Business groups and environmental violations: Evidence from China

Although, in the modern era, stakeholders put pressure on firms to engage in environmental friendly practices, yet collaborative arrangements in the shape of business group affiliations may prove a double-edged sword. Accordingly, this study examines the impact of such collaborative arrangements on firm's environmental violations. On one hand, this affiliation can better pursue environmental policies and regulations because of their higher political or social visibility and reduce environmental infractions. Conversely, higher political legitimacy may derive from engaging in environmental violations. Using a unique sample from China comprising 6860 firm-year observations over the 2010 to 2020 time period, we find that business group affiliation increases environmental violations, implying that stronger political legitimacy provides them relaxation in strictly following environmental regulations in comparison to standalone firms. We also find that this nexus is more pronounced when the affiliated firms have poor shareholder and board monitoring. These findings are helpful for policymakers/regulators concerning the initiative's evaluation regarding sustainable development and ecological protection.     

Political connections and privatization: Evidence from China

We examine how the political connections of acquirers influence the process and outcomes of privatization in China. We find that politically connected acquirers receive preferential treatment and acquire higher quality firms during full privatization, and document evidence of post-privatization tunneling from target firms to acquirers. We show that the excessive tunneling by politically connected acquirers is associated with lower performance after privatization. Overall, our results suggest that individuals are likely to abuse their political connections to exploit the opportunities arising from privatization. We recommend that policymakers constrain the influence of political connections in the privatization process.     

Political connections,tax benefits and firm performance: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the different effects of political connections on the firm performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises. Using data on Chinese listed firms from 1999 to 2007, we find that private firms with politically connected managers outperform those without such managers, whereas local SOEs with connected managers underperform those without such managers. Moreover, we find that private firms with politically connected managers enjoy tax benefits, whereas local SOEs with politically connected managers are prone to more severe over-investment problems. Our study reconciles the mixed findings of previous studies on the effect of political connections on firm performance.     

Political connections of newly privatized firms

We investigate the extent of political connections in newly privatized firms. Using a sample of 245 privatized firms headquartered in 27 developing and 14 developed countries over the period 1980 to 2002, we find that 87 firms have a politician or an ex-politician on their board of directors. Politically-connected firms are generally incorporated in major cities, are highly leveraged, and operate in regulated sectors. The likelihood of observing political connections in these firms is positively related to government residual ownership, and negatively related to foreign ownership. Political fractionalization and tenure, as well as judicial independence are also key explanatory variables. Finally, politically-connected firms exhibit a poor accounting performance compared to their non-connected counterparts.     

Political costs and corporate tax avoidance: Evidence from sin firms

The products and services of firms operating in sin industries (alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and firearms) run contrary to social norms and can produce significant negative externalities for society. As such, we expect that sin firms are at greater risk of incurring political costs in the form of additional regulation, higher excise taxes, or capital market intervention if they come under scrutiny for their income tax avoidance practices. Because of the nature of their products, regulators and policymakers are likely to face less pushback on new regulations or taxes on these firms. Sin firms start with a lower ability to influence the political process than firms in non-sin industries. Consequently, we hypothesize and find that sin firms exhibit less tax avoidance than non-sin firms, particularly through uncertain and more risky tax avoidance strategies. The negative relationship between the status of sin firms and tax avoidance is less pronounced in firms that accumulate political capital via intensive lobbying activities. Exploiting changes in partisan control of the Congress and White House, difference-in-differences tests show that firearm firms engage in less (more) tax avoidance when the Democrats (Republican) control both the Congress and White House. Overall, we conclude that political costs play an important role in corporate tax avoidance decisions.     

Political connections,auditor choice and corporate accounting transparency: evidence from private sector firms in China

This article investigates the way in which political connections impact auditor choice. Using a political connection index constructed based on the bureaucratic ranks of executive managers and board members in Chinese private sector firms, we find that for firms with weak political connections, the likelihood of hiring high‐quality auditors increases with the degree of political connectedness, while it decreases with political connectedness for firms with strong political connections. This inverse U‐shaped relationship is particularly pronounced for firms with ownership structures that intensify agency problems. Finally, we find that political connections and accounting transparency also have an inverse U‐shaped relationship.     

The impact of political connections and business groups on cash holdings: Evidence from Chinese listed firms

We investigated the impact of political connections and business group affiliation on the cash holdings of firms listed on two main Chinese stock exchanges. We applied panel data regression analysis on a dataset comprising 10,832 observations for these companies from 2008 to 2015. We found political connections to be positively correlated with cash holdings, while business group affiliation is negatively correlated. Firms with both political connections and business group affiliations hold more cash. These findings are consistent with the tenets of agency theory and the speculative motives of corporate managers.     

Tax avoidance in family firms: Evidence from large private firms

Ownership structure plays an important role in firms’ decisions on tax avoidance. Recently, the effect of family ownership on corporate tax avoidance has become an issue of increasing interest among scholars from both the fields of family business research and tax research; however, empirical findings have so far remained ambiguous. Based on a unique sample of 678 large private firms from Germany, we show that for unlisted large firms (i) family firms avoid more tax than non-family firms, (ii) tax avoidance increases with the percentage of family ownership, and (iii) tax avoidance is a function of the number of shareholders. We interpret our results as evidence that benefits from avoiding taxes outweigh the non-tax costs in the case of large private family firms in Germany. Furthermore, as the number of family shareholders increases, family firms satisfy increasing demand for dividends by avoiding taxes.     

Institutional trading and information processing: Evidence from complicated firms and easy-to-analyze firms

In this article, I examine institutional trading within two groups of firms with different demands on investor information processing: conglomerate firms and stand-alone firms. On average, institutional trading in conglomerate firm stocks yields significantly lower returns than institutional trading in stand-alone firm stocks. Inferior returns following institutional trading in conglomerate firm stocks persist across small and large firms. Moreover, financial institutions with a low concentration of conglomerate firms in their portfolios are more profitable in their trading. This study provides evidence that skilled institutional investors intentionally focus their information-processing efforts on easy-to-analyze firms.     

Disability and accounting firms: Evidence from the UK

An accumulation of interpretative studies in a range of international contexts has considered gender, race and social class in accounting employment. However, no work has considered accounting firms’ attitudes towards employing disabled people. This omission is surprising given the passing of successive disability rights legislation in the United States since 1918 and the United Kingdom (UK) since 1944 and consequent changes in public expectations regarding equal employment opportunities for disabled people. This paper examines the UK accounting profession's response to changes in disability legislation. Using a survey administered to UK firms and an analysis of the Big Four firms’ 2003 UK annual reviews, we report that firms’ have a minimal understanding of disability, that disability is not a significant component of firms’ personnel policies, that firms lag behind other organizations in their attitudes to disability, and images of disability are wholly absent from firms’ annual reviews. We discuss these findings in the context of prior accounting research which considers gender, race and social class, which is used to develop a research agenda.     

Corporate governance and risk-taking: Evidence from Japanese firms

This paper examines the influence of corporate governance on the risk taking of Japanese firms. We show that family control and ownership concentration are associated with higher idiosyncratic risk, whereas bank control has the opposite effect. Considering the link between idiosyncratic risk and firm performance, the results provide an economic rationale for the higher (lower) performance of family-controlled firms (bank-controlled firms). The results also explain the higher performance of firms with concentrated ownership by relating their governance structures to the risk-taking strategies that generate greater competitive advantages. Finally, we show that the impact of governance structures on risk taking is stronger after controlling for endogeneity.     

Cross-listing and corporate malfeasance: Evidence from P-chip firms

The rapid growth of the private sector in China in recent decades has resulted in a large number of capital-hungry private sector firms. An increasing number of these firms choose to raise equity capital on international exchanges, which typically have stronger disclosure, corporate governance, and investor protection regulations. In light of international investors' and regulators' concerns about the corporate finance practice of China's private sector firms, particularly regarding the integrity of their reported earnings, we investigate whether these firms aggressively manipulate their accounts by examining those listed in Hong Kong, commonly known as P-chips. We find systematic evidence that P-chips engage in more earnings management and other corporate misbehaviors than their counterparts in Hong Kong. We posit and provide evidence consistent with cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as a possible explanation for P-chips' questionable practices, and discuss its implications.     

Media attention and regulatory efficiency of corporate violations: Evidence from China

We examine the influence of media attention on the regulatory efficiency of corporate violations in a restrictive media environment. Using a hand-collected sample of corporate violations in China during 1998–2018, we find that fraudulent firms accompanied by more negative media attention are associated with a higher hazard rate of the violation being investigated and enforced. The effect is not diminished by the political connections of the fraudulent firms and is robust after controlling for potential confounding factors. Our findings suggest that by influencing regulatory efficiency, the media serve as an effective governance mechanism even in markets with strict media control.     

Founders and board structure: Evidence from UK IPO firms

This study investigates whether a company's founders affect the combination of executive, grey and independent directors on its board at the time of initial public offering (IPO) in the UK. Particularly, we analyse how venture capitalists are associated with board structure in founder-managed and non-founder-managed firms. We find that UK IPO firms managed by founders tend to have more executive directors. Further, they are more likely to stack non-executive directors with more independent directors relative to grey directors. Venture capital ownership is not significantly associated with board structure at the IPO stage. However, further evidence suggests that venture capital ownership is negatively related to the percentage of executive directors and positively related to the percentage of grey directors in the founder-managed firms.     

Managerial ownership and firm valuation: Evidence from Japanese firms

We study the relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's q (Q) for 123 Japanese firms from 1987 to 1995. Managers in Japanese firms own a smaller stake in their firms relative to their US counterparts. Our initial analyses using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model show a negative (positive) relation between Q and managerial ownership at low (high) levels of ownership. However, we argue that this finding is most likely a statistical artifact. When we control for firm fixed effects, suggested by recent literature, we reach a different conclusion. Specifically, we find that Q increases monotonically with managerial ownership. Our findings, therefore, suggest that as ownership increases, there is a greater alignment of managerial interests with those of stockholders. This conclusion remains when both managerial ownership and Q are treated as endogenous variables in a simultaneous equation system.     

Ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from Italian firms

Abstract

This paper reports on empirical investigations into the relationship between dividend policy and ownership structure of firms, using a sample of 139 listed Italian companies. Ownership structure in Italy is highly concentrated and hence the relevant agency problem to analyse seems to be the one that arises from the conflicting interests of large shareholders and minority shareholders. This paper therefore attempts to test the rent extraction hypothesis by relating the firm’s dividend payout ratio to various ownership variables, which measure the degree of concentration in terms of the voting rights of large shareholders. The hypothesis that other non-controlling large shareholders may have incentives to monitor the largest shareholder is also tested. The results of the empirical analysis reveal that firms make lower dividend payouts as the voting rights of the largest shareholder increase. Results also suggest that the presence of agreements among large shareholders might explain the limited monitoring power of other ‘strong’ non-controlling shareholders.     

Ownership structure and divestiture decisions: Evidence from Australian firms

Divestitures create shareholder value by helping firms to optimize their portfolio of assets. However, firms may forego value enhancing divestitures because of agency problems. More specifically, large controlling shareholders may prefer to retain the assets in order to extract private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders. In this paper, we explore the role that other blockholders play in constraining the largest shareholder's influence. The results indicate that divestiture activity decreases with the ownership of the largest shareholder. The presence of another significant blockholder appears to curb this negative bias towards divestitures. Our findings provide an economic rationale for the higher performance of firms characterized by more balanced ownership structures. Involvement of family owners also appears to provide similar benefits.     

Confucianism,successor choice,and firm performance in family firms: Evidence from China

This study examines the nexus between Confucianism, the choice of the leadership successor, and firm performance in family firms in China. It provides original evidence that firm founders who are deeply influenced by Confucianism have a higher likelihood of choosing a family member or a guanxi-connected nonfamily member as the successor. Moreover, family/guanxi-connected successors have a positive effect on firm performance compared with their counterparts outside of the family/guanxi circle. One underlying reason is that, affected by Confucianism, only the family/guanxi-connected successors can acquire the founder's specialized assets via pre-succession internal managerial experience, which, in turn, enables them to outperform other successors.     

Tax avoidance in government-owned firms: Evidence from Italy

This paper studies whether and why government-owned firms avoid taxation to a greater extent than wholly privately-owned firms do. By considering a sample of Italian listed corporations for the period between 2006 and 2011, it was found that government ownership had a systematically negative effect on corporate effective tax rate, with a prevalence of tax-planning policies focused on the long term. Managers of local government-owned firms focused on minimizing costs, even if this was to the detriment of national tax-revenue collection.     

Aggressive reporting,investor protection and stock price informativeness: Evidence from Chinese firms

This paper investigates the impact of aggressive reporting on the ability of stock prices to inform in Chinese firms. Using both stock price synchronicity and the probability of informed trading as proxies for stock price informativeness, we find that aggressive reporting damages the ability of stock prices to inform in Chinese firms. Our findings are robust to potential endogeneity and the use of alternative aggressive-reporting measures. Finally, we find that the impact of aggressive reporting in reducing stock price informativeness is stronger in firms located in regions of weaker institutional development and in private sectors firms.