INTERSTATE BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF BANK MERGERS

We examine a sample of 443 bank mergers between publicly traded banks announced during the 1990s to investigate empirically the role of full interstate banking deregulation. The pre‐deregulation 1990s are characterized by value creation, with mergers involving a high degree of branch overlap experiencing significant announcement gains. Bank mergers in the post‐deregulation 1990s, however, fail to create value, and mergers with a high degree of branch overlap actually experience significant losses. Consistent with prior research, these valuation consequences are magnified for large bank mergers in the 1990s. Overall, our results are consistent with the broader literature on corporate control, suggesting that an economic shock can materially alter industry structure and the economic rationale for the efficient reallocation of assets through merger activity.     

Merger waves following industry deregulation

Deregulation is endogenous. It is preceded by poor industry performance and is predictable with performance variables. These results imply that merger activity following deregulation should be systematically related to poor pre-deregulation industry performance. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that post-deregulation mergers serve a contractionary role. Bidders and targets in post-deregulation mergers are poor performers prior to the merger and operate with significant excess capacity. Consistent with the hypothesis that post-deregulation mergers represent a form of exit, the frequency of cash and bankruptcy mergers is significantly higher following deregulation and the offer premium is significantly lower.     

Geographic Deregulation and Competition in the U.S. Banking Industry

We examine the effects of geographic deregulation on state‐level competition in U.S. banking markets over the period 1976‐2005. The empirical results confirm that the U.S. banks in general operated under monopolistic competition during the period examined. After partitioning the sample based on bank size we find that the market competition for large banks in Delaware, Oregon, and Rhode Island can be characterized as monopolistic while small banks in Arizona and Massachusetts seem to have operated under the conditions of perfect competition. The removal of geographic restrictions appears to have very limited and non‐uniform effect on state‐level competitive conduct. There is some evidence that the U.S. banking industry might have actually experienced a less competitive behavior in recent years due to increased market power of larger banks.     

U.S. financial deregulation : Upheaval and promise

Financial deregulation in the U.S. has ample ramifications for international banking. For U.S. based international banks, the deregulation shifts the emphasis back to the now deregulated U.S. market. For foreign banks in the U.S. deregulation is a mixed blessing. One aspect of the deregulation is interstate banking, another is merger across industry lines. Thus Parker, a pen manufacturer, owns several financial institutions including a bank. All this functional integration may be exaggerated. Banks will continue to operate more or less as they have done in the past. The changes will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary in nature, and they will lead our industry from the production of banking services to the production of financial services.     

Industry aspects of takeovers and divestitures: Evidence from the UK

This paper examines takeover and divestiture activity at the industry level for the population of UK firms over the period 1986–2000. Consistent with US research, takeovers in the UK cluster both across industries and over time. The evidence for divestitures indicates clustering across industries only. The paper further investigates whether broad and specific industry shocks (e.g., growth, free cash flow, concentration, deregulation, foreign competition, technology, stock market performance) explain takeover and divestiture clustering at the industry level. The results suggest that broad shocks increase (decrease) the likelihood of takeovers (divestitures), although not significantly for takeovers. Specific industry shocks that increase the likelihood of takeover activity include low growth, the threat of foreign competition and high stock market performance. For divestitures, high industry concentration and deregulation increase activity. Little evidence is found for deregulation as a significant factor in explaining takeover activity.     

Bank Mergers and Crime: The Real and Social Effects of Credit Market Competition

Using a unique sample of commercial loans and mergers between large banks, we provide micro‐level (within‐county) evidence linking credit conditions to economic development and find a spillover effect on crime. Neighborhoods that experience more bank mergers are subject to higher interest rates, diminished local construction, lower prices, an influx of poorer households, and higher property crime in subsequent years. The elasticity of property crime with respect to merger‐induced banking concentration is 0.18. We show that these results are not likely due to reverse causation, and confirm the central findings using state branching deregulation to instrument for bank competition.     

Deregulation,listing and delisting

We study patterns of new lists, delisting and mergers in deregulated industries in the 1973 to 2017 period. Consistent with prior research, we find that merger activity tends to cluster in deregulated industries. But we provide new evidence that new lists and overall delisting also cluster in deregulated industries, with new lists preceding delisting. We also find that deregulated industries are growing in size and value prior to deregulation and grow significantly larger, more valuable and more competitive following deregulation. The results are consistent with the linkage of deregulation and industries undergoing significant change; deregulation aids in industry adaptation to change and facilitates expansion. Moreover, the results provide a specific mechanism by which industries undergo event waves.     

Geographical deregulation and competition in U.S. banking markets

The effects of geographical deregulation on competition in banking markets is examined. Using a model that develops an index of competition as proposed by Bresnahan and applied to banking markets by Shaffer, the empirical evidence suggests that geographical deregulation has not had a significant impact on competition. The limited effects of geographical deregulation on competition is consistent with other evidence presented, suggesting that banking markets were already highly competitive. In those states where a significant effect was observed, geographical deregulation increased the degree of competition in some states but had the opposite effect in others.     

Uncertainty or Misvaluation? New Evidence on Determinants of Merger Activity from the Banking Industry

We use data from the past 30 years of takeover activity in the U.S. banking industry to test competing neoclassical and misvaluation merger theories. Test results are consistent with evidence in the literature that merger activity is significantly related to both structural industry change and stock price misvaluation. Our primary contribution is to show that changes in misvaluation reflect a rise in industry‐wide risk taking and that increases in risk originate from changes in industry structure due to deregulation. A measure of bank risk taking subsumes the power of stock price misvaluation to explain subsequent merger activity.     

Dynamic efficiencies of the 1997 Boeing‐McDonnell Douglas merger

We evaluate the welfare effects of the 1997 Boeing‐McDonnell Douglas merger in the medium‐sized, wide‐body aircraft industry. We find that the merger led to lower prices. To explain the price drop, we develop a dynamic oligopoly game with learning‐by‐doing. We quantify the welfare effects of the merger by incorporating both increased market power and merger efficiencies from accelerated learning‐by‐doing. Our dynamic analysis indicates that net consumer surplus increased by as much as $5.14 billion, whereas a static model ignoring efficiencies of learning‐by‐doing predicts a $0.92 billion loss.     

COMPETITION AND CASCADES IN MARKETS: AN AGENT‐BASED MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS MERGERS

We present an agent‐based model of endogenous merger formation in a market with turnover of market participants. We describe the dynamics of the model and identify the conditions under which market competition is sufficiently disrupted to prompt extended periods during which mergers are desirable. We also demonstrate how merger waves can be triggered by industry shocks and firm overconfidence. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Estimation of cost efficiencies from mergers: application to US radio

This article estimates fixed‐cost efficiencies from mergers using a dynamic oligopoly model in which mergers and repositioning of products are endogenous. The inference is based on revealed preference approach selecting cost synergies that rationalize observed merger decisions. The estimates can be used to assess the total welfare impact of retrospective and counterfactual mergers. The framework is applied to estimate cost efficiencies after the 1996 deregulation of U.S. radio industry. Within the period of 1996 to 2006 the cost savings resulting from mergers amount to $1.2 billion per year (equally split across economies of scale and within‐format cost synergies).     

The Importance of Industry Links in Merger Waves

We represent the economy as a network of industries connected through customer and supplier trade flows. Using this network topology, we find that stronger product market connections lead to a greater incidence of cross‐industry mergers. Furthermore, mergers propagate in waves across the network through customer‐supplier links. Merger activity transmits to close industries quickly and to distant industries with a delay. Finally, economy‐wide merger waves are driven by merger activity in industries that are centrally located in the product market network. Overall, we show that the network of real economic transactions helps to explain the formation and propagation of merger waves.     

Product market competition and conditional conservatism

Based on pooled cross-sectional analysis, we find a robust positive relation between product market competition and conditional accounting conservatism. We also find evidence of an inter-temporal increase in conditional conservatism following industry deregulation and increased antitrust case filings. Distinguishing further between two dimensions of competition, we find conditional conservatism is greater when there is a higher threat of new entrants as well as stiff existing competition. Moreover, we find these results largely hold for industry followers as opposed to industry leaders, suggesting that strategic considerations shape the extent to which product market competition affects conditional conservatism.     

The Competitive Dynamics of Geographic Deregulation in Banking: Implications for Productive Efficiency

Deregulation of geographic restrictions in banking over the past 20 years has intensified both potential and actual competition in the industry. The accumulating empirical evidence suggests that potential efficiency gains associated with consolidating banks are often not realized. We evaluate the impact of this increased competition on the productive efficiency of non-merging banks confronted with new entry in their local markets and find that the incumbent banks respond by improving cost efficiency. Thus, studies evaluating the impact of bank mergers on the efficiency of the combining parties alone may be overlooking the most significant welfare-enhancing aspect of merger activity.     

Mergers in India. A Response to Regulatory Shocks

Recent empirical research shows that industry and regulatory shocks play a key role in determining merger activity in developed countries. We use this framework to analyze merger activity in India, using a comprehensive database spanning a thirty-year period, from 1973-74 to 2002-3. At the industry level, we identify clustering of merger activity in India, indicating that mergers may be a response to industry and regulatory shocks. At the firm level, the 1991 amendments to the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, which removed premerger scrutiny, are found to have a positive and significant effect on merger behavior of firms that had been under its purview. After the 1991 amendments, firms underwent mergers that would have been scrutinized by the MRTP Act otherwise. These mergers were undertaken for expansionary reasons.     

The effect of the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger on auditor concentration in Australia: A note

Concerns have been raised about the impact of the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) merger on the structure of and competition in the audit and assurance services market in Australia. The market share of publicly listed companies for audit firms for each industry category pre– and post–merger is examined in this paper to ascertain levels of auditor concentration. Using the approach outlined by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission a decrease in the level of competition is identified. However, when using another generally accepted concentration measure, the Herfindahl Index, the merger is found to not necessarily decrease competition. In fact, for a number of industry sectors a more equitable spread of clients between the main audit firms was achieved.     

Regulatory changes in the electric utility industry: Investigation of effects on shareholder wealth

In 1992, the regulatory environment for electric utilities changed dramatically with enactment of the Energy Policy Act, mandating increased competition in this formerly monopolistic industry. The results of our study suggest that these regulatory changes in the electric utility industry and the opening of transmission lines to outsiders had negative and significant effects on stock values for the overall sample of firms examined. The basic results indicate that the movement toward greater competition dissipates economic rents associated with the previously held monopolistic situations. Multivariate analysis indicates that firms with greater levels of nuclear assets and higher earnings per dollar of assets prior to the regulatory actions suffered greater negative abnormal returns than other firms in the sample. Additionally, firms in a more competitive environment prior to regulatory changes had less negative abnormal returns. Results also show utility firms are riskier after deregulation with an increase in market risk of 48.88% and in firm specific risk of 23.66%. Overall, it appears that, as with other deregulation of natural monopolies in the US, increased competition will benefit some producers, harm other producers and generally dissipate economic rents to consumers.     

The accuracy of hospital merger screening methods

This article analyzes the accuracy of various prospective hospital merger screening methods used by antitrust agencies and the courts. The predictions of the screening methods calculated with pre‐merger data are compared with the actual post‐merger price changes of 28 hospital mergers measured relative to controls. The evaluated screening methods include traditional structural measures (e.g., Herfindahl‐Hirschman Index), measures derived from hospital competition models (e.g., diversion ratios, willingness‐to‐pay, and upward pricing pressure), and hospital merger simulation. Willingness‐to‐pay and upward pricing pressure are found to be more accurate at flagging potentially anticompetitive mergers for further investigation than traditional methods.     

Deregulation and earnings management: The case of the U.S. airline industry

This paper examines earnings management dynamics in the airline industry during the airline industry deregulation of 1978. We expect that earnings management would increase after deregulation, since industry deregulation generally increases managerial discretion, whereas internal corporate governance systems are sluggish in adapting to newly changed environments. As corporate governance structures become more effective in tempering highly discretionary managers, and as capital markets learn more about how to design better management incentive systems, managers’ incentives and capacity to engage in earnings management will diminish. Based on industry data, we find that the magnitude of absolute values of discretionary accruals increase significantly in the post-deregulation period. Managers in the airline industry were inclined to engage in income increasing earnings management after deregulation. However, the increased level of earnings management then decreased to return close to the level seen during the regulation period. The findings support the predicted deregulation impact on earnings management dynamics.