Do the stock and CDS markets price credit risk equally in the long-run?

In this paper, we examine the existence and stability of the long-run equilibrium relation between the price of credit risk in the stock and CDS markets for a sample of non-financial iTraxx Europe companies during the 2004–2017 period. We show that standard cointegration tests with no breaks frequently fail to detect cointegration. Once we formally account for the breaks in the cointegrating vector, we are able to detect cointegration over the entire sample period for the vast majority of the companies considered. An application of these results to CDS-equity trading shows that the profitability of traditional trading strategies crucially depends on the presence of cointegration and on the stability of the cointegrating vector. Finally, we find that CDS illiquidity factors decrease the likelihood of the stock and CDS market cointegration.     

Home equity lines of credit and the unemployment rate: Have unemployed consumers borrowed themselves into the next financial crisis?

Some economists argue the recent recovery has been so meager because many consumers have lost their main source of income and maxed-out their home-equity borrowings. Further, banks that were able to make consumer loans did so with less security because home prices fell so dramatically. This paper argues that at least part of that recovery story is purely anecdotal and, in fact, incorrect. In spite of the precipitous decline in home prices, the original price increases were so large that many homeowners still have/had adequate equity in their homes to borrow. The paper presents evidence that the average quarterly increase in aggregate home equity line of credit (HELOC) lending after housing prices began their decline is, statistically, no different than the average quarterly increase in HELOC lending before housing prices began their downward trend. The evidence also suggests that increased HELOC lending during the recession is not correlated with higher unemployment.     

The chicken or the egg? A note on the dynamic interrelation between government bond spreads and credit default swaps

This note provides the first empirical assessment of the dynamic interrelation between government bond spreads and their associated credit default swaps (CDS). We use data for the Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) that found themselves with a problematic public sector in the dawn of the recent financial distress. We find that CDS prices Granger-cause government bond spreads after the eruption of the 2007 sub-prime crisis. Feedback causality is detected during periods of financial and economic turmoil, thereby indicating that high risk aversion tends to perplex the transmission mechanism between CDS prices and government bond spreads.     

Game changer? The impact of the VW emission-cheating scandal on the interrelation between large automakers’ equity and credit markets

This paper investigates the change in the securities market pricing behavior of 16 large, global automakers following disclosure of the Volkswagen (VW) emission-cheating scandal on September 18, 2015, when the EPA issued a notice of violation to VW, stating that VW had intentionally circumvented the US clean air rules for diesel automobile emissions. We contend that this event unblocked an informational cascade, in that much of the information was already known to outside parties, yet no significant market response occurred until the September 18 EPA notice. We also find a significant change in the evolution of equity and credit default swap (CDS) prices in the automobile industry consistent with more-informed trading in the equity market. A test of economic significance further supports this finding by showing a decrease in the profitability of a trading rule based on a predictive relation between CDS spread changes and lagged equity returns.     

What do equity issuances signal? A study of equity issuances in the UK before and during the financial crisis

The financial crisis provides an ideal setting to study how quality signalling by firms, and information asymmetries, might explain the stock price reactions around seasoned equity offerings. The heightened information asymmetry levels during the GFC should have increased the importance of issuance quality and information asymmetries in explaining announcement returns. However, we document new and, in some cases, surprising findings, using a sample of 700 UK seasoned equity offerings between 2003 and 2012: (1) Contrary to expectations, announcement returns during the crisis were driven less by signalling and asymmetric information effects and more by macroeconomic conditions and general uncertainty. (2) In constrained capital markets, firms that were able to move more quickly to raise significant amounts of capital, made the capital-raising environment more challenging for firms that followed, such that the latter had to incur additional costs. (3) Contrary to the traditional view that the low book-to-market ratios may proxy for overvaluation and thus lower announcement returns, we found a negative relationship during the crisis period. The latter is consistent with the view that book-to-market ratios may also proxy for a distressed firm effect which may have dominated the conventional ‘market timing’ effect during the GFC. (4) Announcement returns were strongly positive for many firms at the peak of the crisis, possibly because the market was relieved to see that equity issues might potentially save firms from insolvency; an equity issuance could, in such circumstances, be a positive signal, even though equity issues are conventionally seen as negative signals. Overall, our paper documents fresh and surprising results about equity capital-raising during the GFC, and also offers insights for corporate finance that are of interest beyond the current crisis.     

How resilient and countercyclical were emerging economies during the global financial crisis?

By studying the cross-country incidence of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, we document a structural break in the way emerging economies responded to the global shock. Contrary to popular perceptions, emerging economies suffered growth collapses (relative to the pre-crisis levels) comparable to those experienced by developed economies, even when they continued growing. Afterwards, most economies returned to their pre-crisis growth rates. Although emerging economies were not able to avoid the collapse originated in the U.S. and then transmitted across countries, they were more resilient during the global crisis than during past crises. Namely, they resumed their higher growth rates earlier and converged more quickly to their pre-crisis growth trend. Moreover, breaking with the past, emerging economies did not fall more than developed economies during the global crisis and were able to conduct countercyclical policies, thus becoming more similar to developed economies.     

Is there a relation between audit fee cuts during the global financial crisis and banks’ financial reporting quality?

As a result of the global financial crisis (GFC), several audit clients were able to negotiate lower audit fees for the years 2008 and 2009. However, the PCAOB has expressed concern that lower audit fees might lead to lower audit effort and lower audit quality and financial reporting quality. This study examines the relation between audit fee cuts and banks’ financial reporting quality. Specifically, we focus on earnings management via loan loss provisions (LLP), the relation between current period LLP and future loan charge-offs, i.e., LLP validity, and the timely recognition of loan losses. For banks audited by Big 4 auditors, we find that income-increasing abnormal LLP are decreasing in audit fee cuts and LLP validity is increasing in audit fee cuts. For banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors, LLP validity is higher for banks that received a fee cut of more than 25% relative to other banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors. We do not observe an association between timely loan loss recognition and cuts in audit fees except for banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors and exempt from internal control audits where a fee cut of more than 25% is associated with less timely loan loss recognition. Overall, the findings suggest that Big 4 auditors constrained earnings management via LLP in banks that received cuts in audit fees. Our findings have important implications for regulators, investors, and others.     

How common are credit-less recoveries? Firm-level evidence on the role of financial markets in crisis recovery

We study firm recoveries from systemic sudden stops in developing countries, where firms' cash flows suffer exogenous shocks. Contrary to macro studies suggesting that output recovery precedes that of the financial sector, firm-level data shows that only in less than a third of firms, operating cash flows recover without a recovery in external credit, and even these firms have access to other sources of cash. Specifically, firms with high prior short-term debt exposure do experience a sharp reduction in short-term credit but increase operating cash flows during a crisis. Firms with high prior cash holdings experience negative cash flows and deplete their cash holdings. Thus, firms' financial prepositioning predicts recovery in cash flows and is consistent with trade-off theories of capital structure and with precautionary motives for cash holdings. We find no support for the maturity mismatch hypothesis, which predicts that firms with high short-term debt should have harder recoveries post crisis.     

Did the securitization market freeze affect bank lending during the financial crisis? Evidence from a credit register

Using data from the Italian Credit Register we identify the adverse effect of the freeze of the securitization market on bank lending during the crisis of 2007–2008. Applying a differences-in-differences estimation to data on firms that borrow from multiple banks, we single out credit supply by including firm fixed effects. Our results show that the degree to which banks tightened credit supply to nonfinancial firms is positively related to the share of loans they securitized before the crisis. The tightening translated into lower credit growth, higher interest rates, lower probability of accepting loan applications and higher probability of relationship termination. Firms were unable to fully compensate the negative credit supply shock, which suggests that the securitization freeze played a role in reducing aggregate credit availability.     

How close a relationship does a capital market have with other such markets? The case of Taiwan from the Asian financial crisis

In assessing how far and how close the relationships are between the Taiwan capital market and other international capital markets in Asian financial case, we examine the co-movement patterns by developing the “unequal variance test”. We find that a closer relationship exists between Taiwan and Hong Kong throughout the sample period than between Taiwan and other Asian countries and the US. It thus appears that adjacent regions with similar backgrounds in terms of their capital markets will reflect price patterns that are more similar to those of Taiwan than those of countries with which Taiwan frequently trades or cooperates.     

Are cryptocurrencies a safe haven for equity markets? An international perspective from the COVID-19 pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic provided the first widespread bear market conditions since the inception of cryptocurrencies. We test the widely mooted safe haven properties of Bitcoin, Ethereum and Tether from the perspective of international equity index investors. Bitcoin and Ethereum are not a safe haven for the majority of international equity markets examined, with their inclusion adding to portfolio downside risk. Only investors in the Chinese CSI 300 index realized modest downside risk benefits (contingent on very limited allocations to Bitcoin or Ethereum). As Tether successfully maintained its peg to the US dollar during the COVID-19 turmoil, it acted as a safe haven investment for all of the international indices examined. We caveat the latter findings with a warning that Tether's dollar peg has not always been maintained, with evidence of impaired downside risk hedging properties earlier in our sample.     

Spillover effects of the 2008 global financial crisis on the volatility of the Indian equity markets: Coupling or uncoupling? A study on sector-based data

This paper focuses on the following question: has the global financial stress in the US markets during the subprime crisis induced a persistent volatility of Indian equity stocks? We answer this question using sector-based data and we propose a simple stochastic volatility model augmented with exogenous inputs (financial stress indicators in the US market). We derive analytically the autocorrelation of the squared returns using cross-moments and estimate the impact of several variables such as the CDS spreads, the ABCP spreads, market liquidity, the volatility of the S&P 500 using a Kalman filter approach with the impact captured through Almon polynomials. We find a strong evidence of persistent volatility irrespective of the sector and interpret this finding as the result of two factors: the lower liquidity of the Indian equity markets during the subprime crisis and a wake-up call effect.     

Why has the investment-cash flow sensitivity declined so sharply? Rising R&D and equity market developments

The study of the investment-cash flow (ICF) sensitivity constitutes one of the largest literatures in corporate finance, yet little is known about changes in the ICF relationship over time, and the literature has largely ignored how rising R&D investment and developments in equity markets have impacted ICF sensitivity estimates. We show that for the time period 1970–2006, the ICF sensitivity: (i) largely disappears for physical investment, (ii) remains comparatively strong for R&D, and (iii) declines, but does not disappear, for total investment. We argue that these findings can largely be explained by the changing composition of investment and the rising importance of public equity as a source of funds, particularly for firms with persistent negative cash flows.     

Are safe haven assets really safe during the 2008 global financial crisis and COVID-19 pandemic?

This study evaluates the safe-haven role of twelve assets against the US stock market during the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) and the COVID-19 pandemic. Our results show that silver and the Islamic stock index were safe havens during the 2008 GFC, and the Islamic stock index and Tether have been safe havens during COVID-19. We observe that the Islamic stock index and Tether have emerged as strong new safe havens. However, our supplementary analysis reveals that gold and Bitcoin still exhibit safe-haven behavior during severe market downturns. Overall, our findings suggest that safe-haven assets may vary over time.     

How does credit risk affect cost management strategies? Evidence on the initiation of credit default swap and sticky cost behavior

In this paper, we examine the effect of credit defaults swaps (CDS) initiation on reference firms' cost management strategies. CDS contracts provide insurance protection for creditors, inducing a shift in bargaining power from borrowers to creditors and an excessive incidence of bankruptcy. Anticipating more intransigent creditors in debt renegotiations and higher bankruptcy risk, CDS firms are incentivized to mitigate risk through decreasing cost stickiness after CDS initiation, as cost stickiness lowers liquidity and triggers early covenant violations. We find that, on average, CDS initiation is associated with a decline in reference firms' cost stickiness. This association is more pronounced for less liquid, financially distressed, and lower credit quality firms. We also find that CDS firms with a reduction in cost stickiness will exhibit lower future bankruptcy risk than CDS firms without such as reduction in stickiness. Collectively, our findings suggest that the CDS-induced “empty creditor problem” causes reference firms to undertake more conservative cost management practices to alleviate downside risk.     

The 2008 global financial crisis and COVID-19 pandemic: How safe are the safe haven assets?

We compare the performance of safe-haven assets during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and COVID-19 pandemic. First, regarding the GFC, we find, intermediate (weak) safe haven evidence for US dollar, Swiss franc and T-bonds (Gold, Silver and T-bills). Second, with regard to COVID, we find gold is very risky in some settings, while silver has become extremely risky. Collectively, our findings suggest that the character of safe-haven assets has changed between the crises. Therefore, investors should exercise extreme care when investing in potential safe-haven assets during times of market stress.     

On the prediction of financial distress in developed and emerging markets: Does the choice of accounting and market information matter? A comparison of UK and Indian Firms

We examine differences in price delay for a sample of real estate investment trust (REIT) and non-REIT matched pairs. Results suggest an economically and statistically higher level of price delay for REIT securities, which implies heightened frictions that increase the time needed for new information to be impounded into the prices of REIT shares. The primary drivers for the observed delay differential include differences in idiosyncratic volatility, market risk, and the number of days traded. Within-REIT determinants of delay confirm findings for the pooled sample of matched pairs. Importantly, we infer find that REIT investors are not compensated for restricted information flow, as excess returns are unrelated to the price delay.     

The impact of a new term auction facility on Libor–OIS spreads and volatility transmission between money and mortgage markets during the subprime crisis

During the subprime crisis, the U.S. Federal Reserve was concerned about widening spreads between overnight interbank lending rates such as the overnight index swap (OIS) and term London Interbank Offer Rate (Libor). Among the tools it used to counter the impact of the crisis, the innovative term auction facility (TAF) attracted much attention. We investigate the impact of the TAF on the Libor–OIS spread. We find that the TAF has clear initial and sustained expectation effects on the three-month Libor–OIS spread, but no real initial or short-term funding effects, which casts doubt on the usefulness of the TAF in reducing risk spreads. Since the subprime crisis also spilled across the interbank, commercial paper, and jumbo mortgage markets, we further examine the lead–lag relation between Libor–OIS, commercial paper, and jumbo spreads and the volatility transmission effects between them. For the period before the crisis, we find that the three markets behave largely independently. For the subprime crisis period, however, we find multidirectional lead–lag relations and one-way volatility transmission between these markets.     

Is managerial ability a moderator? The effect of credit risk and liquidity risk on the likelihood of bank default

This study investigates the effect of credit and liquidity risks as well as the moderating role of managerial ability on the likelihood of European commercial bank default during the period 2006 to 2017. We employ data envelopment analysis and a tobit model to measure banks' efficiency, the z-score to measure the likelihood of their default, and perform endogeneity and model specification robustness tests. Our results reveal that both risks significantly affect the likelihood of bank default and that the high skill of managers does not attenuate this effect. Rather, in the case of credit risk, managerial ability extenuates this effect. Managerial overconfidence and narcissism may explain the latter result. Another plausible explanation is that highly skilled managers who are likely to be rewarded with performance-based compensation schemes may be incentivized to hide bad news for an extended period of time. Such a scenario would increase the likelihood of bank default.     

Spanish credit institutions: do efficiency and solvency support the first decisions on bank restructuring from a financial point of view 2008-2012?

The restructuring processes of the Spanish financial entities over the last years has led us to analyze financially how efficiency and solvency of banks and savings banks explain the decisions of incorporation and control of these entities. We analyze 51 Spanish financial entities for the period 2008-2012. The results show higher solvency and efficiency of banks over savings banks. On the other hand, after the first integrations it is observed that it is still early for these ratios to improve on the results obtained by the entities before the integrations. However, from the financial point of view, these integrations do explain how correct the start-up and intensification of the restructuring processes were. There are some exceptions to the global criteria, which are explained by the size, strength and structure of the business and the closeness of its financial management scope to the area and business structure of the bigger banking groups.