Endogenous scope of bargaining in a union–oligopoly model: when will firms and unions bargain over employment?

The scope of firm–union bargaining is shown to be endogenously determined in a union–oligopoly model with decentralized negotiations. If the unions' power is sufficiently high, all bargaining units choose to negotiate over wages alone, i.e., universal right-to-manage bargaining emerges in equilibrium. Otherwise, wage/employment bargaining and right-to-manage bargaining coexist in the same industry. In equilibrium, some firm–union pairs will always choose to bargain over employment as well, since the firms become Stackelberg leaders in the market by committing to a particular output during the negotiations. The firms and their unions both benefit from the additional Stackelberg rents, provided that the unions' power is small enough. Our analysis suggests that there is not necessarily a negative relationship between unions' power and sectoral employment rates.     

Wage bargaining,union membership,and the organization of unemployment insurance

The paper offers a theoretical analysis of a labor market institution known as the Gent system, which is a system where unions run unemployment insurance (UI) through government-subsidized UI funds. This system is practiced in four Nordic countries with comparatively very high unionization rates. The analysis shows that the Gent system is more conducive to unionization than a compulsory UI system if the Gent system is heavily subsidized by the government or if workers are strongly risk averse. Moreover, a rise in the share of benefits financed by union members is likely to reduce wages as well as union membership.     

Paying to queue: a theory of locational differences in nonunion wages

Traditional theories of the effect unions have on nonunion wages are difficult to reconcile with firm and worker mobility. We show how differences in nonunion wages can persist in a two-city search model. Nonunion wage differences across cities are driven by transition rates into the union sector. Should union queues form in the nonunion sector, union power decreases nonunion wages as workers are willing to take lower wages to line up for union jobs. However, if queues are formed in the unemployed sector, union power increases nonunion wages as nonunion firms pay premiums to induce workers to leave the queue.     

Flexible pay,firm performance and the role of unions. New evidence from Italy

This paper focuses on the effects of a shift in the firm pay strategy from a fixed wage to a flexible pay scheme on the performance of the “treated” firms. Theory predicts that the introduction of performance-related pay (PRP) may produce both incentive and sorting effects, making the incumbent workers more productive and attracting the most able workers from outside. Furthermore, productivity gains may be shared with the workers through higher wages and heterogeneous effects may be expected by union density. Matching estimates based on panel data for a representative sample of Italian metalworking firms in the 1990s show positive effects on labour productivity (around 7–11%) and to some extent on wages (around 2–3%), while worker sorting is negligible. Estimates by union density suggest that incentive effects are more present in low unionized firms, while wage effects are more significant in highly unionized ones. Extended sensitivity analysis shows that these results are overall robust with respect to the existence of unobserved confounding factors.     

Performance Pay,Union Bargaining and Within‐Firm Wage Inequality*

Theory predicts that performance pay boosts wage dispersion. Workers retain a share of individual productivity shocks and high‐efficiency workers receive compensation for greater effort. Collective bargaining can mitigate the effect of performance pay on wage inequality by easing monitoring of common effort standards and group‐based pay schemes. Analyses of longitudinal employer–employee data show that the introduction of performance‐related pay raises wage inequality in non‐union firms, but not in firms with high union density. Although performance‐related pay appears to be on the rise, the overall impact on wage dispersion is likely to be small, particularly in European countries with influential unions.     

Regulation, Unionization, and Racial Wage Discrimination: An Analysis of the Trucking Industry

A bstract . This article tests the hypothesis that increased product market competition of deregulation decreased employer and union wage discrimination in the motor carrier industry. Specifically, in each regulatory period, we estimate the portion of the industry racial wage differential that is due to racial differences: in driver attributes, returns to attributes, and unionization. Our findings suggest that enhanced product market competition directly reduces wage discrimination and may have a smaller indirect effect of further reducing racial wage disparities in industries with racially exclusive unions. These findings support the use of competition to reduce wage discrimination as opposed to government intervention.     

The cost of living,threshold bargaining and incomes policy1

For trade union bargainers one of the infallible laws of political economy is that wages lag behind prices. This means that in an inflationary era the real value of the wage to which their members are entitled will be eroded, and some compensation will have to be made for this at the next round of wage negotiations. Therefore, changes in the cost of living since the last settlement will be regarded by trade unions as one of the most important factors to be taken into account in arriving at a new settlement. This is implicit in the statement made by the TUC in 1971 that “it requires pay increases of at least 10 per cent simply to restore the real disposable pay of a union's previous settlement 12 months earlier”. Economists, on the other hand, argue that once an inflation is under way, then economic agents will develop an inflationary psychology—that is, they will expect it to continue and will adjust their behaviour accordingly. If this is correct, trade union bargainers will attempt to anticipate inflation by trying to fix the money wage at a higher level than they would aim for if the price level were more stable.     

Do Unions Affect Labor's Share of Income: Evidence Using Panel Data

There have been a number of studies analyzing the impact of unions on labor's share of income. Most have relied on either time series or cross‐section data. The purpose of this paper is to determine the impact of unions on labor's share of income in the U.S. This study adds to the understanding of this topic by developing an analytical model of imperfect competition and estimating the model using panel data for the manufacturing sector. This study finds that unions have a positive impact on labor's share of income. Specifically, this paper finds that labor's share declined 17.9 percent between 1997 and 2006 whereas, if unionization density had remained at its 1997 level, labor's share would have declined only 13.9 percent. Thus, the decline in unionization explains about 29 percent of the decline in labor's share of income. This paper is important for three reasons. First, this paper sheds light on whether social and institutional forces play an important role in determining the distribution of income between labor and capital. Second, it helps to explain recent increases in wage inequality. Third, it has implications for understanding the potential impact of legislation, such as the Employee Free Choice Act, that would make it easier for workers in the U.S. to unionize.     

Asset specificity,unionization and the firm's use of debt

This paper considers the combined influence of asset specificity and unionization on the firm's use of debt. While previous literature tends to examine these effects separately, we find that the interaction of the two is critical. Thus, while asset specificity may reduce debt as in Williamson (1988), the presence of a strong union offsets this. Unionization increases the firm's debt as in Bronars and Deere (1991), but asset generality diminishes this effect. We model and test the interactive nature of these two effects. Using firm-specific unionization data and various proxies for asset specificity, we find support for our model. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Motivate and select: Relational contracts with persistent types

We develop a model of relational contracts with moral hazard and asymmetric persistent information about an employee's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics and the distribution of employees' talent. Bonus contracts are more likely to be adopted in complex jobs and when high talent is not too common or too rare. Firms with “normal” jobs are more likely to adopt termination contracts. In labor market equilibrium, different contracts may be adopted by ex ante identical firms. Hence, we offer an explanation for the coexistence of different employment systems within the same industry.     

Customer‐oriented employees: Blessing or curse for firms?

I investigate whether the presence of customer‐oriented employees benefits firms in a competitive environment. Employees are defined as customer‐oriented if they are interested not only in their wage but also in the well‐being of their customers. I find that firms may obtain higher profits by hiring self‐interested rather than customer‐oriented employees. This is because the employees' customer orientation has opposing effects on the profits obtained by the firms. On the one hand, customer‐oriented employees provide a given level of quality for a lower wage. On the other hand, the employees' customer orientation increases competition reducing prices. If the second effect dominates, firms find themselves trapped in a prisoners' dilemma as the strategy of hiring self‐interested employees is strictly dominated by that of hiring customer‐oriented employees. Hence, the very presence of customer‐oriented employees may hurt firms. If motivated employees are merely interested in the quality of the good provided, the effect on the price outlined before disappears.     

Is tax progression really good for employment? A model with endogenous hours of work

This paper discusses the effect of tax progression on wage setting and employment in a unionised labour market. Recent contributions to this field argue that tax progression paradoxically enhances employment if wage setting is subject to collective bargaining. In this literature, individual hours of work are usually assumed to be exogenously given. We show that the positive employment effect of tax progression can be generalized to a model with a positive labour supply elasticity of individual workers. However, the wage-moderating effect of tax progression does not unambiguously carry over to a world where the union may fix both wages and individual hours of work. In this framework, the union reacts to tax progression by cutting individual working time. The wage rate, however, may decrease or increase. If the wage rate increases, the number of employed workers may decline despite the reduction in hours of work.     

How do European firms adjust their labour costs when nominal wages are rigid?

Although workers' nominal wages are seldom cut, firms have multiple options available if they require adjustments in their wage bills. We broaden the analysis of relative (in)flexibility in labour costs by investigating the use of other margins of labour cost adjustment at the firm level beyond base wages. Using data from a unique survey, we find that European firms make extensive use of other components of compensation to adjust the cost of labour. Interestingly, firms facing base wage rigidity are more likely to use alternative margins of labour cost adjustment; therefore there appears to be some degree of substitutability between wage flexibility and the flexibility of other cost components. Changes in bonuses and non-pay benefits are some of the potential margins firms use to reduce costs. We also show how the margins of adjustment chosen are affected by unionisation and firm and worker characteristics.     

Volatile multinationals? Evidence from the labor demand of German firms

Does more FDI make the world a riskier place for workers? We analyze whether an increase in multinational firms' activities is associated with an increase in firm-level employment volatility. We use a firm-level dataset for Germany which allows us to distinguish between purely domestic firms, exporters, domestic multinationals and foreign multinationals. Employment in multinationals could be more volatile than employment in domestic firms if multinationals were facing more volatile demand or if they react more to aggregate developments. We therefore decompose the labor demand of firms into their reaction and their exposure to aggregate developments. We find no above-average wage and output elasticities for multinational firms.     

How do workers decide their jobs? The influence of income,wage and job characteristics

This paper provides results on the economic decision‐making process of Spanish workers, who decide their jobs from the effects of variations in the non‐wage income, the wage and the prices of non‐pecuniary job characteristics. To that end, we formulate a non‐separable generalization of the Linear Expenditure System (NLES) as a joint model of labor supply and job characteristics demand, estimated separately for both males and females, using a 1991 Spanish survey. The main results show that: (i) some job characteristics have a positive effect on the wage, whereas others have a negative effect; (ii) the average percentage effect of employer size and the complexity index are higher for males than for females, with the fatal accident risk displaying similar values; (iii) if the non‐wage income of every worker increases, these individuals will prefer to devote less hours to work, and will also prefer jobs in smaller companies and with a lower risk; and (iv) if the wage and hedonic prices of non‐pecuniary job characteristics increase, then both males and females will prefer to reduce their labor supply, and devote their available time to jobs in bigger firms, with a higher risk and complexity. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

最低工资对正规部门、非正规部门工资和就业的影响

本文根据是否遵守最低工资标准,将劳动部门分为正规部门和非正规部门。利用中国健康与营养调查（CHNS）微观数据,运用固定效应模型和Multinomial Logit模型,本文实证研究了2004年以来,最低工资对正规部门和非正规部门工资和就业的影响。研究发现：最低工资每提高1%,正规部门工资会增加0.5%,非正规部门平均工资下降统计不显著,而处于最低工资线附近的非正规部门劳动者工资下降0.77%;最低工资提高使得失业者向非正规部门流动,而非正规部门劳动者向正规部门流动,最终将有利于劳动者在正规部门就业。因此,政府在制定最低工资制度时应全面考虑最低工资标准作用效果的部门差异。     

Learning quality through prices and word‐of‐mouth communication

This paper studies the effect of word‐of‐mouth communication on the optimal pricing strategy for new experience goods. I consider a dynamic monopoly model with asymmetric information about product quality, in which consumers learn in equilibrium from both prices and other consumers. The main result is that word‐of‐mouth communication is essential for the existence of separating equilibria, wherein the high‐quality monopolist signals high quality through a low introductory price (lower than the monopoly price), and the low‐quality one charges the monopoly price. The intuition is simple: low prices are costly, and will only be used by firms confident enough that increased experimentation (and therefore communication among consumers) will yield good news about quality and increased future profits. Additional results are the following: for the high‐quality seller, the expected price (quantity) is increasing (decreasing) over time; whereas for the low‐quality one, the opposite is true. Moreover, signaling becomes more difficult when consumers pay less attention to their peers' reports and more attention to past prices. Finally, word‐of‐mouth communication improves consumer welfare.     

UNION WAGE DIFFERENTIALS IN AN ERA OF DECLINING UNIONIZATION†

ABSTRACT This paper examines the change in union wage differentials in Britain between 1984 and 1990, a period of considerable legislative change and marked decline in unionization. Small falls in union differentials are found for manual workers, together with a sharp decline in the premium associated with, and incidence of, the pre-entry closed shop. The decline in the average differentials is found to be largely due to the inability of unions to establish differentials in new establishments. No link is found between the differential and the probability of closure and no evidence of decline in raw differentials in a matched panel.     

Do unions redistribute income from capital to labour? Union density and wage shares since 1960

The income distribution between capital and labour is understudied within industrial relations. This article investigates the relationship between union density, taken as an indicator of the bargaining power of unions, and the wage share of national income in 16 advanced capitalist economies since 1960. It is shown that overall there is a positive relationship between union density and the wage share, as one would expect. But the relationship is weak or non‐existent in the Nordic countries, and in some specifications in Germany and Anglo‐Saxon countries, and overall it is weak in the 1980s and early 1990s. The article discusses the differences between countries in relationship to the literature on corporatism and wage moderation, and the decreasing effect over time with reference to increased global competition and conservatism of monetary policy from about 1980 on, increasing unions' incentives for wage moderation policies.     

Strategic militancy and the probability of strikes in union-firm bargaining

The paper provides a model that explains the probability of strikes by the union's use of militancy as a strategic tool in bargaining. Militants are useful because they provide a credible threat, hence enhancing the union's bargaining position. Using a multi-stage bargaining game, we show that, in general, militants will be used by the union as a strategic tool. The strategic benefit of militancy is reflected by the fact that the wage and employment level will be higher in a union that uses militants, compared to a union that does not. We use the model to show that the level of militancy and the probability of a strike decrease with the union's power. This suggests that policies that increase the strength of the union will have, at least, a partial positive effect on social welfare. We also show that the model can be viewed as providing an equilibrium of a repeated game, an interpretation that can explain the probability of strikes even in the absence of militants.