Linkages between the ADR market and home country macroeconomic fundamentals: Evidence in the context of the BRICs

This study investigates the long-run and short-run lead–lag linkages between American Depositary Receipt (ADR) prices and home country economic fundamentals in the context of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China). In order to obtain an indication of the segmentation or integration between the ADR market and its underlying stock market, the same investigation is also undertaken in relation to the latter. We find that in the long run, economic growth positively drives ADR returns in the cases of Brazil and China but negatively in the cases of Russia and India. In the short-run, economic growth and money supply lead ADR prices but ADR prices predict inflation and oil prices with regard to Brazil while in Russia, oil prices predict ADR returns but the ADR market leads monetary policies and real economic activity. As regards India, in the short run, oil prices and economic growth lead ADR prices but ADR prices predict money supply changes. Finally, with respect to China, the ADR index lead economic growth and inflation but economic variables do not predict ADR prices in the short-run. In the long run, with the exception of China, we find the same kind of linkages between these economic fundamentals and the underlying stock market although the linkages are somewhat stronger. The short run dynamics for ADRs with respect to economic fundamentals are, however, different for that of the respective home country stock market. This would imply that the ADR market and its underlying stock market, as far as the BRICs are concerned, are integrated in the long-run but not in the short-run.     

Bank runs and investment decisions revisited

We examine how the possibility of a bank run affects the investment decisions made by a competitive bank. Cooper and Ross [1998. Bank runs: liquidity costs and investment distortions. Journal of Monetary Economics 41, 27-38] have shown that when the probability of a run is small, the bank will offer a contract that admits a bank-run equilibrium. We show that, in this case, the bank will chose to hold an amount of liquid reserves exactly equal to what withdrawal demand will be if a run does not occur; precautionary or “excess” liquidity will not be held. This result allows us to show that when the cost of liquidating investment early is high, an increase in the probability of a run will lead the bank to invest less. However, when liquidation costs are moderate, the level of investment is increasing in the probability of a run.     

Cities under stress

This paper studies the effect of terrorist attacks on the internal structure of cities. We develop an urban framework with capital structures suitable for the study of this question and analyze the long and short term implications of this type of events. In the long run, the analysis shows that a terrorist attack will affect urban structure only modestly, relative to the potentially large decrease in the level of economic activity in the city. Land rents will not decline at all locations. In the short run, agglomeration forces will amplify the effect of the original destruction and will reduce urban economic activity temporarily.     

Borrowing to Finance Public Investment? The ‘Golden Rule of Public Finance’ Reconsidered in an Endogenous Growth Setting*

In this paper, we look for long‐run and short‐run effects of fiscal deficits on economic growth and welfare in a standard endogenous growth model. We show that, under very general hypotheses, the ‘golden rule of public finance’, which allows a government to run public‐investment‐oriented fiscal deficits, leads to a lower balanced‐growth path in the long run, and eventually in the short run, compared with balanced‐budget rules. Welfare effects are more difficult to assess, and depend on the form of the utility function. Our model shows that debt rules such as the golden rule may improve (if the consumption elasticity of substitution is ‘low’) or weaken (if the consumption elasticity of substitution is ‘high’) intertemporal welfare. Consequently, a balanced‐budget rule does not necessarily dominate debt rules from the point of view of welfare, while it does from the point of view of long‐run economic growth.     

Is Economic Growth Good for Investors?1

When measured over long periods of time, the correlation of countries' inflation‐adjusted per capita GDP growth and stock returns is negative. This result holds for both developed countries (for which the correlation coefficient is –0.39 using data from 1900–2011) and emerging markets (the correlation is –0.41 over the period 1988–2011). And this means that investors would have been better off investing in countries with lower per capita GDP growth than in countries experiencing the highest growth rates. This seems surprising since economic growth is generally assumed to be good for corporate profits. In attempting to explain this finding, the author begins by noting that economic growth can be achieved through increased inputs of capital and labor, which don't necessarily benefit the stockholders of existing companies. Growth also comes from technological advances, which do not necessarily lead to higher profits since competition among firms often results in the benefits accruing to consumers and workers. What's more, it's important to recognize that growth has both an expected and an unexpected component. And one explanation for the negative correlation between growth and stock returns is the tendency for investors to overpay for expected growth. But there is another—and in the author's view, a more important—part of the explanation. Along with the negative correlation between long‐run average stock returns and per capita growth rates, the author also reports a strong positive association between (per share) dividend growth rates and overall stock returns. Such an association is not surprising since unusual growth in dividends is a fairly reliable predictor of increases in future earnings. But another effect at work here is the role of dividends—and, in the U.S., stock repurchases too—in limiting what might be called the corporate “overinvestment problem,” the natural tendency of corporate managers to pursue growth, if necessary at the expense of profitability. One of the main messages of this article is that corporate growth adds value only when companies reinvest their earnings in projects that are expected to earn at least their cost of capital—while at the same time committing to return excess cash and capital to their shareholders through dividends and stock buybacks.     

Future of secularism in India

The question of future of secularism in India is very important particularly at this juncture. Secularism was never meant to be the indifference to religion by our leaders and freedom fighters, who realised that India is a highly religious country. That is why even the most orthodox Hindus and Muslims accepted it as a viable ideology for India. But after independence Indian secularism followed a tortuous course and religious fundamentalism has grown dangerously in the last few decades. The Bhartiya Janta Party and the Sangh Parivar, in particular, are likely to intensify the Hindutva agenda in the future. In these political circumstances the future of secularism does not seem to be bright in the short run. But in the long run, India’s bewildering culture of pluralism, dating back many centuries, economic progress in the future and the well-established Indian democracy are factors that point to a more stable and secular polity.     

中国养老保险制度改革的政策选择——老龄化、城市化、全球化的视角

中国的养老保险制度改革不仅要考虑到人口老龄化的挑战,还需看到经济全球化提出的要求,以及城市化带来的机遇。本文基于详实的数据和深入的前期研究,指出中国的养老保险制度改革仍然具有一些独特的空间,包括老年劳动参与的提高,劳动生产率的提升,养老保险覆盖面的扩大,保险基金投资回报率的提高等。中国的老龄化发生在经济发展水平相对较低的阶段,在经济全球化时代,需要权衡缴费率和国际竞争力之间的矛盾。与人口老龄化相伴随的是城市化,将农村转移劳动力纳入城镇社会保障体系可以在较长时间内改变体系的负担率,同时农村老年人口绝对数量的下降,也可为政府补贴增长提供条件。长期而言,老龄化社会的养老能力根本上取决于劳动生产率的不断提高。     

Problem bank loans, conflicts of interest, and institutions

I consider problem bank loans as the outcome of decisions made by banks in the dual role they serve as financial intermediaries. This dual role necessarily introduces conflicts of interest that can lead to bank mismanagement and consequently problem bank loans. Because bank activities take place within the tangible and intangible structure of institutions, institutions may affect the quality of bank loans. I consider legal, political, sociological, economic, and banking institutions and explore their contribution to problem bank loans. I find support that a variety of institutions impact the share of bank assets that are non-performing.     

Non-renewable resources: A review of long-term projections

This article reviews available estimates of long-term future demand for the major mineral resources, together with estimates of the total world endowment of each. The confrontation of these two sets of estimates is not to be viewed as an exercise in doomsday forecasting. Rather, it yields a set of indices of the lead times available for the exploration of solutions to the problems of the demand for, and the supply of, resources. It is not obvious that market forces will be able to cope with shortages swiftly and flexibly. There is thus a need for a continuing evaluation of the long-run resource implications of world economic expansion.     

CREATING VALUE IN THE OIL INDUSTRY

In contrast with current thinking that conglomerates are inefficient, this article begins by presenting arguments in favor of the size and structure of the large integrated oil companies, also known as "the supermajors." Among the advantages are tax efficiency, information flow, political and technological know-how, broad supplier and customer relationships, scale economies, cross-business economies of scope, brand power, and the ability to coordinate strategic initiatives across businesses. These advantages all translate into a lower cost of capital.
One problem, however, is that this lower cost of capital does not seem to be reflected in the target returns on capital currently set by the supermajors. Observing that the financial goal of a corporation is to maximize not its return on capital but rather the net present value of expected future cash flows and earnings, the authors argue that the majors need to make two major changes to current practice. First, their investment hurdle rates should be reduced from their current level of 14–15% to the weighted average cost of capital, which is estimated to run about 8–9%. Second, the actual returns on capital reported in published accounts are largely meaningless; and when evaluating new investments and existing operations alike, the companies must find an annual performance measure that better reflects the economic realities of the business. This paper recommends use of a performance measurement framework based on economic profit that should serve two critical purposes: it will encourage managers to undertake all value-increasing projects (not just those that will maintain or increase reported return on capital), and it will help the companies communicate their strategy and results to the investment community.     

State-ownership and financial constraints on investment of Chinese-listed firms: new evidence

We examine how state-ownership affects financial constraints on investment of Chinese-listed firms during 1999–2008. We find that although an average sample firm experiences some degree of financial constraints, state-ownership does not necessarily help in reducing the firm's financial constraints on investment. Further evidence shows that state-ownership does not lead to more borrowing from the Chinese banking sector, implying that state-ownership does not necessarily reduce the firm's financial constraints via the state-controlled banking sector. We consider not only the standard factors in the investment equation, but also the firm's equity financing behaviour explicitly. The result is robust to both the conventional proxy for financial constraints, i.e. the investment–cash-flow sensitivity, and a recently developed proxy for financial constraints, i.e. the KZ index. Our results suggest that China's corporatisation movement is effective in that soft budget constraints once enjoyed by former state-owned enterprises have been removed along with the progress of corporatisation. These firms, although still state-involved, can be seen as modern corporations operating in a market environment.     

Can universities be good corporate citizens?

As universities respond to a prolonged period of economic rationalism there appears to be resignation, for the most part, that the role of a university is not what it once was. By adopting the operational strictures of economy, efficiency and performance, many universities are behaving like and being run as though they were a business. The term ‘corporate university’ now carries much meaning and has been the subject of significant discourse over the last decade. Resource limitations, political influences and competitive pressures are commonplace with implications for the way in which a university can fulfil a role in society, however that is defined. In this paper we consider the notion of corporate citizenship and ask whether this concept is relevant to the role of a university in Australia and New Zealand. In these countries universities are substantially (although progressively less so) funded by the government and are public service entities. The application of corporate citizenship to universities serves to highlight the duality of these institutions, which operate like corporations, and yet have more obvious historically based obligations to society. The comparison also suggests that as corporations are becoming more aware of the long-term benefits of a societal role for business entities that universities appear to be moving in the opposite direction. With a few exceptions academics have been reluctant to engage in public debates. They have progressively lost control of their working environment. The risk is that the public interest will have no place in the corporatised university of the 21st century unless academics increase their critic and conscience activities.     

Alternative space futures: The next quarter-century

Space developments do not exist in a vacuum! The shape of future space activities will depend on a combination of social, economic and political forces, creating the determinants for different patterns of space utilization. Forecasts of alternative space futures can therefore be explored by integrating different scenarios of world development and space trends. Here, alternative world trends are related to the underlying dynamics of space development, in terms of the economic, military and scientific utilization of space. The importance of space as a political issue is thus emphasized, in that the outcomes of policy choices to be made both now and in the future will help shape the social and economic contexts in which space technology will be used in the decades ahead.     

Gas transportation, geopolitics and future market structure

Recent studies have shown the important role of geography, politics and technology for the evolution of markets for natural gas. Gas market differs from other markets due to high share of transport and infrastructure costs. Since investment is location specific, it involves also geopolitical aspects as a consequence. Future market structure becomes path dependent on the investment decisions, particularly in gas infrastructure (pipelines and LNG). Another important aspect that shapes future gas market is heterogeneity in reserve-production ratios across gas producing countries that will eventually lead to the emergence of narrow oligopoly formed by countries with the largest reserves: Russia, Iran and Qatar. The goal of this paper is to analyse a long run gas game. There exist several time scales, and by backward induction we arrive at the conclusion that some time during the 21st century (we name it long run) there will be an oligopoly consisting of only three major gas reserve holders: Russia (26%), Iran (15%) and Qatar (14%). They will face the demand from three major gas importers: EU, USA and Core Asia. While the development paths and market structures are highly uncertain in the middle run (when temporal competition with rivals having 3% or less of gas reserves is feasible), the cloud of uncertainty shrinks in the long run. But investment strategies of major players in the middle run will determine the topology of gas infrastructure in the long run. All the players have a vector of strategic choices where geography, politics and technology set their limitations. Putting it in a simple formal framework, we can say that players choose: intensity of exploitation and shares of investment in transport infrastructure (LNG and location-specific pipelines). Geographical analysis of gas fields of Russia shows that it has moderate flexibility, but still can control the future share of LNG and pipeline flows to Europe and Asia. Pipelines to EU are slightly preferred to pipelines to Asia but political aspects may play crucial role. Qatar is likely to invest only in LNG, but has the flexibility in the speed of its field exploitation (it may be lower that for Russia). Iran has the highest technological and geographical freedom in choices. Future market structures for gas can vary from oligopolistic to monopolistic–monopsonistic relationship, with possibly different prices.     

The economic role of foreclosures

We consider the economic consequences of changing the foreclosure rules. By incorporating renegotiation into the analysis, we show that although renegotiation decreases the number of foreclosures it can make the effects of foreclosure more significant. Even when foreclosure does not actually occur, a change in foreclosure rules changes the threat points of lender and borrower in any renegotiation, and thus changes the effective interest rate that the lender receives. In the long run, stated interest rates on loans will adjust to compensate for any change in the effective interest rate. We also examine the impact of a change in foreclosure laws on the borrower's welfare.     

A kingdom inside: the future of Hawaiian political identity

“A Kingdom Inside” is a critical look at some of the contemporary political events unfolding in Hawaii at the end of 2002. It takes a look at Hawaiian representation in the media, politics and in history, and it reveals the political and legal reality of the ongoing US military occupation of Hawai’i. By calling into question the legitimacy of Hawai’i as the 50th state, this essay unravels some of the confusing issues around Hawaiian political identity and considers potential economic consequences to the United States that could lead to a negotiated withdrawal from Hawai’i.     

浅析马克思主义政治经济学的研究对象在21世纪的拓宽

政治经济学的研究对象是政治经济学理论研究的一个非常基本的问题，而这个问题在我国教材上却至今没有达成共识。在社会主义经济建设的实践中保持马克思政治经济学与时俱进的先进性需要我们对政治经济学的研究对象进行创新。生产力是社会持续发展的动力并且是决定着生产方式的现实基础，生产力、生产方式和生产关系是相互制约的，因此拓宽马克思的政治经济学研究对象还应研究生产力。     

The end of neoliberal history—the future of economics

The future of economics needs discussion both negatively, as the denial of neoliberal perspective, and positively as a science that is able to handle the historic welfare-freedom-culture paradox. The authors state that this alternative is political economy, which they define as a science searching for materialisation of social visions in the economic sphere. This tradition dates back to ancient cultures and does not coincide with the present usage of political economy. The article discusses the political economy of the information age and beyond. The core idea is that the human alternative of ongoing technological changes executes long run visions of mankind: co-existence of freedom and welfare under cultural leadership in a global scale.     

Great expectations but poor results: financial and social performance of the T oscana Energia merger

Benchmarking is often used in the public sector as a way of driving up performance. This article explains why benchmarking does not necessarily lead to better performance and why it can generate unwanted consequences. The article recommends ways of improving the link between benchmarking and performance. These involve the design of the benchmarking scheme, the presentation of benchmarking scores, the stakeholders to which these scores will be disclosed, and the actions that will be undertaken as a follow-up.     

Leverage and the Complexity of Takeovers

There is scant empirical evidence on how the leverage of target firms affects gains to their shareholders, although there are several widely cited economic theories offered in the literature. The limited available evidence shows that shareholders of targets with greater leverage experience higher returns. However, even this observed effect of debt on takeovers cannot be distinguished from a mere mechanical pure leveraging effect, leaving the economic explanations untested. Consequently, we adopt an alternative approach here to examine if targets' debt truly matters in takeovers. We report that acquisition processes involving targets with higher leverage tend to be significantly more complex in several ways. We find that such acquisitions tend to take a longer time to consume, are more likely to be associated with multiple bidder auctions, and experience greater revisions in offer prices. Finally, we find that factors that make takeovers more complex also lead to greater target gains.