Political costs and corporate tax avoidance: Evidence from sin firms

The products and services of firms operating in sin industries (alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and firearms) run contrary to social norms and can produce significant negative externalities for society. As such, we expect that sin firms are at greater risk of incurring political costs in the form of additional regulation, higher excise taxes, or capital market intervention if they come under scrutiny for their income tax avoidance practices. Because of the nature of their products, regulators and policymakers are likely to face less pushback on new regulations or taxes on these firms. Sin firms start with a lower ability to influence the political process than firms in non-sin industries. Consequently, we hypothesize and find that sin firms exhibit less tax avoidance than non-sin firms, particularly through uncertain and more risky tax avoidance strategies. The negative relationship between the status of sin firms and tax avoidance is less pronounced in firms that accumulate political capital via intensive lobbying activities. Exploiting changes in partisan control of the Congress and White House, difference-in-differences tests show that firearm firms engage in less (more) tax avoidance when the Democrats (Republican) control both the Congress and White House. Overall, we conclude that political costs play an important role in corporate tax avoidance decisions.     

Cross-listing and corporate social responsibility

This paper investigates the dynamics of cross-listing and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using a sample of 10,815 firm-year observations from 54 countries over the period 2002–2011, we find that cross-listed firms have better CSR performance than non–cross-listed domestic firms. This result is robust to endogeneity and different types of cross-listing. We also find that CSR increases (decreases) significantly after cross-listing in (delisting from) U.S. markets. The positive impact of cross-listing on CSR performance is stronger for firms from countries with weaker institutions, lower country-level sustainability, and higher liability of foreignness, and for firms operating in industries with high litigation risk. Finally, we find that cross-listed firms with better CSR performance exhibit higher valuations.     

Excess insider control and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from dual-class firms

We investigate the corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance of firms with a dual-class share structure. Dual-class firms, which represent a fast-growing segment of the U.S. capital market, violate the "one share, one vote" principle by giving corporate insiders control in excess of their economic interest in the firm. We observe a negative association of excess insider control and firms’ CSR performance, primarily with respect to the community- and employee-related dimensions of CSR. Extended analyses reveal that this negative association is mitigated by high financial resource availability. Consistent with a trade-off between corporate spending on CSR or on benefits for insiders, we also observe a negative association between CSR performance and executive pay in dual-class firms. Taken together, these extended analyses are consistent with self-interested behavior of entrenched insiders who, unless resources are abundant, appear to reduce CSR activities to maintain resources available for their personal benefit. While the exposure to risks engendered by a dual-class equity structure may be reflected in the share price, our findings draw attention to an externality: diminished CSR performance affects not just shareholders, but all stakeholders.     

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from Chinese listed firms

This study examines the impact of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on acquirers’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). Based on a sample of Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with cross-border M&A activities experience an improvement in subsequent CSR performance. Specifically, the CSR rating is approximately 8.24% higher in firms with cross-border M&As than in those without such activities. We also find that this positive influence is more pronounced in firms with low initial CSR ratings than in those with high initial CSR ratings at the time when a cross-border M&A deal is completed. Additional analyses reveal that this positive effect is mainly driven by the target firms from countries with high social preference relative to China and that the enhancement in CSR driven by cross-border M&As translates into higher operating performance and easier access to finance. Overall, our findings demonstrate that cross-border M&As can serve as a critical channel for acquirers from a country with low institutional quality to build a better reputation through environmentally friendly behaviour and socially responsible engagement, and therefore gain capital market benefits.     

Determinants and consequences of voluntary corporate social responsibility disclosure: Evidence from private firms

We examine whether and how private firms differ from public firms in determining corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure policies. We document that private firms are less likely to issue CSR reports compared with their public peers. Adopting a bivariate probit model that accommodates partial observability, we find that the effect is mainly driven by a supply-side force rather than a demand-side force. From a debtholder-oriented perspective, while public firms enjoy more favorable credit ratings and a lower cost of debt due to CSR disclosure, private firms do not reap similar benefits from CSR disclosure. Corporate governance and CSR assurance alleviate debtholders' concern on private firms’ engagements in CSR.     

Implications of public corruption for local firms: Evidence from corporate debt maturity

Using political corruption conviction data from the U.S. Department of Justice, we examine the impact of local corruption on firms’ debt maturity structure while exploring both demand-side and supply-side explanations. Our results support the demand-side story and indicate that firms in high corruption areas utilize less short-term debt to mitigate liquidity and refinancing risks. Consistent with this, we find the effect is more pronounced among firms with smaller size, lower asset redeployability, and higher volatility. Our findings remain robust to the inclusion of an array of controls expected to influence debt maturity preferences as well as time, industry, and state fixed effects. Moreover, a seemingly unrelated regression approach, instrumental variables regression, propensity score matching, placebo analyses, and alternative corruption measures corroborate our findings. Altogether, our results indicate that firms alter their debt maturity choices in response to local corruption to limit refinancing risk and the uncertainty created by corrupt government officials.     

Cross-listing and legal bonding: Evidence from mergers and acquisitions

Using a sample of foreign acquisitions of US targets, this study examines the extent to which cross-listing in the US leads to legal and regulatory bonding, and/or whether reputational bonding proxied by financial intermediaries monitoring, an often ignored component of the bonding mechanism, is an important factor in US investors decision to hold shares in cross-listed firms. We find that compared to US firms, cross-listed firms are less likely to use equity in takeovers of US targets. Further, cross-listed firms from countries with poorer legal protections are less likely to finance with equity and pay higher premiums than cross-listed firms from countries with better legal protections. Using analysts’ coverage and institutional following as proxies for financial intermediary monitoring, we find some support for the importance of reputational bonding. The evidence suggests that while cross-listing reduces barriers to investment, there are limits to its ability to completely subsume both the legal environment and the importance of the monitoring of financial intermediaries. This further suggests that the extent of actual legal and regulatory bonding by cross-listed firms may be more limited than often assumed.     

Peer R&D disclosure and corporate innovation: Evidence from American depositary receipt firms

In this paper, we examine the effect of peer research and development (R&D) disclosures on corporate innovation. R&D disclosures can generate externalities for related firms, enabling those firms to better infer a project's likely payoffs and thus prioritize projects with higher net present values. We use a sample of foreign firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges to investigate whether U.S. peer firms experience externalities from the cross-listing firm's R&D disclosures. We find that R&D disclosures by cross-listing firms are associated with greater innovation for industry peers in the U.S. market, especially when product market competition is high. The effect also varies with the home country's legal protection systems, disclosure environments, and accounting reporting rules. Cross-sectional analyses indicate that the externalities are more pronounced in industries or firms that rely more on external financing and firms subject to higher financial constraints; disclosures of higher quality appear to promote innovation by ameliorating financing frictions. Overall, this study provides evidence of R&D disclosure as an industry-wide determinant of innovation, thereby contributing to literature on the real effects of peer disclosures.     

Shareholding structure and corporate performance of partially privatized firms: Evidence from listed Chinese companies

Equity ownership in a listed Chinese firm can have as many as five different classes: state-owned shares, legal-person (LP) shares, tradable A-shares, employee shares, and shares only available to foreign investors, a phenomenon that is unique to the Chinese equity market. In this paper, we investigate whether and how the corporate performance of listed Chinese firms is affected by their shareholding structure. The sample consists of all firms listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) from 1991 to 1996. It is found that firm performance is positively related to the proportion of LP shares but negatively related to the proportion of shares owned by the state. Additional analyses indicate that firm performance increases with the degree of relative dominance of LP shares over state shares. Moreover, for the subsample of firms that do not have both state and LP shares, the return on equity (ROE) of firms with LP shares but no state shares is higher than that of firms with state shares but no LP shares by 3.84%, and this difference is statistically significant. On the other hand, there is little evidence in support of a positive correlation between corporate performance and the proportion of tradable shares owned by either domestic or foreign investors. These findings suggest that the ownership structure composition and relative dominance by various classes of shareholders can affect the performance of state-owned enterprise (SOE)-transformed and listed firms.     

Does media governance restrict corporate overinvestment behavior? Evidence from Chinese listed firms

Using China’s A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2011, this paper empirically tests how media governance affects firms’ levels of overinvestment and whether exte...     

The impact of corporate fraud on director‐interlocked firms: Evidence from bank loans

We examine the impact of corporate fraud committed by one firm (the “fraudulent firm”) on other firms with interlocking directors (the “interlocked firms”), focusing on the debtholder side. We argue that the revelation of a fraudulent firm's fraud can damage the reputation of the interlocked firms because corporate governance can propagate via director interlocks. Empirically, we find that the interlocked firms' cost of debt is higher and the loan covenants become stricter after the fraud cases of the fraudulent firms are revealed. Consistent with the corporate governance propagation explanation, our results are weaker (stronger) for interlocked firms that have better (worse) pre‐event corporate governance standards. Our findings suggest that corporate fraud of fraudulent firms can affect other firms through director‐interlocks beyond shareholder value.     

Determinants of corporate cash policy: Insights from private firms

We provide one of the first large sample comparisons of cash policies in public and private U.S. firms. We first show that despite higher financing frictions, private firms hold, on average, about half as much cash as public firms do. By examining the drivers of cash policies for each group, we are able to attribute the difference to the much higher agency costs in public firms. By combining evidence from across public and private firms as well as within public firms across different qualities of governance, we are able to reconcile existing mixed evidence on the effects of agency problems on cash policies. Specifically, agency problems affect not only the target level of cash, but also how managers react to cash in excess of the target.     

Diversity and inclusion: Evidence from corporate inventors

Inclusion is often considered a crux of diversity management. However, little is known about how board diversity affects corporate performance through organizational inclusive behavior. Using the inventor-level patenting data, we find that firms with more ethnic minority directors attract more productive ethnic minority inventors and promote greater collaboration among inventors, leading to more patents and patents with greater market value. Our findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. Overall, our study offers new evidence that racially diverse boards cultivate inclusive environment for inventors to succeed.     

Institutional trading and information processing: Evidence from complicated firms and easy-to-analyze firms

In this article, I examine institutional trading within two groups of firms with different demands on investor information processing: conglomerate firms and stand-alone firms. On average, institutional trading in conglomerate firm stocks yields significantly lower returns than institutional trading in stand-alone firm stocks. Inferior returns following institutional trading in conglomerate firm stocks persist across small and large firms. Moreover, financial institutions with a low concentration of conglomerate firms in their portfolios are more profitable in their trading. This study provides evidence that skilled institutional investors intentionally focus their information-processing efforts on easy-to-analyze firms.     

Tax avoidance in family firms: Evidence from large private firms

Ownership structure plays an important role in firms’ decisions on tax avoidance. Recently, the effect of family ownership on corporate tax avoidance has become an issue of increasing interest among scholars from both the fields of family business research and tax research; however, empirical findings have so far remained ambiguous. Based on a unique sample of 678 large private firms from Germany, we show that for unlisted large firms (i) family firms avoid more tax than non-family firms, (ii) tax avoidance increases with the percentage of family ownership, and (iii) tax avoidance is a function of the number of shareholders. We interpret our results as evidence that benefits from avoiding taxes outweigh the non-tax costs in the case of large private family firms in Germany. Furthermore, as the number of family shareholders increases, family firms satisfy increasing demand for dividends by avoiding taxes.     

Cross-listing effect on information environment of foreign firms: ADR type and country characteristics

We examine sources of improvement in the information environment of foreign firms that cross-listed in the United States as American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) between 1995 and 2005. We analyze changes in the number and dispersion of analyst recommendations on foreign firms following their cross-listing. We find increases in analyst coverage intensity across all four types of ADR programs, especially among firms that were listed on organized exchanges (the listing effect), and those that adopted capital raising ADR programs (the financing effect). Our results suggest that the listing effect is more persistent than the financing effect. On the other hand, reductions in recommendation dispersion are observed mainly for firms that choose non-capital raising ADRs and those from emerging markets. Overall, improvements in information environment are more profound among foreign firms originating from countries with greater information asymmetry, namely, countries with weaker legal tradition and rule of law, and countries that are less familiar to U.S. investors.     

Disability and accounting firms: Evidence from the UK

An accumulation of interpretative studies in a range of international contexts has considered gender, race and social class in accounting employment. However, no work has considered accounting firms’ attitudes towards employing disabled people. This omission is surprising given the passing of successive disability rights legislation in the United States since 1918 and the United Kingdom (UK) since 1944 and consequent changes in public expectations regarding equal employment opportunities for disabled people. This paper examines the UK accounting profession's response to changes in disability legislation. Using a survey administered to UK firms and an analysis of the Big Four firms’ 2003 UK annual reviews, we report that firms’ have a minimal understanding of disability, that disability is not a significant component of firms’ personnel policies, that firms lag behind other organizations in their attitudes to disability, and images of disability are wholly absent from firms’ annual reviews. We discuss these findings in the context of prior accounting research which considers gender, race and social class, which is used to develop a research agenda.     

Managerial expertise,corporate decisions and firm value: Evidence from corporate refocusing

This paper investigates how managerial expertise—specifically, industry expertise—affects firm value through divestiture. Using CEOs’ managerial experiences in industries throughout their careers as a measure of their industry expertise, I find that CEOs in diversified conglomerates are more likely to divest divisions in industries in which they have less experience. This finding is consistent with CEOs who divest such divisions in order to refocus on those divisions in which they have specialized—that is, to achieve a better match between their expertise and their firms’ retained assets. Firms that divest for a better CEO-firm match experience significant improvements in operating performance, as well as significant abnormal stock returns that persist for an average of three years following a divestiture. Further, among firms that divest for a better match, those firms with more experienced CEOs realize greater gains in firm value. In contrast, divestitures that increase corporate focus, but do not improve the expertise-asset match, do not lead to long-run increases in firm value.     

Corporate governance and risk-taking: Evidence from Japanese firms

This paper examines the influence of corporate governance on the risk taking of Japanese firms. We show that family control and ownership concentration are associated with higher idiosyncratic risk, whereas bank control has the opposite effect. Considering the link between idiosyncratic risk and firm performance, the results provide an economic rationale for the higher (lower) performance of family-controlled firms (bank-controlled firms). The results also explain the higher performance of firms with concentrated ownership by relating their governance structures to the risk-taking strategies that generate greater competitive advantages. Finally, we show that the impact of governance structures on risk taking is stronger after controlling for endogeneity.     

Political uncertainty and corporate investment: Evidence from China

Using hand-collected data on changes of government officials in 277 Chinese cities, we examine how political turnover affects corporate investment in a transitional economy. We find that political turnover leads firms to significantly reduce corporate investment, particularly when the new official is an outsider appointed by a higher level government. The effect of political turnover on corporate investment is stronger for state-owned enterprises, capital intensive firms, and firms deemed locally important. Overall, the volatility of corporate investment increases with political turnover. Finally, the investment decline due to political turnover has significantly negative impact on the profitability of private firms, but not state-owned firms.