Shadow banking,macroprudential policy,and bank stability: Evidence from China’s wealth management product market

This study examines whether shadow banking activities reduce the stability of 269 commercial banks in China, and if they do, whether a tightening macroprudential policy could mitigate this negative effect. A quarterly bank level, unbalanced panel data of wealth management products (WMPs) from 2006 to 2018 measured China’s shadow banking activities. The results show that China’s shadow banking activities weaken the stability of banks, especially for principal-floating WMPs, long-term WMPs, and WMPs issued to individual investors. China’s macroprudential supervision improves the soundness of banks and eases the negative effects of shadow banking on banking stability. Our results suggest the necessity to design specific macroprudential policies based on different kinds of shadow banking activities and different types of banks.     

Banking Regulation and Systemic Risk

The term Systemic Risk belongs to the standard rhetoric of economic policy discussions related to the banking industry. Besides the goal of protecting small depositors, control of systemic risk is given as one of the main arguments for banking regulation. Various recent financial crises have increasingly focused the regulatory debate on issues of systemic risk and financial stability. There is, however, no generally accepted definition of systemic risk and the effectiveness and the economic consequences of various instruments of banking regulation that are intended to attenuate it are still only partially understood both theoretically and empirically. In this paper, we make an attempt to discuss some of the issues raised in this debate by reviewing recent contributions to the academic literature.     

我国的金融监管模式与现状分析

近年来的全球金融危机使得金融监管的体制的问题再度成为关注热点,金融监管体制在决定监管效率上发挥着基础作用,对于整个的金融监管来说至关重要。监管当局监管不力该为此次金融危机的发生以及蔓延负上重要责任,本文通过对不同监管模式的比较,结合我国的具体情况,对我国的金融监管问题进行了分析。     

美国金融监管漏洞对我国金融法建设的启示

由美国次贷危机而导发的金融危机自美国本土向全球蔓延,严重危害着全世界的金融安全和稳定,对全球经济也造成不可估计的损伤。然而这次金融危机的出现从深层暴露了美国金融市场的不稳定和松乱,其直接原因还是要归咎于美国金融政策的过度宽松和监管体系散漫。鉴于这次国际金融市场的动荡和金融危机的损害,我国理当有所借鉴,有所警惕,以此为例检测我国金融市场和金融法规体系,以期达到完善法律、稳定市场。     

关于影子银行的文献综述

随着金融改革与创新的不断深化,中国金融脱媒和大量表外资产的出现,我国影子银行体系迅速发展,成为当前金融体系的重要组成部分,并得到国内外学术界积极地关注。关于影子银行相关问题的研究众多且角度多样。本文主要从影子银行的概念界定、影子银行体系的运作特征、影子银行对金融体系的影响以及影子银行风险控制与监管等角度加以文献综述。     

论经济全球化背景下的外资银行金融监管

我国正加快融入金融一体化和全球化,传统的金融监管模式已不能适应中国加入世贸后的新形势。在金融全球化、经济一体化背景下,机遇与挑战并存,只有通过监管理论创新进而达到监管制度创新,积极学习借鉴国际金融监管先进经验,在发展中加强监管,以监管促开放,促引进,促发展,我们就一定能够迎头赶上金融监管的国际水平,为我国更加积极主动参与国际竞争提供良好的金融支持。     

Independence and Architecture of Financial Supervision: With Focus on the Effects on Banking Stability

Abstract

Empirical work on the performances of supervisory governance and architecture is scarce relative to the intensifying debates on related institutional arrangements. Using an expansive panel data-set, this paper is a first attempt to explore the effects of governance, architecture and their interactions on banking stability. Empirical analyses reveal that independence matters, as a major governance factor, and the two critical architecture factors, the integration of authorities and the central bank' involvement undermine banking stability. Also, in spite of the interaction between independence and architecture, its effect appears to be limited.     

金融危机背景下高管薪酬法律规制新论

金融危机使高管天价薪酬再次成为社会公众关注的焦点,同时也为高管薪酬规制提出了新的挑战。本文旨在检讨分析传统高管薪酬规制方法的基础上,借鉴台湾地区肥猫条款模式,探讨高管薪酬规制的新方法,以期对金融危机背景下我国高管薪酬规制制度完善有所裨益。     

Designing a central bank: Social player,monetary agent,or banking agent?

This paper reviews recent advances on the role of the central bank in the money supply process and its effects on inflation. The literature is presented according to a three-stage process, with the central bank acting first as social player, then as monetary agent, and finally as a combined monetary and banking agent.     

国际银行业统一监管体系的发展与完善

布雷顿森林体系解体以来,银行业发展迅速,机构跨国化,业务多样化以及创新工具不断涌现,金融危机频发,急需一个有效的国际统一监管体系。巴塞尔委员会自1975年成立以来,对国际银行统一监管发挥了重要作用,文章就巴塞尔协议这35年以来的发展趋势进行了研究,并试图找出新协议的缺陷和仍需继续改进的地方,提出进一步完善的重点。     

试析美国金融危机的根源——“政府”与“市场”关系的重大失误

在"政府"与"市场"的关系的长期论争中,自由市场派占据上风并导致监管缺失,成为美国金融危机的根源。其主要表现为:金融监管法律放松,长期宽松的货币政策,对市场的自由放任和对金融衍生品的监管放纵,对投资银行等金融机构的监管失职等。对我国的启示:要正确认识和处理好"政府"与"市场"的关系,要审慎推动金融创新,防范金融衍生品风险,要加强对金融机构和住房抵押贷款的监管。     

监管处罚与银行高质量发展:基于银行效率的视角

作为微观审慎监管的重要工具,监管处罚对商业银行高质量发展具有重要影响。利用手工收集的行政处罚公告数据,本文采用面板固定效应模型分析了监管处罚对中国商业银行效率的影响,以此理解其与银行高质量发展的关系。研究发现,监管处罚会在短期内降低违规银行的效率,主要通过降低银行营业收入和市场势力以及提高银行经营成本来发挥作用。异质性分析表明,监管处罚主要作用于低效率、高风险、非国有和低公司治理银行群体;对机构进行经济类处罚、对个人进行非经济类处罚以及贷款或票据业务处罚的效果更为明显。进一步研究发现,监管处罚不仅降低了银行风险,还引导银行资金脱虚向实,增强了银行服务实体经济的能力。本文为监管部门如何更好兼顾风险和效率、提升监管有效性进而增强金融服务实体能力提供了有益的借鉴。     

How were the Federal Reserve Bank locations selected?

The Reserve Board Organization Committee decision to locate 12 Federal Reserve Banks is reviewed. Probability choice models estimate a city’s selection probability for a Federal Reserve Bank location. Results of predicted selections show reserve cities were selected for their spatial economic characteristics, including information contained in bankers’ preferences, infrastructure development, population and recent National Banking System growth, rather than Democratic Party politics. The Reserve Board Organization Committee placed Federal Reserve Banks in preeminent financial and commercial centers, and relied upon bankers’ preferences for the remaining non-obvious selections. Given 12 cities were to be selected, the conclusion drawn is the decision was in the public interest.     

Connecting National Safety Nets: The Dialectics of the Basel II Contracting Process

Basel II consists of supervisory guidelines negotiated by representatives of central banks and national regulatory commissions that were members of the Basel committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The BCBS is itself a regulatory response to globalization, which is connecting national safety nets in market-driven ways. A country’s financial safety net is a social contract established by short-lived agents for principals in long-lived economic sectors. Restraints placed on the authority of the BCBS members to contract for their principals by domestic politics explains: why Basel II authorizes individual countries to implement the agreement in markedly different ways; why US implementation of Basel II ran into so much doubt, controversy, and delay; and how the implementation debate set small and large banks and the Federal Reserve and other federal regulators against one another.

Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis

The paper analyses the causes of the current crisis of the global financial system, with particular emphasis on the systemic elements that turned the crisis of subprime mortgage-backed securities in the United States, a small part of the overall system, into a worldwide crisis. The first half of the paper explains the role of mortgage securitization as a mechanism for allocating risks from real estate investments and discusses what has gone wrong and why in the implementation of this mechanism in the United States. The second half of the paper discusses the incidence of systemic risk in the crisis. Two elements of systemic risk are identified. First, there was excessive maturity transformation through conduits and structured-investment vehicles (SIVs); when this broke down in August 2007, the overhang of asset-backed securities that had been held by these vehicles put significant additional downward pressure on securities prices. Second, as the financial system adjusted to the recognition of delinquencies and defaults in US mortgages and to the breakdown of maturity transformation of conduits and SIVs, the interplay of market malfunctioning or even breakdown, fair value accounting and the insufficiency of equity capital at financial institutions, and, finally, systemic effects of prudential regulation created a detrimental downward spiral in the overall financial system. The paper argues that these developments have not only been caused by identifiably faulty decisions, but also by flaws in financial system architecture. In thinking about regulatory reform, one must therefore go beyond considerations of individual incentives and supervision and pay attention to issues of systemic interdependence and transparency. Revised and expanded text of the Jelle Zijlstra Lecture at the Free University of Amsterdam on May 27, 2008. I am very grateful to the Jelle Zijlstra Professorial Fellowship Foundation for inviting me to visit the Netherlands as Jelle Zijlstra Professorial Fellow 2008 and to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study for providing a wonderful environment for this visit. This expanded text tries to respond to comments and questions from the discussant, Gerrit Zalm, and from members of the audience at the Lecture, for which I am very grateful. I am also grateful for comments on this text from Christoph Engel. Kristoffel Grechenig, Hans-Jürgen Hellwig, Isabel Schnabel, and two referees. As the text was being written, its subject itself has been evolving at a catastrophic pace. Some anachronisms are therefore unavoidable. However, the core of the analysis is, I believe, unaffected.     

江苏省银行业发展与经济增长关系实证分析

依据金融发展与经济增长相关理论,以江苏省为研究对象,选取1995-2012年的年度数据,以实际人均GDP、银行业规模和银行业效率等变量来衡量经济增长与银行金融机构发展的关系。结果表明：江苏省银行业规模与经济增长之间呈正相关关系,而银行业效率与经济增长间呈负相关关系。基于实证分析结果,提出江苏银行业发展的相关建议。