The efficiency of IPO issuing mechanisms and market conditions: evidence in China

This study conducts a comparison analysis on the efficiency of bookbuilding and secondary market proportional offering (hereafter, SMP offering) in the China stock market. SMP offering as described in this paper is not a follow-on offering, but an initial offering applicable to investors in the secondary market. Specifically, as a unique type of fixed price offering, SMP offering only allows the existing investors who are holding shares (of any listed firms) in the secondary market to subscribe to IPO shares. The amount of IPO shares available to be subscribed by the existing investors is proportional to market value of shares held by them in the secondary market. We find some interesting evidence showing that, compared with bookbuilding, SMP offering is more efficient for pricing IPOs, particularly, in a volatile market. SMP offering leads to lower underpricing and lower cross-sectional variation of short-run returns of IPOs. Also, SMP offering is better able to counteract adverse market conditions in the form of low market return and/or high market volatility. Our results are robust to various alternative tests, e.g., the Heckman (Econometrica 47:153–161, 1979) two-stage procedure and an out-of-sample test, after controlling for the problem of endogeneity and for the influence of the exchange of listing, respectively.     

Differences between European and American IPO Markets

This brief survey discusses recent developments in the European initial public offering (IPO) market. The spectacular rise and fall of the Euro NM markets and the growth of bookbuilding as a procedure for pricing and allocating IPOs are two important patterns. Gross spreads are lower and less clustered than in the USA. Unlike the USA, some European IPOs, especially those in Germany, have when‐issued trading prior to the final setting of the offer price. Current research includes empirical studies on the valuation of IPOs and both theoretical and empirical work on the determinants of short‐run underpricing.     

Rational IPO Waves

We argue that the number of firms going public changes over time in response to time variation in market conditions. We develop a model of optimal initial public offering (IPO) timing in which IPO waves are caused by declines in expected market return, increases in expected aggregate profitability, or increases in prior uncertainty about the average future profitability of IPOs. We test and find support for the model's empirical predictions. For example, we find that IPO waves tend to be preceded by high market returns and followed by low market returns.     

IPO first-day returns,offer price revisions,volatility, and form S-1 language

Form S-1 is the first SEC filing in the initial public offering (IPO) process. The tone of the S-1, in terms of its definitiveness in characterizing the firm’s business strategy and operations, should affect investors’ ability to value the IPO. We find that IPOs with high levels of uncertain text have higher first-day returns, absolute offer price revisions, and subsequent volatility. Our findings provide empirical evidence for the theoretical models of uncertainty, bookbuilding, and prospect theory.     

The Post-Issue Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings in China's New Stock Markets

In this paper, we investigate the post-issue market performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in China's new stock markets. Our analysis focuses on whether and how institutional features unique to China differentially affect IPO performance. These features include the existence of dual-class shares for the same underlying firms (A-shares issued to domestic investors and B-shares issued to foreign investors) and the unusually long time lag between the offering and listing dates. Our sample consists of 277 A-share and 65 B-share IPOs that were listed on China's new stock markets during the 1992–1995 period. Our study has a number of interesting results. First, A-share IPOs are much more severely underpriced during the initial return period than B-share IPOs. Second, B-share IPOs underperform A-share IPOs (and the market) during the post-issue periods for up to three years. Third, the results of multivariate regression analyses strongly suggest that economic factors determining the post-issue performance of IPOs differ across the A-share and B-share samples.     

REVISITING BOOKBUILDING VERSUS AUCTION IPOS: A PERSPECTIVE OF INFORMATIONALLY EFFICIENT PRICES IN THE AFTERMARKET

We compare price efficiency between auction and bookbuilding initial public offerings (IPOs). Our empirical results fail to support the prevailing conjecture that bookbuilding IPOs are more price efficient than auction IPOs. We find statistical insignificance between two IPO samples or weak evidence for the opposite hypothesis. We add to the evidence that auctions yield aftermarket price efficiency equal to that of bookbuilding or are statistically indifferent when measured by market microstructure and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data. We also examine whether underlying price efficiency forces reflect the relative presence of informed institutional and retail investors, aftermarket price support, and divergence of investor expectations.     

A theory of the transition to secondary market trading of IPOs

We develop a model in which investment banks and institutional investors collaborate in smoothing an initial public offering's (IPOs) transition to secondary market trading. Their intervention promotes welfare under the assumption that significant new information arrives in the market in the immediate aftermath of the IPO. Under this assumption, it is optimal to stage the offering and suboptimal to commit to selling shares at a uniform price. The optimal strategy yields an economic rationale for secondary market price stabilization for IPOs carried out via a well-coordinated network of repeat institutional investors.     

AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNDERWRITER SELECTION PROCESS FOR INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

This study extends previous research that shows prestigious underwriters avoided underwriting smaller, more speculative initial public offerings (IPOs) during a post-SEC period, 1966–77. Estimating a logit model with a sample of 1,192 IPOs from 1977 to 1988, we evaluate the effect of offering characteristics and prevailing market conditions on the probability a prestigious investment banker will underwrite an IPO. Similar to previous studies, we find that prestigious underwriters avoid smaller, riskier issues. However, we also find stock market volatility, interest rate volatility, and the strength and profitability of the recent market for seasoned new issues to be important determinants of a prestigious underwriter's decision to underwrite an IPO.     

A Note on the Intraday Patterns of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Hong Kong

This paper examines the intraday patterns of IPOs in Hong Kong during the period 1995–1998. The results reveal that the well‐known under‐pricing phenomenon of IPOs occurs only at the opening trading of new issues and vanishes afterwards. The return volatility of IPOs is found to be high during the first trading session, and declines rapidly during the rest of the first trading day until the end of the trading day. The intraday return volatility of IPOs is found to follow a double U‐shape pattern, which is similar to that of the general market. A great deal of trading activity was recorded during the first five minutes of the trading day. Consistent results are obtained for IPOs registered during the pre‐crisis and post‐crisis periods. This paper has practical implications for investors. Investors can benefit from the under‐pricing only if they subscribe for new shares in the primary market. There is, however, no profit‐making opportunity for day traders who buy shares on the first trading day. This shows that the Hong Kong market is efficient in adjusting for the IPO under‐pricing. In addition, it is likely that, because of Hong Kong's share allotment method, only big investors who apply for large numbers of shares can benefit from this under‐pricing phenomenon.     

IPOs with and without allocation discretion: Empirical evidence

Bookbuilding, the dominant offering mechanism for IPOs, is controversial because of the power it gives underwriters over IPO allocations. Critics argue that allocations could be abused to generate kickbacks for underwriters while proponents hold that allocation power could improve pre-market price discovery. We examine underpricing, bidding, and allocations from two regimes in the Indian IPO market with varying underwriter allocation power. When underwriters control allocations, bookbuilding is associated with lesser underpricing, but the effect quickly dissipates when regulations withdraw allocation powers. Using proprietary datasets of IPO books in both regimes, we find that allocation powers are used quite extensively. Identical bids can receive significantly different allocations, which depend not only on the bid but also on the bidder identity. When allocation powers are withdrawn, we find evidence of bidder exit, new bidder entry, and altered bidding strategies with exit by both favored and unfavored bidders. Our evidence supports bookbuilding theories in which giving underwriters allocation powers assists in pre-market price discovery.     

Multiple lead underwriting syndicate and IPO pricing

This paper examines the role of multiple lead underwriters (MLUs) in pricing initial public offerings (IPOs) by considering certification and market power hypotheses. Consistent with the notion that MLUs provide certification to the issue, we find that IPOs backed by MLUs price the offer closer to the intrinsic value of the firm than firms backed by single lead underwriters. Our results also indicate that IPOs led by MLUs experience lower initial return, lower variability of initial returns and better long-run performance. The results are robust to self-selection and omitted variable biases. MLU led offerings also exhibit a lower risk of withdrawal and are more likely to conduct a larger secondary equity offering.     

Another Look at Bookbuilding,Auctions, and the Future of the IPO Process

In an earlier series of articles published in this journal, one of the three authors of this article predicted the rise of auction IPOs, possibly to the point of displacing the traditional bookbuilding process for pricing and allocating IPOs, only to find himself forced to explain in later articles the continuing preference of issuers for the conventional IPO process. In a 1999 article, for example, this author cited WR Hambrecht as posing a serious challenge to bookbuilding. And in a 2005 article, shortly after Google used an auction for its IPO, he suggested that the time was ripe for change. In this article the authors revisit the debate, taken up most recently in a 2012 exchange between Congressman Darrell Issa and the SEC. They begin by discussing why bookbuilding persists before focusing on several recent developments that could undermine the case for bookbuilding. The authors point out that bookbuilding rests on banks' discretion in allocating IPO shares and, critically, on both issuers and investors trusting that it will be deployed appropriately. After discussing developments that have undermined trust in the financial markets, the authors suggest that, when combined with recent regulatory changes intended to streamline public offerings by small firms, such changes have created opportunities for auctions to gain traction in the U.S. IPO market.     

Bookbuidling, Auctions, and the Future of the IPO Process

Auction theorists predict that bookbuilding, long the standard process for selling equity IPOs in the U.S., is about to give way to an Internet‐based IPO auction process that is both more efficient and more fair. The promise of auctions is that, by using an electronic platform that gives all investors the opportunity to bid on IPOs, the underpricing of IPOs and commissions to underwriters will be reduced, leading to an increase in net proceeds to issuers. Largely missing from such arguments, however, is an appreciation of why bookbuilding has dominated U.S. practice (and continues to supplant auctions in IPOs in most countries outside the U.S) and the role of undepricing in the IPO process. Rather than canvassing all investors, bookbuilding involves eliciting expressions of interest from institutional investors, and then allocating shares mainly according to the strength of their professed interest. In contrast to auctions, which allocate shares according to a set of explicit rules, bookbuilding involves a set of implicit “rules” that provide considerable room for judgment by the underwriter. This does not mean that the rules are arbitrary or not well understood by participants, particularly after thousands of IPOs conducted over the better part of two centuries. But to manage the exchange of information between issuers and investors, and the potential conflicts of interest in representing both groups, such rules must be administered by an intermediary with a considerable stake in protecting its reputation for fair dealing. Investment banks that deal with both issuers and the investment community on a regular basis are well positioned to perform this function. The underpricing of IPOs is best viewed not as a transfer of wealth from issuers to favored investors but rather as compensation to the large influential investors that play a major role in the price discovery process. By opening the process to all comers, auctions will discourage these large investors from bidding aggressively because less sophisticated investors will be able to “free ride” on their research and due diligence. To the extent this happens, auctions may suc ceed in reducing underpricing (in fact, they may even lead to over pricing), but they will also reduce the net proceeds for issuers. Nevertheless, recent advances in communications technology and auction theory will undoubtedly reshape current securities underwriting practices. In particular, Internet auctions are likely to replace bookbuilding in debt IPOs and less risky equity issues (say, IPOs of LBOs). But the argument that Bookbuilding will be completely cast aside in favor of largely untested alternatives fails to appreciate a successful institutional response to major market imperfections, some of which can never be wholly eliminated. Especially in the case of risky (first‐time) equity IPOs, there will continue to be an important role for managing the information exchange between issuers and investors that is critical to the IPO process.     

IPO underpricing and mutual fund allocation: New evidence from registration system

We study the effect of mutual fund allocation on China's IPO market under the new registration system. The introduction of mutual fund bids significantly increases the IPO offer price, resulting in a low initial short-term return and suppressed IPO underpricing. Those newly listed stocks witness lower volatility in the following weeks due to preferential allocation to the mutual fund at the primary market. Further analysis suggests that large investors' net purchase strengthens IPO after-market return and volatility. Besides, the effect of mutual fund participation on IPOs is stronger in places where the COVID-19 outbreak. This new evidence suggests that mutual fund allocation plays a critical role in IPO price discovery and decreases investor lottery trading.     

An investigation of the short-term performance of the Canadian IPO market.

This article explores the short-term return performance of the Canadian initial public offering (IPO) market. Historically, the Canadian IPO market has shown to be one of the least underpriced markets in the world. This paper uses recent IPOs from 2010 to 2017, and the results confirm that the Canadian IPO market remains one of the least underpriced IPO markets in the world. The mean (median) first-day returns show that Canadian IPOs are marginally underpricing at only 1.45% (0.24%) during the sample period. Additional short-run return measures indicate that Canadian IPOs underperform the market in their 1-month, 6-month, and 12-month holding periods. This research also contributes to the existing IPO literature by showing that restricted voting share offerings tend to be more underpriced and perform poorly over the short-term.     

Underpricing and long-term performance of IPOs in China

We study the underpricing and long-term performance of A- and B-share initial public offerings (IPOs) issued in China during the 1993–1998 period. The average underpricing for A- and B share IPOs are 178% and 11.6%, respectively. The underpricing of A-share IPOs is positively related to the number of days between the offering and the listing and the number of stock investors in the province from which the IPO comes, and negatively related to the number of shares being issued. None of these characteristics explain the underpricing of B-share IPOs. In the long run, A-share IPOs slightly underperform the size- and/or book/market (B/M)-matched portfolios while B-shares outperform the benchmark portfolios.     

Underpricing of homecoming A-share IPOs by Chinese firms already listed abroad

Many Chinese firms have pursued overseas listings in Hong Kong or US without being first listed in China’s domestic market, mainly due to the regulatory constraints imposed by the Chinese government. Some of them eventually returned to mainland China through an A-share offering to Chinese investors. This unique feature of cross-listed Chinese stocks offers an experiment field to test some of the conventional theories of initial public offerings (IPOs) underpricing. Homebound IPOs are expected to be less underpriced than domestic only IPOs that are not cross-listed because being already listed in a developed market can mitigate the information asymmetry and issue uncertainty associated with their A-share IPOs. Nevertheless, we find that homecoming A-share IPOs are still substantially underpriced, with an average market adjusted first-day return of 96.53 %. Furthermore, their first-day returns are not significantly different from those of domestic only IPOs once firm- and offer-characteristics are controlled. This is in sharp contrast to the lukewarm aftermarket performance experienced in their overseas debuts. The mean market adjusted first-day return is merely 5.35 % in their US ADR offerings and 11.63 % in their Hong Kong H-share IPOs. Overall, our results suggest the importance of local market structures and norms as influential factors of IPO underpricing.     

The Really Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings: The Pre-Nasdaq Evidence

Financial economists have intensely debated the performance of IPOs using data after the formation of Nasdaq. This paper sheds light on this controversy by undertaking a large, out‐of‐sample study: We examine the performance for five years after listing of 3,661 U.S. IPOs from 1935 to 1972. The sample displays some underperformance when event‐time buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns are used. The underperformance disappears, however, when cumulative abnormal returns are utilized. A calendar‐time analysis shows that over the entire period, IPOs return as much as the market. The intercepts in CAPM and Fama–French regressions are insignificantly different from zero, suggesting no abnormal performance.