Do corporate governance mechanisms matter for cash holdings and firm value?

This paper examines the relationships between firm-level corporate governance mechanisms and cash holdings; along with their combined effects on firm value for a sample of firms listed in Singapore and Malaysia. Firms with less effective governance attributes are found to be more inclined to accumulate cash than those with more effective governance. The results support the flexibility hypothesis in that an increase in agency conflicts between managers and minority shareholders leads to entrenched managers having more discretion to hoard cash reserves. In addition, the incremental value of holding excess cash is shown to be negative for firms with a single leadership structure, firms with a pyramidal ownership structure, as well as family-controlled firms. The discounts associated with these firms may reflect investors’ recognition of the possibility of managerial entrenchment.     

Information asymmetry,leverage and firm value: Do crisis and growth matter?

Drawing on pecking order and agency cost theories, we assess the extent to which information asymmetry is an important determinant of firm value and the extent to which this relationship is conditional on the leverage level of firms. We also assess the impact of information asymmetry on firm value during the pre and post 2007/09 financial crisis period and for high and low growth opportunity firms. Using a large sample of UK firms, our empirical findings suggest that information asymmetry adversely impacts firm value, and that this effect decreases with firm's leverage. We also find that leverage has a negative effect on firm value, and that the marginal effect of leverage is lower for information asymmetric firms. Further, we find that the relation between information asymmetry and firm value is more pronounced in the post-crisis period than the pre-crisis period. Finally, we show that the impact of information asymmetry on firm value is higher (lower) for firms with high (low) growth opportunities.     

Do shareholders really matter for firm performance? Evidence from the ownership characteristics of Italian listed companies

This paper studies the impact of the features of the shareholder base on the performance of a large sample of Italian listed firms between 2007 and 2019, both within and across firms. We expand the empirical evidence on the relation between shareholder type and different dimensions of firm performance by dividing shareholders into six categories, and further differentiating between domestic and foreign investors. We provide extensive evidence on the relation between firm performance and different types of shareholders, showing how diverse performance metrics are correlated with the voting rights of specific types of shareholders. Consistent with previous studies, the picture that emerges from our analysis shows that the ownership structure of Italian listed companies is characterized by a high degree of concentration. In this context, we find that ownership concentration or the presence of a controlling shareholder is in general associated with better performance. Moreover, a positive relation exists between diverse firm performance metrics and the voting rights of family shareholders, founders and foreign investors, while government ownership is detrimental in the short-term.     

To beat or not to beat? The importance of analysts’ cash flow forecasts

We investigate the implications of firms’ benchmark-beating patterns with respect to analysts’ quarterly cash flow forecasts for firms’ current capital market valuation and their future performance. We hypothesize that nonnegative earnings surprises are more likely to be supported by real operating performance and signal higher earnings quality if they are achieved via higher than expected cash flows or lower than expected accruals. We show that firms beating analyst earnings forecasts have larger positive capital market reactions and larger earnings response coefficients if they beat analyst cash flow forecasts or report lower than expected accruals. We also demonstrate that these firms’ superior future performance may provide an economic justification for their more favorable market response. Our findings suggest that firms’ ability to beat analyst cash flow forecasts is informative regarding the quality of their earnings surprises.     

The effect of major customer concentration on firm profitability: competitive or collaborative?

We test two potential hypotheses regarding the effects of major customer concentration on firm profitability. Under the collaboration hypothesis, customer power facilitates collaboration, and both the supplier firm and its major customers obtain benefits. Under the competition hypothesis, customer power results in rent extraction, and the major customers benefit at the expense of the supplier firm. We document that major customer concentration is negatively associated with the supplier firm’s profitability but positively associated with the major customers’ profitability. We demonstrate that these effects weaken as the supplier firm’s own power grows over its relationship with major customers, supporting the competition hypothesis. We carefully reconcile our results with prior studies’ findings that focus only on the supplier firm’s profitability and identify their research design and interpretation problems. We obtain similar inferences in a setting of major customers’ horizontal mergers and when we use an alternative measure of major customer power.

     

Do controlling shareholders collude with their related large shareholders? Evidence of equity pledges and shareholding increases from China

The key for controlling shareholders to prevent the risk of equity pledge is to increase the stock price, and the large shareholders' shareholding increases have the effect of increasing the stock price. Using the data of Chinese A-share firms from 2007 to 2019, this paper examines the relationship between the controlling shareholders' equity pledges and their related large shareholders' shareholding increases. We find that when the controlling shareholders pledge equity, their related large shareholders are more likely to increase their shareholdings. By analyzing the necessity, ability and motivation of related large shareholders to provide help, we find that shareholding increases of related large shareholders are behaviors of helping controlling shareholders to mitigate the risk of equity pledge. Based on the analysis of external acquisition threats, stability heterogeneity of control rights and exogenous impact of Vanke Equity Competition, it is shown that the controlling shareholders pledging equity promote their related large shareholders to increase their shareholdings for the purpose of preventing the risk of control transfer. In further analysis, we find that the shareholding increases of related large shareholders have the practical effect of improving the stock price and preventing pledge risks. This paper proves that the controlling shareholders pledging equity collude with their related large shareholders, which is reflected in the fact that the shareholding increases of the related large shareholders have become a means for controlling shareholders to prevent the risk of equity pledge.     

Is the relationship between investment and conditional cash flow volatility ambiguous,asymmetric or both?

We investigate the effect of cash flow volatility on investment. Our evidence suggests that financially constrained firms decrease investment (i) when experiencing persistently high volatility; (ii) when experiencing both high volatility and negative cash flow growth realisations; and (iii) when holding low cash levels and experiencing both high volatility and a negative cash flow growth realisations. In financially unconstrained firms, the above effects are either not found or are of relatively low economic importance. Overall, our findings lend support to the financial flexibility literature and tend to contradict predictions of the real options literature.     

Grabbing hand or financial constraint mitigation effect? A reexamination of the relationship between institutional development and cash holdings

This study reexamines the impact of institutional development on corporate cash holdings. Our findings confirm that institutional development has a negative effect on corporate cash holdings, which may be partially explained by the financial constraint mitigation effect of institutional development. Our empirical evidence also shows that the corruption index, used as a proxy for the grabbing hand effect, does not mediate the negative effect of institutional development on corporate cash holdings. Furthermore, the impact of institutional development on corporate cash holdings is not significant for large firms and state-owned enterprises. These results are robust to different measures of cash holdings.     

Mutual supervision or conspiracy? The incentive effect of multiple large shareholders on audit quality requirements

Multiple large shareholders may choose to mutual supervise or conspire, thereby affecting the firm's strategy and transactional operations. This paper examines the impact of firms with multiple large shareholders on demand for high-quality audits. Compared with firms with a single large shareholder, firms with multiple large shareholders increase audit cost and increase the probability of hiring a Big Four accounting firm. After a series of robustness checks, this result holds. Furthermore, we find that the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder tends to increase audit cost and increase the probability of hiring the Big Four. The absolute controlling and non-controlling shareholders tend to increase audit cost and increase the probability of hiring the Big Four. The state-owned firms and large firms with multiple large shareholders tend to increase audit cost and increase the probability of hiring the Big Four. This paper helps to enrich the research on external audit supervision and moral hazard research from the perspective of ownership structure.     

Value or Glamour? An empirical investigation of the effect of celebrity CEOs on financial reporting practices and firm performance

In this study, I investigate the impact of managerial reputation, as proxied by high‐profile awards to CEOs, on financial reporting practices and firm performance. Using a sample of 269 awards given to 189 celebrity CEOs (CEOs who win awards) from 1987 to 2003, I compare within‐firm changes in financial reporting practices and firm performance before and after each CEO wins their first award. I find that celebrity CEOs engage in more conservative accounting practices and are less likely to engage in opportunistic earnings management to meet short‐term earnings benchmarks. In addition, firm performance improves after celebrity CEOs win awards.     

Voice and power: Do institutional shareholders make use of their voting power?

I investigate the role of voting power – the ability to influence a vote's outcome – in the voting behavior of institutional shareholders. Using hand-collected data from Israel, an environment with concentrated ownership, I employ a power index borrowed from the political science literature to examine the voting power wielded by institutional shareholders and the voting patterns they display. I find that institutional shareholders' voting power is negatively related to their tendency to vote against management: the stronger the shareholder, the higher the probability they will vote in favor of a management-sponsored proposal. Based on evidence obtained here, this behavior is attributable to pre-vote negotiations as well as to the voting strategy of “counting on my vote not counting.” Next, I use detailed data on shareholders' votes to identify the channel through which a voting rule affects minority shareholder protection. I find that powerful institutional shareholders almost never use their voting power to vote against management, not even when signals of poor governance are discernible. I conclude that the effect of a voting rule on minority shareholder protection operates through proposal selection, rather than through direct voting.     

Liquid asset sheltering,or cost of capital? The effect of political corruption on corporate cash holdings

I posit that political corruption affects firms through an entrenchment between entrepreneurs and politicians instead of coercive extortion. Based on this postulate, I refute the claim that firms in a more corrupt environment hold less cash due to liquid assets sheltering from political extraction. Instead, I propose that firms in a more corrupt environment hold less cash because of the high cost of capital. In fact, I find that firms in more corrupt countries hold cash beyond their optimum for the given cost of carry due to severe financial constraints. This excess cash results in value destruction. I call this phenomenon the financial effect of corruption. Thus, I challenge the conventional wisdom and argue that the effects of political corruption on corporate cash holdings are primarily indirect through financial mechanisms.     

Do defaulting CEOs and directors increase the likelihood of financial distress of the firm?

We hypothesize that the information on a CEO’s and directors’ (board members) past personal payment default entries in public credit data files significantly increases the predictive power of Altman’s (in J Fin 23(4):589–609, 1968) and Ohlson’s (In J Acc Res 18(1):109–131, 1980) distress prediction models. We base our hypothesis on the literature showing that (1) managerial traits such as overconfidence, over-optimism, and the illusion of control affect corporate decisions and that (2) these same personal traits explain personal over-indebtedness and credit defaults. Our results of analyzing the credit data files of more than 100,000 CEOs and directors of the Finnish private limited liability companies support this hypothesis. Our results remain materially unchanged when using the bootstrapping method to assess their significance and when excluding small firms (firm size below the sample median). Collectively, our results imply that creditors should recognize the increased distress risk of firms appointing defaulting CEOs and directors.     

Helping hands or grabbing hands? An analysis of political connections and firm value

We construct a unique political connection index to capture variations in the strength of firm political relations in China. The index incorporates various channels through which a firm's executives, chairperson, directors, and other senior officers are politically connected with government officials and bureaucrats. Overall, there is a negative relation between our index and firm value for the full sample, but such negative relation mainly exists for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and it becomes positive for non-SOEs. Furthermore, close examination shows an inverted U-shaped relation between political connections and firm value for the full sample in general and for non-SOEs in particular: Firm value increases initially at a lower level of connections and then begins to decrease at a higher level. The findings are consistent with the different business objectives and motivations of SOEs and non-SOEs in seeking political connections. Finally, our findings are robust after controlling for potential endogeneity and using an alternative headcount index construction method.     

Role of bank credit on local growth: Do politics and crisis matter?

Although state-owned banks are expected to promote the growth of less-developed regions, especially in developing economies, several cross-country studies report that lending by state banks is associated with the inefficient allocation of credit and low levels of development. Further, state banks have been found to lend to their cronies, especially around elections. In this paper, we study the lending activities of state-owned and private banks during the period 1992–2010 and analyze the relationship between the credit these banks provide and local economic growth in Turkey during crisis periods and in election years. We find that the share of state-owned banks in the credit market in crisis periods and local election years is significantly higher than their share in non-crisis and non-election periods. The per capita real credit that state-owned banks provide during crisis years is found to be positively associated with local growth in all provinces. Our results suggest that although state-owned banks might issue loans for political reasons in election periods, they also seem to play an important role in offsetting the adverse effects of economic shocks, especially in developed provinces.     

Regional growth and finance in Europe: Is there a quality effect of bank efficiency?

In this study, we test whether regional growth in 11 European countries depends on financial development and suggest the use of cost- and profit-efficiency estimates as quality measures of financial institutions. Contrary to the usual quantitative proxies of financial development, the quality of financial institutions is measured in this study as the relative ability of banks to intermediate funds. An improvement in bank efficiency spurs five times more regional growth then an identical increase in credit does. More credit provided by efficient banks exerts an independent growth effect in addition to direct quantity and quality channel effects.     

Halo effect or fallen angel effect? Firm value consequences of greenhouse gas emissions and reputation for corporate social responsibility

Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are perceived to have negative consequences for society at large by contributing to potential climate change and represent a potential cash drain from firms from exposure to future regulatory, abatement, and compliance costs. Beginning in 2010, US companies are required to report their GHG emissions to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). We utilize these data for 2010–2014 to examine whether the possible adverse firm value impact of these GHG emissions is alleviated or exacerbated by the firm’s reputation for corporate social responsibility. Our findings suggest that there is no halo effect, i.e., a firm’s reputation for social responsibility (as reflected in its CSR score) does not protect the firm from the adverse firm value effects of GHG emissions. Rather, our findings suggest a fallen angel effect, i.e., for any given level of GHG emissions, the higher the firm’s CSR score, the greater the adverse impact on firm value. In other words, the decline in firm value due to the adverse impact of GHG emissions is compounded by the hit to the firm’s reputation for corporate social performance. Our paper contributes to the sparse prior US literature on the firm value effects of GHG emissions. Further, by providing scholarly evidence on the existence of a fallen angel effect, our findings suggest that boards and managers of firms that provide voluntary CSR disclosures cannot afford to be complacent about their GHG emissions.     

To switch or not to switch? The effect of audit firms’ economies of scale on audit firm switches after audit price deregulation in China

We exploit the unique setting of China’s 2014 audit price deregulation policy to examine whether audit firms use their economies of scale (EOS) to compete for clients. We find a significant increase in client firms switching from a non-EOS auditor to an EOS auditor after the audit price deregulation policy was implemented. The additional analyses show that EOS audit firms are more likely to offer audit fee discounts than non-EOS audit firms while retaining audit quality. We also find that the auditors’ EOS effect is more pronounced for highly homogeneous industries and firms paying high abnormal audit fees, firms in financial distress, and firms receiving less capital market attention than for less homogeneous industries and firms paying low abnormal audit fees, financially stable firms, and firms receiving more capital market attention. Finally, we find that the presence of state-owned enterprises and political connections both separately and jointly moderate the effect of audit firm–client realignments from a non-EOS auditor to an EOS auditor after the audit price deregulation. Overall, our study provides important insights for policymakers and regulators reviewing and developing new policies on audit services.     

Mickey Mouse and the IDioT principle for assessing research contribution: discussion of ‘Is the relationship between investment and conditional cash flow volatility ambiguous,asymmetric or both?’

Keefe and Tate ( 2013 ) provide both interesting and worthwhile insights into whether, under what circumstances and to what extent cash flow volatility impacts corporate investment. In the current paper, I have two related goals. First, more narrowly, I provide a constructively critical commentary on salient aspects of their empirical strategy, giving particular emphasis to the key drivers of Keefe and Tate's contribution to the literature. Second, illustrated in the context of Keefe and Tate, my broader goal is to give general advice especially aimed at novice researchers on how to make any empirical study more appealing to a critical reader.     

For whom (and for when) is the firm governed? The effect of changes in corporate fiduciary duties on tax strategies and earnings management

The proper object of the fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers is frequently described as the central question in all corporate law. We use the adoption of constituency statutes, which shift the loci of corporate managers' duties from shareholders to a wide range of stakeholders, as a quasi-natural experiment to determine the actual impact of fiduciary duties. We find that though the adoption of constituency statutes has no significant effect on measures of earnings management, it has a robust effect on firms' effective tax rate, which increases in a range between 0.570% and 1.903%. These results are robust in terms of various measures of the firm's effective tax rate. We provide explanations for why fiduciary duties apparently do not influence manager behaviours in relation to shareholders but do affect their behaviours in relation to the taxing authority. We argue that a change to fiduciary duties does not appear to alter the motivation of managers to maximize shareholder welfare outcomes, but rather it allows them to eschew short-term strategies that often impair long-term outcomes.