WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MONETARY AND MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES: A SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW

The emergence of macroprudential policies, implemented by central banks as a means of promoting financial stability, has raised many questions regarding the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies. Given the limited number of studies available, this paper sheds light on this issue by providing a critical and systematic review of the literature. To this end, we divide the theoretical and empirical studies into two broad channels of borrowers – consisting of the cost of funds and the collateral constraint – and financial intermediaries – consisting of risk‐taking and payment systems. In spite of the existing ambiguity surrounding coordination issues between monetary and macroprudential policies, it is argued that monetary policy alone is not sufficient to maintain macroeconomic and financial stability. Hence, macroprudential policies are needed to supplement monetary. In addition, we find that the role of the exchange rate is critical in the implementation of monetary and macroprudential policies in emerging markets, while volatile capital flows pose another challenge. In so far as how the arrangement of monetary and macroprudential policies varies across countries, key theoretical and policy implications have been identified.     

Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Policy: New Evidence from a World Panel of Countries

The event of the recent financial crisis raises the question of whether policy makers could have done more or something different to prevent the build‐up of financial imbalances. This paper contributes to the field of regulatory impact by tackling the debate on whether central banks should ‘lean against the wind’, while in case the response is positive, how macroprudential policies should be combined with monetary policy. Using an augmented Taylor rule and a sample of 127 global economies, the results provide evidence on the importance of macroprudential issues for the implementation of an effective monetary policy. They also document that the type of adopted macroprudential instrument has a substantial effect on such effectiveness, with this policy mix being less ‘integrated’ when the monetary rule aims at primarily safeguarding inflation stability. The results survive robustness checks under alternative assets.     

Macroeconomic and financial stability in a monetary union: The case of Lithuania

In this paper, we study the implications of macroprudential policies in a monetary union for macroeconomic and financial stability. For this purpose, we develop a two-country monetary union new Keynesian general equilibrium model with housing and collateral constraints, to be calibrated for Lithuania and the rest of the euro area. We consider two different scenarios for macroprudential policies: one in which the ECB extends its goals to also include financial stability and a second one in which a national macroprudential authority uses the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) as an instrument. The results show that both rules are effective in making the financial system more stable in both countries, and especially in Lithuania. This is because the financial sector in this country is more sensitive to shocks. We find that an extended Taylor rule is indeed effective in reducing the volatility of credit, but comes with a cost in terms of higher inflation volatility. The simple LTV rule, on the other hand, does not compromise the objective of monetary policy. This reinforces the “Tinbergen principle”, which argues that there should be two different instruments when there are two different policy goals.     

The macroeconomic impact of economic uncertainty and financial shocks under low and high financial stress

External financial frictions might increase the severity of economic uncertainty shocks. We analyze the impact of aggregate uncertainty and financial condition shocks using a threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) model with stochastic volatility during distinct US financial stress regimes. We further examine the international spillover of the US financial shock. Our results show that the peak contraction in euro area industrial production due to uncertainty shocks during a financial crisis is nearly-four times larger than the peak contraction during normal times. The US financial shocks have an influential asymmetric spillover effect on the euro area. Furthermore, the estimates reveal that the European Central Bank (ECB) is more cautious in implementing a monetary policy against uncertainty shocks while adopting hawkish monetary policies against financial shocks. In contrast, the Fed adopts a more hawkish monetary policy during heightened uncertainty, whereas it acts more steadily when financial stress rises in the economy.     

Monetary policy,financial uncertainty,and secular stagnation

A monetary policy framework describing how to cope with a financial crisis might alleviate a recession; however, it might also result in subsequent secular stagnation. Based on an empirical New Keynesian model with financial uncertainty, this study investigates how monetary policy can avoid sluggish economic recovery in response to financial shocks. The results show that a protracted sluggish response of an output gap to a financial shock is triggered by inflation targeting, without considering interest rate variations. In such a policy, the uncertainty causes additional sluggish behavior after a sharp reduction in the output gap. In contrast, in a speed limit policy, the output gap recovers rapidly, regardless of the central bank’s approach to interest rate variations, and the uncertainty mitigates reductions in the output gap. Finally, the results are robust under several alternative settings.     

The federal funds market,excess reserves,and unconventional monetary policy

Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, interbank borrowing and lending dropped, whereas reserve holdings of depository institutions skyrocketed, as the Fed injected liquidity into the U.S. banking sector. This paper introduces bank liquidity risk and limited market participation into a real business cycle model with ex ante identical financial intermediaries and shows, in an analytically tractable way, how interbank trade and excess reserves emerge in general equilibrium. Investigating the role of the federal funds market and unconventional monetary policy for the propagation of aggregate real and financial shocks, I find that federal funds market participation is irrelevant in response to standard supply and demand shocks, whereas it matters for “uncertainty shocks”, i.e. mean-preserving spreads in the cross-section of liquidity risk. Liquidity injections by the central bank can absorb the effects of financial shocks on the real economy, although excess reserves might increase and federal funds might be crowded out, as a side effect.     

中美货币政策国际协调的福利收益——基于NOEM框架的分析

本文利用金融危机前后中美两国经济数据,描述了两国货币政策协调与经济周期协动之间的关系。同时,以新开放经济宏观经济学为理论分析框架,结合经济全球化及金融危机后中美两国现实背景,借鉴Canzoneri等对货币政策国际协调的福利收益的衡量和分析方法,考察了中美两国进行货币政策国际协调的福利收益函数及需要满足的条件。理论模型分析表明,当两国各部门受到冲击的不确定性不对称程度较低时,货币政策国际协调是双赢的选择。     

Lessons from a century of FED policy: Why monetary and credit policies need rules and boundaries

Wide operational and financial independence given to monetary and credit policies subjects the Federal Reserve to incentives detrimental for macroeconomic and financial stability. The absence of a monetary policy rule created go-stop incentives that produced inefficient volatility of both inflation and unemployment during the Great Inflation. Fed credit policy has undergone massive “mission creep” since the Fed was established. Being debt-financed fiscal policy, Fed credit policy beyond ordinary temporary lending to solvent depositories creates friction with the fiscal authorities and jeopardizes the Fed׳s independence. An ambiguous boundary of expansive Fed credit policy creates expectations of Fed accommodation in financial crisis—that blunts the incentive of private entities to take protective measures beforehand (to shrink counter-party risk and reliance on short-term finance, and build up equity capital) and blunts the incentive of the fiscal authorities to prepare procedures in advance to act systematically in times of credit turmoil. These points are illustrated with reference to the 2007–09 financial crisis. Part of the problem is that the independent Fed does not have the same incentive as the 19th century Bank of England to follow Bagehot׳s Rule. The paper concludes with a set of principles to preserve a workable, sustainable division of responsibilities between the independent central bank and the fiscal authorities.     

Bank equity and macroprudential policy

This paper proposes an alternative macroprudential policy in the framework of Gertler et al. (2012). In their model, the central bank subsidizes bank outside equity, where the subsidy rate is determined by the shadow cost of the deposit. We find that the alternative rule in which the subsidy rate responds to the aggregate bank outside equity ratio is welfare improving because it has a better stabilization effect on the bank asset deterioration after a financial shock. We disentangle different channels through which macroprudential policies affect the economy and demonstrate that the better stabilization in the post-crisis economy has a positive effect on the economy in normal times through security prices.     

Central bank disclosure as a macroprudential tool for financial stability

The Basel Capital Accord (pillar 3) states that disclosure of information (transparency) is essential to financial stability. This study analyzes, through inflation reports, the disclosure of information from the Central Bank of Brazil concerning the credit market. We consider credit risk and capital buffers as measures of financial stability in this analysis. Furthermore, in order to measure the perception of the monetary authority on the credit market, we built two indices based on the central bank’s communication on credit development. We performed a panel data analysis based on a sample of 125 banks for the period from June 1999 to September 2014 (7000 observations). The findings suggest that central bank communication regarding expectations concerning the credit market contributes to financial stability. Therefore, this kind of communication of central banks (about credit development) may constitute an important macroprudential tool to improve financial stability.     

In search for yield? Survey-based evidence on bank risk taking

Monetary policy can have an impact on economic and financial stability through the risk taking of banks. Falling interest rates might induce investment into risky activities. This paper provides evidence on the link between monetary policy and bank risk taking. We use a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) for the US for the period 1997–2008. Besides standard macroeconomic indicators, we include factors summarizing information provided in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL). These data provide information on banks׳ new loans as well as interest rates for different loan risk categories and different banking groups. We identify a risk-taking channel of monetary policy by distinguishing responses to monetary policy shocks across different types of banks and different loan risk categories. Following an expansionary monetary policy shock, small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk. Large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure. Foreign banks take on more risk only in the mid-2000s, when interest rates were ‘too low for too long’.     

Monetary policy and bank performance: The role of business models

This paper examines the relationship between monetary policy and bank performance in a multiple-instrument environment, particularly highlighting the conditioning role of bank business models. Employing a unique dataset of Vietnamese commercial banks from 2007 to 2019, we display that banks react to monetary policy changes, either when the central bank increases policy rates or injects money into the economy through open market operations, by decreasing overall returns and increasing financial instability. Additionally, we document that the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves benefits bank outcomes, contrasting to open market operations, albeit the central bank uses both of these policy instruments to alter money supply in the economy. Our key analysis of interest reveals that business models considerably matter in the effects of monetary policy on bank performance. Collectively, our findings demonstrate that banks’ business models that yield more non-interest income or diversify more into different income sources may mitigate the pass-through of monetary policy to bank performance. This finding holds across all interest- and quantitative-based monetary policy indicators and across all the functions of risk-taking behavior, earning-profit capacity, and financial stability. Furthermore, while plotting the marginal effects of monetary policy, we realize that they are insignificant for banks whose business models heavily rely on non-traditional segments.     

货币政策的数量型工具与价格型工具的调控绩效比较——来自动态随机一般均衡模型的证据

本文基于我国经济发展现实,构建了包含金融加速器、工资调整粘性以及消费惯性的新凯恩斯动态随机一般均衡模型,从货币政策的冲击效应、非政策冲击下宏观经济波动幅度以及中央银行损失函数等三个方面对比了不同货币工具的调控绩效,研究显示,价格型工具的调控绩效优于数量型工具,而稳健性分析也对此提供了进一步证明。因此,中央银行应积极地运用利率工具以更有效控制通货膨胀和实际产出波动,维护宏观经济稳定。     

基于市场利率波动测度的货币政策操作风险研究

在货币政策操作过程中,中央银行对宏观经济形势的认识偏差,货币政策工具及政策调控时机的选择不当,以及政策信息的披露不及时等,都有可能误导公众预期,增加市场不确定性,从而引致货币政策操作风险。文章通过利用中国货币市场上同业拆借和债券回购的利率数据进行实证,结果表明,中央银行政策操作透明度不高以及对宏观经济形势进行判断的前瞻性不足,是引致我国货币政策操作风险的重要原因。     

Fed Credit Policy: What is a Lender of Last Resort?

Discussions of the Fed׳s financial crisis lending – and its role as “Lender of Last Resort” more generally – often overlook the distinction between monetary policy and credit policy. Central bank actions constitute monetary policy if they alter the quantity of the bank׳s monetary liabilities, but constitute credit policy if they alter the composition of the bank׳s portfolio without affecting the outstanding amount of monetary liabilities. In the 19th century, Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot advocated Lender of Last Resort policies as a means of expanding the money supply when the demand for money surged in a crisis. In contrast, the Fed׳s recent crisis lending for the most part left its outstanding monetary liabilities unaffected, and thus represented credit policy, not Lender of Last Resort activity. Credit allocation in a crisis is potentially costly because it affects market participants׳ beliefs about the likelihood of future central bank rescues, which in turn reduces their incentive to protect themselves against financial distress and thus exacerbates financial instability. Credible limits on credit policy thus are critical to central banks׳ core policy mission. One path to establishing such limits is to create “living wills” that detail how to resolve large, complex financial firms without government support.     

Does transparency of central banks communication affect credit market? Empirical evidence for advanced and emerging markets

This study examines the effect of the transparency of central banks communication on credit market. In particular, this study investigates how central banks’ effort to provide more detailed information about their objectives regarding the price stability (monetary policy transparency) and financial stability (financial stability transparency) policies are able to mitigate information asymmetry on credit market, through the net interest margin charged by the banks to engage in financial intermediation (credit spread). The findings denote central bank transparency is able to reduce the credit spread. Additionally, the evidence suggests the effect of central bank transparency on the credit spread is greater in emerging markets, where there is less information available on credit market. In brief, transparency in central banks communication is an important tool to mitigate the information asymmetry in the credit market.     

What does a Monetary Policy Shock Do? An International Analysis with Multiple Filters*

What does a monetary policy shock do? We answer this question by estimating a new‐Keynesian monetary policy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for a number of economies with a variety of empirical proxies of the business cycle. The effects of two different policy shocks, an unexpected interest rate hike conditional on a constant inflation target and an unpredicted drift in the inflation target, are scrutinized. Filter‐specific Bayesian impulse responses are contrasted with those obtained by combining multiple business cycle indicators. Our results document the substantial uncertainty surrounding the estimated effects of these two policy shocks across a number of countries.     

Robust monetary policy in a small open economy

We study how a central bank in a small open economy should conduct monetary policy if it fears that its model is misspecified. Using a new-Keynesian model of a small open economy, we solve analytically for the optimal robust policy rule and the equilibrium dynamics, and we separately analyze the consequences of central bank robustness against misspecification concerning the determination of inflation, output, and the exchange rate. We show that an increase in the preference for robustness makes the central bank respond more aggressively or more cautiously to shocks, depending on the type of shock and the source of misspecification.     

Gains from Wage Flexibility and the Zero Lower Bound*

We analyse the welfare impact of greater wage flexibility in the presence of an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate. We show that the ZLB constraint generally amplifies the adverse effects of greater wage flexibility on welfare when the central bank follows a conventional Taylor rule. When demand shocks are the driving force, the ZLB implies that an increase in wage flexibility reduces welfare even under the optimal monetary policy with commitment.     

Gains from Wage Flexibility and the Zero Lower Bound*

We analyse the welfare impact of greater wage flexibility in the presence of an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate. We show that the ZLB constraint generally amplifies the adverse effects of greater wage flexibility on welfare when the central bank follows a conventional Taylor rule. When demand shocks are the driving force, the ZLB implies that an increase in wage flexibility reduces welfare even under the optimal monetary policy with commitment.