Can Ecolabeling Schemes Preserve the Environment?

A three-stage game of production technology, signal and price competition is developed to study the impact of eco-labeling, in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation. The production technology and the subsequent pollution level are non-observable by consumers. The only way to inform consumers about the environmental quality of the product is to stick an ecolabel on it. However, a polluting firm may also usurp the ecolabel by incurring a certain cost. By assuming that consumers are altruistic and willing to pay for environmental quality, we show that ecolabels can reduce the pollution level. Finally and importantly, under restrictive conditions on labeling cost, ecolabeling can constitute to some extent an environmentally effective and economically efficient policy. However, ecolabeling cannot alone internalize the whole negative externality until the optimum point.      

Eco-labelling, Competition and Environment: Endogenization of Labelling Criteria

This paper suggests a modelling of the labelling procedure consistent with empirical observations, that allows the endogenous calculation of labelling criteria. The authority in charge of the labelling program chooses the level of labelling criteria so as to maximise the social surplus, anticipating competition between firms in environmental qualities and prices. While accounting simply for the informational role of labels, this model allows to understand observed behavior such as firms’ ignorance of a label, resistance, support or indifference of firms to the labelling program and the decision of the authority not to set up a label. Grateful thanks are due to Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Antoine Soubeyran, Joan Canton and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and suggestions.     

Determinants of demand for green products: An application to eco-label demand for fish in Europe

In this paper, we confront the theoretical motivations of the consumption of eco-friendly products and the factors influencing the European perceptions regarding the fact that “fish caught using an environmentally friendly technique may carry a special label”. We take advantage of the recent integration of non-economic elements in the microeconomic analysis of consumers' behavior in order to highlight the factors leading to their demand for green products. Thanks to an original European survey on seafood product carried out on more than 5000 consumers, we test the influence of intrinsic motivation, information, localization and socio-economic factors on the demand for an eco-label for fish.Our results show a significant connection between the desire for eco-labeling and seafood features, especially the freshness of the fish, the geographical origin of the fish and the wild vs farmed origin of the fish. Moreover, we prove the major role played by the fish price. We also demonstrate that the ecological issue regarding fisheries is highly connected to consumer information, intrinsic motivation and socio-economic status: the typical “green fish consumer” is a young woman, well educated, well informed on the state of marine resources and not very trusting of the regulation of the fisheries. Consumers who are aware of the importance of marine resource preservation have the same profile.     

Non-existence of Duopoly Equilibria: A Simple Numerical Example

We give a simple example to the non-existence of duopoly equilibrium in pure strategies in an economy with two goods and two types of consumers. This extends also the discussion on the incentive for trade in an oligopolistic framework initiated in Cordella and Gabszewicz (1998).     

双寡头市场中电视媒体平台的质量水平及定价策略研究

本文以电视媒体平台为例,以竞争平台企业如何确定平台质量水平为出发点,建立了双寡头双边市场竞争模型,旨在给出双边市场价格结构的参考。本文主要运用完全信息静态博弈收益矩阵,试图找到纳什均衡。分析可得,媒体平台企业的主要收入来自于广告,其努力寻求更广泛的观众是为了拥有更多的广告收入。媒体平台企业为了吸引更多的广告商,最终会选择提高平台质量水平。     

Environmental Policy in the European Community: Harmonization or National Standards?

This paper explores the claim that the setting of environmental standards needs to be centralized in order to avoid a competitive race to the bottom. Such a claim represents a fundamental challenge to the basic theory of fiscal federalism. But the theory of interjurisdictional competition, although diverse in approach and findings, does not provide a fully compelling basis for this proposition. Moreover, the terminology is itself misleading. The paper suggests that in the absence of environmental spillover effects across jurisdictional boundaries, there remains a strong case for decentralized environmental management.     

横向税收竞争的环境效应研究

在我国,提供公共产品的事权多在地方。在财力有限的情况下,为了较好地履行职责,地方政府不得不通过参与激烈的税收竞争来增强本地的经济和财政实力。文章通过分析地方税收竞争的诱因,提出地方政府之间存在激烈的横向税收竞争也会影响环境污染的理论推断,并依经济发展水平的不同,将全国分为东、中、西部三个地区,尝试探讨了不同地区环境污染的相似性及差异性。运用面板数据分析地方政府之间横向税收竞争对辖区环境质量的影响情况,结果发现,在横向税收竞争的作用下,不同地区在工业三废排放方面既存在一定的相似性又有所差异。建议采取必要的对应措施解决地方政府之间横向税收竞争所造成的不良环境后果。     

Cap and trade policies in the presence of monopoly and distortionary taxation

We extend an analytical general equilibrium model of environmental policy with pre-existing labor tax distortions to include pre-existing monopoly power as well. We show that the existence of monopoly power has two offsetting effects on welfare. First, the environmental policy reduces monopoly profits, and the negative effect on income increases labor supply in a way that partially offsets the pre-existing labor supply distortion. Second, environmental policy raises prices, so interaction with the pre-existing monopoly distortion further exacerbates the labor supply distortion. This second effect is larger, for reasonable parameter values, so the existence of monopoly reduces the welfare gain (or increases the loss) from environmental restrictions.     

“腾笼换鸟”和“承接转移”相互矛盾吗

本文拓展了陈钊的模型,解释了"腾笼换鸟"和"承接转移"其实并不矛盾,只是不同发展阶段的地区根据实际情况做出的"理性选择"。政府应该对不同的地区采取不同的政策,改变当前绩效考核方式,促进经济的可持续增长。     

Backward integration and collusion in a duopoly model with asymmetric costs

This paper formalizes the idea that input transactions might be used to implement side payments among colluding firms. A model is proposed to analyze the effect of backward integration on collusive outcomes in a downstream duopoly with asymmetric marginal costs. Vertical integration expands the set of collusive outcomes that are sustainable for a given realization of the discount factor. This is an additional effect of vertical integration that antitrust authorities should consider. Side payments implemented by input sales are more relevant the larger the difference in marginal costs, since they allow for the shifting of production towards the relatively more efficient firms, while maintaining firms’ incentives to collude. A price of the input above that posted by an alternative source or sales of the input below cost may be observed, depending on the realization of downstream firms’ costs.      

The effects of air quality regulations on the location decisions of pollution-intensive manufacturing plants

This research examines the effects of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) on the location decisions of pollution-intensive manufacturing plants. We develop a panel data set to analyze plant births of polluting manufacturers over time as a function county-level attainment status of the federal standard for ozone pollution. We find that more stringent county-level environmental regulations impact pollution-intensive capital flows through deterring new plant births. We also find that the impact of stricter regulations varies by pollution-intensity of manufacturers, with results suggesting that federal guidelines have a greater impact on high pollution intensive manufacturers than more moderate polluters.      

Behavioural responses to science-based eco-labelling: gold,silver, or bronze

This study uses unique data collected from field experiments to investigate consumer willingness to pay (WTP) for otherwise homogeneous commodities that provide different levels of environmental services. On average, individuals are willing to pay more for products that provide a higher level of ecosystem services. This effect is larger when the label contains symbols that explicitly differentiate the levels. The effect magnitude is further amplified when it contains brief information on the scientific basis for the levels. However, our results also suggest that the WTP premium for the superior product is smaller than the discount in WTP for the inferior product.     

Eco-labeling in commercial office markets: Do LEED and Energy Star offices obtain multiple premiums?

This paper investigates the effect of eco-labeling on rental rates, sale prices and occupancy rates. The consensus emerging from previous studies appears to be that investors in and occupiers of eco-labeled buildings obtain a bundle of benefits related to lower operating costs, reputation benefits and productivity higher. In this study, a hedonic model is used to test whether the presence of an eco-label has a significantly positive effect on rental rates, sale prices and occupancy rates of commercial office buildings in the US. The results suggest that office buildings with Energy Star or LEED eco-labels obtain rental premia of approximately 3-5%. Dual certification produces an additive effect with rental premia estimated at 9%. Respective sale price premia for Energy Star and LEED labeled office buildings are 18% and 25%. The sale price premium for dual certification is estimated at 28-29%. An occupancy premium could not be confirmed for LEED labeled office buildings and only a small positive occupancy premium was found for Energy Star.     

价格竞争还是质量竞争--中国出口产品竞争力的实证研究

中国出口产品普遍被认为“价廉质次”,然而这并不能充分解释中国出口贸易长期增长的实质。对中国2001年加入WTO以来出口产品竞争力的实证研究表明：一方面,中国出口产品的相对单位价格呈现持续下降的趋势,这说明低价竞争是中国出口产品的一个主要特征;另一方面,中国出口产品质量在逐年上升,其中高技术出口产品的质量竞争力较为明显,这说明中国出口产品并未陷入低质量产品的陷阱。在新时期进一步深化对外贸易转型中,把握中国出口产品竞争力特征对我国对外贸易政策制定有重要意义。     

土地双垄断情况下的收益博弈

本文通过重复信号博弈模型和双垄断模型,运用制度分析法来考察现有土地制度安排下地方政府和中央政府对土地利用的最优反应,结果显示:(1)中央政府对地方政府的监管成本过高,导致土地垄断利润分配过程中地方政府获利更大,进而催生了《土地管理法》;(2)现有地方土地资源利用完全不受限制,导致地方经济发展失去了中央宏观调控的约束.因此,本文提出相关对策建议.     

Competition and compatibility among Internet Service Providers

We consider a two-stage game between two competing Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The firms offer access to the Internet. Access is assumed to be vertically and horizontally differentiated. Our model exhibits network externalities. In the first stage the two ISPs choose the level of compatibility (i.e. quality of a direct interconnect link between the two networks). In the second stage the two ISPs compete á-la Hotelling. We find that the ISPs can reduce the stage 2 competitive pressure by increasing compatibility due to the network externality. The firms will thus agree upon a high compatibility at stage 1. When it is costly to invest in compatibility, we find that the firms overinvest, as compared to the welfare maximising investment level.