Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers

Procurement auction literature typically assumes that the suppliers are uncapacitated [see, e.g. Dasgupta and Spulber in Inf Econ Policy 4:5–29, 1990 and Che in Rand J Econ 24(4):668–680, 1993]. Consequently, the auction mechanisms award the contract to a single supplier. We study mechanism design in a model where suppliers have limited production capacity, and both the marginal costs and the production capacities are private information. We provide a closed-form solution for the revenue maximizing direct mechanism when the distribution of the cost and production capacities satisfies a modified regularity condition [Myerson in Math Oper Res 6(1):58–73, 1981]. We also present a sealed low bid implementation of the optimal direct mechanism for the special case of identical suppliers. The results in this paper extend to other principle-agent mechanism design problems where the agents have a privately known upper bound on allocation. The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for valuable suggestions and comments.     

A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

We consider a many-to-one matching market with externalities among firms where each firm’s preferences satisfy substitutability, increasing choice and no external effect by unchosen workers, which are defined by  Bando (2012). We first illustrate that a sequential version of the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm with worker-proposing may not find a worker-optimal quasi stable matching. Then, we provide a modified DA algorithm in which (i) each worker simultaneously proposes to his most preferred firm that has not rejected him and (ii) each firm chooses its acceptable workers from the cumulative set of workers who have ever proposed to it, assuming that the other workers proposing to its rival firms are hired. We show that this algorithm finds a worker-optimal quasi stable matching. We also show that this algorithm can be generalized into a fixed point algorithm.     

Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

We study a labor market described by a many-to-one matching market with externalities among firms in which each firm’s preferences depend not only on workers whom it hires, but also on workers whom its rival firms hire. We define a new stability concept called weak stability and investigate its existence problem. We show that when the preferences of firms satisfy an extension of substitutability and two new conditions called increasing choice and no external effect by an unchosen worker, then a weakly stable matching exists. We also show that a weakly stable matching may fail to exist without these restrictions.     

Corporate entrepreneurship and acquisitions: creating firm wealth

Acquisition is one way entrepreneurial firms have to capture the assets needed to achieve their strategic objectives. We investigate shareholder value creation of Spanish listed firms in response to announcements of acquisitions over the period 1991–2006. Similar to foreign markets, bidders earn insignificant average abnormal returns regardless of the pricing model used in the estimation procedure. When we relate these results to company and transaction characteristics our evidence suggests that the listing status of the target firm is a critical key in the strategic decision to acquire a company. This listing status effect is mainly associated with the fact that unlisted firms tend to be smaller and lesser–known firms, and thus suffer from a lack of competition in the market for corporate control. Consequently, the payment of lower premiums and the possibility of diversifying shareholders’ portfolios lead to unlisted firm acquisitions being viewed as value–orientated transactions which have major implications for managers.     

Exploring the financial consequences of the servitization of manufacturing

Commentators suggest that to survive in developed economies manufacturing firms have to move up the value chain, innovating and creating ever more sophisticated products and services, so they do not have to compete on the basis of cost. While this strategy is proving increasingly popular with policy makers and academics there is limited empirical evidence to explore the extent to which it is being adopted in practice. And if so, what the impact of this servitization of manufacturing might be. This paper seeks to fill a gap in the literature by presenting empirical evidence on the range and extent of servitization. Data are drawn from the OSIRIS database on 10,028 firms incorporated in 25 different countries. The paper presents an analysis of these data which suggests that: [i] manufacturing firms in developed economies are adopting a range of servitization strategies—12 separate approaches to servitization are identified; [ii] these 12 categories can be used to extend the traditional three options for servitization—product oriented Product–Service Systems, use oriented Product–Service Systems and result oriented Product–Service Systems, by adding two new categories “integration oriented Product–Service Systems” and “service oriented Product–Service Systems”; [iii] while the manufacturing firms that have servitized are larger than traditional manufacturing firms in terms of sales revenues, at the aggregate level they also generate lower profits as a % of sales; [iv] these findings are moderated by firm size (measured in terms of numbers of employees). In smaller firms servitization appears to pay off while in larger firms it proves more problematic; and [v] there are some hidden risks associated with servitization—the sample contains a greater proportion of bankrupt servitized firms than would be expected.

The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model

The Blocking Lemma identifies a particular blocking pair for each non-stable and individually rational matching that is preferred by some agents of one side of the market to their optimal stable matching. Its interest lies in the fact that it has been an instrumental result to prove key results on matching. For instance, the fact that in the college admissions problem the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers and the strong stability theorem in the marriage model follow directly from the Blocking Lemma. However, it is known that the Blocking Lemma and its consequences do not hold in the general many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable preference relations. We show that the Blocking Lemma holds for the many-to-one matching model in which firms’ preference relations are, in addition to substitutable, quota q-separable. We also show that the Blocking Lemma holds on a subset of substitutable preference profiles if and only if the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers on this subset of profiles.     

Agreement toward stability in matching markets

For firms with responsive preferences, we prove that the set of stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to any firm quasi-stable matching has a lattice structure. This follows from a generalization of the Decomposition Lemma. The result does not hold when firms have q-substitutable preferences. Nevertheless, we show that the set of stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to a firm quasi-stable matching contains an element which is unanimously least preferred by workers, and most preferred by firms. When a firm quasi-stable matching is fed into our extension of the Deferred Acceptance algorithm (where firms propose), the existence of this matching guarantees the success of the algorithm.     

A dynamic analysis of collusive networks

This paper investigates the strategic formation of collusive networks in a dynamic framework. A collusive network is a set of market sharing agreements between firms in oligopolistic markets and auctions. Belleflamme and Bloch (Int Econ Rev 45(2):387–411, 2004) fully characterize the pairwise stable collusive networks in their symmetric model. In contrast, we characterize the collusive networks to which a dynamic network formation process converges with positive probability in the symmetric model. We provide a complete characterization for the case of the process that starts from a network with sufficiently few links. Moreover, we show that the process never cycles but always converges to a stable network. In addition, we discuss an asymmetric model where firms enjoy a home country advantage. We show that the expected number of collusive agreements may be reduced by an increase in the degree of the home country advantage. This implies that policies for discouraging entry may fail, and may lead to a decrease in expected social surplus.     

Implementing efficient market structure

Abstract. This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke–Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry. Received: 7 May 2001 / Accepted: 24 June 2002 We would like to thank seminar participants at Bonn and Berlin, in particular Peter Bank, Wieland Müller, and Urs Schweizer, the two anonymous referees, and the associate editor for most useful and exceptionally detailed comments. Financial support was received by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 373 (“Quantifikation und Simulation ?konomischer Prozesse”), Humboldt–Universit?t zu Berlin.     

Workers’ enterprises are not perverse: differential oligopoly games with sticky price

We take a differential game approach to study the dynamic behaviour of labour managed (LM) firms, in the presence of price stickiness. We find that the oligopoly market populated by LM firms reaches the same steady state equilibrium allocation as the oligopoly populated by profit-maximising (PM) firms, provided that the LM membership and the PM labour force are set before the market game starts. The conclusion holds under both the open-loop solution and the closed-loop solution. The result confirms the point made by Sertel (Eur Econ Rev 31:1619–1625, 1987) in a static framework.     

The status of workers and platforms in the sharing economy

We consider whether workers who provide their services through online platforms, such as Handy and Uber, should be classified as independent contractors or employees. Using a formal economic model, we show how being too strict or too liberal in classifying workers as independent contractors (relative to the actual degree of control workers have) can be detrimental, not just to firms and welfare, but sometimes to the workers themselves. We also use the model to explore the extent to which an intermediate classification of workers between employees and independent contractors may lead to better outcomes. The intermediate classification is meant to apply to firms that retain control of some actions while their workers control others, as is the case for many online platforms.     

Mapping the successful succession process in family firms: evidence from Greece

The succession process in family firms has by far been determined to be the most critical phase in the family business life-cycle (e.g. Morris et al. Journal of Business Venturing 18:513–531, 1997; Wang et al. 2000) and characterized as the period in which most family firm fatalities occur (Handler and Kram Family Business Review 1:361–381, 1988). This paper is an empirical study on Greek family firms and seeks to identify the critical success factors that have a major impact on the outcome of a generational transition in the leadership of the family firm. Based on an integrated conceptual framework proposed by Pyromalis et al. (2006), we test the impact of five factors, namely the incumbent’s propensity to step aside, the successor’s willingness to take over, the positive family relations and communication, succession planning, and the successor’s appropriateness and preparation on both the satisfaction of the stakeholders with the succession process and the effectiveness of the succession process per se. The results provide a useful insight and confirm the importance of the aforementioned factors in the succession process by mapping a safe passage through the family business succession process, and by contributing not only to the overall family business literature but also generating strong arguments in favor of the family firm as an integral entrepreneurial element for a region’s sustainable economic development.     

Simultaneous search with heterogeneous firms and ex post competition

In this paper we study the allocation of workers over high and low productivity firms in a labor market with coordination frictions. Specifically, we consider a search model where workers can apply to high and or low productivity firms. Firms that compete for the same candidate can increase their wage offers as often as they like. We show that if workers apply to two jobs, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where workers mix between sending both applications to the high and sending both to the low productivity sector. But, efficiency requires that they apply to both sectors because a higher matching rate in the high-productivity sector can then be realized with fewer applications (and consequently fewer coordination frictions) if workers always accept the offer of the most productive firm. However, in the market the worker's payoff is determined by how much the firm with the second highest productivity is willing to bid. This is what prevents them from applying to both sectors. For many configurations, the equilibrium outcomes are the same under directed and random search so our results are not driven by random search. We discuss the effects of increasing the number of applications and show that our results can easily be generalized to N-firms.     

Financial crisis and relative productivity dynamics in Korea: evidence from firm-level data (1992–2003)

We have estimated the relative TFP growth at firm level and analyzed the firm dynamics in view of entry and exit of firms in Korea during 1992–2003, which includes the turbulent financial crisis of 1997–1998. Following Pyo and Ha, Hitotsubashi J Econ 48(1): 67–81, (2007), we have adopted a gross output model rather than a value added model of relative TFP analysis. We have found that the cyclical variation of productivity growth plays a dominant role in the decomposition effects before and after the 1997 financial crisis in Korea. Productivity growth is modest before the crisis and strong after the crisis owing to the recovering market efficiency. There is the likelihood that the productivity growth of stayers during the post-crisis period was significantly higher than new entrants. The net entry effect is found to be more sensitive in small business and export-based firms than in large business and domestic market-based firms. Our findings suggest that Korean firms have recovered a modest level of technical change after its severe financial crisis owing to the improvement of management transparency and the build-up of market efficiency during the IMF-mandated restructuring process. But since the entry effect is estimated to be still negative in Manufacturing and the exit effect is negative in Service sector after the crisis, the Korean economy has not fully recovered its metabolism in the post-crisis period and still lacks a creative destructive process to resume another round of sustainable growth path.     

Urban search models under high-relocation costs. Theory and application to spatial mismatch

We develop a search-matching model in which mobility costs are so high that it is too costly for workers to relocate when a change in their employment status occurs. We show that, in equilibrium, wages increase with distance to jobs and commuting costs because firms need to compensate the transportation cost difference between the employed and unemployed workers at each location in the city. We also show that the equilibrium land rent is negatively affected by the unemployment benefit because an increase in the latter induce firms to create less jobs, which, in turn, reduces the competition in the land market. We then use this model to provide a mechanism for the observed spatial mismatch between where black workers live and where jobs are. We finally show that a transportation policy consisting in subsidizing the commuting costs of black workers can increase job creation and reduce unemployment if the level of the subsidy is set at a sufficiently high level.     

An exploration of older worker flexible working arrangements in smaller firms

This article explores flexible working arrangements (FWAs) for older workers in smaller UK firms. We address three questions: how far older workers need and value FWAs, the type of FWAs they need, and whether smaller firms can offer these FWAs. We draw on 46 semi‐structured interviews from six smaller case study firms to present a qualitative exploration of both owner‐manager and (under‐researched) worker perspectives. We evidence the offer and importance of temporal and work‐role FWAs, together with the use of i‐deals and ad hoc FWAs in meeting the needs of this diverse group. We make three contributions: first, theoretically, in arguing for an extended definition of FWAs and understanding formality of offer; second, to practice, in highlighting FWA mechanisms appropriate to older workers; third, to policy, in questioning the effectiveness of both the business case approach to older worker FWAs in smaller firms and policy's positioning of older workers as a homogeneous group.     

Intangible investment in people and productivity

Organizational activity, information and communication technology work, and research and development (R&D) can be classified as work that creates intangible capital. We measure the returns to these three types of labor input by accounting for differences in their productivity compared with other labor inputs using Finnish firm-level data from 1998 to 2008. We apply a novel idea to use hiring as one proxy for productivity and demand shocks. We find that organizational workers increase total factor productivity and improve the profitability of high-productivity firms. R&D workers account for a large share of intangible capital; however, the returns to R&D are low. Investments in organizational competence are more likely to result in more rapid productivity growth. Firms with performance-related pay or domestically owned firms with extensive foreign activities have been among the highest performers with respect to the use of organizational work.     

An empirical assessment of assortative matching in the labor market

In labor markets with worker and firm heterogeneity, the matching between firms and workers may be assortative, meaning that the most productive workers and firms team up. We investigate this with longitudinal population-wide matched employer–employee data from Portugal. Using panel data methods, we quantify a firm-specific productivity term for each firm, and we relate this to the skill distribution of workers in the firm. We find that there is positive assortative matching, in particular among long-lived firms. Using skill-specific estimates of an index of search frictions, we find that the results can only to a small extent be explained by heterogeneity of search frictions across worker skill groups.     

Impact of liquidity and information on the mispricing of newly public firms

We test whether the mispricing of newly public firms is affected by liquidity and information during the quiet period, from the end of the quiet period until the lock-up expiration date, and post lock-up. Liquidity is affected by the underwriter’s stabilization efforts during the quiet period and the founder’s ability to sell shares in the post-lockup period. Based on a sample of winner and loser events for more than 2,600 newly public firms during 1992–2001, the degree of under-or overreaction is conditioned on the period within the aftermarket following the IPO. We attribute the results to different liquidity and information effects among the three periods.