Herding by mutual funds: impact on performance and investors’ response†

In this paper we investigate whether herding by actively managed equity funds affects their performances and flows over the 1980–2013 period. We show that during the herding quarter, on average, funds that trade with the herd benefit from this behavior. Although this does not directly translate into a positive association between the extent to which funds herd and their subsequent performance, we find that the funds that follow the herd earn negative abnormal returns whereas the ones that lead earn no abnormal returns. Our results also indicate that investors react adversely to follower funds while they are neutral towards the leader funds.     

Leading the herd: evidence from mutual funds’ buy and sell decisions

This article investigates whether a mutual fund’s performance is related to its herding behavior. Using the methodology of Sias (Rev Finance Stud 17:165–206, 2004), we develop a measure to capture the magnitude that a fund’s buy (sell) decisions are leading other funds’ buys (sells), and find that a fund’s performance is positively (negatively) related to its “buy leading” (“sell leading”). We interpret these findings as evidence that “buy leaders” (“sell leaders”)’ performance benefits (suffers) from the positive (negative) price effect associated with buy (sell) herds. Additionally, we find a positive relationship between fund performance and valuation-motivated “buy leading”, while we find weak evidence on the relationship between performance and valuation-motivated “sell leading”. We interpret these results as evidence that leading funds’ outperformance is due, in part, to their ability to value stocks.     

Are mutual funds sitting ducks?

We find that patient traders profit from the predictable, flow-induced trades of mutual funds. In anticipation of a 1%-of-volume change in mutual fund flows into a stock next quarter, the institutions in the same 13F category as hedge funds trade 0.29–0.45% of volume in the current quarter. A third of the trading is associated with the subset of 504 identified hedge funds. The effect is stronger when quarterly mutual fund portfolio disclosure is required and among hedge funds with more patient capital. A one standard deviation higher measure of anticipatory trading by a hedge fund is associated with a 0.9% higher annualized four-factor alpha. A one standard deviation higher measure of anticipation of a mutual fund's trades by institutions is associated with a 0.07–0.15% lower annualized four-factor alpha. The effect is stronger for more constrained mutual funds.     

Can mutual funds time investor sentiment?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This paper examines the ability of mutual fund managers to time aggregate investor sentiment. Our results indicate that mutual fund managers alter...     

Analysis of Consumer Reports’ recommended mutual funds compared to actual performance

This study examines 60 mutual funds presented in the February 2007 issue of Consumer Reports. In addition, data for the same group of mutual funds were obtained as of 30 September 2008 to evaluate the recommendations provided in Consumer Reports. In order to exclude the major declines that occurred in the stock market in October 2008, the time periods of 30 November 2006 and 30 September 2008 were analyzed in this study. Specifically, this research examines the relationship between mutual funds’ net assets, share prices, manager tenures, expense ratio, tax–cost ratio and annualized returns to see whether Consumer Reports is a reliable source for investors seeking to purchase mutual funds.     

Does concurrent management of mutual and hedge funds create conflicts of interest?

This paper shows that conflicts of interest may exist in cases where a hedge fund manager starts a mutual fund but not in the opposite case. We compare performance, asset flows, and risk incentives to establish several key differences between these two scenarios: First, prior to concurrent management, hedge fund managers experience worse performance while mutual fund managers achieve better performance relative to their full-time peers. Second, hedge fund managers who choose concurrent management are disproportionately the ones with less experience. Their hedge funds tend to suffer a decline in performance after the event. By contrast, mutual fund managers who choose concurrent management tend to outperform their full-time peers. Based on our findings, we make important recommendations for policy makers and companies. The relevance of our recommendations extends beyond the small share of companies presently engaged in concurrent management.     

Stock selection based on Morningstar’s ten-year,five-star general equity mutual funds

Recent research suggests that the individual investor can build stock portfolios that outperform broad market indices. Based on this research and on evidence supporting the persistence of mutual fund performance, we test whether or not the individual investor can build market-superior portfolios from stocks selected from the top holdings of Morningstar’s ten-year, five-star general equity mutual funds. We use modern portfolio theory to construct the portfolios. Although the portfolios tend to outperform the S&P 500 for the 1990s, we conclude that the evidence is not strong enough to recommend this stock selection strategy to the individual investor.     

Institutional investor’ proportions and inactive trading

We focus on a typical market anomaly-inactive trading: trading volume shrinks while stock price abnormally jumps. We calibrate a theoretical model with variance ambiguity heterogeneous among investors and illustrate that ambiguity averse investors' proportions enhance trading volume shrinkage and abnormal price jumps. We provide a cross-section analysis of stocks' inactive trading by introducing institutional investors' proportions to measure investor structures' differences among stocks. We also empirically measure relative inactive trading for constituent stocks in S&P 500 from 2014 to 2019 and demonstrate that institutional investors' proportion is negatively related to inactive trading. Finally, we demonstrate that higher proportions of institutional investors lead to less inactive trading anomalies.     

What determines mutual fund trading in foreign stocks?

We examine the portfolio rebalancing, measured by the equity churn rate, of mutual funds from 29 countries based on annual stockholdings over the 1999–2006 period. We find that funds more often trade the stocks of companies located in countries with higher degree of information asymmetry and are less familiar to fund managers, after we control for the effects of stock market development and investor protection. Consistent with the behavioral bias, fund managers more often rebalance stocks in foreign markets that perform well. This bias is exacerbated when fund managers are less familiar with and less informed about those markets.     

Why are some mutual funds closed to new investors?

Fund families typically claim that closing a fund protects the fund's superior performance by preventing it from growing too large to be managed efficiently. Even though funds with better performance and larger size are more likely to be closed, there is no evidence that closing a fund can indeed protect its performance. Instead, fund closing decisions are more likely to be motivated by spillover effects – by closing a star fund, the fund family signals its superior performance and also brings investors' attention and investments to other funds in the family. Some evidence exists to suggest that the closing strategy is effective in generating higher inflows into the rest of the family, at least in the short run.     

Performance persistence and style consistency of Indian fixed income mutual funds – A longitudinal study

In this study, we evaluate the performance of Indian fixed-income mutual funds using a comprehensive sample over a ten-year period from April 2010 to March 2020. We examine performance persistence of 190 fixed income funds across 16 fund categories and analyze investment style of the most persistent and top performing funds. We assess performance persistence using recursive portfolio formation test, and analyze investment style using Sharpe's (1992) asset class factor model supplemented with Lobosco and diBartolomeo (1997) approach for statistical robustness. We also study the correlation between performance persistence and style consistency and find persistent funds to be less consistent in style. Our findings indicate that a substantial proportion (73%) of the funds considered were under-performers. Our results pertaining to style analysis indicate substantial drift in investment style from regulator-mandated investment objectives. Further, the study nudges regulators to revisit the prevailing practice of fund classification based on Macaulay's duration. In light of the growing prominence of Indian fixed income securities, the findings of this study are all the more pertinent to investors, asset management companies and policy makers.     

Does mutual fund ownership reduce stock price clustering? Evidence from active and index funds

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - The literature is rich with examples of price clustering in financial markets. This study focuses on the relation between mutual fund ownership (both...     

Home bias and Dutch pension funds’ investment behavior

Using a panel data set of more than 600 Dutch pension funds (PFs) between 1992 and 2006, we investigate asset allocation behavior of Dutch PFs across multiple asset classes. We find that domestic investments, also known as home bias, in portfolio choices of Dutch institutional investors have fallen. We also find that the introduction of the euro, the dot-com crisis (1999–2001) and individual PF's characteristics are significant determinants of home bias. Overall, mature PFs’ portfolios are diversified internationally, whereas large PFs seem to prefer to only scale up their foreign, less-risky positions at the expense of domestic fixed-income positions. The effect of the dot-com crisis is more pronounced for domestic bonds, whereas the introduction of the euro was more important for domestic equities.     

The performance of precious-metal mutual funds: Does uncertainty matter?

We studied the relative risk-adjusted returns and downside risk performance of precious-metal mutual funds (PMFs) in different uncertainty periods (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis) using propensity score matching techniques and difference-in-differences matching regression. For a sample of PMFs and global corporate funds quoted in USD over the period January 2005 to June 2015, we found that the relative performance of PMFs differed across uncertainty periods. Thus, they performed similarly to corporate funds in the pre-crisis period, they outperformed corporate funds regarding risk-adjusted returns but underperformed in terms of downside risk in the crisis period and they displayed a similar risk-return performance to corporate funds in the post-crisis period. Difference-in-difference estimates indicate that a shift from low to high uncertainty had a positive impact on risk-adjusted returns for PMFs, whereas this advantage dissipated when uncertainty was reduced. However, fluctuations in uncertainty had mixed effects on the relative downside risk associated with PMFs. This evidence has implications for investors who seek to gain exposure to precious metals using PMFs.     

Missing the marks? Dispersion in corporate bond valuations across mutual funds

We study the dispersion of month-end valuations placed on identical corporate bonds by different mutual funds. Such dispersion is related to bond-specific characteristics associated with liquidity and market volatility. The Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) could have contributed to the general decline in dispersion over our sample period, though other factors most likely played roles. Further tests reveal marking patterns to be consistent with returns smoothing behavior by managers. Funds with ambiguous marking policies and those holding “hard-to-mark” bonds appear more prone to smooth reported returns. From a regulatory perspective, we see little downside to requiring funds to explicitly state their marking standards.     

Bank lending ‘manias’ in theory and history

A popular view of banking crises sees them as consequences of prior bank lending manias. Such manias are supposed to be especially likely in legally unrestricted banking systems, where banks can issue notes and are not subject to statutory reserve requirements. Here it is argued that the bank lending mania hypothesis (1) exaggerates the role of subjective factors, including bankers' confidence or optimism, as a stimulus to bank lending, and (2) is not supported by evidence from past, legally unrestricted banking systems.     

Bank–SMEs relationships and banks’ risk-adjusted profitability

This research investigates how SME performance, the typology of loans and the length and scope of relationships between small banks and SMEs affect the margin adjusted for the risk that each customer generates. After analysing 4285 firm-year observations from Finnish banks, the quality of a SME’s performance is found to be the major factor in explaining the risk-adjusted profitability of banks. However, the length and scope of a relationship and the loan dimensions also play an important role.     

IQ and corporate insiders’ decisions to time insider and outsider trading

We examine how corporate insiders’ cognitive ability (IQ) affects their decisions to time insider and outsider trading before abnormal stock price changes. Our analysis of archival data on male corporate insiders in Sweden shows they are less prone to time their insider selling and to sell in larger amounts, before abnormal stock price declines as IQ increases. We also find that insiders with a higher IQ are better at timing their outsider buying. Taken together, our results show that corporate insiders’ IQ affects their trading decisions differently, depending on whether they are trading in their insider or outsider stocks.     

Actively managed mutual funds holding passive investments: What do ETF positions tell us about mutual fund ability?

We provide the first in-depth examination of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) within actively managed mutual fund (AMMF) portfolios to better understand why AMMFs make substantial investments in passive ETFs. We examine the association between holding ETF positions and AMMF performance, as well as indirect measures of performance, including market timing, flow management, and cash holdings. We find that over one-third of AMMFs take an ETF position between 2004 and 2015. Our results indicate that AMMFs allocating large portions of their portfolio to ETFs perform worse, by between 0.41% and 1.63% annually using various performance measures. These AMMFs also exhibit worse market timing and hold more cash. In contrast, AMMFs that hold ETFs in small amounts have similar characteristics to non-user AMMFs. Therefore, the act of holding an ETF does not signal inferior ability, however, taking large ETF positions does.