团队生产、集体声誉和分享规则

集体行动问题是契约与组织理论关注的核心主题,而＂搭便车＂或团队道德风险的存在使得这一问题难以得到令人满意的解决方案。本文为解决团队内部的道德风险难题提供了一种新的思路：一个团队为了向市场显示对自己有利的产出信号,会提供高于静态博弈的联合努力水平,从而形成一种集体声誉。这种集体声誉可以用于补贴团队内部由于＂搭便车＂造成的效率损失,从而缓解＂预算平衡约束＂和＂激励相容约束＂之间的矛盾。本文的分析表明,当集体声誉租金足够大时,通过适当的内部分享规则或者产权安排,不同类型的团队组合均可能实现一定程度的合作,从而缓解＂搭便车＂问题。     

团队职业声誉激励及其对团队构建的启示

团队职业声誉隐性激励能够解决部分团队生产搭便车的问题。这种隐性激励由团队成员能力的不确定性与其合作伙伴能力的不确定等因素共同决定。因此,不同的工作团队组建方式会影响其中的职业声誉隐性激励。研究表明,新老员工搭配方式组建的工作团队能给新员工更大的隐性激励,而且当其中的老员工是资深员工时具有更高的组织效率。     

团队生产、剩余分享与ESOP模式

对劳动力单一工资分配论的分析表明,该分配制度导致了团队生产中各产权主体权责利关系的不对称和劳动力产权实现的不充分,不能保证企业产权组合的效率与公平。基于员工持股的ESOP模式使各产权主体间的博弈关系发生了变化,在一定条件下,这有助于维护社会公平、促进产权组合效率的提升。我国的相关实践正处于发展初期,需要规范引导,加强各方面建设。     

声誉效应与科研团队成员报酬契约的关系研究

文章探讨了声誉对科研团队成员报酬契约的影响。首先．分析了科研团队成员效用函数的组成，将声誉这个隐性激励约束因素引入科研团队成员的效用函数，随后，建立了信息不对称下科研团队成员的报酬激励模型，分析了声誉系数和职业生涯时间对契约中各要素的影响．说明了科研团队管理者可以利用科研团队的声誉效应和职业生涯时间来设计更加有利的报酬契约，最后给出了主要结论。     

外生集体声誉约束下中国认证产业的最优数量结构

中国认证产业存在的最大特殊性在于行业存在制度性的外生集体声誉约束。此文尝试从认证产业的最优数量结构来探讨认证有效性问题,通过一个改进的双重不完全信息重复博弈模型,系统性地在外生集体声誉约束的框架下考察中国认证产业维持"质量卡特尔"的最优认证机构数量问题。我们的研究发现:首先,当认证机构注重未来的长远收益时,认证机构以其集体声誉作为一种可置信承诺,认证行业外生集体声誉的制度设计优于认证机构自设认证标准的个体声誉的制度设计;其次,在外生集体声誉约束下,分享集体声誉的最优认证机构数量是有限制的,最优认证机构数量与认证机构对未来的重视程度存在非线性的正相关关系,与虚假认证的收益存在非线性的负相关关系。因此,增加行业的信号传递效率和虚假认证的惩罚力度将是有效配合集体声誉约束事前机制的有效事后机制。     

证券监管者声誉和承销商声誉的关联性研究

作者通过构建不对称信息结构下的两阶段博弈模型,应用Bayes法则对证券监管者声誉和承销商声誉的动态化以及二者声誉变动的关联性进行了研究。模型结论显示,监管者对承销商的违规或错误评估行为的“宽容”以及任何“下不为例”的监管思维不仅会加剧自身声誉的下降,而且会导致承销商评估失误概率的上升和承销商声誉的下降,表明监管者声誉和承销商声誉具有一损俱损的关联性。     

集体声誉租金对保险代理人声誉贡献的影响--基于双账户门限公共物品的实验研究

对于保险代理人而言,保险公司的声誉具有外部性,并且其建设具有门槛特征。本文通过成本独立和收益关联的门限公共物品实验,研究声誉贡献门限以及其外部性特征如何以及通过何种机制影响保险代理人对保险公司声誉的建设行为,得出主要影响保险代理人声誉贡献努力程度的因素：一是保险公司声誉贡献门限;二是保险公司的集体声誉租金;三是信息披露方式。并且发现,这些因素会综合影响代理人的声誉贡献努力程度和最优收入获得效率。     

知识型团队集体离职内外因模型构建

知识型团队的集体离职是企业面临的新挑战。因现有的离职模型难以诠释知识型团队集体离职的原因,通过回顾现有离职研究理论,采用定性分析法,从组织层面分析了知识型团队集体离职的内因和外因,设计了内因矩阵、外因矩阵和综合矩阵,最终构建了知识型团队集体离职内外因模型,为知识型团队集体离职的研究提供了新思路。     

Collective Organizations versus Relative Performance Contracts: Inequality, Risk Sharing, and Moral Hazard

This paper studies collective economic organizations that share risk and mitigate moral hazard and compares them with relative performance contracts. Information-constrained optimal distributions of organizations and contracts are shown to be functions of the underlying primitives, in particular, the distribution of Pareto weights, and hence degree of inequality. Internal inequality of a potential, local group is a force for collective organization. That is, multi-agent organizations exist in order to extract wealth from some but not necessarily all members. The group organization is also shown to be information-constrained Pareto optimal at extremes of local wealth relative to an outsider. But the group organization is susceptible to both agents simultaneously deviating, colluding against the outsider, and this distortion makes an individualistic, relative performance contract an attractive alternative. More generally, organizations, contracts, and allocations are jointly determined. These implications could be distinguished in cross-sectional, time series data. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D82.     

The Collective Household, Household Production and Efficiency of Marginal Reforms

Most research on the welfare properties of taxes employs the unitary model of the household, ignoring household production. A simple model provides expressions for the changes in individual utility given marginal reforms to government policy. It is shown that the burden of a higher tax on household goods falls on the household member that consumes more than they produce or purchase. Numerical calculations show that price substitution (complementarity) between home and market labor increases (decreases) aggregate efficiency costs of a marginal redistribution of income without impacting the intra-household distribution of utility changes. Modeling household goods as public versus private can alter the distributional consequences of marginal reforms.     

Gender,Decent Work,and Global Production Sharing in Indonesian Manufacturing

Abstract:

Global commodity chains reflect and affect gendered labor markets. This article uses the Decent Work framework from the International Labour Organization to analyze employment outcomes for Indonesian workers in manufacturing. This research investigates trends in feminized manufacturing sectors in variously sized firms. Regression analyses is used to evaluate how firm characteristics related to global production sharing effect decent work outcomes for women and men, as well as female share of employment itself. The results suggest that exports and FDI affect men and women differently and that feminization and decent work outcomes depend on how the sector is positioned along the global value chain.     

Private Benefits,Warm Glow,and Reputation in the Free and Open Source Software Production Model

A great deal of production and consumption behavior takes place in the context of social organizations that seem to fall outside of the traditional paradigm of profit/utility maximization. These organizations are voluntary in nature and rely on contributions from members to achieve their objectives. Examples include the Linux operating system and other FOSS projects, political movements, churches and religious groups, Habitat for Humanity, and similar charitable organizations. In this paper, we consider a world containing agents with heterogeneous abilities who may voluntarily choose to make effort contributions to one or more different public projects. Agents are motivated by a desire to be seen as significant contributors to important and valuable projects, the warm glow from the act of contributing, and a desire to directly enjoy the benefits of projects when complete. We find that contributions from others can be either strategic complements or substitutes. We show that Nash equilibria exist and study how agents’ abilities and project quality affect the equilibrium levels of contributions.     

Reputation,monitoring, and effort

This paper studies the impact of strategic monitoring on reputation building, focusing in particular on models of the principal-agent type. The main result is that the principal always will monitor risk-neutral agents more closely early in the game, while such agents may or may not work harder as the game progresses, depending on their initial reputation. If agents are sufficiently risk-averse, they will always work harder early in the game, whereas the principal may or may not monitor such agents more closely as the game progresses.     

地方政府投资参股农村信用社的探索

在省级政府负责农村信用社发展和风险化解的政策背景下,借鉴国内外的经验教训,允许地方政府参股陷入困境的农村信用社,是对信用社产权制度改革的一次重大突破。这一改革与政府直接对农村信用社进行资金扶持相比,有着更深层的意义,关键是趋利避害,扬长避短。当然,当信用社正常运转后,政府的退出也是必然的选择。     

道德、信誉与合约

市场经济之初,人们体会最深,感叹最多的是道德问题和信誉问题。市场经济离不开道德和信誉,缺乏道德和信誉支持的市场经济只能是灾难经济。然而,信誉和道德有着本质区别,但日常生活中人们将它们混在一起来谈论,有时甚至是不分的,本文力图从合约的角度辨清二者之间的关系。     

团队内部粘滞性知识共享的模型构建与管理对策

首先回顾了知识共享和粘滞性知识的相关文献,随后从知识共享主体、共享客体、共享媒介以及外界环境4个方面对团队内部粘滞性知识的共享模型进行构建。并以此为基础,提出了若干降低共享过程知识粘滞性的对策。