Earnings Volatility,Post–Earnings Announcement Drift,and Trading Frictions

We find that lower ex ante earnings volatility leads to higher Post–Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD). PEAD is a function of both the magnitude of an earnings surprise and its persistence. While prior research has largely investigated market reactions to the magnitude of the earnings surprise, in this study we show that the persistence of the earnings surprise is equally important. A unique feature of the anomalous PEAD returns documented here concerns the association between abnormal returns and trading frictions. Besides demonstrating that firms with lower earnings volatility have higher abnormal returns, we also find that lower earnings volatility firms have lower trading frictions. Taken together, these findings imply that higher abnormal returns are associated with lower trading frictions. We exploit this implication to empirically demonstrate that PEAD returns due to earnings volatility are not concentrated in the firms with the largest trading frictions, which is in contrast to the findings in prior anomaly studies.     

Does voluntary balance sheet disclosure mitigate post-earnings-announcement drift?

Theory suggests that balance sheet information such as total assets, total equity, or total liabilities complements earnings information in helping investors assess a firm’s profitability and estimate earnings growth. The voluntary disclosure of balance sheet information at earnings announcement could help investors gather and process this information at a lower cost. We therefore predict that voluntary balance sheet disclosure at the time of an earnings announcement helps investors promptly understand the implication of current earnings news for future earnings and subsequently reduces post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). Consistent with these predictions, our results show that when firms provide voluntary balance sheet disclosures, the earnings response coefficient in the event window is significantly higher and the corresponding PEAD is significantly lower. We further find that the impact of voluntary balance sheet disclosure on PEAD is more pronounced when the magnitude of balance sheet value surprise is larger, when balance sheet value is more informative about future earnings, when earnings uncertainty is higher, or when information cost is higher, consistent with our conjectures that helping investors to better understand future earnings performance and lowering information costs are key mechanisms underlying the effect of voluntary balance sheet disclosure on PEAD.     

Implications of Transaction Costs for the Post–Earnings Announcement Drift

This paper examines the effect of transaction costs on the post–earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Using standard market microstructure features we show that transaction costs constrain the informed trades that are necessary to incorporate earnings information into price. This implies weaker return responses at the time of the earnings announcement and higher subsequent returns drift for firms with higher transaction costs. Consistent with this prediction, we find that earnings response coefficients are lower for firms with higher transaction costs. Using portfolio analyses, we find that the profits of implementing the PEAD trading strategy are significantly reduced by transaction costs. In addition, we show, using a combination of portfolio and regression analyses, that firms with higher transaction costs are the ones that provide the higher abnormal returns for the PEAD strategy. Our results indicate that transaction costs can provide an explanation not only for the persistence but also for the existence of PEAD.     

Are good-news firms riskier than bad-news firms?

This paper examines the relative risk of good-news firms, i.e., those with high standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), and bad-news (low SUE) firms using a stochastic discount factor approach. We find that a stochastic discount factor constructed from a set of basis assets helps explain post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). The risk exposures on the pricing kernel increase monotonically from the lowest to highest SUE sorted portfolios. Specifically, good-news firms always have higher risk exposures than bad-news firms in both 10 SUE sorted portfolios and 25 size and SUE sorted portfolios. However, the estimated expected risk premium is too small to explain the observed magnitude of returns on the PEAD strategy. Our risk adjustment can explain only about one-fourth of the total magnitude of the average realized return to the PEAD strategy. As a result, the average risk-adjusted returns of earnings momentum strategies are mostly positive and significant. Overall, our results support the view that at least some portion of the returns to the earnings momentum strategies examined represent compensation for bearing increased risk.     

Insider trading,future earnings,and post-earnings announcement drift

This paper examines the association between insider trading prior to quarterly earnings announcements and the magnitude of the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). We conjecture and find that insider trades reflect insiders’ private information about the persistence of earnings news. Thus, insider trades can help investors better understand and incorporate the time-series properties of quarterly earnings into stock prices in a timely and unbiased manner, thereby mitigating PEAD. As predicted, PEAD is significantly lower when earnings announcements are preceded by insider trading. The reduction in PEAD is driven by contradictory insider trades (i.e., net buys before large negative earnings news or net sells before large positive earnings news) and is more pronounced in the presence of more sophisticated market participants. Consistent with investors extracting and trading on insiders’ private information, pre-announcement insider trading is associated with smaller market reactions to future earnings news in each of the four subsequent quarters. Overall, our findings indicate insider trading contributes to stock price efficiency by conveying insiders’ private information about future earnings and especially the persistence of earnings news.     

Earnings communication conferences and post-earnings-announcement drift: Evidence from China

Earnings communication conferences in China have become the main platform for direct communication between listed firms and individual investors. This study investigates whether hosting an earnings communication conference and its tone affect post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). We find that hosting an earnings communication conference increases PEAD. One possible explanation for our results is that investors overreact to the stock prices of firms that hold earnings communication conferences. We also conclude that the conference tone is negatively correlated with PEAD. In addition, the market reacts more strongly to the managers’ tone than it does to the investor's tone.     

Earnings Management and the Post‐earnings Announcement Drift

We posit that the post‐earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is related to earnings management. Accordingly, we find that firms with large negative (positive) changes in operating cash flows manage accruals upward (downward). Most importantly, we find that PEAD is concentrated largely among those firms that are most likely to have smoothed their reported earnings and is generally associated with discretionary accruals as opposed to nondiscretionary accruals. There is no evidence of a positive (negative) PEAD for those firms with large positive (negative) earnings changes that are least likely to have managed earnings downward (upward).     

Objective estimation versus subjective perceptions of earnings patterns and post‐earnings‐announcement drift

We investigate how the market's subjective estimates of autocorrelation in quarterly earnings vary with objective time‐series estimates. Our results suggest that investors increasingly underestimate the correlation as the autocorrelation level increases, and as a result, the post‐earnings‐announcement drift (PEAD) increases with the level of autocorrelation. We further show that the ability of autocorrelation to explain variation in the PEAD is robust to alternative explanations based on risk and institutional factors. Additional analysis indicates that the market's inefficiency in assessing the existence and magnitude of autocorrelation (and the related impact on PEAD) is inversely related to the richness of the information environment.     

Post earnings announcement drift and the roles of drift-enhanced factors in New Zealand

This study examines the profitability of trading on analyst forecast-based earnings surprises during the post announcement period in the New Zealand stock market over the period 1994 to 2008. The results show that a post earnings announcement drift (PEAD) anomaly exists in the New Zealand equity market. A hedge strategy of going long the top quintile of earnings surprise stocks and short the bottom quintile of earnings surprise stocks can generate more than 6% excess return in the 60 days following the earnings announcement. I further test the association between PEAD and several control variables and find that PEAD is increasing in 1) earnings surprise defined relative to past earnings, and 2) the level of arbitrage risk. Interestingly, I do not find evidence of a positive relation between PEAD and revenue surprise after controlling for earnings surprise as documented in the United States (Jegadeesh and Livnat, 2006). There is also no evidence that the 2002 Disclosure Reform in the New Zealand Stock Exchange reduced the magnitude of PEAD.     

Information Uncertainty and Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift

Abstract:  We examine whether rational investor responses to information uncertainty (IU) explain properties of and returns to the post-earnings-announcement-drift (PEAD) trading anomaly. Consistent with a rational learning explanation, we find that: (1) unexpected earnings (UE) signals that are characterized as having greater IU have more muted initial market reactions; (2) extreme UE portfolios are characterized by securities with higher IU than non-extreme UE portfolios; and (3) within the extreme UE portfolios, high IU securities are more prevalent and earn larger abnormal returns than low IU securities. Further tests show that prior evidence of greater PEAD profitability for higher idiosyncratic volatility securities is explained by the greater information uncertainty associated with these securities.     

Agency-based demand for conservatism: evidence from state adoption of antitakeover laws

We use antitakeover laws passed by several states in the mid-1980s and early 1990s as an exogenous increase in agency conflicts and examine how these laws affect the demand for asymmetric timeliness of loss recognition (ATLR). Consistent with the debt-based contracting demand for ATLR, we find an increase in ATLR after the passage of antitakeover laws for firms with high contracting pressures. These increases are incremental to those found in control firms that face similar pressures but whose states did not pass antitakeover laws. We do not find comparable changes in ATLR for firms with higher agency costs of equity. In contrast to the observed increases in ATLR, we find no change in the short-window information content of earnings announcements. Overall, our results suggest that higher agency conflicts result in a heightened demand for ATLR in financial statements but not for more forward-looking new information. Further, these demands seem to emanate from debtholders and not from equityholders.     

Do higher value firms voluntarily disclose more information? Evidence from China

This paper examines the effect of guanxi on the relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure of information about new investment projects in China's institutional setting. We find a negative relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure for firms that rely heavily on guanxi in their value creation (e.g. non-high-tech firms, and firms located in regions with underdeveloped institutions). By contrast, for firms that rely less heavily on guanxi and more on other sources of core competencies (e.g. high-tech firms, and firms in high-marketisation regions), we find a positive relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure. The moderating role of guanxi on the relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure is explained by firms conscientiously balancing the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure relative to guanxi. Specifically, high guanxi-dependence firms refrain from detailed voluntary disclosures for fear of revealing sensitive information that may harm their guanxi. In contrast, low guanxi-dependence firms rely more heavily on voluntary disclosures to reduce information asymmetry and financing cost, with such incentives being particularly strong for high value firms. Our evidence has implications for research on motives for disclosure and regulation of financial reporting.     

Executive option exercises and financial misreporting

Several recent papers document that the magnitude of potential gains from stock-based compensation is positively related to the likelihood of misreporting. In a sample of firms that announce restatements of their financial statements from 1997 to 2002, we examine whether managers realize these potential gains occurring from their accounting choices. After controlling for diversification needs and stock price impact, we find no significant evidence of higher option exercises by executives in the misreported years. However, for firms that are more likely to have made deliberate aggressive accounting choices, we find significant evidence of higher option exercises. For these firms, option exercises are higher by 20–60% in comparison to industry and size matched nonrestating firms. Options exercises by executives are also increasing in the magnitude of the restatement as captured by the effect of the restatement on net income. These higher option exercises tend to be more pervasive and are not just confined to the CEO and CFO of the firm.     

Improving internal control quality as a corporate response to the Forbes Rich List

This study takes advantage of the Forbes Rich List as an external shock to examine its effect on internal control quality in mainland China. Using the difference-in-differences (DiD) method for a large sample of 17,910 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2014, we find that firms controlled by entrepreneurs included in the Forbes Rich List tend to have higher internal control quality than firms not controlled by entrepreneurs in the list. The listed entrepreneurs improve their firms’ internal control quality by means of reducing the information asymmetry between the firms and outsiders. Further tests show that the event effect is more pronounced when firms have higher misreporting costs and when listed entrepreneurs hold chairman positions than in other situations. Our results remain robust after applying the propensity score matching method, stacked DiD estimation, and an alternative measure of internal control quality. These findings enrich the literature on the effect of the Rich List and the determinants of internal control quality in emerging markets.     

Information asymmetry,leverage and firm value: Do crisis and growth matter?

Drawing on pecking order and agency cost theories, we assess the extent to which information asymmetry is an important determinant of firm value and the extent to which this relationship is conditional on the leverage level of firms. We also assess the impact of information asymmetry on firm value during the pre and post 2007/09 financial crisis period and for high and low growth opportunity firms. Using a large sample of UK firms, our empirical findings suggest that information asymmetry adversely impacts firm value, and that this effect decreases with firm's leverage. We also find that leverage has a negative effect on firm value, and that the marginal effect of leverage is lower for information asymmetric firms. Further, we find that the relation between information asymmetry and firm value is more pronounced in the post-crisis period than the pre-crisis period. Finally, we show that the impact of information asymmetry on firm value is higher (lower) for firms with high (low) growth opportunities.     

Financial distress,information asymmetry,and syndicate structure: Evidence from Japanese borrowers

This paper examines how borrower firm characteristics affect syndicate size structure in the Japanese loan market for the 1999–2003 period when the banking system is undergoing a major consolidation. We find that syndicates are smaller when borrowers have higher credit risk and when borrowers present larger information asymmetries to the lending group. Interestingly, however, these results are primarily driven by keiretsu (business group) firms. This suggests that the benefits of enhanced monitoring and superior renegotiation prospects are especially useful for banks participating in syndicated loans to Keiretsu firms in Japan rather than informationally opaque, independent firms.     

Rumors in the sky: Corporate rumors and stock price synchronicity

Using hand-collected rumor clarification announcements from Chinese listed firms to identify corporate rumors, we find that rumored firms have lower stock price synchronicity (R²) than do firms without rumors. Channel analyses reveal that rumors reduce stock price synchronicity through elevating investor sentiment rather than stimulating informed trading. Additionally, the negative association between corporate rumors and stock price synchronicity is more evident among firms with more individual investors and higher information opacity. Moreover, corporate rumors are associated with higher analyst forecast errors and forecast dispersion. Overall, our evidence suggests that corporate rumors reduce stock price synchronicity by increasing investor irrationality.     

Shaking hands with common foes: Clique premium and information diffusion in private equity networks

The fastest growing segment of private equity deals is secondary buyouts (SBOs) sales from one private equity (PE) firm to another. We operationalize a novel FactSet database to map the network structures of secondary buyouts between PE firms. We offer three contributions. First, after controlling for economic covariates, we find that PE firms are almost three times more likely to transact if they share a partner, that is both firms belong to the same clique. Second, we find that the profitability of such transactions is unambiguously higher relative to the baseline only if these are the result of repeated interaction between firms belonging to the same cliques. In other words, a clique premium exists under repeated interaction. Third, we provide evidence that the economic incentive at the core of clique premium may be related to access to information. In fact, we show that information related to transactions diffuses through the network, with 23% and 16% of the information going one and two steps beyond transacting parties, respectively.     

媒体关注、制度环境与盈余信息市场反应——对市场压力假设的再检验

针对于忠泊等人(2011)提出的媒体关注市场压力假设,文章从盈余信息市场反应的角度,进一步解释了市场压力的来源以及对管理者行为的影响。文章发现,媒体关注增加了短期内盈余信息的市场反应;降低了长期内的盈余公告后漂移程度;而且媒体关注的这种效应在外部市场化环境较差的地区更加显著。媒体关注对短期内盈余信息市场反应的放大效应,对长期内盈余信息传递效率的提升作用,正是管理者所面临的市场压力之一,媒体关注通过影响资本市场而发挥外部公司治理的功能。     

The persistence of earnings and cash flows and the role of special items: Implications for the accrual anomaly

We argue that high accruals are likely to be the outcome of rules with an income statement perspective, while low accruals are likely to be the outcome of rules with a balance sheet perspective, and that this has implications for the properties of earnings. Specifically, earnings persistence is affected both by the magnitude and sign of the accruals. Accruals improve the persistence of earnings relative to cash flows in high accrual firms, but reduce earnings persistence in low accrual firms. We show that the low persistence of earnings in low accrual firms is primarily driven by special items. We then show that special item-low accrual firms have higher future stock returns than other low accrual firms. This is consistent with investors misunderstanding the transitory nature of special items. Further analysis reveals that special item-low accrual firms have poor past performance and declines in investor recognition (analyst coverage and institutional holdings). Special items continue to explain future returns after controlling for these factors.