capital controls can affect both the volume and the composition of capital flows.     

Do capital flows change domestic credit allocation?

Since the 1990s, domestic bank credit has been reallocated away from lending to non-financial business and toward households. An expanding literature discusses negative effects on growth and stability of this change in credit allocation. We research its drivers. We hypothesize that if foreign capital flows into economies with few investment opportunities, it may substitute for domestic bank lending to non-financial business, so that bank balance sheets become more dominated by household lending. In GMM estimations on data for 36 economies over 1990–2011, we find evidence consistent with this mechanism. Foreign capital inflows into the non-bank sector (but not into the bank sector) are associated with lower shares of business lending in domestic bank portfolios. The association is weaker in economies with more investment opportunities, whether proxied by investment shares, current account surpluses, or EMU membership. Our results highlight the importance of sectoral destination in determining the effects of capital flows.     

Do capital importing countries pay higher prices for their imports of goods?

We examine the effects that a country's net capital flows have on the (border) prices that a country pays for its imports of goods. Using data from 2000 to 2009 for 11 euro area countries we utilize a pricing-to-market specification to study exporters' pricing behavior to the rest of the countries in the sample, at the industry level, for 900 goods disseminated at the 4-digit Standard International Trade Classification level. This allows us to construct a panel dataset which contains observations across exporters, importers, industries and time. We find a strong positive influence of the importing country's net capital inflows on the border prices of its imports of goods. This result is robust across different specifications of the underlying model, as well to different sample dis-aggregations across types of capital flows, product categories, and exporters.     

Do capital buffers matter? Evidence from the stocks and flows of nonperforming loans

This paper investigates the determinants of the stocks and flows (both in- and outflows) of nonperforming loans (NPLs) by considering a bank-specific factor that is not adequately analysed in the literature, namely, bank capital buffers. Using unbalanced panel data with 6,087 bank-year observations for the 2006–2018 period and a two-step system generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation, we find that banks with higher levels of capital buffers (both in terms of Tier 1 and total capital) have fewer NPL stocks and generate fewer NPL inflows. When we control for the characteristics of the loan portfolio, real guarantees collected by the bank increase the stocks and flows of new, impaired loans, while personal guarantees favour the outflow of bad loans.     

Do different forms of government ownership matter for bank capital behavior? Evidence from China

This study attempts to reconcile the conflicting theoretical predictions regarding how government ownership affects bank capital behaviour. Using a unique Chinese bank dataset over 2006–2015 we find that government-owned banks have higher target capital ratios and adjust these ratios faster compared to private banks, supporting the ‘development/political’ view of the government’s role in banking. This effect is stronger for local government-owned and state enterprise-owned banks than for central government-owned banks. We also find that undercapitalized government-owned banks increase equity while undercapitalized foreign banks contract assets and liabilities as their respective main strategy to adjust their capital ratios.     

Do monetary policy announcements affect stock prices in emerging market countries? The case of Thailand

We examine the effect of monetary policy announcements in Thailand, which is one of emerging market countries in Asia, on stock prices at the firm level. We find that the expected change, rather than the unexpected change, in interest rates affects stock prices. The stock price response to the interest rate announcement is asymmetric. For instance, the relation between interest rate surprises and stock prices is conditional on the direction of the interest rate change. In general, macroeconomic conditions and firm characteristics cannot explain the stock price reaction to the announcement. In addition, stock prices of firms in different industries appear to react heterogeneously to the interest rate announcement.     

Do oil prices drive food prices? The tale of a structural break

It is frequently argued that biofuel (and ethanol) promotion policies in the United States have created a link between oil and corn prices that has accentuated the recent rally in the price of that crop and its substitutes (especially soybeans). Even though it is intuitively appealing, one problem with this hypothesis is that ethanol policies have been in place in the US for more than 35 years, whereas the run up in food prices dates back only to 2006. However, a significant change in US biofuel policy during that year provides an adequate framework to test for the existence of a structural break in the stochastic properties of the corn and soybean price processes. The results show that structural stability is rejected, and the transmission of oil price innovations to corn prices has become stronger after 2006 (no changes with respect to soybeans). There is also a significant transmission of corn price innovations to oil and soybean prices. Moreover, the data show evidence of a previously non-existent cointegration relationship between oil and corn prices.     

Are Chinese trade flows different?

We find that Chinese trade flows respond to economic activity and relative prices – as represented by a trade weighted exchange rate – but the relationships are not always precisely or robustly estimated. Chinese exports are generally well-behaved, rising with foreign GDP and decreasing as the Chinese renminbi (RMB) appreciates. However, the estimated income elasticity is sensitive to the treatment of time trends. Estimates of aggregate imports are more problematic. In many cases, Chinese aggregate imports actually rise in response to an RMB depreciation and decline with Chinese GDP. This is true even after accounting for the fact a substantial share of imports are subsequently incorporated into Chinese exports. We find that some of these counter-intuitive results are mitigated when we disaggregate the trade flows by customs type, commodity type, and the type of firm undertaking the transactions. However, for imports, we only obtain more reasonable estimates of elasticities when we allow for different import intensities for different components of aggregate demand (specifically, consumption vs. investment) or when we include a relative productivity variable.     

Does corporate social responsibility affect the cost of capital?

We examine the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the cost of equity capital for a large sample of US firms. Using several approaches to estimate firms’ ex ante cost of equity, we find that firms with better CSR scores exhibit cheaper equity financing. In particular, our findings suggest that investment in improving responsible employee relations, environmental policies, and product strategies contributes substantially to reducing firms’ cost of equity. Our results also show that participation in two “sin” industries, namely, tobacco and nuclear power, increases firms’ cost of equity. These findings support arguments in the literature that firms with socially responsible practices have higher valuation and lower risk.     

Do personal taxes affect capital structure? Evidence from the 2003 tax cut

Because the personal tax treatments of interest and dividend income likely affect the relative cost of debt and equity financing, a sharp change in tax treatment could affect firms' optimal leverage. This paper examines the effect of the 2003 equity income tax cut on firms' debt usage. Because this tax cut affected only individual investors, we can use a difference-in-differences method to identify the effect of personal tax on firms' leverage. Previous research has found that the 2003 tax cut encouraged dividend payouts and reduced the cost of equity, but it provides no link to equilibrium leverage ratios. We estimate that the tax cut causes the affected firms' leverage to decrease by about 5 percentage points. Furthermore, we show that the effects of the tax cut are stronger for firms with lower marginal corporate tax rates and for firms that are not financially constrained, consistent with our theoretical predictions. Overall, we find strong evidence that personal tax is an important determinant of firms' optimal leverage.     

Do prime brokers intermediate capital?

Prime brokers play an important role in intermediating arbitrage capital to hedge funds. A fund’s peer-group ranking, relative to funds that share the same prime broker, significantly affects how investors respond to its past performance. I decompose the standard performance-flow relationship into two components: (1) flows that respond to overall performance rank, and (2) flows that respond to relative (within prime broker) performance rank. Strong relative rank drives fund in-flows, while poor overall rank drives out-flows. These results suggest that prime brokers intermediate about 40% of the standard performance-flow relationship.     

Can enforcement constraints explain the patterns of capital flows after financial liberalizations?

A standard, small open economy model would have problems accounting for the pattern of capital flows into capital-poor economies that open to the rest of the world: such types of models would predict extremely large and very sudden capital flows, putting these predictions at odds with the data. While the bulk of the literature has focused on the role of inputs frictions to produce slower capital flows, this article presents an exploration into the role of financial frictions (in particular, enforcement constraints) to produce endogenously slow capital flows. We are left with three main findings. First, enforcement constraints are helpful frictions for producing slow capital flows. However, these flows do not exhibit the degree of persistence observed in the data. Finally, when we extend our model to mimic declining values of financial autarky, the model is able to produce more persistent capital inflows that are more in line with the data. Although these deficits revert into surpluses more quickly than in the data, we are left with a finding that leads to a promising line of research: models that include endogenously increasing costs of defaulting are better suited to reproduce the patterns of capital flows into opening economies.     

Do spot food commodity and oil prices predict futures prices?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Futures prices reflect the price that both the buyer and the seller agree will be the price of a commodity upon delivery. Therefore, these prices...     

Do subjective expectations explain asset pricing puzzles?

The structural uncertainty model with Bayesian learning, advanced by Weitzman (AER 2007), provides a framework for gauging the effect of structural uncertainty on asset prices and risk premiums. This paper provides an operational version of this approach that incorporates realistic priors about consumption growth volatility, while guaranteeing finite asset pricing quantities. In contrast to the extant literature, the resulting asset pricing model with subjective expectations yields well-defined expected utility, finite moment generating function of the predictive distribution of consumption growth, and tractable expressions for equity premium and risk-free return. Our quantitative analysis reveals that explaining the historical equity premium and risk-free return, in the context of subjective expectations, requires implausible levels of structural uncertainty. Furthermore, these implausible prior beliefs result in consumption disaster probabilities that virtually coincide with those implied by more realistic priors. At the same time, the two sets of prior beliefs have diametrically opposite asset pricing implications.     

The performance of venture capital investments: Do investors overreact?

Using a unique proprietary data set of over 5400 realized and unrealized venture capital investments between 1980 and 2005, we examine the impact of demand-related factors, e.g. entrepreneurial activity, as well as supply-related factors, i.e. money provided by VC investors, on the return of individual VC investments. This way, we are able to shed more light on the question whether volatile VC investment returns are rather driven by fundamental changes with regard to the number of attractive investment opportunities or by the overreaction by investors. We find that rising demand for VC, i.e. an increase in entrepreneurial activity, results initially in higher returns. However, our results also indicate that overreaction on the supply side can be observed, destroying deal-level results. Overfunding, specifically overinvesting seems to be a recurring characteristic of the VC industry. In fact, contra-cyclical investment strategies yield highest deal-level returns.     

Do oil futures prices predict stock returns?

This paper explores stock return predictability by exploiting the cross-section of oil futures prices. Motivated by the principal component analysis, we find the curvature factor of the oil futures curve predicts monthly stock returns: a 1% per month increase in the curvature factor predicts 0.4% per month decrease in stock market index return. This predictive pattern is prevailing in non-oil industry portfolios, but is absent for oil-related portfolios. The in- and out-of-sample predictive power of the curvature factor for non-oil stocks is robust and outperforms many other predictors, including oil spot prices. The predictive power of the curvature factor comes from its ability to forecast supply-side oil shocks, which only affect non-oil stocks and are hedged by oil-related stocks.     

Forecasting metal prices: Do forecasters herd?

We analyze more than 20,000 forecasts of nine metal prices at four different forecast horizons. We document that forecasts are heterogeneous and report that anti-herding appears to be a source of this heterogeneity. Forecaster anti-herding reflects strategic interactions among forecasters that foster incentives to scatter forecasts around a consensus forecast.     

Do bank bailouts affect the provision of trade credit?

We document that borrowers of banks that received capital support under TARP/CPP significantly increased their quarterly provision of trade credit (accounts receivable) during the crisis by 5.2%, while borrowers of other banks did not. The effect is strongest in 2008Q4, and larger for pre-crisis riskier, growth-oriented and bank-dependent firms and for firms that borrow from pre-crisis smaller, less profitable and better capitalized CPP banks. Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that the effect is caused by CPP and not by heterogeneity between firms, banks and time periods. Our study provides novel evidence that suggests a beneficial multiplier effect of bank bailouts.     

Do regulatory changes affect the underpricing of European IPOs?

We use a sample of 3677 European IPOs during the period 1998–2012 to examine how the adoptions of corporate governance codes by Member States of the European Union (EU) have affected IPO underpricing on Member State-regulated markets, where issuers are subject to corporate governance rules instituted by Member States, relative to a control sample of IPOs on exchange-regulated markets, where issuers are exempt from Member State corporate governance codes. Using this control sample approach facilitated by the existence of second-tier, exchange-regulated markets in the EU, we find that, on average, IPO underpricing declined on Member State-regulated markets after Member States adopted corporate governance codes containing SOX-like provisions. We do not find a similar reduction in IPO underpricing on exchange-regulated markets. Our results are robust to alternative specifications, and our findings support the view that elevating corporate governance standards increases transparency and reduces information asymmetries that affect IPO valuations.     

Liquid asset sheltering,or cost of capital? The effect of political corruption on corporate cash holdings

I posit that political corruption affects firms through an entrenchment between entrepreneurs and politicians instead of coercive extortion. Based on this postulate, I refute the claim that firms in a more corrupt environment hold less cash due to liquid assets sheltering from political extraction. Instead, I propose that firms in a more corrupt environment hold less cash because of the high cost of capital. In fact, I find that firms in more corrupt countries hold cash beyond their optimum for the given cost of carry due to severe financial constraints. This excess cash results in value destruction. I call this phenomenon the financial effect of corruption. Thus, I challenge the conventional wisdom and argue that the effects of political corruption on corporate cash holdings are primarily indirect through financial mechanisms.