Cost management and corporate payout decisions

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We investigate the relationship between cost management and dividend payout decisions. Prior studies document that firms with consistent earnings or...     

Geopolitical risk and corporate payout policy

In this study, we examine the effects of geopolitical risk on corporate payout policy. Exploiting a news-based index of geopolitical risk, we find that firms adopt a more conservative payout policy by reducing share repurchases in response to greater geopolitical risk, whereas the effects of geopolitical risk on cash dividends are insignificant. Further analysis suggests that cash flow uncertainty and financial distress risk are two potential channels through which geopolitical risk affects corporate payout policy. We also show that the effects of geopolitical risk on share repurchase are more pronounced for firms with greater exposure to product market competition and those facing higher threats of financial distress. Overall, our study emphasizes the implications of geopolitical risk for corporate payout choice.     

Growth,governance and corporate payout policy

We show that when growth opportunities decreased following the end of the Cold War, defence firms responded by increasing total payout. This change in policy was largely driven by increased stock buybacks as opposed to changes in cash dividends and primarily by firms that faced stronger external governance. On the other hand, firms with weaker internal governance that were more severely affected by the reduced growth chose to alter the mix of payout at the expense of repurchases. Overall, our findings (i) demonstrate a causal link where exogenous shocks to growth cause payout policy changes, (ii) support the role of internal governance in payout policy design where entrenched managers pre‐commit to higher dividends and (iii) emphasize the monitoring role of external governance in mitigating agency costs of free cash flow.     

Short‐selling constraints and corporate payout policy

This study shows that managers adjust corporate payout policies to counteract intensified short‐selling pressures following the removal of a short‐selling constraint. We use a controlled experiment, the Regulation SHO pilot program, to find that changing the short‐selling rule brings small companies to increase cash dividends, but not to repurchase more shares. Because paying dividends is costly, it is acknowledged as a more reliable signal of stock undervaluation than share repurchase. While our evidence suggests that companies select this payout strategy to deter predatory short sellers, it also shows that a short‐selling activity has a causal effect on corporate payout decisions.     

Readability of narrative disclosures,and corporate liquidity and payout policies

In this paper, we examine the relation between the readability of narrative disclosures in 10-K reports, and corporate liquidity and payout policies. We find that firms with less readable disclosures hold significantly more cash. We also find that this relationship is stronger for firms with weak corporate governance, and with higher financing constraints and refinancing risks. Further analysis also shows that firms with less readable disclosures pay fewer cash dividends and repurchase less stock. Our findings are robust to different estimation methods, and to alternative specifications of key variables. The findings from this study contribute to the emerging research that stresses the importance of 10-K report readability in protecting shareholder wealth.     

How corporate governance affects payout policy under agency problems and external financing constraints

This paper analyzes the effect of corporate governance on the payout policy when a firm has both agency problems and external financing constraints. We empirically test whether strong corporate governance would lead to higher payout to minimize agency problems (outcome hypothesis), or to lower payout to avoid costly external financing (substitute hypothesis). We find that firms with higher (lower) external financing constraints tend to decrease (increase) payout ratio with an improvement in their corporate governance. The results are consistent with our hypothesis that the relation between payout and corporate governance is reversed depending on the relative sizes of agency and external financing costs.     

Shareholder litigation rights and corporate payout policy: Evidence from universal demand laws

This study exploits the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws, which place significant obstacles to derivative lawsuits and thus, undermine shareholders’ rights by 23 states in the United States (U.S.) from 1989 to 2005 as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the effects of shareholder litigation rights on corporate payout policy. Weakened litigation rights for shareholders materially increase firms’ payout ratios. The effect is more pronounced for firms exposed to higher shareholder litigation risk ex-ante, firms with higher institutional holdings, and ones financially unconstrained. Overall, the findings are consistent with lower shareholder litigation threats motivating firms to increase dividend payouts.     

The evolution of ownership structure of corporate spin-offs

Spin-offs inherit the ownership structure of their parents. The change from the monitoring requirements of the parent to those of an often smaller and higher risk firm constitutes a shock to this inherited ownership structure. This paper examines how block ownership changes in response to this shock and the performance and survival consequences of these changes. Block ownership increases from an average inherited level of 20.34% to 27.35% in three years. Comparison with size and industry-matched firms shows that this is not due to secular trends. Block ownership increases more when the inherited block ownership is smaller, when the spin-offs are smaller, have poorer performance and fewer growth opportunities relative to the parent, and when they operate in industries that are less related to the parents' industries. The results suggest that block ownership changes in response to the monitoring needs of spin-offs. This interpretation is supported by the positive association between changes in block ownership and subsequent firm performance and survival.     

Patterns in payout policy and payout channel choice

We study the decision to distribute funds as well as the choice of the payout channel (i.e. dividends, repurchases, or both). Our analysis of the payout policy of UK firms demonstrates that the importance of share repurchases is increasing, but dividends still constitute a vast proportion of the total payout. We document that there is a relation between the presence of blockholders and the choice of the payout channel. We find that payout decisions are influenced by directors’ liquidity needs but are not consistent with the agency theory of payout. We also reject the tax-clientele explanation for payout choices.     

Repurchase premia as a reason for dividends: a dynamic model of corporate payout policies

We propose that it is precisely because firms' repurchases oftheir own stock through tender offers are associated with largestock-price increases that repurchases are unattractive as ameans o distributing cash. As a result, firms distribute somecash in the form of dividends - despite the tax disadvantage- and carry the rest to future periods. However, when theirstock is sufficiently undervalued, firms distribute all accumulatedcash through stock repurchases. We show that dividends are smoothedand are positively related both to earnings innovations andto previous period's dividends. Also, the stock-price reactionto a repurchase announcement, of a given size, is increasingin the previous period's dividends.     

Internationalization and the evolution of corporate valuation

By documenting the evolution of Tobin's q before, during, and after firms internationalize, this paper provides evidence on the bonding, segmentation, and market-timing theories of internationalization. We find that Tobin's q does not rise after internationalization, even relative to domestic firms. Instead, q rises significantly before and during the internationalization year, but then falls sharply in the following year, quickly relinquishing the increases of the previous years. In decomposing these dynamics, we find that market capitalization rises before internationalization and remains high, while corporate assets increase during internationalization. The evidence supports the theory that financial internationalization facilitates corporate expansion, but challenges the theory that internationalization produces an enduring effect on q by bonding firms to a better corporate governance system.     

Corporate payout policy in dual-class firms

We examine corporate payout policy in dual-class firms. The expropriation hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out less to shareholders because entrenched managers want to maximize the value of assets under control and the associated private benefits. The pre-commitment hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out more to shareholders because firms use corporate payouts as a pre-commitment device to mitigate agency costs. Our results support the pre-commitment hypothesis. Dual-class firms have higher cash dividend payments and total payouts, and they use more regular cash dividends rather than special dividends or repurchases, compared to their propensity-matched single-class firms. Dual-class firms with severe free cash flow-related agency problems and few growth opportunities rely even more on corporate payouts as a pre-commitment mechanism. We also rule out the alternative explanation that dual-class firms pay out more because super-voting shareholders lack the ability to generate home-made dividends by selling shares since super-voting shares are often non-tradable or very illiquid.     

The rise of corporate governance in corporate control research

This article has two related tasks. First, we review the articles published in this Special Issue on Corporate Control, Mergers, and Acquisitions. These articles provide new evidence on several aspects of corporate control and governance including the value and performance effects of various ownership groups, the impact of internal governance structures, the effects of regulatory changes on specific industries and evidence on bidding strategies in takeovers. This analysis leads us to our second task – to examine the evolution of corporate control research, broadly defined. Our analysis shows a movement in research from mergers and acquisitions to a broader analysis of corporate governance, especially internal governance features. We suggest that there is a trend toward an increase in the relative importance of internal governance compared to discipline from the market from corporate control. This trend reflects an important change over the past several decades in the means through which the market disciplines corporate behavior.     

Expropriation of minority shareholders and payout policy

This paper studies the payout policy of Italian firms controlled by large majority shareholders (controlled firms). The paper reports that a firm's share of dividends in total payout (dividends plus repurchases) is negatively related to the size of the cash flow stake of the firm's controlling shareholder and positively associated with the wedge between the controlling shareholder's control rights and cash flow rights. These findings are consistent with the substitute model of payout. One of the implications of this model is that controlled firms with weak corporate governance set-ups, in which controlling shareholders have strong incentives to expropriate minority shareholders, tend to prefer dividends over repurchases when disgorging cash.     

Evidence on the international evolution and convergence of corporate governance regulations

The issue of appropriate corporate governance framework has been a focal point of recent reforms in many countries. This study provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of corporate governance regulatory systems and their evolution since 1990 in 30 European countries and the US. It proposes a methodology to create detailed corporate governance indices which capture the major features of capital market laws in the analyzed countries. The indices indicate how the law in each country addresses various potential agency conflicts between corporate constituencies: namely, between shareholder and managers, between majority and minority shareholders, and between shareholders and bondholders. The analysis of regulatory provisions within the suggested framework enables us to understand better how corporate law works in a particular country and which strategies regulators adopt to achieve their goals. The 15-year time series of constructed indices and large country-coverage also allows us to draw conclusions about the convergence of corporate governance regimes across the countries.     

The association between dividend payout and firm growth: Australian evidence

We report that whereas firms with high earnings distributions tend to have low‐to‐moderate growth (consistent with conventional theory), firms with low earnings distributions run the range between high and low performers. We interpret our findings for firm growth and payout policy in relation to the firm's location on the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) matrix that combines high/low growth with high/low market share. Our findings suggest that the market has difficulty in distinguishing between these types of firms. A concern is that investor preferences as an outcome may be focussed on dividend‐paying firms at the expense of younger growing firms in need of retained earnings.     

The effect of information shocks on dividend payout and dividend value relevance

We exploit the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as a source of exogenous shock to the corporate financial information environment to study the potential effect that this information shock might have on the dividend payout policy and dividend value relevance in the UK and France. We employ a difference-in-differences research design, in which our choice of the control and treatment groups is mainly based on the divergence between domestic accounting standards and IFRS, while holding institutional factors constant. The UK domestic accounting standards slightly diverge from IFRS (low-divergence firms), whereas French domestic accounting standards substantially diverge from IFRS (high-divergence firms). Nevertheless, both countries have similar institutional factors that might confound the effect of IFRS adoption. Our theoretical argument is that IFRS adoption is expected to mitigate information asymmetry, a major reason for the free cash flow problem (Jensen, 1986) and cash over-retention (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Our findings suggest that IFRS adoption is a major contributor in increasing dividend payouts among high-divergence firms via reduction of asymmetric information. Moreover, improving the information environment helps investors become more confident about using accounting numbers to assess firm financial performance, which causes a significant reduction in dividend value relevance among high-divergence firms.     

The end of corporate imperialism

As they search for growth, multinational corporations will have no choice but to compete in the big emerging markets of China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil. But while it is still common to question how such corporations will change life in those markets, Western executives would be smart to turn the question around and ask how multinationals themselves will be transformed by these markets. To be successful, MNCs will have to rethink every element of their business models, the authors assert in this seminal HBR article from 1998. During the first wave of market entry in the 1980s, multinationals operated with what might be termed an imperialist mind-set, assuming that the emerging markets would merely be new markets for their old products. But this mind-set limited their success: What is truly big and emerging in countries like China and India is a new consumer base comprising hundreds of millions of people. To tap into this huge opportunity, MNCs need to ask themselves five basic questions: Who is in the emerging middle class in these countries? How do the distribution networks operate? What mix of local and global leadership do you need to foster business opportunities? Should you adopt a consistent strategy for all of your business units within one country? Should you take on local partners? The transformation that multinational corporations must undergo is not cosmetic--simply developing greater sensitivity to local cultures will not do the trick, the authors say. To compete in the big emerging markets, multinationals must reconfigure their resources, rethink their cost structures, redesign their product development processes, and challenge their assumptions about who their top-level managers should be.     

永恒的主题:银行业公司治理建设

银行公司治理建设是一个长期实践和动态的过程,好的治理机制应该具备健全稳定的治理架构,对治理主体清晰职责边界的确定,以及内部相互监督与制约机制、激励考核和问责机制,还应包括透明度建设和社会责任与形象的提升。