IS DIVERSIFICATION A JOB SAFETY NET FOR SELL-SIDE ANALYSTS?

We study sell-side analysts’ motives to diversify their portfolios across industries. Despite the negative association between diversification and accuracy, more than 60% of analysts cover multiple industries. We argue that analysts’ choice to diversify is rooted in concerns about future job security. We find that more diversified analysts are less likely to experience job turnover and leave the profession but are not more likely to advance their careers. For experienced and all-star analysts, diversification does not improve career outcomes. We conclude that industry diversification is a safety mechanism for inexperienced and unranked analysts who are concerned about job security.     

WHAT DO AUDITORS DO? OBVIOUSLY THEY DO NOT SCRUTINISE THE ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING

Auditors and auditing firms are important actors in the process of institutionalising accounting standards. However, the formal and institutional requirements to de facto ensure professionalism and independence in the Swedish municipal sector have been strongly questioned. The aim of this paper is to investigate and explain how deviations from accounting standards are treated and reported by auditors. The results indicate deficiency in both competence and independence among the auditors. The institutional arrangements in Sweden do not seem to ensure that auditors facilitate and support the implementation of accounting standards.     

DO DIVIDEND FLOWS AFFECT STOCK RETURNS?

We examine price impacts from dividend flows. Event‐study estimates show that stocks experience abnormal returns on the dividend distribution day. Results also show a spillover effect to non‐dividend‐paying stocks that are likely to be part of the same benchmark portfolio as the dividend‐paying stocks. Regression results indicate that the effect is dependent on the ownership share by professional investors. The temporary nature of the effect on returns is in line with the literature's demand‐driven price pressure hypothesis.     

WHO WINS IN LARGE STOCK BUYBACKS – THOSE WHO SELL OR THOSE WHO HOLD?

Both fixed-price and dutch auction repurchases offer large premiums over current values to tendering shareholders. And, because announcements of such offers are generally accompanied by significant increases in stock prices, economists view selftender offers as mechanisms for signaling undervaluation. Using samples of fixed-price and dutch auction self-tender offers from the 1980s, this study attempts to answer the following questions: Are non-tendering shareholders fully compensated for the premium wealth transfer by the increase in the intrinsic value of their shares? Since fixed-price offers feature larger premiums, are they accompanied by larger increases in intrinsic value (or do insiders have a tendency to “overpay” in fixed-price offers)? Is the premium wealth transfer a big component of the returns to the two shareholder groups—and what percentage of firm value does the transfer represent? The findings of this study, unlike those reported by earlier research, suggest that the two types of offers generate roughly the same total returns (about 10–11%, on average, during the offering period) to shareholders who do not tender. Fixed-price offers involve considerably larger premiums (over the new, “full-information” price) and wealth transfers than dutch auctions. Reflecting the higher premiums, shareholders tendering into fixed-price offers receive higher returns than those tendering into dutch auctions (13.8% vs. 11.3% during the announcement period). But while fixed-price offers involve a considerably larger wealth transfer from non-tendering to tendering shareholders, fixed-price repurchases compensate the non-tendering shareholders for the larger wealth transfer with larger increases in “intrinsic value,” thus generating the same total return as dutch auctions. Moreover, despite the large premiums offered in both types of offers, the wealth transfer implicit in the premium represents a small cost (less than 1% in fixed-price offers, and less than 0.1% in dutch auctions) to non-tendering shareholders.     

WHEN DO STRATEGIC ALLIANCES CREATE SHAREHOLDER VALUE?

This article reports the findings of the authors' study of the stock market reaction to 345 strategic alliances announced during the period 1983-1992. The study reports statistically significant gains that, when translated into dollars, are divided roughly evenly between the larger and smaller partners (though the smaller partners experience larger percentage gains). Moreover, the value gains are largest in those cases in which two high-tech firms ally to develop or apply new technology, while the market shows less enthusiasm for non-technical or marketing alliances.
The underlying rationale for strategic alliances is that each partner contributes its expertise to the relationship and gains access to some special resource or competence that it lacks—but without incurring the costs associated with creating a larger organization through a merger or joint venture. Consistent with this argument, the authors report that alliances are relatively long-lasting, and are not preludes to merger or formal creation of joint venture entities.     

DO STOCK MARKET FLUCTUATIONS AFFECT SUICIDE RATES?

In this study, we extend the standard economic model of suicide by considering a new influential factor driving the voluntary death rate. Using an international sample, we estimate the model and document a robust and significant inverse relation between stock market returns and the percentage increase in suicide rates. Trends in male and female suicide are affected by market fluctuations, both contemporaneously and at a lag. This predictive quality of stock returns offers the potential to implement pro-active suicide prevention strategies for those who could be affected by the vagaries of the market and general economic downturns.     

DO STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT MATTER IN MUNICIPAL ORGANISATIONS?

In Sweden, a large share of public services are organised, produced and delivered by municipalities, large and small, rich and poor. Contextual conditions (size and location) and economic conditions (efficiency and wealth) differ considerably among these service‐providing organisations. The question raised in this paper is whether a municipality's economic situation is a direct consequence of the contextual situation or the organisation's strategy and management – that is: Do strategy and management matter? Our analysis rests on a resource‐based view of organisation strategy. Both quantitative and qualitative observations have been made. First, cost savings data from 50 municipalities were examined for patterns and relationships between contextual and economic conditions. Second, about 100 representatives – municipal executive board members and leading officials – from 20 municipalities with different characteristics were interviewed. In this paper we outline an analytical framework and propose that sound and sustainable provision of municipal service depends on whether organisational decision‐making is in harmony with work methods and objectives. The results indicate that strategy and management do matter. Among the municipalities included in our study, we identify four prevalent basic strategies. Strategy tends to coincide with the economic situation rather than the contextual situation. A low‐performing municipality tends to have a predominantly outward orientation in its decision‐making, whereas a higher‐performing municipality makes decisions with both inward and outward orientation.     

DO WELL-CONNECTED BOARDS INVEST OPTIMALLY IN R&D ACTIVITIES?

Researchers have argued that the uncertainty surrounding innovative activities causes firms to either underinvest or overinvest in research and development (R&D). We examine whether the information gained by boards through directors’ connections helps mitigate such distortions. We find that an increase in directors’ connections has an asymmetric impact on under- and overinvesting firms. R&D expenditures are shown to increase with board connections. Such increases in R&D intensity exacerbate the extent of overinvestment, resulting in a loss in future market-to-book value. The increase in R&D intensity, however, reduces underinvestment only among firms with higher than average R&D productivity. We find that increased director busyness is one cause of overinvestment.     

INTRADAY STEALTH TRADING: WHICH TRADES MOVE PRICES DURING PERIODS OF HIGH VOLUME?

Research documents a U-shaped intraday pattern of returns. We examine which trade sizes drive the U-shaped pattern and find that intraday price changes from larger trades exhibit a U-shaped pattern whereas price changes from smaller trades show a reverse U-shaped pattern. We argue that price changes from smaller trades are higher during the middle of the day because informed investors break up their trades to disguise their information when intraday volume is low. Price changes from larger trades are likely higher at the beginning and end of the day because high volume allows informed investors to increase their trade size without revealing their information to the market.     

DO SCANDALS TRIGGER GOVERNANCE CHANGES? EVIDENCE FROM OPTION BACKDATING

We examine whether firms charged with backdating option grants make discernible changes to board structure and activity and whether such changes help recoup value losses from the revelation of option backdating. We find that these firms increased board size, reduced duality, and increased board independence. In addition, the boards and the compensation committees of these firms experienced significant increases in meeting frequency. We also find that firms in the same sectors that had not been identified as backdating option grants experienced similar changes in board activity and some elements of board structure. Additional analysis reveals that increases in board size, chief excutive officer turnover, and the meeting frequency of the audit committee are related to buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns in the postscandal period.     

DO INVESTORS CARE ABOUT PRESIDENTIAL COMPANY‐SPECIFIC TWEETS?

When the president of the United States tweets, do investors respond? We analyze the impact of tweets from President Donald J. Trump's official Twitter accounts from November 9, 2016 to December 31, 2017 that include names of publicly traded companies. We find that these tweets move company stock prices and increase trading volume, volatility, and institutional investor attention, with a stronger impact before the presidential inauguration. There is some evidence that the initial impact of the presidential tweets on stock prices is reversed in the next few trading days.     

ARE FIRM‐ AND COUNTRY‐SPECIFIC GOVERNANCE SUBSTITUTES? EVIDENCE FROM FINANCIAL CONTRACTS IN EMERGING MARKETS

We investigate how borrowers’ corporate governance influences bank loan contracting terms in emerging markets and how this relation varies across countries with different country‐level governance. We find that borrowers with stronger corporate governance obtain favorable contracting terms with respect to loan amount, maturity, collateral requirements, and spread. Firm‐level and country‐level corporate governance are substitutes in writing and enforcing financial contracts. We also find that the distinctiveness of borrowers’ characteristics affect the relation between firm‐level corporate governance and loan contracting terms. Our findings are robust, irrespective of types of regression methods and specifications.     

WHY DO UK ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE ACADEMICS NOT PUBLISH IN TOP US JOURNALS?

In peer reviews of the quality of academic accounting and finance journals, US journals are consistently perceived to be the most prestigious. UK accounting and finance academics share these perceptions, and yet very few of them ever publish in top US journals. A survey of UK accounting and finance academics was undertaken in an attempt to ascertain why this is so. The respondents perceive that the preference of top US journals for a US focus to published articles, reinforced by a strong element of gatekeeping and the need to be able to network with the US academic community, provide major barriers to entry. As a result, there is a strong belief that efforts to publish in top US journals will be unsuccessful and, therefore, publishing in the UK is seen to be easier.     

DO MULTIPLE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS PLAY A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ROLE? EVIDENCE FROM EAST ASIA

We examine the governance role of multiple large shareholder structures (MLSS) to determine their valuation effects in a sample of 1,252 publicly traded firms from nine East Asian economies. We find that the presence, number, and size of multiple large shareholders are associated with a significant valuation premium. Our results also show that the identity of MLSS influences corporate value and that the valuation effects of MLSS are more pronounced in firms with greater agency costs. Our results imply that MLSS play a valuable monitoring role in curbing the diversion of corporate resources.     

DO INSIDERS PRACTICE WHAT THEY PREACH? INFORMED OPTION EXERCISES AROUND MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

We examine executive stock option exercises around a sample of merger and acquisition announcements between 1996 and 2006, focusing on a subset we identify as potentially informed. For stock‐financed acquisitions, we find a surge in informed exercises by acquirer insiders in the year leading up to the acquisition announcement, but target insiders display no similar increase. We find the market reaction upon the announcement for acquirers is negatively related to extreme early exercises and find some evidence of long‐run underperformance. Overall, our evidence indicates that insiders knowingly bid for firms when they personally believe their own firm is overvalued.