Market efficiency,trading institutions and information mirages: evidence from a laboratory asset market

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination - The study at hand investigates the performance of a continuous double auction, and a call market mechanism in an experimental asset market where...     

Trading places: An experimental comparison of reallocation mechanisms for priority queuing

In a laboratory experiment, we compare two auction mechanisms that are designed to improve a queue's efficiency by allowing customers to trade places. In the server‐initiated auction, the server, when idle, sells the right to be served next to the highest bidding customer in the queue and distributes the proceeds among the remaining customers. In the customer‐initiated auction, new arrivals can sequentially trade places with queued customers. We use two novel experimental protocols to examine the behavioral properties of both auction mechanisms. We find that both auction mechanisms improve a queue's efficiency on average and that both perform equally well in terms of efficiency gain. We also find evidence of the sunk‐cost effect but not of the endowment effect. Participants indicated that they found the server‐initiated auction a fairer mechanism than the customer‐initiated auction. When voting between the two auctions, the participants tended to favor the server‐initiated auction.     

Labour market recruiting with intermediaries

We consider a Rothschild–Stiglitz–Spence labour market model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an employment office or head hunter. In a centralised descending-bid, multi-item procurement auction, workers submit wage-bids for each job and are assigned stable jobs as equilibrium outcome. We compare this outcome to independent, sequential hiring by firms and conclude that, in general, a stable assignment can only be implemented if firms coordinate to some extent.      

Selling shares to retail investors: auction vs. fixed price

We analyze the problem of selling shares of a divisible good to a large number of buyers when demand is uncertain. We characterize equilibria of two popular mechanisms, a fixed price mechanism and a uniform price auction, and compare the revenues. While in the auction truthful bidding is a dominant strategy, we find that bidders have an incentive to overstate their demand in the fixed price mechanism. For some parameter values we find that the fixed price mechanism outperforms the auction.     

The participatory Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism

This paper introduces the participatory Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism, which satisfies both ex-ante budget balance and interim individual rationality. We bound the efficiency loss of this mechanism by a parameter that captures the structure of marginal contributions to the social welfare. We then apply the theory to quite general multiple unit double auction problems to show that the participatory VCG mechanism achieves asymptotic efficiency.     

我国海域使用权招标拍卖市场机制分析与完善

海域使用权招标拍卖作为国有海域资源配置的重要方式之一,是海域使用管理制度顺应市场经济发展需要的突出表现。本文从参与主体、适用范围以及市场规模方面对海域使用权招标拍卖市场机制进行了现状分析,从保留价格计算、创新招标拍卖方式、构建交易平台等方面,对现有的海域使用权招标拍卖市场交易机制进行了完善,以期丰富和发展海域使用权的招标拍卖机制,提高海域使用权的市场化配置效率。     

Auctions with endogenous participation

We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and entry decisions for both first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions when participation is endogenous. We show that there is a pure strategy entry equilibrium where only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid. In this context, both types of auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrary to the predictions of the fixed number of bidders literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry. As in the fixed-n literature, we show that first-price auctions generate more expected revenue than second-price auctions when buyers are risk-averse. Finally, we characterize the optimal auction – the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue – by using a direct revelation mechanism. The optimal auction involves a reserve price larger than the optimal reserve price in the fixed-n literature. The winner's payment is the second highest bid less the participation cost and losers receive a subsidy equal to the participation cost. Received: 17 August 1998 / 21 September 1999     

Charity auctions as assets: Theory and simulations of fundraising risk management in mean-variance space

This paper demonstrates how the risk over auction revenue at fundraising events can be managed with modern portfolio theory. Within the independent private values (IPV) framework, it is shown that auction mechanisms offer charities an inherent mean-variance tradeoff over revenue when contributions produce a public good benefit among bidders. This allows the fundraiser to construct a “portfolio” of auction mechanisms for their event so as to manage auction revenue outcomes according to the charity's risk preferences. Simulations provide support for the empirical prominence of the second-price winner-pay (i.e. English) auction, as this is often the portfolio's most heavily weighted mechanism under reasonable risk preferences.     

The Gates Hillman prediction market

The Gates Hillman prediction market (GHPM) was an internet prediction market designed to predict the opening day of the Gates and Hillman Centers, the new computer science complex at Carnegie Mellon University. Unlike a traditional continuous double auction format, the GHPM was mediated by an automated market maker, a central agent responsible for pricing transactions with traders over the possible opening days. The GHPM’s event partition was, at the time, the largest ever elicited in any prediction market by an order of magnitude, and dealing with the market’s size required new advances, including a novel span-based elicitation interface that simplified interactions with the market maker. We use the large set of identity-linked trades generated by the GHPM to examine issues of trader performance and market microstructure, including how the market both reacted to and anticipated official news releases about the building’s opening day.     

Auctions with different rates of patience: Evidence from the resale shoe market

Bids and asks are examined over time using auction data from a continuous auction of authentic deadstock sneakers. A theoretical analysis of a double auction over time shows that if buyers and sellers have different rates of patience, then a buyer (respectively, seller) who is patient will be more likely to set a lower initial bid (respectively, higher initial ask). This causes an increase in the unfulfilled bid–ask spread over time. These results are tested using data collected from the StockX website for two specific deadstock sneakers. Results show that the unfulfilled bid–ask spread is positively correlated with time.     

多属性网上拍卖市场的发展现状和提升对策

多属性网上拍卖是电子采购的主要手段之一,具有广阔的市场发展空间。本文剖析了多属性网上拍卖的服务模式,设计了多属性网上平台架构,对多属性网上拍卖的应用范围和经济效益进行深入分析。通过分析多属性网上拍卖市场的发展现状,指出当前多属性网上拍卖市场存在欺诈、信用评价机制缺陷、以及有限的参与性等问题。在此基础上,提出了多属性网上拍卖市场的提升对策:设计满足激励相容的多属性拍卖机制,建立有效的多属性网上拍卖信用评价体系,开发智能化的代理软件以提高多属性网上拍卖的参与人数。     

Web service discovery among large service pools utilising semantic similarity and clustering

With the rapid development of electronic business, Web services have attracted much attention in recent years. Enterprises can combine individual Web services to provide new value-added services. An emerging challenge is the timely discovery of close matches to service requests among large service pools. In this study, we first define a new semantic similarity measure combining functional similarity and process similarity. We then present a service discovery mechanism that utilises the new semantic similarity measure for service matching. All the published Web services are pre-grouped into functional clusters prior to the matching process. For a user’s service request, the discovery mechanism first identifies matching services clusters and then identifies the best matching Web services within these matching clusters. Experimental results show that the proposed semantic discovery mechanism performs better than a conventional lexical similarity-based mechanism.     

Fear of losing in a clock auction

We examine bidding behavior in a clock auction in which price is set by the lowest-accepted bid and provisional winners are reported each round (the LABpw auction). This format was used in the India 3G spectrum auction. In the standard theory, the auction performs poorly. In particular it yields lower revenues and is less efficient than the more standard clock auction with exit bids and highest-rejected-bid pricing (the HRB auction). However, the LABpw auction performs well in the lab, achieving higher revenues than the HRB auction. We show how fear of losing provides one motivation for the overbidding that causes higher revenues in the LABpw auction.     

Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study

This paper considers two multi-item auction formats (ascending and sealed bid) which both identify the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices and where truthful preference revelation constitutes an equilibrium. Even though these auction formats share many theoretical properties, there are behavioral aspects that are not easily captured. To explore this issue in more detail, this paper experimentally investigates what role the design of the auction format has for its outcome. The results suggest that the sealed bid mechanism performs weakly better in all of the investigated measures (consistent reporting, efficiency etc.). In addition, we find that the performance of the ascending auction is increasing over time, whereas the sealed bid auction shows no such tendency.     

拆分招标的供应商数量研究

许多企业在采购时,常常将整笔业务拆分为两个合同:较大的第一合同和较小的第二合同,通过分批二级价格封闭式招标来选择不同的供应商供货。本文通过建立分批招标模型分析了供应商的投标策略和买方的采购策略,得出了当参加第一合同竞标的供应商数目和第二合同新引入的供应商数目满足一个不等式时,拆分招标的采购成本小于整体招标的采购成本,并且指出了拆分比例对拆分招标的采购成本的影响。     

小议上海私车牌照额度拍卖

上海私车牌照额度拍卖机制自实施伊始,即饱受争议。无论其合法性、合理性、拍卖收入流向及拍卖政策实施效果等方方面面均受到人们的质疑。在此质疑声中,上海私车牌照额度拍卖价格冲破了9万的关口。而作为缓解大城市交通拥堵的重要举措,为从源头上控制机动车拥有量而实施的私车牌照额度拍卖制度,上海市政府对其寄以重望。基于此,本文对上海私车牌照额度拍卖政策的实质及实施历程进行了梳理和分析,以期厘清概念。     

A final price prediction model for english auctions: a neuro-fuzzy approach

Online auction has now been a popular mechanism in setting prices for internet users. However, auction price prediction, involving the modeling of uncertainty regarding the bidding process, is a challenging task primarily due to the variety of factors changing in auction settings. Even if all the factors were accounted for, there still exist uncertainties in human behavior when bidding in auctions. In this paper, three models, regression, neural networks and neuro-fuzzy, are constructed to predict the final prices of English auctions, using real-world online auction data collected from Yahoo-Kimo Auction. The empirical results show that the neuro fuzzy system can catch the complicated relationship among the variables accurately much better than the others, which is of great help for the buyers to avoid overpricing and for the sellers to facilitate the auction. Besides, the knowledge base obtained from neuro fuzzy provides the elaborative relationship among the variables, which can be further tested for theory building.     

He who must not be named

Landsberger et al. have studied a sealed bid first price auction with two players in which the ranking of the valuations is known. They argue that such a situation can arise in a sequential auction where only the name of the winner is revealed. In this paper we consider sequential auctions where two identical goods are sold sequentially to N players who are interested in both objects. In sealed bid auctions, no information is a priori revealed by the mechanism, but the seller can in principle reveal whatever he wants. We restrict our attention to the case where only the name of the winner is revealed to be in the context of Landsberger et al. for the second auction. The aim of the paper is to compare such a sequential auction with a simultaneous auction where both goods are sold as a bundle or equivalently with a sequential auction where no information is revealed. We first show that there exists an equilibrium of the sequential game in pure and monotone strategies. Then, the comparison of the seller's expected revenue in the two cases allows us to conclude that contrary to Landsberger et al.'s predictions, the seller can not use the information to increase his revenue. This result is obtained using simulations for a large class of distribution functions. The seller must not reveal the name of the winner between the two auctions and instead sell both goods using a simultaneous auction.Received: 31 July 2001, Accepted: 5 February 2003, JEL Classification: B44I wish to thank Laurent Linnemer, Thomas Ricke, Michael Visser and Shmuel Zamir for helpful comments and suggestions. I am very grateful to the referees and the associated editors in charge of my paper.     

后危机时代浙江艺术品拍卖市场可持续发展研究

本文从浙江艺术品拍卖市场格局着手,重点分析金融危机给浙江艺术品拍卖市场带来的恐慌、画价缩水、业务下滑等灾难性影响,深入探讨其存在的根源,提出在困境中的浙江艺术品市场迎接新机遇的根本策略。从错位经营、疯狂操作到理性回归各自市场本位;从市场多层次需求开辟新的市场方向,构建由单一到多元的经营结构;从单打独斗的粗放经营到走品牌化发展之路,逐步与国际艺术品拍卖市场接轨,实现浙江艺术品拍卖市场的可持续发展。     

基于拍卖的垄断型产品供应链的博弈分析

论文研究了基于拍卖交易的垄断型产品供应链中卖方和买方的博弈问题,成交价格同时取决于卖方向拍卖市场的供货数量和买方向拍卖市场的竞拍数量。博弈结果显示,在垄断供应的情况下,博弈的纳什均衡将会是买卖双方都不通过拍卖渠道来进行交易,只有在非常极端的条件下可以达成供货和竞拍等量的均衡。最后,论文引入一个新卖方作为买方参与拍卖后的补货来源,得到的新均衡解能使原买卖双方的收益提高,从而说明单纯的拍卖并不总是最好的交易方式,多渠道的销售方式有时更能保障买卖双方的利益。