The investment opportunity set,director ownership,and corporate policies: evidence from an emerging market

This paper provides evidence of the association between a firm's investment opportunity set (IOS), director ownership, and corporate policy choices. Using a sample of growth and non-growth firms in an emerging Asian market, we find that the IOS theory has significant explanatory power in the financing, dividend, executive compensation, and leasing aspects of corporate policies. Growth firms have lower debt-to-equity ratios and dividend yields, pay higher cash compensation and bonus amounts to their top executives, and finance a higher proportion of their asset acquisitions through operating leases. We also find that director ownership moderates and counteracts the association between IOS and corporate policies. Our results are consistent with contracting theory predictions that high director ownership mitigates the need for incentive or bonus compensation plans in growth firms.     

Do firms lease to hedge? CEO risk-taking and operating lease intensity

Operating leases are used extensively for financing, but their ability to separate ownership and use also creates hedging opportunities. We investigate whether firms recognize such opportunities by examining the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) risk-taking incentives and the use of operating leases. Consistent with firms using operating leases to hedge, we find higher CEO risk-taking incentives lower operating lease intensity. To address endogeneity, we use the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R as an exogenous shock to option compensation, dynamic panel generalized method of moments, simultaneous equations, and change regressions. Our results are robust to placebo and alternative tests.     

Recognition versus disclosure of finance leases: Evidence from Japan

This study examines whether credit market participants—bond investors and credit rating agencies—treat recognized and disclosed finance leases differently when assessing firms’ credit risk in Japan. I use firms’ credit risk, measured by bond spreads and credit ratings, to investigate the relations between recognized versus disclosed finance lease obligations and firms’ credit risk following the adoption of Statement No. 13, Accounting Standard for Lease Transactions. For a sample of firms issuing new bonds, I find that, unlike recognized finance leases, disclosed finance leases are not associated with bond spreads. Moreover, the associations between recognized versus disclosed finance leases and bond spreads are substantially different. Conversely, recognized and disclosed finance leases are associated with credit ratings and are processed similarly when credit ratings are determined. Taken together, my results suggest that the sophistication of capital market participants influences their credit risk assessments of recognized versus disclosed finance leases.     

Lessee Reactions to Regulation of Accounting for Leases

This study examines lessee firms’ responses to Australian Accounting Standard 17, Accounting for Leases (AAS 17, 1987) and Approved Accounting Standard ASRB 1008, Accounting for Leases (ASRB 1008, 1987). Both Standards required that lessees capitalize finance leases, thus bringing the finance leases of many firms‘on balance sheet’ and increasing reported leverage. If the capitalization requirement altered firms’ equilibrium contracting cost distributions sufficiently, firms would take actions to mitigate its effect, possibly by altering their capital structures. The study examines whether the capital structures of these firms did change in response to the requirement, and if so, how. The results indicate that firms responded to the Standards by reducing their reliance upon finance leasing and increasing their reliance upon non-lease debt and shareholders’ funds. Firms do not appear to have used definitional interpretations to classify leases as operating rather than finance leases. As expected, the firms previously disclosing finance leases in footnotes experienced increases in non-lease debt reliance while the control sample (firms that previously capitalized the lease obligations) experienced decreases. Differences between control firms’ and footnote disclosure firms’ reactions to the Standard are generally consistent with contracting theory predictions. Control firms reacted to the loss of the potential to off balance sheet finance. Footnote-disclosure firms reacted to the loss of an already utilized off balance sheet financing technique.     

Government audit supervision,financialization, and executives' excess perks: Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises

In recent years, the phenomenon of corporate financialization has become increasingly prevalent in China. This paper uses data from Chinese state-owned listed firms from 2006 to 2018 to investigate whether large-scale financial investments by companies facilitate executives' excess perk consumption, and whether government auditing, as an important component of the national governance system, can play a governance role in this behavior. The results show that corporate financialization behavior significantly exacerbates executives' excess perks, and government auditing can mitigate the effect of corporate financialization on executives' excess perk consumption. We find that increased cash flow is the mechanism by which financialization behavior positively affects executives' excess perks. Furthermore, this study reveals that the implicit corruption of state-owned enterprise executives through corporate financialization is primarily based on compensation psychology, which will reduce the effectiveness of monetary compensation contracts. However, government auditing can effectively constrain this influence.     

The Relationship Between Equity-Based Compensation and Managerial Risk Taking: Evidence from China

The authors analyze the impact of equity-based compensation on managerial risk-taking behavior in Chinese listed firms from January 2006 to July 2011. They find that greater risk-taking incentives lead executives to invest more in research and development (R&D) projects and less in capital expenditures. Greater managerial risk-taking incentive increases firm focus. Managerial risk-taking incentives have positive effects on firms' leverage. Overall, increasing the sensitivity of chief executive officers' portfolio value to stock return volatility helps incentivize executives to work harder, as sharing gains and losses with shareholders aligns the interests of executives and shareholders. In addition, the results indicate that state control of firms has a negative effect on R&D investment, and this suggests that state-controlled firms should take more initiative to innovate.     

Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section

Little evidence exists that firms index executive compensation to remove the influence of marketwide factors. We argue that executives can, in principle, replicate such indexation in their private portfolios. In support, we find that market risk has little effect on the use of stock‐based pay for the average executive. But executives' ability to “undo” excessive market risk can be hindered by wealth constraints and inalienability of human capital. We replicate the standard result that there is little relative performance evaluation (RPE) for the average executive, but find strong evidence of RPE for younger executives and executives with less financial wealth.     

Agency,Delayed Compensation,and the Structure of Executive Remuneration

In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of “bonding” executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards actions that are in the long-run interest of the stockholders. Firms must take into account their ability to discern unfortunate circumstances from mismanagement, the extent to which a compensation package forces the executive to face risks beyond his control, and the willingness of a given executive to bear this risk. We use our theory to interpret some executive compensation data from the early 1970s.     

The Relation Between Voluntary Disclosure and Financial Reporting: Evidence from Synthetic Leases

I investigate how the use and voluntary disclosure of synthetic leases is affected by incentives to defer cash outflows and manage the financial statements by keeping debt off the balance sheet. I find that managers of cash‐constrained firms with incentives to defer cash payments are more likely to finance asset purchases with synthetic leases. The mandated reporting for synthetic leases allows managers to avoid disclosing the financial consequences of these transactions. Managers of firms with incentives to use off‐balance‐sheet financing do not provide transparent disclosure about their synthetic leases. However, managers of cash‐constrained firms, which are less likely to use synthetic leases for financial reporting reasons, do voluntarily disclose the existence and financial consequences of these contracts. Alternative tests around FIN 46 adoption corroborate these findings.     

高管海外经历与企业全要素生产率

依据2007-2016年沪深A股上市公司数据,考察高管海外经历对企业全要素生产率的影响。结果发现：高管海外经历正向影响企业全要素生产率。从内部制度环境角度来看,企业内部控制质量越高、薪酬制度越完善,高管海外经历对企业全要素生产率的影响越显著;从外部制度环境角度来看,高管海外经历对企业全要素生产率的影响在政府监管较好、存在机构投资者持股以及市场化程度较高地区的企业中更显著。     

Proposed Changes in Lease Accounting and Private Business Bankers' Credit Decisions*

This study contributes to the debate on lease accounting currently ongoing at the international level and to future discussions at the Canadian level for private enterprise standards following a potential revision of lease accounting in international financial reporting standards (IFRS). A user perspective is adopted to examine private business bankers' preferences on the issue of capitalizing all noncancelable lease contracts, including operating leases, as suggested by the G4+1. While bankers use both capital and operating lease information, they give significantly more consideration to the former when analyzing private business loan requests. Accordingly, operating lease information receives less attention than capital lease information in the credit‐granting decision process. In addition, private business bankers consider a number of aspects of the current lease accounting standard to be inadequate and are in favor of the principles governing the approach suggested by the G4+1. They feel that the capitalization of operating leases would improve their ability to evaluate lessees' long‐term financial commitments and increase their estimates of the risks involved in providing financing to lessees. This study also demonstrates that the capitalization of operating leases would have a significant impact on key financial indicators of a sample of Canadian private companies. Bankers perceive that these realistic changes in financial indicators would affect their assessment of borrowers' capital structure/solvency, liquidity, ability to repay, and risk rating. From a cost‐benefit perspective, the findings provide standard‐setters with an indication of the benefits of the G4+1 proposals to users.     

The Debt Equivalence Of Leases In The UK: An Empirical Investigation

In finance theory, leasing is viewed as a form of borrowing. Prior studies have indicated that secured debt and lease are regarded as equivalent by the capital market.The following questions are addressed: i) do debt and lease have the same effects on the volatility of equity return? ii) Have changes in the accounting regulations altered the effect of lease obligation on the volatility of equity return? The results indicate that, on average, finance leases have a positive effect on the volatility of the return on equity as debt does. It is also found that the market considers leases more favourably (less risky) than debt.Two explanations are possible for the favourable treatment: i) the finance lease obligations are less like debts due to the imposed capitalisation requirements; ii) firms pay high costs of leasing because of the benefits from leasing relative to debt and the market reacts to those benefits favourably.     

Location and lease intensity

U.S. firms lease assets extensively. We find that, during 1980–2011, the average U.S. firm has a lease intensity of about 40%. Or, the average firm has present and future (up to five years) rent commitments equal to 16.6% of their total assets. We investigate whether agency costs between the lessor and the lessee affect the lease intensity of firms. To do so, we examine the impact of firms' location on the use of operating leases. The main idea of our paper is that, because obtaining information and monitoring is costly for potential lessors, especially when a lessee is relatively far away from financial centers, rural firms are less likely to use operating leases. Consistent with this hypothesis, we show that rural firms tend to have lower lease intensities than similar urban and small city firms. In addition, we find that firms with higher levels of debt capacity lease less and firms that face more financial constraint lease more. Our findings are robust to industry and lease maturity controls and consistent with the existence of an agency problem associated with leasing.     

Microfinance institutions and International Financial Reporting Standards: An exploratory analysis

Previous studies analyzing firms’ incentives to choose international accounting standards show that firms with strong contracting incentives will be more likely to comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). These studies are mostly centered on developed economies and are based on European and US data. Little is known about development finance organizations’ incentives to choose to draft their financial statements according to IFRS. Because commercialized microfinance institutions (MFIs) have strong contracting incentives, we investigate whether commercialization drives the choice of IFRS and study a pooled international sample of MFIs’ audited financial statements extracted from the MIX from 2007 to 2014. Consistent with our predictions, evidence shows that commercialization and maturity (age) are likely to drive the MFIs’ choice to comply with IFRS. Results are robust after controlling for heterogeneity in national regulations with regard to IFRS.     

Evaluating Constructive Lease Capitalization and Off‐Balance‐Sheet Financing: An Instructional Case with FedEx and UPS

This case illustrates the effects of the proposed new lease standard by the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board on existing outstanding operating leases. Specifically, the case examines the effects of the proposal that all firms report existing operating leases as capital leases upon the initial adoption of the proposed standard. By applying a constructive capitalization model to two firms who rely on operating leases for financing, FedEx and UPS, we found that both companies would have to record billions of dollars of liabilities that had only appeared in the footnotes of their financial statements under the current lease standards. In addition, the firms would experience a decline in retained earnings and key financial ratios, such as the debt‐to‐equity, return‐on‐assets, and interest coverage ratios, by reporting operating leases as capital leases under the new proposed standard. Furthermore, the magnitude of the lease capitalization impact is much smaller for UPS than for FedEx.     

The role of equity compensation in reducing inefficient investment in labor

We investigate whether equity compensation incentivizes executives to make efficient labor investment decisions. In doing so, we examine the extent to which stock options and restricted stock differentially influence labor investment decisions. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that stock options exacerbate, while restricted stock mitigates, inefficient labor investment. The effect of stock options (restricted stock) are weaker (stronger) for financially constrained firms. Our results are robust to alternative proxies for inefficient labor investment and when addressing a range of endogeneity concerns. Our research demonstrates that stock options and restricted stock matter in executives' labor investment decisions, but in different ways. Our findings have implications for future research, suggesting that stock options and restricted stock need to be separately considered when examining the impact equity compensation has on capital or investment decision making; and for executive remuneration practice.     

The Leasing Puzzle

Prevailing theories in finance and economics suggest that leases and debt are substitutes; an increase in one should led to a compensating decrease in the other. In particular, there are three views on the magnitude of the substitution coefficient. Standard finance theory treats cash flows from lease obligations as equivalent to debt cash flows, thus describing the tradeoff between debt and leases as one-to-one. Others are willing to use a tradeoff of leases for debt which is less than, but close to, one. The rationale for a dollar of leases using less of debt capacity than a dollar of debt obligation is based upon the differences in the terms and nature of lease and debt contracts. Finally, there are some who argue that since leased assets may be firm-specific, the risk of moral hazard may be great, resulting in a tradeoff of greater than one-to-one; that is, a dollar of a lease obligation uses more of debt capacity than a dollar of a debt obligation. A series of empirical tests are performed in this study on samples of approximately 600 firms, covering the years 1976 through 1981, with none of the three views supported by the results. Instead, the results indicate that leases and debt are complements; greater use of debt is associated with a greater use of leasing. This finding reappears consistently for each year, each definition of leverage ratios, and each approach to analysis. This complementary relationship persists even after refinements are made to the estimation technique.     

Operating and synthetic leases: Exploiting financial benefits in the post-Enron era

Applying constructive lease capitalization to operating leases of firms in the 2003 S&P 500 index, we demonstrate that currently companies can hide billions of liabilities, enhance retained earnings, income, and ratios by reporting leases as operating. With the rekindled interests of the International Accounting Standards Board and Financial Accounting Standards Board on lease reporting, our study provides valuable and timely information for their decisions.Results indicate that by reporting operating leases, firms avoided on average $582 million of liabilities (11% of total liabilities) and $450 million of assets (4% of total assets) for our 366 sample firms. Partitioning sample into negative and positive income impact subgroups provides additional insight into firm's motivation for using operating leases. Under lease capitalization the top quartile positive subgroup experienced an 18% increase in income while the top quartile negative subgroup had an 11% decline in income. There was also a significant negative impact on liquidity, leverage and performance ratios.     

Public-Private Partnerships: Form Over Substance?

Public-private partnerships have been devised to avoid treating financing arrangements as government "debt". Governments face incentives to avoid treating these arrangements as giving rise to liabilities. Both the Australian and UK standards boards have avoided a "substance over form" approach in order to accept that PPPs may be kept off-balance-sheet. The analysis supporting their conclusions was based on consideration of whether PPPs led to the acquisition of an asset, using the analogy of accounting for finance leases, rather than addressing whether the substance of commercial arrangements means that contractual commitments may evolve into liabilities.     

Public‐Private Partnerships: Form Over Substance?

Public-private partnerships have been devised to avoid treating financing arrangements as government "debt". Governments face incentives to avoid treating these arrangements as giving rise to liabilities. Both the Australian and UK standards boards have avoided a "substance over form" approach in order to accept that PPPs may be kept off-balance-sheet. The analysis supporting their conclusions was based on consideration of whether PPPs led to the acquisition of an asset, using the analogy of accounting for finance leases, rather than addressing whether the substance of commercial arrangements means that contractual commitments may evolve into liabilities.