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1.
In the context of a vertically differentiated duopoly, we analyse the influence of the degree of differentiation on cartel sustainability, under both price and quantity competition. We find that, under both Bertrand and Cournot competition, the effect of vertical product differentiation on sustainability of the collusive equilibrium is unclear. It is shown that, given a degree of differentiation, price collusion is more sustainable than quantity collusion. 相似文献
2.
Summary. Within the framework proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978) for modelling quality differentiation, consumers are assumed to make
mutually exclusive purchases. A unique pure strategy equilibrium exists in this case. In this note, we allow consumers to
buy simultaneously different variants of the differentiated good. We call this the “joint purchase option”. The paper proposes
a detailed analysis of price competition when this option is opened: first, we show that either uniqueness, or multiplicity,
or absence of price equilibrium arise, depending on the utility derived from joint purchase relative to exclusive purchase.
Second, we characterize these equilibria, whenever they exist.
Received: July 25, 2001; revised version: October 21, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The second author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from Interuniversity Attraction Pole Program- Belgian
State- Federal Office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural Affairs under contract PAI 5/26.
Correspondence to: X.Y. Wauthy 相似文献
3.
We analyze optimal penal codes in both Bertrand and Cournot supergames with product differentiation. We prove that the relationship between optimal punishments and the security level (individually rational discounted profit stream) depends critically on the degree of supermodularity in the stage game, using a linear duopoly supergame with product differentiation. The security level in the punishment phase is reached only under extreme supermodularity, i.e., when products are perfect substitutes and firms are price setters. Finally, we show that Abreu's rule cannot be implemented under Cournot behavior and strong demand complementarity between products. 相似文献
4.
Martin Peitz 《Economic Theory》1999,14(3):717-727
Summary. In models of product differentiation and location models it is implicitly assumed that consumers can afford to buy the differentiated
goods in the market. I show that with income heterogeneity there are severe existence problems of a price equilibrium in models
of horizontal product differentiation with unit demand because some consumers are income-constrained. The result generalizes
to other models of product differentiation, search, and switching costs. I present an alternative specification of variable
individual demand in which this kind of existence problem cannot arise.
Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: February 20, 1998 相似文献
5.
Tommaso M. Valletti 《Research in Economics》2000,54(4):149
This paper analyses the problem of price discrimination in a market where consumers have heterogeneous preferences both over a horizontal parameter (brand) and a vertical one (quality). Discriminatory contracts are characterized for different market structures. It is shown that price dispersion, i.e. the observed range of prices for each class of customers, increases almost everywhere as competition is introduced in the market. 相似文献
6.
Boiteux's solution to the shifting-peak problem and the equilibrium price density in continuous time
Summary. Bewley's condition on production sets, imposed to ensure the existence of an equilibrium price density when is the commodity space, is weakened to allow applications to continuous-time problems, and especially to peak-load pricing
when the users' utility and production functions are Mackey continuous. A general form for production sets with the required
property is identified, and examples are given of technologies which meet the weakened but not the original condition: these
include industrial use and storage of cyclically priced goods. This gives a framework for settling Boiteux's conjecture on
the shifting-peak problem. To make clear the restriction implicit in Mackey continuity, we interpret it as interruptibility
of demand; and we point out that, without this assumption, the equilibrium can feature pointed peaks with singular, instantaneous
capacity charges. The general equilibrium results are supplemented by results for prices supporting individual consumer or
producer optima.
Received: February 16, 2000; revised version: July 7, 2001 相似文献
7.
Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs.
Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through
a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit
outcomes.
Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000 相似文献
8.
The theory of economic price and quantity indicators 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary. This paper develops the theory of economic price and quantity indicators, being the difference analogue of indexes. The properties of indicators and indexes are compared. Observable bounds for the indicators will be derived, as well as two exactness results for Bennet (1920)-type price and quantity indicators.Received: 3 January 2002, Revised: 2 December 2002, JEL Classification Numbers:
C43Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Economic Measurement Group Workshop 2001, School of Economics, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 30 March 2001, and at a seminar at the School of Economics, University of New England, Armidale NSW, 7 September 2001. The authors thank Erwin Diewert for helpful comments on a previous version. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect any policy of Statistics Netherlands. 相似文献
9.
Francisco Martínez-Sánchez 《Research in Economics》2021,75(1):1-6
In a model à la Mussa and Rosen (1978) in which consumers are loss-averse, I check the robustness of the result obtained by Tanaka (2001). As he did, I find that the quantity contract is a dominant strategy for both firms. Thus, Cournot is the outcome in equilibrium. Finally, I find that loss aversion in general intensifies competition. 相似文献
10.
Martin Peitz 《Economic Theory》2002,20(4):849-860
Summary. I present a class of address models of product differentiation with unit-elastic individual demand and show the existence
of Nash equilibrium in prices under assumptions on utility functions and the taste and income heterogeneity across consumers.
This paper complements the work by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991, Econometrica), who analyze unit demand models of product differentiation.
Received: December 28, 1998; revised version: September 5, 2001 相似文献
11.
《Research in Economics》2014,68(2):157-168
This paper aims at investigating if the conventional wisdom (i.e. an increase of competition linked to a decrease in the degree of product differentiation always reduces firms׳ profits) can be reversed in a unionized duopoly model. We show that a decrease in the degree of product differentiation may affect wages, hence profits, differently, depending on both the firms׳ production technology and the mode of competition in the product market. Specifically, under constant returns to labour, the “reversal result” can apply under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, but it is more likely when firms compete in quantities. By contrast, under decreasing returns, profits can increase with competition but only if firms compete in prices. 相似文献
12.
Michael Pfaffermayr 《Journal of Economics》1999,70(3):309-326
Conjectural-variation models (CV models) are popular in empirical research as they infer the degree of market power from real data. Theorists of industrial organization, however, disapprove of them for lack of theoretical foundation arguing that dynamic reactions are forced into a static model with the strategy space and time horizon only loosely defined. The presented model follows an idea put forward by Cabral (1995) and demonstrates that the CV model can be interpreted as the joint-profit-maximizing steady-state reduced form of a price-setting supergame in a differentiated product market under optimal punishment strategies. For the symmetric two-firm case the CV parameter is shown to cover the full range of possible outcomes — from Bertrand competition to joint unconstrained monopoly — depending on the degree of product differentiation, market growth, bankruptcy risk, and the discount rate. For the asymmetric-cost case numerical calculations are provided. 相似文献
13.
Reiko Aoki 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):653-672
We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product
market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally
on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible
commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition,
higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater
with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus
credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition.
Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai
and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve
Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments
from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this
work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee. 相似文献
14.
Pedro Mendi 《Journal of Economics》2009,96(2):95-112
This paper formalizes the idea that input transactions might be used to implement side payments among colluding firms. A model
is proposed to analyze the effect of backward integration on collusive outcomes in a downstream duopoly with asymmetric marginal
costs. Vertical integration expands the set of collusive outcomes that are sustainable for a given realization of the discount
factor. This is an additional effect of vertical integration that antitrust authorities should consider. Side payments implemented
by input sales are more relevant the larger the difference in marginal costs, since they allow for the shifting of production
towards the relatively more efficient firms, while maintaining firms’ incentives to collude. A price of the input above that
posted by an alternative source or sales of the input below cost may be observed, depending on the realization of downstream
firms’ costs.
相似文献
15.
By assuming asymmetric product differentiation, we consider the “merger paradox” in price competition (or the incentive to collude in prices). We investigate whether the emergence of the merger paradox depends on the degree of product differentiation between firms. In particular, unlike Deneckere and Davidson (1985), we demonstrate that if the degree of product differentiation between the insider and outsider is sufficiently small, then they are strategic substitutes, and thus, the merger paradox arises in price competition. 相似文献
16.
Summary. Models of spatial competition are typically static, and exhibit multiple free-entry equilibria. Incumbent firms can earn
rents in equilibrium because any potential entrant expects a significantly lower market share (since it must fit into a niche
between incumbent firms) along with fiercer price competition. Previous research has usually concentrated on the zero-profit
equilibrium, at which there is normally excessive entry, and so an entry tax would improve the allocation of resources. At
the other extreme, the equilibrium with the greatest rent per firm normally entails insufficient entry, so an entry subsidy
should be prescribed. A model of sequential firm entry (with an exogenous order of moves) resolves the multiplicity problem
but raises a new difficulty: firms that enter earlier can expect higher spatial rents, and so firms prefer to be earlier in
the entry order. This tension disappears when firms can compete for entry positions. We therefore suppose that firms can commit
capital early to the market in order to lay claim to a particular location. This temporal competition dissipates spatial rents
in equilibrium and justifies the sequential move structure. However, the policy implications are quite different once time
is introduced. An atemporal analysis of the sequential entry process would prescribe an entry subsidy, but once proper account
is taken of the entry dynamics, a tax may be preferable.
Received: April 26, 1999; revised version: September 22, 1999 相似文献
17.
This paper analyzes Stackelberg price leadership in a duopoly in which firms are capacity constrained and products are imperfect substitutes. Assuming symmetric substitutes, linear demand, and efficient rationing, we characterize the equilibria with an exogenously specified leader. Using the equilibrium profits derived from these games, we argue that over certain ranges of asymmetric capacities an endogenous price leader will emerge. When endogenous leadership does arise, it is the large capacity firm which is the leader. We thus provide a game theoretic model of dominant firm price leadership.Dave Furth's research has been undertaken as a part of the project Competition and Cooperation. Dan Kovenock has benefited from financial support from Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Krannert School of Management, and the Jay N. Ross Young Faculty Research Fellowship. We are grateful to Tom Faith for valuable research assistance. We have benefited from the comments of the editor, two anonymous referees, and participants at the European meetings of the Econometric Society in September 1989 and the North American Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society in December 1989. 相似文献
18.
The multiple unit auction with variable supply 总被引:9,自引:0,他引:9
Yvan Lengwiler 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):373-392
Summary. The theory of multiple unit auctions traditionally assumes that the offered quantity is fixed. I argue that this assumption
is not appropriate for many applications because the seller may be able and willing to adjust the supply as a function of
the bidding. In this paper I address this shortcoming by analyzing a multi-unit auction game between a monopolistic seller
who can produce arbitrary quantities at constant unit cost, and oligopolistic bidders. I establish the existence of a subgame-perfect
equilibrium for price discriminating and for uniform price auctions. I also show that bidders have an incentive to misreport
their true demand in both auction formats, but they do that in different ways and for different reasons. Furthermore, both
auction formats are inefficient, but there is no unambiguous ordering among them. Finally, the more competitive the bidders
are, the more likely the seller is to prefer uniform pricing over price discrimination, yet increased competition among bidders
may or may not enhance efficiency.
Received: June 18, 1998; revised version: January 13, 1999 相似文献
19.
Technologically dynamic industries are characterised by the availability of ample differentiation opportunities. Implementing an appropriate product differentiation strategy is a critical determinant of entrant success in such industries. Firms typically have to engage in two sequential decisions. They need to first decide whether to differentiate and if they decide to do so, they need to choose between a horizontal and a vertical differentiation strategy. Despite the growing literature on the consequences of product differentiation strategy, limited attention has been paid to ascertaining the determinants of these dynamic decisions. We suggest that a complex interplay of firm-level (firm size and pre-entry experience) and industry (technology regime) characteristics impacts the choice of differentiation strategies. Empirical tests using multinomial logit models on data obtained from a census of all entrants into the personal computer industry between 1974 and 1994 support our theory. 相似文献
20.
Summary. Asset prices and returns are known to vary significantly more than␣output or aggregate consumption growth, and an order of
magnitude in excess of what is justified by innovations to fundamentals. We study excess price volatility in a lifecycle economy
with two assets (claims on capital and␣a public debt bubble), heterogeneous agents, and increasing returns to financial intermediation.
We show that a relatively modest nonconvexity generates a set valued equilibrium correspondence in asset prices, with two␣stable
branches. Price volatility is the outcome of an equilibrium selection mechanism, which mixes adaptive learning with “noise”,
and alternates stochastically between the two stable branches of the price correspondence.
Received: March 19, 1998; revised version: June 2, 1998 相似文献