Asymmetric information in securitization: An empirical assessment

Asymmetric information in securitization deals is analyzed based on a unique dataset comprising a million mortgages, both securitized and not, and using a methodology, previously applied to insurance data, that looks at the correlation between risk transfer and default probability. The main finding is that, for given observable characteristics, securitized mortgages have a lower default probability than non-securitized ones. We show that this finding is consistent with banks caring about their reputation for not selling lemons.     

信息不对称、管理者内生偏好与上市公司股权融资偏好

一般以为,上市公司的股权融资偏好是由于不合理的成本因素、有缺陷的监管制度和政策与低效的资本市场等原因造成的.本文分析认为,上市公司股权融资偏好产生的基本原因是管理者的内生融资偏好.如果公司绩效影响管理者的财富(或职位、声誉等),管理者的偏好将支配公司的融资决策;对称信息下,管理者将有充分的股权融资偏好.不对称信息下,如果管理者对公司项目(或资产)拥有私人信息,且厌恶风险,管理者将最大限度地使用股权融资,直至达到均衡.最后,本文提出,管理者对股权融资的偏好是内生的,治理目前上市公司股权融资偏好所产生危害的基本思路是\"疏\",而不是\"堵\".     

虚假广告的产生及其监控分析

虚假广告的产生来源于商家与消费者之间存在的信息不对称及信息搜寻存在成本,使得商家在发布虚假广告与信息时消费者往往不能正确地识别。虚假广告的存在导致市场中会出现柠檬市场的效应,使劣质产品占领了市场。基于博弈论的分析得到以下结论:政府对广告信息发布的监督概率与其对虚假广告与信息的发布者的惩罚因子具有替代性;如果制造商通过发布虚假信息所获取的利润越大,则政府越有必要提高其监督概率;政府的监督概率与发布虚假信息的成本成负相关的关系;如果制造商发布的虚假信息量越大,则政府越有必要提高其监督概率。     

浅议借贷管制与金融自由

在商业银行贷款行为日益市场化的今天,贷款仍是商业银行最主要的资产业务之一.随着现代经济与金融的飞速发展,各个金融机构的信贷规模迅速发展扩大,但同时带来的负面影响则是其贷款的风险越来越大,安全系数越来越小.随着全球金融一体化的发展和我国加入WTO,我国金融市场上的不确定因素急剧增加,特别是商业银行的经营管理将面临越来越严峻的考验.是继续加强对贷款的管制,还是顺应金融自由化的浪潮而放松管制,很难有明确划一的答案.本文拟通过对现行商业银行贷款在实体与程序方面所作限制的介绍与分析,找出借贷管制与金融自由化的连接点.     

Order book characteristics and the volume–volatility relation: Empirical evidence from a limit order market

Using unique data, we address the issue of price formation in a limit order market. A standard volume–volatility relation is documented with the number of trades acting as the important component of volume. The main contribution of the paper is to identify strong evidence that volume, volatility, and the volume–volatility relation are negatively related to the order book slope. These results are robust to the inclusion of several liquidity measures. A significant empirical relationship between the order book slope and the coefficient of variation in earnings forecasts by financial analysts suggests that the slope is proxying for disagreement among investors. Hence, our results support models where investor heterogeneity intensifies the volume–volatility relation.     

Information content and recency effect of the audit report in loan rating decisions

We examined the significance of the audit report in loan rating decisions using the belief revision model. We designed a laboratory experiment where the sign of the audit report is mixed with other annual financial information in a series of sequential evidence. The results of an experimental design, using 106 loan officers from international financial institutions, support the hypothesis that the qualified audit report appears to be an independent and useful piece of evidence when it is contrary to favourable financial expectations. Our findings also support that the ‘recency effect’ might influence international commercial loan officers’ perception of the qualified audit report.     

商业银行信用风险控制在助学贷款中的运用

实行助学贷款是发展教育的一项重要政策,但在实施的过程中却出现了“银行有钱贷不出”和“学生没钱贷不到”的尴尬局面,这引起了人们对这项政策的再思考。通过对产生这种现象的内在原因的分析和对银行和学生二者之间预期效用的比较分析,以及对银行和学生行为选择的分析,认为缺乏有效的抵押担保机制和良好的社会信用体系是导致这种现象的重要原因,最后从制度约束和道德约束两方面思考,减少信息不对称现象,增加学生不还贷成本,降低银行风险,不断完善助学贷款制度。     

现金贷果如洪水猛兽?——来自断点回归设计的证据

现金贷具有高利率、无抵押、无场景、线上放款的特性,近两年来饱受争议。一方面,现金货因其服务对象为中低收入者和弱势群体而具有一定的普惠特性,但另一方面,部分从业者无节制放贷则让行业逐步成为监管严管的对象。为了衡量现金贷利率对于贷款者贷款数量与逾期表现的影响,本文使用某现金贷公司2017年6月-9月全部贷款数据,利用其使用连续信用分对申请者进行分级、对不同信用等级赋予不同利率的特性,进行断点回归设计。研究发现贷款申请人对于利率有稳健的敏感性,同时道德风险并不明显,之后进一步从不同角度分析影响贷款人利率敏感性的因素,并依据实证结果提出相关政策建议。     

信息不对称、风险规避与农地金融合约--基于农户与贷款者的分析

本文从农贷市场的不对称信息视角,集中讨论了农户与贷款者的信贷行为关系.通过分析他们之间信息不对称的两类性质后,从信号博弈角度分析了农地使用权抵押对降低农贷风险的信号发送过程,并给出了基于贷款者的农地抵押金融合约模型.本研究得出的结论是农地使用权抵押金融既可以提高农贷资金的安全性,又蕴涵着农地使用权市场化流转的可能.     

商业银行违规信息披露行为分析

当商业银行按照利润最大化原则确定的信息披露数量小于政府按照市场效率最大化原则确定的信息披露数量时,商业银行就产生了违规披露信息的动机,违规披露信息数量是两者的差额,是其违规披露信息的可能最大数量。但政府不会容许其存在,会通过提高执法严厉程度减少它,减少的最优数量决定于强制商业银行减少违规披露信息导致的社会边际成本等于社会边际收益。这表明,剩余的违规信息披露数量是政府所容许的,是商业银行的最优违规信息披露数量。     

Dynamic credit relationships in general equilibrium

We construct a general equilibrium model with private information in which borrowers and lenders enter into long-term dynamic credit relationships. Each new generation of ex ante identical individuals is divided in equilibrium into workers and entrepreneurs. Workers save through financial intermediaries in the form of interest-bearing deposits and supply labor to entrepreneurs in a competitive labor market. Entrepreneurs borrow from financial intermediaries to finance projects which produce privately observed sequences of random returns. Each financial intermediary holds deposits from a large number of workers and operates a portfolio of dynamic contracts with different credit positions. We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and find that dynamic contracting is very effective at mitigating the effects of private information. Moreover, restricting borrowers and lenders to use static (one-period) contracts with a costly monitoring technology has adverse effects both on the level of aggregate economic activity and on individual welfare unless monitoring costs are very small. Finally, the optimal provision of intertemporal incentives leads to increasing consumption inequality over time within generational cohorts as in U.S. data.     

Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults,self-cures and securitization

A leading explanation for the lack of widespread mortgage renegotiation is the existence of frictions in the mortgage securitization process. This paper finds similarly small renegotiation rates for securitized loans and loans held on banks' balance sheets that become seriously delinquent, in particular during the early part of the financial crisis. We argue that information issues endemic to home mortgages, where lenders negotiate with large numbers of borrowers, lead to barriers in renegotiation. Consistent with the theory, renegotiation rates are strongly negatively correlated with the degree of informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders over the course of the crisis.