Payroll tax incidence when the tax varies by jurisdiction: The case of the U.S. unemployment insurance tax

Standard treatment of payroll tax incidence suggests that labor, both because of inelastic supply and because workers value the benefit financed by the tax, bears most of the tax. This note considers the special case of the U.S. unemployment insurance tax, which is a payroll tax that varies by jurisdiction (states). The model set forth in this paper allows for differing degrees of both labor mobility and substitutability between types of labor and capital. Contrary to the standard treatment, this paper predicts that some types of labor will avoid this particular type of payroll tax completely. I thank Daniel Hamermesh and seminar participants at the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and at Oakland University for helpful comments on an earlier draft. I also gratefully acknowledge sabbatical support provided by Oakland University during the initial conceptualization of the ideas presented in this paper.     

Double Bertrand tax competition: a fiscal game with governments acting as middlemen

In a common market with costless mobility of all factors regional governments can attract mobile firms by granting subsidies which they must finance out of wage taxes on mobile labour. Firms locate where subsidies are highest and workers settle where taxes are lowest, forcing government ‘in the splits’ (double Bertrand-type tax competition). Initially, there is unemployment in the economy. Regional governments then behave like middlemen in the labour market, and the fiscal game takes the form of competition among strategic intermediaries. Results from the theory of intermediation are applied to this framework. It is shown that government size may increase rather than decline in a fiscal competition, that industrial clustering may emerge from tax competition, and that tax competition may alleviate the unemployment problem.     

失业保险,道德风险与激励机制研究

在简化的Lucas—Prescott（1974）的模型基础上，本文说明了失业保险中失业保险金对搜寻努力存在着负效用，并分别就无失业保险、完全失业保险、不完全失业保险、失业保险金过低等四种情况，分析了道德风险的产生机制以及克服道德风险的激励机制。针对失业保险中的道德风险问题，本文提出了相应的政策建议：失业期内单调下降的失业保险金支付方法，征收失业保险税或奖励再就业，对失业工人的搜寻努力进行监督和惩罚，执行劳动福利计划等。     

Unemployment insurance and job turnover in Spain

The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the potential relationships between the unemployment insurance system and labour market turnover. This study assumes the incentives embedded in the unemployment insurance system have a heterogeneous impact, depending on the type of labour market transition (quits versus layoffs and recalls versus new job entrances) and on a worker's attachment to the labour market (gender and type of contract). The layoff hazard rate increases as workers qualify for unemployment benefits, whilst the quit hazard rate remains stable. Similarly, employment inflow increases sharply after the exhaustion of unemployment benefits. The timing and importance of the exit differ between recalls and new job entry and depend on a worker's attachment to the labour market. The results show that unemployment benefits appear to favour job turnover and both firms' and workers' decisions seem to matter.     

Job separation in a non‐stationary search model: a structural estimation to evaluate alternative unemployment insurance systems

This paper considers a job search model in which the environment is not constant throughout the unemployment spell and where jobs do not last for ever. In this situation, reservation wages can be lower than they would be in a model without consideration of such separations, but they can initially be higher precisely because of the non‐constant environment. The model is estimated structurally by using Spanish data for the period 1985–1996. The main finding is that, after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the unemployment hazard rate is almost flat during the first six months. However, after this duration, the highly decreasing job offer arrival rate comes to be the only significant factor, given that acceptance probabilities become equal to one. The estimated parameters are used to evaluate different unemployment insurance designs. We conclude that a non‐monotonic pattern in unemployment benefits, joint with a tax paid by workers and based on unemployment duration, makes this duration 13.2% lower than it currently is in Spain. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Taxes on labour and unemployment in a shirking model with union bargaining

This paper studies the impact of a cut in labour taxes in a model that combines two explanations for equilibrium unemployment: employee shirking and union bargaining. It is shown that if the ratio of unemployment compensation to the net-of-tax wages is kept fixed, a tax cut leads to higher unemployment. When the unemployment benefits are fixed in real terms, the effect of a tax cut on unemployment is ambiguous. Adverse employment effects are ruled out if unions are powerless or the labour share is constant.     

Unemployment compensation under partial program coverage

More than half of the unemployed in the U.S. are not covered by unemployment insurance. For them the provision of employment-dependent UI creates an additional benefit from work: future UI eligibility. This paper explores the overall and distributional effects of providing unemployment compensation under partial coverage. I extend a standard search model to accommodate eligible and non-eligible workers, where eligibility status is determined by previous separation history. While the effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration and post unemployment wages is theoretically ambiguous, a calibration of the model to the U.S. economy shows that unemployment benefits raise the unemployment rate. In addition I show that wage gaps and unemployment duration differentials between the eligible and non-eligible exist and are larger when layoffs are high.     

The end of the Ghent system as trade union recruitment machinery?

During the past 15 years, membership rates in many unions have been declining in Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Reasons for this decline may be similar to what has happened in other countries—occupational change and neoliberal ideology and policies—but in the three Ghent countries, changes in the unemployment insurance system may also have affected trade union membership losses. The major part of the decline has taken place in a period of low unemployment, which may have reduced the employee incentive to take unemployment insurance, but will increasing unemployment rates mean more trade union members? At least for the LO‐ and SAK‐affiliated trade unions, it seems that trade union independent unemployment funds may be alternatives for workers who take unemployment insurance.     

Labor Regulations and European Venture Capital

European nations substitute between employment protection regulations and labor market expenditures (e.g., unemployment insurance benefits) for providing worker insurance. Employment regulations more directly tax firms making frequent labor adjustments than other labor market insurance mechanisms. Venture capital (VC) investors are especially sensitive to these labor adjustment costs. Nations favoring labor market expenditures as the mechanism for providing worker insurance developed stronger VC markets over 1990–2008, especially in high‐volatility sectors. In this context, policy mechanisms are more important than the overall level of worker insurance.     

Progressive Taxes and the Labour Market: Is the Trade–off Between Equality and Efficiency Inevitable?

Does an income tax harm economic efficiency more the more progressive it is? Public economics provides a strong case for a definite ‘yes’. But at least three forces may pull in the other direction. First, low–wage workers may on average have more elastic labour supply schedules than high–wage workers, in which case progressive taxes contribute to a more efficient allocation of the total tax burden. Second, in non–competitive labour markets, progressive taxes may encourage wage moderation, and hence reduce the equilibrium level of unemployment. And third, if wage setters have egalitarian objectives, progressive taxes may reduce the need for redistribution in pre–tax wages, and hence increase the demand for low–skilled workers. This paper surveys the theoretical, as well as the empirical literature about labour supply, taxes and wage setting. We conclude that in a second best world, the trade–off between equality and efficiency is not always inevitable.     

Do Low‐Wage Workers React Less to Longer Unemployment Benefits? Quasi‐Experimental Evidence*

The fact that unemployed workers have different abilities to smooth consumption entails heterogeneous responses to extended unemployment benefits. Our empirical exercise explores a quasi‐experimental setting generated by an increase in the benefits entitlement period. The results suggest a hump‐shape response of unemployment duration over the one‐year pre‐unemployment wage distribution; individuals at the bottom and top of the wage distribution reacted less than those in the interquartile range. This behaviour of job searchers is consistent with labour supply models with unemployment insurance and savings. It questions the optimality of very long entitlement periods to target the unemployment experiences of low‐wage workers.     

State dependency in youth unemployment: A lost generation?

Utilizing a job search framework and survey data on both completed and uncompleted spells of unemployment we present in this paper maximum likelihood estimates of the determinants of re-employment probabilities of young workers in Britain. The model used allows us to examine the importance of state dependency in youth unemployment as well as ethnicity, educational qualifications, and unemployment income. Results suggest that there is strong evidence of negative duration dependence in the transition from unemployment to employment for young workers in Britain.     

Designing employment subsidies

The paper examines the relative effectiveness of two policy proposals in reducing unemployment and working poverty: hiring subsidies and wage subsidies. The hiring subsidies are targeted exclusively at the unemployed and are provided only for a limited period of time. The wage subsidies, on the other hand, are granted to all low-wage earners regardless of their employment history and are of limitless duration. Our analysis indicates that the relative effectiveness of the two policies depends on workers' prospective wage growth. The more upwardly mobile workers are (i.e. the more their wages rise with employment duration), the more effective will unemployment vouchers be relative to low-wage subsidies. Conversely, the greater the danger that workers come to be trapped in dead-end jobs with flat wage profiles, the more effective will low-wage subsidies be relative to unemployment vouchers.     

Equilibrium Unemployment Dynamics in a Panel of OECD Countries

We focus on the equilibrium unemployment rate as a parameter implied by a dynamic aggregate model of wage and price setting. The equilibrium unemployment rate depends on institutional labour market institutions through mark‐up coefficients. Compared with existing studies, the resulting final equation for unemployment has a richer dynamic structure. The empirical investigation is conducted in a panel data framework and uses OECD data up to 2012. We propose to extend the standard estimation method with time dummies to control and capture the effects of common and national shocks by using impulse indicator saturation (WG‐IIS), which has not been previously used on panel data. WG‐IIS robustifies the estimators of the regression coefficients in the dynamic model, and it affects the estimated equilibrium unemployment rates. We find that wage co‐ordination stands out as the most important institutional variable in our data set, but there is also evidence pointing to the tax wedge and the degree of compensation in the unemployment insurance system as drivers of equilibrium unemployment.     

Evaluating job-search programs for old and young individuals: Heterogeneous impact on unemployment duration

This paper exploits an area-based pilot experiment to identify average treatment effects on unemployment duration of treated individuals of two active labor market programs implemented in Portugal. We focus on the short-term heterogeneous impact on two subpopulations of unemployed individuals: young (targeted by the Inserjovem program) and old (targeted by the Reage program). We show that the latter program has a small and positive impact (reduction) on unemployment duration of workers finding a job upon participation, whereas the impact of Inserjovem is generally negative (extended durations). These results are robust to a wide variety of constructions of quasi-experimental settings and estimators. The identification of heterogeneous effects showed that the program results were less satisfactory for young workers, for those over 40 and for the less educated. Women also benefited less from the programs. The results seem to improve slightly for young workers in the 2nd semester of implementation, but they deteriorate in the medium term. The lack of wage subsidies in the Portuguese programs may explain the minor impacts obtained, when compared to similar programs.     

Effect of monetary policy shocks on the racial unemployment rates in the US

This study analyzes the effect of monetary policy shocks on the unemployment rate of different racial groups in the US, using data from 1969Q2 to 2015Q4. Employing a narrative approach to identify monetary policy shocks and local projections, we find that although an expansionary monetary shock affects White workers positively and significantly, the effect on Black workers is larger, and for Hispanic workers it is not statistically different from zero. These results are robust when considering unconventional monetary policy measures in the specification, and when exploring the impact of monetary policy on different genders and age groups. We also highlight how recession affects the transmission channel of monetary policy to the labor market for White and Hispanic workers. Finally, further extensions suggest that the Fed’s monetary policy is effective in reducing the racial unemployment gap, particularly between Whites and Blacks, and during economic booms.     

Demographic and education effects on unemployment in Europe

We analyse the effects of demographic and education changes on unemployment rates in Europe. Using a panel of European countries for the 1975–2002 period - disaggregated by cohort and education - we empirically test the economic effects of the “baby bust” and the “education boom”. We find that structural shifts in the population age structure play an important role and that a significant share of variation in unemployment rates is also attributable to educational changes, the latter being usually neglected in aggregate studies. Results show that demographic and education shocks are qualitatively different for young (adult) workers as well as for more (less) educated people. Changes in the population age structure are positively related to the unemployment rate of young workers, while have no effect on adults. Conversely, changes in the education structure show a negative effect on the unemployment of the more educated. Labour market institutions also influence unemployment rates in different ways. Employment protection for regular workers increases unemployment rates, while temporary employment provisions reduce it. Unemployment benefits are found to have a displacement effect on unemployment, while corporatism of wage bargaining improves employment performance.     

FLEXIBLE RETIREMENT

Flexible retirement – that is, the opportunity to choose one's own personal retirement age – is a hedge against pension risk and provides insurance to workers facing health or productivity shocks. Flexible retirement and flexible pension schemes are in practice closely linked because of imperfect capital markets and institutional restrictions. I discuss three necessary conditions to provide insurance through flexible retirement. First, it should be possible to adjust the pension starting date at limited cost. This condition is gradually being fulfilled, as many countries are moving toward more actuarially neutral pension schemes. Second, individuals should be willing to adjust their labor supply in case of a wealth shock. This condition seems largely fulfilled, although the available empirical evidence suggests that the ‘standard retirement age’ is at least as important as the income effect. Third, the labor market should be able to deal with flexible individual retirement decisions. This condition is gaining importance, but has not yet received much attention in the literature. Institutions often hamper employment past the ‘standard retirement age’. Moreover, the hiring rates of older workers are low and their unemployment duration is high. Institutional reforms facilitating flexible retirement opportunities are desirable from an insurance perspective.     

The Effects of Cannabis Use on Wages of Prime‐age Males*

This paper uses a data set collected among inhabitants of Amsterdam, to study whether wages of prime‐age male workers are affected by cannabis use. The analysis shows that recent cannabis use has a negative effect on wages. The size of the wage effect depends on the age of onset. The earlier the start of cannabis use the larger the negative wage impact.     

Layoff tax and employment of the elderly

In 1996 Austria introduced a tax for the layoff of older workers, which was tightened in 2000. The regulation requires employers to pay a tax of up to 170% of the gross monthly income when they give notice to employees aged 50 or more. We use data from Austrian social security records to investigate if such layoff taxes lead to less firing of older workers. We compare a control group of workers aged nearly 50 with the treatment group above 50. We apply a difference-in-difference approach to analyze the difference in the displacement probability of all prime aged workers. Results show substantial reductions in layoff behavior for workers aged 50 and above after the tightening of the tax.