Carbon policy risk and corporate capital structure decision

This study examines the relationship between carbon policy risk and corporate capital structure in China. Using a sample of A-share listed firms from 1997 to 2018, we find that carbon policy risk reduces firms' financial leverage. The result is robust to the introduction of difference-in-differences tests, instrumental variable regression, and a placebo test used to address endogeneity, as well as to other tests of alternative measures. This negative relationship is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises, firms with low institutional investor ownership, firms with poor corporate social responsibility performance, firms belonging to competitive or carbon-sensitive industries, and firms located in provincial cities. Financing constraints, bankruptcy risk, and government power are potential mechanisms underlying this observation. Our findings provide practical suggestions through which firms can address carbon policy risk and provide guidance to governments and regulators for the further implementation of environmental policies.     

Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation

In this paper, a model of corporate leverage choice is formulated in which corporate and differential personal taxes exist and supply side adjustments by firms enter into the determination of equilibrium relative prices of debt and equity. The presence of corporate tax shield substitutes for debt such as accounting depreciation, depletion allowances, and investment tax credits is shown to imply a market equilibrium in which each firm has a unique interior optimum leverage decision (with or without leverage-related costs). The optimal leverage model yields a number of interesting predictions regarding cross-sectional and time-series properties of firms' capital structures. Extant evidence bearing on these predictions is examined.     

A macroeconomic approach to corporate capital structure

The cross-sectional distribution of corporate capital structure and its macroeconomic implications are underexplored research areas. This paper embeds a dynamic trade-off theory of firm financing into a general equilibrium model with firm dynamics. I find that the stationary equilibrium replicates fairly well the distribution of leverage as well as the relationship between leverage, size and profitability. The counterfactual experiment points out relatively small effects of tax benefits on corporate capital structure. It also implies that the effects of the default cost on macroeconomic variables are almost negligible under endogenous capital structure choice.     

Multinationality and capital structure dynamics: A corporate governance explanation

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on capital structure dynamics. Using ordinary least squares regressions on 17,496 firm-year observations for 2,294 US multinational companies (MNCs) over the period 1990–2018, we find that MNCs with strong corporate governance use more debt than those with weak governance. Furthermore, strong corporate governance is associated with a faster speed of adjustment to capital structure. This relationship is more pronounced for MNCs than domestic companies, particularly for overlevered firms. We also use the two-part zero-inflated fractional regression model, instrumental variable, and structural equation model estimations to deal with any endogeneity concerns associated with the explanatory variables. Overall, our findings, which withstand a battery of robustness checks, suggest that improvements in corporate governance reduce the costs of monitoring for bondholders, resulting in increased debt financing.     

Credit supply and corporate capital structure: Evidence from Japan

In this paper we examine how financial constraints, especially fluctuations in the supply of credit, affect the capital structure of 1537 publicly listed Japanese firms from 1980 to 2007, in a data set with 33,000 observations. It is one of the first studies to do so and is inspired by the recent studies of Leary (2009) and Faulkender and Petersen (2006). Japan was selected due to the extreme credit supply fluctuations observed during the last 30 years. It thus offers an ideal natural experiment to test the impact of credit supply on corporate capital structure. In particular, in our panel data study we investigated the impact of the asset bubble in the 1980s and the credit crunch of the late 1990s on corporate capital structure decisions. The results of this paper show, among other findings, that financial policy decisions are indeed influenced by monetary conditions and the supply of credit. In particular, smaller sized firms face financial constraints, especially during economic downturns.     

Optimization of corporate capital structure A probabilistic Bayesian approach

This article develops a probabilistic approach to the problem of optimization of corporate capital structure. The approach enables quantitative assessment of optimal Debt to Equity ratio and includes calculation of probability of corporate bankruptcy in the future as a function of the time interval remaining until the bankruptcy. The probability is then used in a modified formula of discount share valuation to calculate the (share) value of a corporation that can become bankrupt at some future moment. Assessing the corporate (share) value in dependence on Debt/Equity ratio (which affects both corporate returns and probabilities of bankruptcy), one can find optimal value of the ratio which maximizes the share value. The optimal Debt/Equity ratio appears to be dependent on current corporate profitability, liquidity, and other fundamental factors. Factors of macroeconomic environment also appear to be relevant.     

Long-term persistence in corporate capital structure: Evidence from India

This study examines the stability of corporate capital structure in a sample of listed Indian firms for the period 1988–2015. In general, the firms do not maintain a stable level of leverage over long durations. The firm specific temporal variations in leverage are large and significant. We find that capital structure models that incorporate time varying firm effects perform better in explaining the variation in leverage than those that employ time invariant firm effects. The cross-sectional distribution of leverage also exhibits considerable variations over time. The quartile decompositions of leverage cross-sections reveal that migrations across leverage quartiles are pervasive. Only the firms with low leverage ratios ratio exhibit some persistence in their leverage ratios. High leverage ratios are not rare but are invariably transient.     

Director capital and corporate disclosure quality

Conventional wisdom regarding board effectiveness emphasizes the role of board composition and incentives in alleviating conflicts of interest. We argue that board capital, however, may be a more important aspect of board efficacy since directors are the highest level agents of shareholders, meet infrequently, and shareholders have limited recourse for poor decision-making. In contrast, shareholders and the SEC can sue/prosecute directors for conflicts of interest or bias. One role of the board involves determining the depth and degree of the firm’s financial disclosures. To test the idea that high capital boards seek to provide greater disclosure quality to investors, we manually collect data on director attributes and apply factor analysis to measure the networking, educational, and experience capital of the board. The results indicate that board capital is positively related to disclosure quality, with differing key attributes for inside and outside directors. These results are robust to 2SLS and difference-in-difference approaches.     

Organization capital and corporate cash holdings

This paper investigates the relationship between organization capital and corporate cash holdings. We develop two competing hypotheses in relating organization capital with cash holding. Our analysis reveals that organization capital is related to high levels of cash holdings. Moreover, we find that the effect of organization capital on corporate cash holdings is stronger for firms experiencing high levels of financing constraint and cash flow risk. Our results remain robust to alternative measures of organization capital and corporate cash holdings, and are not driven by omitted variable bias or endogeneity issues. We also find that the positive relation between organization capital and cash holdings is not confounded by sample period or industry group. Overall, we provide robust evidence that supports the precautionary motive for corporate cash holding.     

Investment timing and optimal capital structure under liquidity risk

Deterioration in debt market liquidity reduces debt values and affects firms' decisions. Considering such risk, we develop an investment timing model and obtain analytic solutions. We carry out a comprehensive analysis in optimal financing, default, and investment strategies, and stockholder–bondholder conflicts. Our model explains stylized facts and replicates empirical findings in credit spreads. We obtain six new insights for decision makers. We propose a ‘new trade-off theory’ for optimal capital structure, a new tax effect, and new explanations of ‘debt conservatism puzzle’ and ‘zero-leverage puzzle’. Failure in recognizing liquidity risk results in substantially over-leveraging, early bankruptcy or investment, overpriced options, and undervalued coupons and credit spreads. In addition, agency costs are surprisingly small for a high liquidity risk or a low project risk. Interestingly, the risk shifting incentive and debt overhang problem decrease with liquidity risk under moderate tax rates while they increase under high tax rates.     

A jump-diffusion model for pricing corporate debt securities in a complex capital structure

This paper proposes a jump-diffusion model, in closed form, to price corporate debt securities, senior and junior, with the same maturity and violation of the absolute priority rule. We take the structural approach that the firm's asset value follows a jump-diffusion process in a stochastic interest rate economy. Default occurs only if the firm value at the maturity of the corporate debts is less than the sum of the prespecified face values. Unlike previous models in the structural approach, our model is consistent with the current term structures of credit spreads for both senior and junior debts. In particular, it captures realistic short maturity credit spreads observed in the market. The key idea is to allow the jump intensity to be a time-dependent function. As an application, valuation of credit spread options is presented.     

Making sense of corporate venture capital

Large companies have long sensed the potential value of investing in external start-ups, but more often than not, they fail to get it right. Remember the dash to invest in new ventures in the late 1990s and the hasty retreat when the economy turned? This article presents a framework that will help a company decide whether it should invest in a particular start-up by first understanding what kind of benefit might be realized from the investment. The framework--illustrated with examples from Intel, Lucent, and others--explains why certain types of corporate VC investments proliferate only when financial returns are high, why other types persist in good times and in bad, and why still others make little sense in any phase of the business cycle. The framework describes four types of corporate VC investments, each defined by its primary goal--strategic and financial--and by the degree of operational linkage between the start-up and the investing company. Driving investments are characterized by a strong strategic rationale and tight operational links. Enabling investments are also made primarily for strategic reasons, but the operational links are loose. Emergent investments, which are characterized by tight operational links, have little current--but significant potential--strategic value. Passive investments, offering few potential strategic benefits and only loose operational links, are made primarily for financial reasons. Passive corporate VC investments dry up in a down economy, but enabling and driving investments usually have more staying power. That's because their potential returns are primarily strategic, not financial. In other words, they can foster business growth. Emergent investments may make sense even in a weak market because of their potential strategic value--that is, their ability to help companies identify and spark the growth of future businesses.     

Board structure and corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector

This paper examines the relationship between board structure and corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector. We show how the board size, board independence and combining the role of CEO and chairperson in boards may affect corporate risk taking in financial firms. Our sample is based on a panel dataset of all publicly listed firms in the UK financial sector, which includes banks, insurance, real estate and financial services companies over a ten year period (2003 − 2012). After controlling for the effects of endogeneity through the application of the dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimator, the findings of this study suggest that the presence of non-executive directors and powerful CEOs in corporate boards reduces corporate risk taking practices in financial firms. The negative relationship can be explained within the agency theory context, where managers are regarded as more risk averse because of the reputational and employment risk. An increased power concentration is therefore expected to enhance the risk aversion behaviour of directors. The findings however, do not show any significant effect of board size on corporate risk taking in financial firms. As this study covers recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code on the role of corporate boards in managing firms' risk, the empirical evidence could be useful for corporate governance regulation and policy making.     

Voluntary disclosure of corporate venture capital investments

In this paper, we investigate drivers of corporate venture capital investment announcements. Consistent with voluntary information disclosure theories, we find that a public announcement is less likely to be made when the start-up firm is in the seed stage but more likely when the parent company is large, active in concentrated markets and in non-high-tech industries; spends heavily on internal R&D and capital expenditures; has low leverage ratio; and faces more information asymmetry problems. In addition, corporate venture capital programs managed externally disclose more often than internal programs. We find that parent companies facing more severe asymmetric information problems enjoy the highest abnormal returns in response to announcements. This study contributes to the literature on voluntary information disclosure in that it evidences that larger corporations use disclosure of some of their investments in innovative startups strategically as a way to convey valuable information to the market.     

Bank deregulation and corporate risk

Although research shows that competitive banks spur corporate growth, less is known about the impact of bank competition on corporate risk. Using a sample of more than 70,000 firm-year observations covering the period from 1975 through 1994, we find that deregulation that intensified competition among banks materially reduced corporate risk, especially among firms that rely heavily on bank finance. We find that competition-enhancing bank deregulation reduced corporate volatility by easing credit constraints when firms experience adverse shocks and reducing the procyclicality of borrowing.     

A positive analysis of corporate capital budgeting practices

Although the academic literature has long argued that discounted cash flow methods are superior to other capital budgeting rules, these methods have only fairly recently come into widespread use. This article points out that there are both costs and benefits to using discounting rules such as net present value. Therefore, they may often not work better in practice than nondiscounting methods. Empirically, the use of discounting methods is positively correlated with market interest rates and the dissemination of information about these tools and negatively correlated with the degree of uncertainty in the economy, which is consistent with our hypotheses.     

Ownership structure and corporate performance

This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure and the performance of corporations if ownership is made multi-dimensional and also is treated as an endogenous variable. To our knowledge, no prior study has treated the corporate control problem this way. We find no statistically significant relation between ownership structure and firm performance. This finding is consistent with the view that diffuse ownership, while it may exacerbate some agency problems, also yields compensating advantages that generally offset such problems. Consequently, for data that reflect market-mediated ownership structures, no systematic relation between ownership structure and firm performance is to be expected.     

Collateral and capital structure

We develop a dynamic model of investment, capital structure, leasing, and risk management based on firms' need to collateralize promises to pay with tangible assets. Both financing and risk management involve promises to pay subject to collateral constraints. Leasing is strongly collateralized costly financing and permits greater leverage. More constrained firms hedge less and lease more, both cross-sectionally and dynamically. Mature firms suffering adverse cash flow shocks may cut risk management and sell and lease back assets. Persistence of productivity reduces the benefits to hedging low cash flows and can lead firms not to hedge at all.     

Liquidity and capital structure

We examine the relation between equity market liquidity and capital structure. We find that firms with more liquid equity have lower leverage and prefer equity financing when raising capital. For example, after sorting firms into size quintiles and then into liquidity quintiles, the average debt-to-asset ratio of the most liquid quintiles is about 38% while the average for the least liquid quintiles is 55%. Similar results are observed in panel analyses with clustered errors and using instrumental variables. Our results are consistent with equity market liquidity lowering the cost of equity and, therefore, inducing a greater reliance on equity financing.