Henry George, Emile de Laveleye, and the Issue of Peasant Proprietorship

A bstract .   In Emile de Laveleye's demonstration that communal landholding was universally a characteristic of primitive societies, Henry George saw evidence of a golden age before the development of private ownership of land. Though he agreed with George that unequal access to land was a major cause of the social evil of poverty, de Laveleye did not consider it the sole cause of poverty. Where George would nationalize land rent, de Laveleye would make private ownership more widespread; and he faulted George for giving too little attention to the question of how government would use the revenue from a land tax, and for failing to consider the concentration of capital as a cause of poverty.     

Simplified Alonso–Mills–Muth model with a monopoly vendor

One important but unrealistic assumption in the simplified Alonso–Mills–Muth (AMM(0)) model is that the composite good is ubiquitous and thus there is zero shopping cost for residents. This paper assumes that the composite good is only sold by a monopoly vendor inside the city and hence a shopping cost is inevitable for residents. It is shown that the vendor will locate at the city boundary in equilibrium. In contrast to the symmetric land rent pattern in the AMM(0) model, the current AMM(k) model offers an asymmetric land rent pattern in equilibrium. Moreover, this paper shows that a rent-maximizing government either regulates the vendor to locate at the central business district (CBD) (when income is high) or does not enact any regulation (when income is low).     

Interest Originating from Invested Rent: Social or Prwate Property?

A bstract Herny George contends that rent , even whten derived from land purchased with the fruits of honest toil, cannot justly be privately appropriated, because land (not being a labor product) can have no clear moral title, and because its value is nto produced by the owner but by society Although he does nto explicity address the ethical propriety of interest earned by capital originating from invested rent, his writings yield the following implieit analysis Even as rent should be returned to the community, abstractjustice also demands that interest on capital that stems from rent should be returned to the community But there is no feasible way in which to implement this demand, since it is scarcely ever possible to separate interest derived indiretly from private rent from interest not so derived however, this poses no real problem if We seek justice for the present and the future instead of reparations for injustice in the past For the socialization of rent would render accumulations of private capital, regardless of how obtained, impssible to sustam (absent special privileges confeired by government) unless directed toward the satisfaction of public de mand as reflected in the marketplace     

Marshall's Parable of the Meteoric Stones:

A bstract Marshall defended the classical concepts of land, labor and capital, even though many of his neoclassical contemporaries rejected these old distinctions and explained all factor incomes with a unified and general theory In his parable of the meteoric stones. Marshall illustrated the principles that separately determine rent, quasi-rent and interest , but he reconciled the old and the new by making special assumptions, which he did not fully explain His theory of rent requires the supply of land to be perfectly inelastic, and his doctrine of quasi-rent implies that markets are imperfectly competitive     

4 Human Rights, Global Justice, and Disaggregated States: John Rawls, Onora O'Neill, and Anne-Marie Slaughter

A bstract .   Human rights are urgently important rights that all individual persons may validly claim and that all governments are obligated to respect. According to some philosophers, no government can plausibly claim legitimate authority unless its legal and political system ascribes such rights, and no society can plausibly claim to be just unless it has a legitimate government. John Rawls presents his own version of this conception in the context of his account of the moral basis of a just global system of public law, which he calls the Law of Peoples. According to some of his critics, including Onora O'Neill, not only is the Law of Peoples statist, but also it relies on a false view of the state. O'Neill has developed a new conception of an ideally just global order in which states have fewer, and corporations more, powers and obligations to secure human rights, in contrast to Rawls's conception. Her conception is consistent with Anne-Marie Slaughter's account of the transformation of state sovereignty due to globalization. However, contrary to initial appearances, it is not the case that O'Neill's and Slaughter's views taken together require significant modification of Rawls's conception of human rights. There is no fundamental conflict between Rawls's conception of human rights and Slaughter's account of state transformation. And O'Neill's criticisms of Rawls's view are unwarranted.     

土地出让金制度应该保留--房地产税改革的一点建议

我国房地产税制的改革已经启动，在土地出让金该不该计入物业税按年征收的问题上，学术界争议很大。本文通过深入分析，从税理、经济学原理等方面证明了土地出让金不应该包括在物业税中按土地承租年限征收，应该维持目前的土地出让金制度，在土地出让的同时征收。     

Exclusivity and Control

We model competition between content distributors (platforms) for content providers, and show that whether or not content is exclusive or “multihomes” depends crucially on whether or not content providers maintain control over their own pricing to consumers: if content providers sell their content outright and relinquish control, they will tend to be exclusive; on the other hand, if content providers maintain control and only “affiliate” with platforms, then multihoming is sustainable in equilibrium. We show that the outcome under affiliation depends on the tradeoff between platform rent extraction (which increases in exclusivity) and content rent extraction (which increases in multihoming), and demonstrate that the propensity for exclusivity can be increasing, decreasing, or even nonmonotonic in content quality. Finally, if a content provider internalizes the effect of its own price on platform demand, we prove that a platform that already has exclusive access to content may prefer to relinquish control over content pricing to the content provider in order to reduce price competition at the platform level.     

Irving Fisher's Spendings (Consumption) Tax in Retrospect

A bstract .   Irving Fisher wrote a significant number of papers towards the end of his career on the design of the U.S. tax system. These writings culminated in a book that he wrote with his brother Herbert in 1942. Fisher thought that the double taxation of saving under an income tax was extremely harmful to the economy and he therefore proposed a "spendings" tax or what he referred to as a "real income" tax. Even though he disliked the terminology, he advocated what today would be referred to as a progressive consumption tax. Fisher's analysis was both theoretical and practical. His 1942 book contained a proposed tax return that implemented his ideas. His analysis is surprisingly modern and relevant today. This paper presents the Fisher proposal and examines the current U.S. tax system in light of his tax views. We argue that Fisher would find that the U.S. tax system lacks intellectual coherence, is economically inefficient, and unnecessarily complex.     

Henry George and the Catholic View of Morality and the Common Good, I

A bstract . On the issuance of the first of the modern social encyclicals, Rerum Novarum , Henry George, the American economist and social philosopher , criticized its author, Pope Leo XIII , for defending a limited right to own land and for limiting the right of private ownership of labor products. George did so by reasoning from Locke's ground that each human has a property right in one's person. George distinguished between possession (and use) and ownership of land on the ground of the common good. That required equality of mutual opportunity , which George would achieve by a Single Tax on all land values. Land reform , he held, would lead to moral reform , and thus to a society based on justice. Pope Leo goes beyond the Schoolmen in stressing a natural right to property, including land, which he asserted must be regarded as sacred. This right, he said, was not absolute, but subject to be used, according to God's Will, for the benefit of others. George looked to a change in the economic structure by reform of land tenure and use to establish a just social order ; Leo to religion and the church , the government, moral individuals and voluntary associations to do so.     

DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRICES WITH DETAILED AGRICULTURAL LAND RENT DATA AND IMPROVED VALUE-ADDED COMPONENTS FOR THE USA

We describe a method for creating social accounting matrices (SAMs) with detailed agricultural land rent data for any arbitrary subset of the 48 contiguous states in the USA. Data on land use and land rents from various public sources is merged with national accounts data. The method reorganizes the rental income of persons concept present in national accounts to payments to conventional primary factors of production. This method also reallocates portions of the indirect business tax account to the appropriate sales and import tax accounts. SAMs created using this method should be useful inputs into input–output or computable general equilibrium models explicitly representing a heterogeneous land market and analyzing the economic effects of agricultural, bioenergy, water and climate policies on land-use change, land rents, agricultural commodity markets, trade and households’ welfare. The method's implementation is freely available, enabling others to rapidly create SAMs with their own desired region and sector aggregations.     

Simon Patten on Public Infrastructure and Economic Rent Capture

Reflecting the Progressive Era's reform agenda Simon Patten (1852–1922) argued that freeing markets from one source of economic rent (by taxing land rent) would merely leave the surplus to be taken by other monopolists and rent extractors (railroads, Wall Street trusts, and basic privatized utilities). To prevent unearned income (economic rent) from adding to the economy's cost of living and doing business, potentially rent‐yielding infrastructure should be kept in the public domain as a “fourth factor of production.” Instead of rentiers making a profit by charging access fees and user fees, the return to public investment should take the form of reducing the economy's overall price structure.     

The 'Socialism' of Léon Walras and His Economic Thinking

A bstract . Léon Walras was one of the few outstanding 19th century economists who, though as a theoretician belonged to the mainstream of orthodox economics , expressed views which at one time were considered to be too radical. He advocated in particular the nationalization of land as the solution to the social problem. This would generate sufficient revenue to government to enable it to do away with taxing income derived from wages and salaries. As a result workers would be in a position to invest their untaxed income and thus acquire their rightful share in the national wealth. Contrary to what many have argued, such 'socialistic' policy was not incompatible with Walras' theoretical model of perfect competition. In the absence of private ownership of land and natural resources , there would be no place for big enterprises and monopolies. His great compromise was: allow social reforms in the realm of distribution, but promote lassser-faire in the production of goods and services. Walras was convinced that if, on top of a radical land reform, the State sought to secure the working of a free competitive system , then the economic system could function very closely to the theoretical model. Though there are flaws in his proposals, his ideas no longer appear as preposterous as they did in his own time.     

Henry George on Land Ownership: A Comment on Pullen

Did George alienate many by presenting his reform program as the institution of a new form of restricted land possession rather than as the retention of traditional ownership with a substantial land tax imposed? It seems doubtful, yet the distinction merits further exploration and the peculiar and hard‐to‐implement nature of the tax and the difficulty of reconciling it with George's distrust of government needs to be stressed. Ideally, George might have preferred complete government ownership of land but his policy proposals were pragmatically adapted to the realities of his own society. The extent of the egalitarianism and aid to the landless implied in his program is questioned.     

How Much Revenue Would a Full Land Value Tax Yield?In the United States in 1981, Census and Federal Reserve Data Indicate It Would Nearly Equal All Taxes

Abstract . Most urban economists and particularly specialists in urban public finance consider the land value tax, because of its economic effects and its influence toward rational development, the tax of choice. But could it replace, in whole or in large part, taxes which now burden labor and capital and distort efficient allocation of resources? How important would a full land rent tax's yield be? The U.S. Bureau of the Census provides data which, adjusted for errors and omissions, indicates that the annual land rent for 1981 was $721 billion. Federal Reserve Board data, similarly adjusted, indicates annual land rent for that year was $590.38 billion Hence we may say that a full land rent tax would yield something around $658 billion in 1981, or 28 percent of the 1981 national income. This is nearly two thirds of all taxes levied by all levels of government in 1981, and, with user charges and similar fees continued, it is probably equal or nearly equal to burdensome taxes.     

Henry George:

ABSTRACT While generally known today for his famous proposal for a Single Tax, Henry George has not been widely recognized as one of the first economists to write about the possibility of political market failure. Based on his appreciation for the allocational efficiency of markets and his suspicion of government intervention, George was an early advocate of public choice ideas who repeatedly warned of the dangers of rent seeking.     

George Reisman on National Income Accounting

A bstract .   George Reisman misrepresents macroeconomists' estimation of national income. He fails to distinguish between intermediate goods and factors of production, and he does not correctly recognize macroeconomists' derivation of the net domestic or national product. His concept of gross national product is also grossly mistaken. This note offers a correction for his confusion.     

Joshua K. Ingalls, American Individualist: Land Reformer, Opponent of Henry George and Advocate of Land Leasing, Now an Established Mode

A bstract . Joshua K. Ingalls was a member of a particularly cohesive group of 19th century intellectual iconoclasts in America, the individualists. Two controversies made him widely known at the time: the land reform vs. abolition argument before the Civil War, and his attacks on Henry George in the 1880s over the issue of land reform through tax reform or land reform through land leasing under an occupancy and use system of tenure. Ingalls held George failed to understand the "true" nature of capitalism; rent goes to the landlord as capitalist as reward for his investment; the landowning capitalist appropriates this by his dominion over the land. Though Ingalls' argument did not prevail, land leasing, which he advocated, is the form in which some resources are now disposed of, as in grazing rights and mineral exploration on public land, and in oil exploration rights on the continental shelves; and in the disposition of urban sites such as the site of Rockefeller Center and the Chrysler Building in New York (the former to the benefit of Columbia University, the latter Cooper Union, both by legislative action).     

Land rent and housing policy: a case study of the San Francisco Bay area rental housing market

In the San Francisco Bay Area, where residential rent is among the highest in the United States, an analysis of data from several sources demonstrates that high rent cannot be accounted for by higher quality, higher operating costs, or higher construction costs. At least one-third of the total rent paid is land rent. Despite increases in real incomes, very-low-income tenants in the Bay Area today have less income remaining after payment of rent than tenants did in 1960. High land rent is a long-term feature of the Bay Area rental market that results mostly from its geography, the density of its urban centers, and a strong economy, rather than from regulatory barriers to new multifamily construction. Deregulation is not a sufficient response to the effects of land rent on low-income tenants. Government should subsidize non-profit housing organizations, particularly land trusts that remove residential land from the market. Taxes on land rent would be a particularly appropriate funding source.     

The State as Both Regulator and Player: The Politics of Transfer of Development Rights in China

The conventional argument that the introduction of transfer of development rights (TDR) shifts the power of land use regulation from the state to the market is increasingly under challenge. In China, the state's grip on land is reinforced through TDR, in which the state is both regulator and player. This state-dominated form of TDR affects China in three ways. First, competing aspirations of different scales of government complicate how TDR is implemented. Although the central state promotes TDR to maintain a national balance of arable land, some local states instrumentalize it to expand their landed basis of accumulation. Secondly, TDR tends to benefit the state but not its people. It may increase the fiscal income of the sending government and lessen the land shortage of the receiving government, but sometimes at the expense of the interests of land users without land ownership. Thirdly, given the state's deep involvement in TDR programs, the key for China's TDR to protect arable land lies not so much in clear property rights or a fully fledged market as in effective checks and balances regarding the state's powers over TDR. These three observations attest to the embeddedness of TDR in the local political economy.     

Effects of rent dependency on quality of government

This paper introduces quality of government rather than regime type as dependent variable in studies of political effects of natural resources. It consists of two parts. First, it argues for an effect of fiscal dependency of oil and gas rents on quality of government. Second, it finds significant, negative effects of oil and gas rent dependency on three empirical indicators of quality of government—low corruption, bureaucratic quality and legal impartiality—in a sample of 139 states in the period 1984–2006. The results hold for inclusion of control variables such as regime type, income, region and religion.