河北省实施排污权交易的实践与反思——基于河北省满城县经验的探讨

排污权交易作为环境控制政策的手段之一,已成为备受关注的环境经济政策。河北省满城县进行了排污权交易的试点探索,在实践中存在不少问题和困惑,诸如：排污权性质、排污总量的确定、交易价格等都需要进一步研究和探讨。     

当前排污权交易市场化机制的问题及对策研究

我国排污权管理存在法律法规不完善,政府与市场角色错位;全国性的排污权交易市场没有形成,交易制度不健全;市场化交易中排污主体和污染物指标覆盖有限;价格市场化信号弱,交易价格构成要素抽象等问题。文章通过对当前排污权交易存在的问题分析,提出了推动与新修订环保法配套法规的完善,发挥政府和市场的各自作用;建立全国性的排污权交易体系,完善市场化交易制度;实现污染物指标和排污主体梯度覆盖,建立目录清单制;强化总量管理,推动政府管理下市场化价格确定等具体对策。发挥市场化机制在节能减排、环境改善中的积极作用。     

我国排污权初始分配和交易的证券化设想

在总量控制的前提下实行排污权交易首先涉及排污权的初始分配问题,如何对排污权进行初始分配是阻碍排污权交易市场形成的主要障碍.现有的排污权初始分配模式复杂且欠缺合理性和可操作性,不利于形成成本较低的排污权交易市场.排污权证券化设想提出了"认购权证-许可确权-自由交易"的排污权初始分配和交易设计思路,简化了初始分配的手段,增加了排污权分配和交易的合理性和可操作性,同时为建立完善排污权交易市场留下了许多制度设计空间.     

西部试行排污权交易制度的再思考

排污权交易制度是以市场为基础的保护环境的方式,即在保持一定区域污染物排放总量不变的前提下,确立排污权,允许各个排污单位的排污权像商品那样买卖。针对西部污染等环境问题,本文阐述了西部试行排污权交易制度的必要性和构想,提出了良好的制度才能建立人与环境的和谐关系,鼓励公众参与,在排污权初始分配中借鉴期权理论,环境政策的整体策动效应是完善此制度的有效措施等观点。     

长株潭城市群主要污染物总量控制与初始排污权分配研究

从总量控制与排污权分配的内涵出发,结合实施实行污染物总量控制的优点、污染物总量控制类型及总量控制区的划分,从初始排污权分配的指标分析了长株潭初始排污权优化配置。     

我国排污权交易的法律制度构建

排污权交易是指在污染物排放总量控制指标确定的条件下,利用市场机制,建立合法的污染排放权利即排污权,并允许这种权利像商品那样被买入和卖出,是对污染物排放进行管理和控制的一种经济手段,是一种以市场为基础的控制策略。排污权交易制度是在污染物排放总量控制的前提下,排污权交易双方利用市场机制及环境资源的特有性质,在环境保护主管部门的监督管理下,通过交易实现低成本污染治理的制度。它是政府用法制制度将环境使用这一经济权利与市场交易机制相结合,使政府这只有形之手和市场这只无形之手紧密结合来控制环境污染的一种较为有效的手段。     

基于成本分析的排污权交易机制的一种理论模型

本文对环境治理目标进行了重新定位,认为环境治理的核心问题是依靠污染物排放量的最优化而非最小化实现社会成本的最小化。进而在成本分析的框架下构建了一种以总量控制为基础的排污权交易机制模型,考察排污权交易机制在环境治理方面对社会成本的影响。研究发现,建立低成本的完善的排污监管机制是建立有效的排污权交易机制的关键条件,政府部门可通过降低监管成本,提高污染物处理能力,加强直接投入治污费用的利用效率等方法有效提高治污效率,节约社会成本。     

论开展电力排污权交易的几个关键问题及挑战

排污权交易强调用市场配置环境资源,改变了政府配置环境资源的管理传统,这将引起环境管理体制和运行机制的全面调整。文章从创造政策环境、建立和电力市场相适应的排污权交易市场、制订中长期总量目标等制度层面分析了我国开展电力排污权交易需要具备的5个前提条件,并针对当前环境管理面临的挑战进行了探讨。     

排污市场化管理与政府监管

提出了基于污染物总量控制的城市排污权管理的市场化制度,分析了排污权许可证制度市场化管理的具体方法和效率。为了保障排污权市场化不影响社会利益,分析了政府在排污权市场化中的监督管理作用。     

排污权交易机制研究进展

排污权交易谋求充分利用市场机制治理环境污染,通过总量管制与排放交易规制,达到环境容量优化配置,其实质是环境容量产权明晰化的制度变迁过程。排污权初始配置方式与价值评估、排污权定价机制、排污权交易制度下厂商行为、政府管制及交易制度的社会福利分析,构成了当前排污权交易机制研究的基本内容。现行的排污权交易制度刚刚处于起步阶段,亟需在排污总量控制的科学性、排污权定价的约束性、初始分配的公平性、市场交易的完备性、监督机构的权威性等方面积累探索经验。     

基于Internet的排污权交易平台分析与设计

利用现代信息技术进行排污权交易平台的开发是河南省排污权交易体系的一个重要组成部分,也是排污权交易发展的必然趋势。排污权交易平台的开发以排污权交易为核心,基于B/S三层体系架构,实现排污权总量控制、申购、交易、跟踪预警、信息管理、平台维护和信息发布等为一体的系统功能,为更好地实现排污权交易提供了系统性的支持平台和有力的实施保障。     

Allowing for Household Preferences in Emission Trading – A Contribution to the Climate Policy Debate

In the context of emission trading it seems to be taken as given that people's preferences can be ignored with respect to the whole process of fixing emission targets and allocating emission permits to polluters. With this paper we want to reopen the debate on how citizens can be involved in this process. We try to show how citizen preferences can be included in the process of pollution control through emission trading. We propose an emission trading system where all emission permits are initially allocated to households who are then allowed to sell them in the permit market or to withhold (at least some of) them in order to reduce total pollution. This proposal tries to overcome the fundamental disadvantage of traditional permit systems which neglect consumer preferences by solely distributing emission permits to producers / polluters. In our system the property right to nature is re-allocated to the households who obtain the opportunity of reducing actual emissions according to their personal preferences by withholding a part or all of the emission permits allotted to them. Such a change in environmental policy would mark a return to the traditional principles of consumer sovereignty by involving households (at least partially) in the social abatement decision process instead of excluding them. Another advantage of admitting households to the TEP market as sellers or buyers of permits is that this increases the number of agents in the permit market and thus significantly reduces the possibilities of strategic market manipulations.     

北部湾排污权拍卖交易建立的可行性分析

北部湾地区属于国家重点开发地区,近几年来开发的热潮始终不减,随之而来的生态环境破坏问题更是值得人们去关注,在我国虽然排污权拍卖的交易制度还尚处在萌芽阶段,但其重要性是不容忽视的,文章通过博弈模型,引进政府、排污企业、环境保护者三方,并结合北部湾地区自身特点,分析排污权拍卖交易实现的可行性及其条件,为解决北部湾在大开发过程出现的环境保护问题提供理论依据,使北部湾开发建设遵循可持续发展战略要求。     

International emission permit markets with refunding

We propose a blueprint for an international emission permit market such as the EU trading scheme. Each country decides on the amount of permits it wants to offer. A fraction of these permits is freely allocated, the remainder is auctioned. Revenues from the auction are collected in a global fund and reimbursed to member countries in fixed proportions. We show that international permit markets with refunding lead to outcomes in which all countries tighten the issuance of permits and are better off compared to standard international permit markets. If the share of freely allocated permits is sufficiently small, we obtain approximately socially optimal emission reductions.     

妨碍我国排污权交易政策实施的制度瓶颈分析

结合污染物的总量控制和排污许可证制度,我国已经进行了十多年的各类排污权交易试点工作。但是,排污权交易却至今未能形成一个全国统一的环境政策。本文利用制度分析框架从制度结构与不完全合约的角度对此进行分析,并认为妨碍我国排污权交易政策实施的制度瓶颈主要是排污权交易制度结构的缺陷。     

The Cost-Effective Choice of Policy Instruments to Cap Aggregate Emissions with Costly Enforcement

We study the cost-effectiveness of inducing compliance in a program that caps aggregate emissions of a given pollutant from a set of heterogeneous firms based on emissions standards and the relative cost-effectiveness of such a program with respect to an optimally designed program based on tradable discharge permits. Our analysis considers abatement, monitoring and sanctioning costs, as well as perfect and imperfect information on the part of the regulator with regard to the polluters’ abatement costs. Under perfect information we find that (a) the total-cost-effective design of a program based on standards is one in which the standards are firm specific and perfectly enforced, and (b) the total cost of an optimally designed program based on standards is lower than the total cost of an optimally designed transferable emission permits system, except under special conditions. This is true when it is optimum to induce perfect compliance and when it is not. Under imperfect information, nevertheless, it is only by implementing a system of tradable permits and perfectly enforcing it with a constant marginal penalty tied to the price of the permits, that the regulator can surmount the informational problem and at the same time minimize the total cost of the program with certainty.     

UNCERTAINTY AND THE COST OF ACID RAIN CONTROL

This paper uses a utility capacity planning and dispatch model to examine the robustness of acid rain mitigation policies. The model meets electricity demand at the lowest economic cost while it responds to price or quantity signals for controlling emissions. The model is unique since it is couched in a risk analysis framework that captures the uncertainty in other economic parameters determining the utility's strategic choices–e.g., demand level and fuel prices. This permits one to compare various institutional settings for pollution control for both a world with perfect foresight and one with imperfect foresight. This exercise provides quantitative results on the cost of pollution control with price and quantity controls. It also provides a measure of the response of these cost functions to the uncertainty in other key parameters.
Exploring the performance of various pollution control mechanisms has led to three findings: (i) that the performance of a price control mechanism is dependent on the level of emission reductions that one seeks, (ii) that regionally traded emission permits and emission fees are equally efficient regardless of the level of foresight, and (Hi) that emission fees lead to more stable electricity generation prices. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the results under imperfect foresight suggest that uncertainties in the level of demand and load management success play an important role in determining future pollution control costs.     

我国沪市土木工程建筑企业竞争力评价与实证研究

通过对建筑企业竞争力进行定义,建立了建筑企业的竞争力评价指标体系。在对比分析已有权重确定和评价方法的基础上,提出采用PCA-LINMAP来确定指标权重,并用TOPSIS进行排序的综合评价方法。最后结合相应评价指标体系和PCA-LINMAP、TOPSIS综合评价方法,对沪市37家土木工程建筑企业进行了实证分析,找出了影响建筑企业竞争力的关键指标,对各种类型建筑企业竞争力进行了分级,并为中小型建筑企业增强竞争力提出了建议。     

Regulated firms in pollution permit markets with banking

This paper examines a competitive intertemporal market for bankable emission permits, such as sulfur dioxide allowances. Without profit regulation, firms are willing to bank permits if permit prices rise over time with the rate of interest, but will not bank if prices rise more slowly.The market achieves aggregate emission targets at least total cost if there is no profit regulation, but may not do so if firms are subject to profit regulation. Firms must arbitrage differences both in abatement cost and in the regulatory treatment of permits to achieve least total cost.The impetus for this work came from research we initiated during the Summer of 1990 for the Energy Information Agency. We would like to thank Chuck Howe for his detailed comments and enthusiasm, and Jim Alm, Dave Bjornstad, Charles deBartolome, Mike Greenwood, Robert Hahn, Douglas Hale, Carolyn Lang, Jim Markusen, Edward Morey, Till Requate, and Tom Tietenberg. We are grateful to the editor and two anonymous referees for stressing the importance of regulation in these markets and for their helpful and clarifying advice.