Divergence in credit ratings

During the recent credit crisis credit rating agencies (CRAs) became increasingly lax in their rating of structured products, yet increasingly stringent in their rating of corporate bonds. We examine a model in which a CRA operates in both the market for structured products and for corporate debt, and shares a common reputation across the two markets. We find that, as a CRA’s reputation becomes good enough, it can be optimal for it to inflate its ratings with probability one in the structured products market, but inflate its ratings with probability zero in the corporate bond market.     

Market-implied ratings and their divergence from credit ratings

In this article, we investigate the divergence between credit ratings (CRs) and Moody's market-implied ratings (MIRs). Our evidence shows that rating gaps provide incremental information to the market regarding issuers' default risk over CRs alone in the short horizon and outperform CRs over extended horizons. The predictive ability of rating gaps is greater for more opaque and volatile issuers. Such predictability was more pronounced during the 2008 financial crisis but weakened in the post–Dodd–Frank Act period. This finding is consistent with credit rating agencies’ efforts to improve their performance when facing regulatory pressure. Moreover, our analysis identifies rating-gap signals that do (do not) lead to subsequent Moody's actions to place issuers on negative outlook and watchlists. We find that negative signals from MIR gaps have a real economic impact on issuers’ fundamentals such as profitability, leverage, investment, and default risk, thus supporting the recovery-efforts hypothesis.     

Time series patterns in credit ratings

This article offers a substitute setting to simulate credit rating migrations. The internal correlations model tracks time-series movements within credit rating entries, rather than cross-ratings correlations. The proposed nonhomogeneous process is authenticated through the likelihood ratio Dickey–Fuller test, and is found to be statistically and economically significant, by better fitting observed cumulative default rates. Several nonlinear regression models assist to better identify these time-related patterns. The economic structure underlying the time dependency often corresponds to changes in GDP, business cycles, and market risk. Furthermore, significant positive autocorrelation is detected mostly among downgrade probabilities.     

Feedback effects of credit ratings

Rating agencies are often criticized for being biased in favor of borrowers, for being too slow to downgrade following credit quality deterioration, and for being oligopolists. Based on a model that takes into account the feedback effects of credit ratings, I show that: (i) rating agencies should focus not only on the accuracy of their ratings but also on the effects of their ratings on the probability of survival of the borrower; (ii) even when rating agencies pursue an accurate rating policy, multi-notch downgrades or immediate default may occur in response to small shocks to fundamentals; (iii) increased competition between rating agencies can lead to rating downgrades, increasing default frequency and reducing welfare.     

Firstborn CEOs and credit ratings

Our study examines whether CEOs’ birth order can predict firms’ credit ratings. Consistent with studies that document a positive relationship in the general population between being firstborn and being conservative, our study finds that firms managed by firstborn CEOs tend to have higher credit ratings than those managed by later-born CEOs. Our results are robust to controlling for additional personal CEO traits, such as political identity, and to using a propensity score matching sample. A change analysis supports the causality of the firstborn effect. We suggest that return on assets and free cash flow are possible channels through which firstborn status affects credit ratings. Cross-sectional analyses show that the positive association is less (more) pronounced for firstborn CEOs who have a pilot license (run firms in less competitive industries). These results suggest that managerial conservatism may be an important factor in credit rating agencies’ credit risk assessments.     

Leads and lags in sovereign credit ratings

This paper analyses lead–lag relationships in sovereign ratings across five agencies, and finds evidence of interdependence in rating actions. Upgrade (downgrade) probabilities are much higher, and downgrade (upgrade) probabilities are much lower for a sovereign issuer with a recent upgrade (downgrade) by another agency. S&P tends to demonstrate the least dependence on other agencies, and Moody’s tends to be the first mover in upgrades. Rating actions by Japanese agencies tend to lag those of the larger agencies, although there is some evidence that they lead Moody’s downgrades.     

Determinants of heterogeneity in European credit ratings

In this study, we empirically analyze the determinants of heterogeneity in rating assessments across different segments of the European loan market. We conduct a benchmarking analysis using rating information on European corporate obligors from nine major Austrian banks that have a large share of foreign lending, particularly in the Central and Eastern European region. We provide evidence that, generally, overall heterogeneity among rating outcomes for foreign markets is higher than for domestic markets. Furthermore, we show that heterogeneity increases in transition economies and those markets where Austrian bank involvement is relatively low. Our evidence supports the hypothesis that heterogeneity in the assessment of credit risk is determined not only by the objective quality of information, which is deemed to be lower in transition economies, but also by the subjective access to information about obligors measured by the level of domestic bank involvement in the respective foreign market. Furthermore, we quantify potential effects on regulatory capital requirements.     

CEO political preference and credit ratings

This study investigates whether a CEO's personal political ideology, as captured by his or her political contributions, is associated with a firm's credit ratings. Republican CEOs, we find, are associated with higher credit ratings, especially when their firms are headquartered in conservative areas. In addition, the link between political ideology and credit rating is more pronounced in firms that exhibit high financial distress or weak corporate governance. Changes in political ideology are associated with changes in credit rating. Our results support the behavior consistency, upper echelon, and social identity theories, as well as the risk acceptance hypothesis, and are robust to a number of alternative specifications as well as when alternate approaches and measures of credit risk are introduced. Using Republican CEOs as a proxy for conservative CEOs, our evidence implies that credit rating agencies justifiably view a CEO's political ideology and conservatism as indicative of corporate policies and, therefore, as an important determinant of the firm's credit ratings.     

Initial credit ratings and earnings management

Credit rating agencies assert that they rely on financial information provided by issuers and that they value rating stability as well as accuracy. In an environment where rating agencies depend on issuer-reported information and are reluctant to adjust ratings promptly, managers of issuing firms can utilize the discretion afforded by GAAP to obtain the most favorable credit ratings. Consistent with our expectations, we find that current accruals are unusually positive and high around initial credit ratings. The increase in abnormally high accruals leading up to the initial credit rating year is followed by a reversal in the subsequent years. Multivariate regression analyses suggest that accounting accruals, abnormal current accruals in particular, are significantly positively related to initial credit ratings after controlling for several issue- and issuer-related characteristics indicative of default risk. Our results are robust to additional tests that account for endogeneity between credit ratings and earnings management, adjust for performance, and account for firms issuing debt and equity simultaneously.     

The alchemy of CDO credit ratings

Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) were one of the largest and fastest growing segments of the structured finance market, fueling the 2003-2007 boom in syndicated loans and leveraged buyouts. The credit crisis brought CLO issuance to a halt, and as a result the leveraged loan market dried up. Similar to other structured finance products, investors in CLOs rely heavily on credit rating provided by the rating agencies, yet little is known about CLO rating practices. This paper attempts to fill the gap. Using novel hand-collected data on 3912 tranches of collateralized loan obligations we document the rating practices of CLOs and analyze their structures.     

Implicit government guarantees and credit ratings

Exploiting the first default of a state-owned enterprise (SOE) in China, we analyze the role of implicit government guarantees in credit ratings. We consider two causes of implicit government guarantees. First, we suggest a “too big to fail” effect by revealing positive associations between credit ratings and issuer size, number of employees and taxes paid. Second, we propose a “government link” effect by showing positive associations between credit ratings and an issuer's state ownership, indicators for SOEs and central SOEs. Importantly, after the first SOE default, both dimensions of implicit government guarantees are weakened when explaining credit rating variations. Extending to analyses of yield spreads, we find that debt pricing relies more on credit ratings after the default event, consistent with bond investors weighing credit ratings more with weakened beliefs in implicit government guarantees. Collectively, our study proposes two dimensions of implicit government guarantees in credit ratings and shows how the initial SOE default significantly changes the role of such guarantees in credit ratings.     

Output spillovers from changes in sovereign credit ratings

This research examines how a sovereign rating revision of one country influences the economic growth rates of other countries. Rating revisions have significant output spillover effects: A one-notch upgrade (downgrade) prompts on average a significant downward revision of about 0.03% (0.07%) in the consensus forecast of annual economic growth rates of other countries in the two-month period after the event. The spillovers are transmitted through direct and indirect trade and financial linkages between event and non-event countries. The evidence indicates that a predominance of differential (common) spillovers leads upgrades (downgrades) to produce adverse output effects for other countries.     

Sovereign risk assessment and agency credit ratings

Sovereign ratings are gaining importance as more governments with greater default risk borrow in international bond markets. However, while the ratings have proved useful to governments seeking market access, the difficulty of assessing sovereign risk has led to agency disagreements and public controversy over specific rating assignments. Recognising this difficulty, the financial markets have shown some scepticism toward sovereign ratings when pricing issues.     

Top management tournament incentives and credit ratings

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This paper investigates whether the current level of tournament incentives for top executives is related to the firm’s future credit rating....     

基于市场定价测算信用评级指标权重

一般而言,投资者会参考一系列指标来综合评估企业债券的信用水平,合理设定这些指标的权重是相对准确地衡量债券信用水平的关键。文章基于有效市场假定,在分类梳理备选信用指标的基础上,将由加权信用指标计算的债券信用估值差异与债券实际收益率差异进行拟合,以此确定最优的信用指标权重组合,以期为简要分析企业信用资质和债券定价判断提供一个参考。     

CEO inside debt holdings and credit ratings

In this paper we investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and long-term credit ratings. We provide evidence that firms with a higher level of inside debt holdings enjoy better credit ratings. Our results are robust to the use of alternative regression estimation and alternative measures of key variables. We employ instrumental variable–based two-stage least squares regression and instrumental variable regression estimation using heteroskedasticity-based instruments to mitigate the endogeneity concern. In addition, we employ propensity-matched sample and entropy balancing estimates to alleviate endogeneity concerns. Our cross-sectional analyses reveal that the relationship between CEO inside debt holdings and credit ratings is more pronounced in firms with a poor information environment, a weak monitoring mechanism, and powerful CEOs. Overall, findings from our study suggest that credit rating agencies evaluate CEO insider debt holdings positively in assessing the creditworthiness of a firm.     

The role of non-financial factors in internal credit ratings

Internal credit ratings are expected to gain in importance because of their potential use for determining regulatory capital adequacy and banks' increasing focus on the risk–return profile in commercial lending. Whereas the eligibility of financial factors as inputs for internal credit ratings is widely accepted, the role of non-financial factors remains ambiguous. Analyzing credit file data from four major German banks, we find evidence that the combined use of financial and non-financial factors leads to a more accurate prediction of future default events than the single use of each of these factors.     

The adjustment of credit ratings in advance of defaults

This paper assesses biases in credit ratings and lead–lag relationships for near-to-default issuers with multiple ratings by Moody’s and S&P. Based on defaults from 1997 to 2004, we find evidence that Moody’s seems to adjust its ratings to increasing default risk in a timelier manner than S&P. Second, credit ratings by the two US-based agencies are not subject to any home preference. Third, given a downgrade (upgrade) by the first rating agency, subsequent downgrades (upgrades) by the second rating agency are of greater magnitude in the short term. Fourth, harsher rating changes by one agency are followed by harsher rating changes in the same direction by the second agency. Fifth, rating changes by the second rating agency are significantly more likely after downgrades than after upgrades by the first rating agency. Additionally, we find evidence for serial correlation in rating changes up to 90 days subsequent to the rating change of interest after controlling for rating changes by the second rating agency.     

Bayesian inference for issuer heterogeneity in credit ratings migration

Rating transition matrices for corporate bond issuers are often based on fitting a discrete time Markov chain model to homogeneous cohorts. Literature has documented that rating migration matrices can differ considerably depending on the characteristics of the issuers in the pool used for estimation. However, it is also well known in the literature that a continuous time Markov chain gives statistically superior estimates of the rating migration process. It remains to verify and quantify the issuer heterogeneity in rating migration behavior using a continuous time Markov chain. We fill this gap in the literature. We provide Bayesian estimates to mitigate the problem of data sparsity. Default data, especially when narrowing down to issuers with specific characteristics, can be highly sparse. Using classical estimation tools in such a situation can result in large estimation errors. Hence we adopt Bayesian estimation techniques. We apply them to the Moodys corporate bond default database. Our results indicate strong country and industry effects on the determination of rating migration behavior. Using the CreditRisk+ framework, and a sample credit portfolio, we show that ignoring issuer heterogeneity can give erroneous estimates of Value-at-Risk and a misleading picture of the risk capital. This insight is consistent with some recent findings in the literature. Therefore, given the upcoming Basel II implementation, understanding issuer heterogeneity has important policy implications.     

Sovereign credit ratings during the COVID-19 pandemic

Using 603 sovereign rating actions by the three leading global rating agencies between January 2020 and March 2021, this paper shows that the severity of sovereign ratings actions is not directly affected by the intensity of the COVID-19 health crisis (proxied by case and mortality rates) but through a mechanism of its negative economic repercussions such as the economic outlook of a country and governments' response to the health crisis. Contrary to expectations, credit rating agencies pursued mostly a business-as-usual approach and reviewed sovereign ratings when they were due for regulatory purposes rather than in response to the rapid developments of the pandemic. Despite their limited reaction to the ongoing pandemic, sovereign rating news from S&P and Moody's still conveyed price-relevant information to the bond markets.