IPOs,trade sales and liquidations: Modelling venture capital exits using survival analysis

This paper examines the dynamics of exit options for US venture capital funds. Using a sample of more than 20,000 investment rounds, we analyze the time to ‘IPO’, ‘trade sale’ and ‘liquidation’ for 6000 VC-backed firms. We model these exit times using competing risks models, which allow for a joint analysis of exit type and exit timing. The hazard rate for IPOs are clearly non-monotonic with respect to time. As time flows, VC-backed firms first exhibit an increased likelihood of exiting to an IPO. However, after having reached a plateau, non-exited investments have fewer possibilities of IPO exits as time increases. This sharply contrasts with trade sale exits, where the hazard rate is less time-varying. We further provide evidence on the impact of economic factors such as syndicate size and composition, geographical location and VC value adding, on exit outcomes.     

Private equity alliances in mergers

This paper examines reasons for alliance formation between private equity bidders when compared to sole-sponsored private equity deals. Testing a comprehensive set of hypotheses, we find strong evidence for the relative-risk hypothesis of Robinson (2008), as private bidders are more likely to form an alliance in a diversifying acquisition. We also find that private equity alliances involved more profitable target firms when compared to sole-sponsored private equity deals. Finally, we find that the significantly lower abnormal returns for target firms in private equity alliance deals are eliminated once we control for differences in the types of target firms acquired by private equity alliances and single private equity bidders. The last result suggests that private equity alliances do not generate significantly lower target returns because of collusion.     

Private equity and Covid-19

We survey more than 200 private equity (PE) managers from firms with $1.9 trillion of assets under management (AUM) about their portfolio performance, decision-making and activities during the Covid-19 pandemic. Given that PE managers have significant incentives to maximize value, their actions during the pandemic should indicate what they perceive as being important for both the preservation and creation of value. PE managers believe that 40% of their portfolio companies are moderately negatively affected and 10% are very negatively affected by the pandemic. The private equity managers—both investment and operating partners—are actively engaged in the operations, governance, and financing in all of their current portfolio companies. These activities are more intensively pursued in those companies that have been more severely affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result of the pandemic, they expect the performance of their existing funds to decline. They are more pessimistic about that decline than the venture capitalists (VCs) surveyed in Gompers et al. (2021). Despite the pandemic, private equity managers are seeking new investments. Rather than focusing on cost cutting, PE investors place a much greater weight on revenue growth for value creation. Relative to the 2012 survey results reported in Gompers, Kaplan, and Mukharlyamov (2016), they appear to give a larger equity stake to management teams and target somewhat lower returns.     

Private equity and regulatory capital

Regulatory capital requirements for European banks have been put forward in the Basel II Capital Framework and subsequently in the capital requirements directive (CRD) of the EU. We provide a detailed discussion of the capital requirements for private equity investments under different approaches. For the internal model approach we present a structural model that we calibrate to a proprietary dataset. We modify the standard Merton structural model to make it applicable in practice and to capture stylized facts of private equity investments. We also implement the early default feature with a fast simulation algorithm. Our results support capital requirements lower than in Basel II, but not as low as in CRD, thereby giving adverse incentives to banks for using advanced risk models. A sensitivity analysis shows that this finding is robust to parameter uncertainty and stress scenarios.     

The Performance of Private Equity‐Backed IPOs

My paper examines the aftermarket performance of private equity‐backed initial public offerings (IPOs) and compares it to the performances of equivalent samples of venture capital‐backed and other nonsponsored issues on the London Stock Exchange during the period 1992‐2005. The evidence suggests marked differences across the three groups in terms of market size, industry classification, first‐day returns, and key operating characteristics at the time of flotation. In fact, private equity‐backed IPOs are larger firms in terms of sales and assets, more profitable, and relatively modest first‐day returns. In the three years following the public listing, they display better operating and market performance when compared to other IPOs and the market as a whole.     

Private equity performance under extreme regulation

This study investigates the impact of excessive regulation on private equity (PE) returns and firm performance. History shows that extreme regulation and prohibition reduce the supply of capital and raise returns (e.g., as with drugs and diamonds). However, for value-added investors such as PE funds, extreme regulation also reduces the quality of capital and fund involvement. The net effect on returns is therefore ambiguous and heretofore not studied. With a new unique dataset, this paper empirically examines the performance of PE investments in Italy when leveraged buyouts are strictly regulated. The data show that extreme regulation reduces not only the supply of capital, but also PE returns and firm performance, as well as the likelihood of an IPO exit.     

Private equity valuation under time-inconsistent preferences

Our research expands on the private equity (PE) valuation theory by incorporating the limited partner’s (LP) time-inconsistent preferences. Our findings show that time inconsistency has a detrimental impact on the LP’s certainty-equivalent valuation, which is dependent on the duration of investment and the value of PE asset. Through a comparative static analysis of the risk-attitude parameter and the future self arrival intensity, we have determined that the negative effects of time inconsistency can be mitigated by a more conservative attitude on the part of LP, while a higher future self arrival intensity exacerbates the impact of LP’s time inconsistency on their certainty-equivalent valuation.     

Private equity benchmarks and portfolio optimization

Portfolio optimization using private equity is typically based on one of three indices: listed private equity, transaction-based private equity, or appraisal value-based private equity indices. However, we show that none of these indices is fully suitable for portfolio optimization. We introduce here a new benchmark index for venture capital and buyouts, which is updated monthly, adjusted for autocorrelation (de-smoothing), and available contemporaneously. We illustrate how our benchmark enables superior quantitative portfolio optimization.     

Private equity,leveraged buyouts and governance

This paper provides an overview of the literature on private equity and leveraged buyouts, focusing on global evidence related to both governance and returns to private equity and leveraged buyouts. We distinguish between financial and real returns to this activity, where the latter refers to productivity and broader performance measures. We also outline a research agenda on this topic.     

Private equity bids in Australia: an exploratory study

In this study, we provide an insight into how private equity players choose their targets and the bid arrangements they prefer. We test our expectations of the unique features of private equity targets using a sample of 23 listed private equity target firms during 2001–2007. We find, relative to a benchmark sample of 81 corporate targets matched by year and industry, the private equity target firms to be larger, more profitable, use their assets more efficiently, more highly levered and have greater cash flow. Multivariate testing indicates that private equity targets have relatively greater financial slack, greater financial stability, greater free cash flow and lower measurable growth prospects. All conclusions are found to be robust to a control sample of 502 takeover bids during 2001–2007.     

Private equity portfolio company performance during the global recession

We assess the recent economic and financial performance of U.K. private equity (PE) backed buyouts. Our empirical evidence, which is based on thousands of transactions, reveals that PE-backed buyouts achieved superior economic and financial performance in the period before and during the recent global recession, relative to comparable firms that did not experience such transactions. Our regression results imply positive differentials of 5–15% in productivity and approximately 3–5% in profitability for buyout firms, relative to non-buyout firms. Another key finding is that revenue and employment growth for PE- backed firms were positive during the sample period.     

Venture capital and private equity investors,governance, and success of IPOs: Evidence from India

In this article, we examine the role of domestic and foreign venture capital and private equity (VCPE) firms in India. We find robust evidence that portfolio firms backed by foreign VCPE firms incorporate effective governance structures after the initial public offering (IPO). Specifically, these firms are associated with smaller, more independent, and gender-diverse boards. Furthermore, our results suggest that foreign VCPE firms continue their association with their portfolio firms in the post-IPO period by nominating directors to the boards. Our results also suggest that portfolio firms backed by foreign VCPE firms are associated with better long-term operating performance and profitability. This positive effect is exacerbated by the presence of independent and female directors. Collectively, our results support the view that good governance practices are key to the long-term success of a business, especially in economies that lack good legal systems, developed financial markets, and alternative investment opportunities and where developing trust between parties in a transaction is crucial.     

Competitive IPOs

Competition between investment banks for lead underwriter mandates in IPOs is fierce, but having committed to a particular bank, the power of the issuer is greatly reduced. Although information revelation theories justify giving the underwriters influence over pricing and allocation, this creates the potential for conflicts of interest. In this clinical paper we analyse an interesting innovation that has been used in recent European IPOs whereby issuers separate the preparation and distribution roles of investment banks, and keep competitive pressure on the banks throughout the issue process. These 'competitive IPOs' allow the issuer greater control and facilitate more contingent fee structures that help to mitigate against 'bait and switch.' But unlike more radical departures from traditional bookbuilding – such as auctions – the competitive IPO is an incremental market-based response to potential conflicts of interest that retains many of the advantages of investment banks' active involvement in issues.     

Long-run abnormal return after IPOs and optimistic analysts' forecasts

This empirical study examines whether the optimistic forecasts of analysts explain the long-run abnormal return following initial public offerings (IPOs). Consistent with prior research, this paper concludes that the analysis of earning forecasts for firms going public has an upward bias. While the usually calculated buy-and-hold abnormal return is not significantly negative on average, a proper control for risk confirms the long-run underperformance hypothesis for the 1-year period following IPOs. The risk-adjusted return is positively correlated to the surprise effect and earning forecast revisions, and appears to be the response to new information about the true earnings perspectives.     

Monitoring via staging: Evidence from Private investments in public equity

I study the causes and consequences of staging in the setting of private investments in public equities (PIPEs). I find that, in PIPE investments, as in venture capital staging, the staging strategy is used by investors as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems. Moreover, strategic investors and investors investing alone are more likely to utilize staging. I show also that staging reduces the cost of financing and has positive implications for PIPE issuers’ long-run stock performance.     

Private equity in the global economy: Evidence on industry spillovers

Using a novel dataset on global private equity investments in 19 industries across 52 countries, we find that labor productivity, employment, profitability, and capital expenditures increase for publicly-listed companies in the same country and industry as private equity investments. Our results show that positive externalities created by private equity firms are absorbed by other companies within the same industry. Consistent with prior literature on competitive spillovers, these effects are more pronounced in country-industries with higher levels of competition, stronger institutions, and moderate levels of technological development suggesting that the competitive pressures from private equity-backed firms cause industry peers to react.     

Zero-revenue IPOs

Information-based models of the IPO decision suggest that going public before having generated revenues is inefficient. Still, 15% of firms going public in Europe have not reported revenues prior to the IPO. This paper investigates why these firms decide to conduct an IPO and examines whether the absence of revenues affects the outcomes of this decision. The evidence shows that zero-revenue firms go public to fund investments, mainly in the form of R&D. However, their shares are more underpriced at the IPO and develop less liquid and more volatile aftermarket trading than those of revenue-generating issuers. These effects are driven by firms whose revenue-less status is more persistent, as 18.6% still report no revenues at their three-year IPO anniversary. Also, zero-revenue issuers face a higher risk of being delisted shortly after the IPO. Overall, the evidence indicates that zero-revenue firms go public in an attempt to fund superior growth opportunities, but the high levels of information asymmetry and uncertainty increase the cost of raising capital and the risk of an early delisting.     

Merger-Motivated IPOs

In this paper, we find support for initial public offerings (IPOs) motivated by subsequent acquisition activity. Over a third of newly public firms enter the market for corporate control as acquirers within three years of the IPO. We find that IPOs facilitate acquisitions in a number of ways. Newly public firms benefit from the cash raised in the IPO, from subsequent access to public financing, and from ability to pay with publicly traded stock for acquisitions. IPO firms also benefit by obtaining market feedback and by taking advantage of high post-IPO stock values in making stock-based acquisitions at favorable terms.     

Legality and venture capital exits

This paper introduces an analysis of the impact of Legality on the exiting of venture capital investments. We consider a sample of 468 venture-backed companies from 12 Asia-Pacific countries, and these countries' venture capitalists' investments in US-based entrepreneurial firms. The data indicate IPOs are more likely in countries with a higher Legality index. This core result is robust to controls for country-specific stock market capitalization, MSCI market conditions, venture capitalist fund manager skill and fund characteristics, and entrepreneurial firm and transaction characteristics. Although Black and Gilson (1998) [Black, B.S., Gilson, R.J., 1998. Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: banks versus stock markets. Journal of Financial Economics 47, 243–77] speculate on a central connection between active stock markets and active venture capital markets, our data in fact indicate the quality of a country's legal system is much more directly connected to facilitating VC-backed IPO exits than the size of a country's stock market. The data indicate Legality is a central mechanism which mitigates agency problems between outside shareholders and entrepreneurs, thereby fostering the mutual development of IPO markets and venture capital markets.