Gales of creative destruction and the opportunistic incumbent: The case of electric vehicles in California

This paper explores the introduction of electric vehicles in response to Californian regulatory pressures as an example of a disruptive technology. The central thesis is that this disruption may open the automobile market to new entrants but only if they collaborate with incumbent automobile manufacturers. This appears to support Schumpeter's argument that large incumbent firms possess innovation advantages over the small entrepreneurial entrant. However, these innovatory advantages lie in the downstream complementary assets required for success in the automobile market.     

The NOME law: implications for the French electricity market

In December 2010, France approved the law “Nouvelle Organisation du Marché de l’Electricité” (or NOME law) to promote competition in the retail electricity market. In practice, the law allows retailers to buy nuclear production from the incumbent, at a regulated access price. This mechanism works up to a ceiling of 100 terawatt hours, which represents one quarter of the incumbent’s production from nuclear plants. Each retailer is assigned a share of that amount proportionally to its portfolio of clients. We contribute to the debate raised by the NOME law regarding the evolution of retail market prices. We show that a price decrease results if the ceiling is sufficiently high compared to the market share of the retailers competing with the incumbent. This pro-competitive effect is stronger when the incumbent’s rivals take into account the impact of their market strategy on the redistribution rule. Finally, we find that, if the regulated price of the NOME electricity is set above the nuclear cost, the incumbent realizes a gain that may result in strategic withholding, weakening the pro-competitive effects of the law.     

A Dynamic Model of Incumbent LEC Response to Entry Under the Terms of the Telecommunications Act of 1996

This paper dynamically models an incumbent Local Exchange Carrier's (LEC's) ability to control market entry with a profit squeeze. The model is consistent with the post-Telecommunications Act of 1996 local exchange market. The model shows that an unconstrained incumbent could choose output prices and input costs to discourage an entrant's output-market production. The impact of a regulatory constraint on incumbent behavior is examined. It is concluded that cost-based input prices may lead to little growth in the entrant's self-provision of inputs and that continuing oversight of output and input prices may be necessary.     

Regulation and Access Pricing: Comparison of Regulated Regimes

The statutory duties of regulators of British utilities include both the encouragement of competition and protection of consumers (through price caps). Competition depends on the terms on which new entrants can gain access to the monopolist's network. Where the incumbent in the retail market also owns the network, the regulator may determine prices in the capped and access markets separately or may make the price cap explicitly dependent on entry in the uncapped market. Contrary to the received wisdom that access charges should be separately regulated we show that higher welfare can be obtained in some circumstances by allowing the incumbent to determine access charges. This is achieved by permitting the incumbent to choose from a menu of retail prices which the regulator makes conditional on the extent of entry in the retail market.     

Environmental taxes and industry monopolization

This paper considers a market with an incumbent monopolistic firm and a potential entrant. Production by both firms causes polluting emissions. The government selects a tax per unit of emission to maximize social welfare. The size of the tax rate affects whether or not the potential entrant enters the market. We identify the conditions that create a market structure where the preferences of the government and the incumbent firm coincide. Interestingly, there are cases where both the government and incumbent firm prefer a monopoly. Hence, the government might induce profitable monopolization by using a socially optimal tax policy instrument.      

Entry Deterrence in a Unionized Oligopoly

We investigate wage determination between an incumbent firm and its labour union under threat from another firm entering its product market. In equilibrium, it may be optimal for a labour union of the incumbent firm to lower its wage demand. This may make it possible for the incumbent firm to maintain a higher employment level, in that the lower wages can help the firm deter the entry of a rival firm. This will yield a higher profit for the incumbent firm and a lower utility level for the labour union compared with those in an equilibrium with no threat of entry.
JEL Classification Numbers: J51, L10     

在位企业非连续性技术变革的技术代际桥研究

非连续性技术变革给在位企业带来巨大挑战，要求在位企业克服新技术研发困难和自身潜在惰性进行积极响应，在与新进入企业市场竞争中获取持续竞争优势，化解熊彼特提出的破坏性创新威胁。整合社会网络理论、知识管理理论及创新管理理论，以65家汽车综合型整车在位制造企业为样本，通过搭建发明家桥、合作研发桥、混合技术桥等3个维度的技术代际桥，探讨在位企业如何在维持两代技术阶段性平衡的前提下提高新技术创新绩效。结果发现：发明家桥与企业新技术创新绩效呈倒U型关系；合作研发桥和混合技术桥对企业新技术创新绩效具有显著促进作用；旧技术创新绩效负向调节发明家桥与新技术创新绩效的倒U型关系。研究旨在为在位企业应对非连续性技术变革，提高新技术创新绩效提供相应的对策建议。     

Pricing Access to a Monopoly Input

What price should downstream entrants pay a vertically integrated incumbent monopoly for use of its assets? Courts, legislators, and regulators have at times mandated that incumbent monopolies lease assets required for the production of a retail service to entrants in efforts to increase the competitiveness of retail markets. This paper compares two rules for pricing such monopoly inputs: marginal cost pricing (MCP) and generalized efficient component pricing rule (GECPR). The GECPR is not a fixed price, but is a rule that determines the input price to be paid by the entrant from the entrant's retail price. Comparing the retail market equilibrium under MCP and GECPR, the GECPR leads to lower equilibrium retail prices. If the incumbent is less efficient than the entrant, the GECPR also leads to lower production costs than does the MCP rule. If the incumbent is more efficient than the entrant, however, conditions may exist in which MCP leads to lower production costs than does the GECPR. The analysis is carried out assuming either Bertrand competition, quantity competition, or monopolistic competition between the incumbent and entrant in the downstream market.     

收入分布、破坏性创新与社会福利

通过构建破坏性创新企业与在位企业进行市场竞争的双寡头博弈模型,分析在具有不同收入分布特征市场中破坏性创新企业的市场绩效及社会福利。研究发现,在收入差距较大的市场中,破坏性创新企业获得更大的市场份额和利润,社会福利相对较小;相反,在收入水平较高且分布趋向同质的市场中,在位企业获得更大的市场份额和利润,并且,破坏性创新厂商的利润随着收入水平的提高而降低。同时,随着收入水平的提高,两企业的产品质量不断提高,但质量差距不断扩大,社会总福利也随之增加。最后,进一步阐释了破坏性创新更多地发生于贫富差距较大的新兴市场的微观机制,为企业根据不同市场的收入分布特征选择竞争战略提供理论依据,为相关国家基于收入分布特点制定限制或支持破坏性创新创业政策提供理论参考。     

Price-Matching Guarantees and Entry Deterrence under Incomplete Information

This paper studies price-matching guarantees in a market where entrant does not have perfect information about incumbent’s cost. The low-cost incumbent can adopt price-matching guarantees as a signal to distinguish itself from the high-cost type and thus effectively deter entry. On the other hand, the high-cost incumbent can successfully fool the potential entrant under certain conditions. Compared with the equilibriums in situations where the option of offering a price guarantee is not available, the use of this instrument either makes it easier for the low-cost incumbent to signal its cost, or expands the range of parameters over which the high-cost incumbent is able to deter entry successfully.     

Product Market Competition in Transition Economies: Increasing Varieties and Consumer Loyalty

This paper analyzes product market competition between foreign entrants and former SOEs in transition markets with respect to expansion of product variety and consumer loyalty formation. While the market share motive induces the more efficient foreign entrant to price aggressively, the extent of this behavior depends critically on its relative efficiency vis-à-vis the local incumbent. If the efficiency gap exceeds some threshold value, the entrant exploits increasingly its cost advantages by raising price rather than investing in market share. Our result suggests that immediate restructuring of former SOEs is important to realize fully the competitive benefits of opening local markets.J. Comp. Econom., December 2000, 28(4), pp. 700–715. International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20431.     

高技术产业中排他性合约研究——以英特尔和AMD为例

构建上游双寡头和下游多家厂商的排他性交易模型。以上游优势厂商控制的下游厂商数量为决策变量,分析了在位上游优势厂商通过控制下游厂商,导致中间产品的价格歧视,剥削下游厂商,排挤竞争对手,提高最终产品价格和不利于产业良性竞争等负面影响。     

Arrested development: the experience of European hard disk drive firms in comparison with US and Japanese firms

This paper analyses how US, Japanese, and European HDD firms responded to technological shifts in the hard disk industry from 1973 through 1996. Leading incumbent US HDD firms were frequently forced out of the market. Leading Japanese incumbent firms in the same industry, however, were not displaced by these changes. US startup firms thrived under these technological shifts, displacing US incumbent firms. Japanese startups did poorly. European firms encountered the worst of both worlds: its incumbent firms were frequently displaced by technological changes, as were US firms; while startup firms (with one exception) performed as poorly as those in Japan.     

History-based price discrimination and entry in markets with switching costs: A welfare analysis

We analyze history-based price discrimination in an asymmetric industry, where an incumbent, protected by switching costs, faces an entrant who does not have access to information about consumers’ purchase histories. We demonstrate that consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with history-based price discrimination. We find that the entry decision is invariant to whether the incumbent implements history-based pricing or uniform pricing. This implies that the potential abuse of market dominance imposed by history-based price discrimination is exploitation, not exclusion. Finally, we establish that the profit gain to the incumbent from history-based pricing exceeds the associated loss to consumers.     

Competition with asymmetric regulation of mobile termination charges

The aim of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of asymmetric regulation, which allows a new mobile network operator to set higher termination rates than the incumbent operator. We assume that there are two market segments: one in which operators compete on equal terms, with a new technology, and the other in which the entrant is at a disadvantage since the technology it offers is inferior to the incumbent??s. Results show that asymmetric regulation can create favorable conditions that allow the entrant to strengthen its market positioning, and enhance consumer net utilities and social welfare. This highlights the importance of the degree of network asymmetry and the ways in which consumers are split between the two market segments. Lastly, we show that asymmetric regulation can create greater investment incentives for the entrant which could effectively enhance social welfare. These findings can provide useful insights for regulatory policy.     

Staggered contracts and profitable entry deterrence: an application to professional sports

This paper examines an incumbent league's entry-deterrence strategies in a professional-sports market. The strategy of staggering long-term contracts offered to star players is analyzed and shown to reduce the wage bill of an incumbent league. However, if long-term contracting reduces player effort, the incumbent balances the benefits of a lower wage bill with the cost of reduced sales revenues. An optimal contract duration in the presence of such moral hazard is characterized in terms of the parameterization of the model. Extensions to the model are also discussed.     

Asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets

In liberalized telecommunications markets, the incumbent typically enjoys several advantages over any entrant. Regulation in such asymmetric markets stimulates competition in the short and the long term if retail prices are low and the entrant's profits are high so that entry is encouraged. I show that asymmetric access price regulation with a cost-based access price for the incumbent and an access markup for the entrant is more successful than cost-based access price regulation applied to incumbent and entrant. This is a robust prediction with respect to the pricing strategies considered. Such asymmetric access price regulation is in accordance with European legislation.     

Forecasting VoWLAN technology for the Taiwan mobile telecommunication industry

Disruptive innovation is always a great challenge to the management of incumbent firms, especially in fast-changing industries. In this study, scenarios were developed to facilitate strategic decision-making by incumbent mobile telecommunications firms that confront the threats of disruptive technology of voice over wireless local area network (VoWLAN). Combining various possible outcomes of uncertain conditions and strategic alternatives available to the incumbent firms, six scenarios were developed: incremental evolution, disruptive evolution, cost deterrence, fierce competition, market pre-emption and market convergence. The results show that a passive ‘do-nothing’ strategy by incumbent firms leads to failure if the disruptive technology is inevitable. However, firms can slow the pace of disruptive technology by applying a price-cut strategy and enjoy several years of profits in the process. Industrial insights and strategic implications obtained from all the scenarios are discussed.     

在位企业如何开拓新技术市场:商业模式与组织身份共演视角

新技术带来了新机遇,在位企业能否成功把握成为生存关键。采用单案例研究方法,以软件企业为案例研究对象,探索在位企业如何通过商业运营实现新技术市场开拓。研究发现:(1)商业模式与组织身份共演过程中,涌现了惯性思路-身份转移、整合思路-身份延伸、修补思路-身份增补3种演化形式;(2)战略导向变化是商业模式与组织身份演化的动因,出现了由内向外、混合导向和由外向内3种变化;(3)演化中组织身份匹配于商业模式,表现为嫁接匹配、重塑匹配和扩充匹配3种机制。扩展了在位企业应对技术变化的研究视角,丰富了组织身份的动态变化研究,深化了商业模式与技术发展间关系的研究,可为在位企业商业实践提供借鉴。