General equilibrium impact of an energy-saving policy in the public sector

We analyse a disregarded environmental policy instrument: a switch in government expenditure away from energy (or other natural resources) and toward a composite good which includes energy-saving expenditure. We first develop two variants of an analytical general equilibrium model. A composite good is produced with constant returns to scale, and energy is imported or produced domestically with diminishing returns, yielding a differential rent to its owners. The government purchases energy and composite goods from private firms. Such a policy unambiguously increases employment. It also raises private consumption and welfare under two conditions: (i) it is not too costly and (ii) the initial share of the resource is smaller in public spending than in private consumption, or the difference is small enough. We then run numerically a model featuring both importation and domestic production of energy (oil, gas and electricity), for the OECD as a whole. Simulations show that employment, welfare and private consumption rise. We provide magnitudes for different parameter values. Earlier versions of this paper have benefited from conference participants at the European Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, International Society for Ecological Economics World Congress, CIRED seminar and EUREQua environmental economics seminar. We especially thank Michèle Sadoun and two anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Redistribution and the marginal cost of public funds

Discussions of the marginal cost of public funds with distortionary taxation are often cast in the framework of a one-consumer economy, while the main justification of distortionary taxes is that they are needed for redistribution. This paper analyzes the issue in a model with heterogeneous consumers and a linear income tax, focusing on the tradeoff between labour market distortions and the redistribution from high-wage to low-wage workers. In an optimal tax system the MCF will be the same for all sources of funds and under certain assumptions less than one. Without optimality the MCF will in general differ between different sources of finance.     

Redistribution policy: A European model

Following the rationale for regional redistribution programs described in the official documents of the European Union, this paper studies a simple multicountry model built around two regions: a core and a periphery. Technological spillovers link firms' productivity within each of the two regions, and each country's territory falls partly in the core and partly in the periphery, but the exact shares vary across countries. In line with the official view of the European Union, we find that the efficient regional allocation requires both national and international transfers. If migration is fully free across all borders, the optimal redistribution policy results from countries' uncoordinated policies. However, if countries have the option of setting even imperfect border barriers, then efficiency is likely to require coordination on both barriers and international transfers (both of which will be set at positive levels). The need for coordination increases as the Union increases in size.     

Agility evaluation in public sector

Agility metrics are difficult to define in general, mainly due to the multidimensionality and vagueness of the concept of agility itself. In this paper, a knowledge-based framework is utilized for the measurement and assessment of public sector＇s agility by A. T. Kearney model. In this research, the authors used Z2 test in SPSS software. So, the authors discovered that the General Office of Standards ＆ Industrial Research of Sistan ＆ Baluchestan Province in Iran is agile. Finally, the authors determine the weakness points of organization by Friedman test.     

公共管理的价值根源

公共管理具有多种价值根源。美国公共管理学会（APSA）认为,有五种主要的价值根源影响着公共政策的制定,它人包括：个人价值、职业价值、组织价值、合法价值和公共利益价值。处理好这些价值之间的矛盾,需要公共管理者进行认真判断和思考。     

Management and employee buy-outs from the Austrian public sector

This paper seeks to extend our understanding of the nature and effects of privatization to the case of Austria, a relatively small economy in which management buy-outs have been a numerically important but neglected part of the privatization programme. The study reviews the development of privatization in Austria and sets management and employee buy-outs within this context. The paper identifies 35 privatization buy-outs, analysing their form and industrial distribution. Evidence from detailed interviews with the 22 largest is used to analyse the effects of buy-out on corporate change, the role of insiders and performance. Comparisons are made with the UK, where management and employee buy-outs have also been an important part of the privatization programme.     

Giving overseas and public policy

Remarkable numbers of people give to overseas development charities. The aim of this paper is to consider how such overseas giving is best modelled and the implications for public policy. Widely used theories of charitable giving, based on warm-glow or the provision of public goods, provide insight but are not fully satisfactory as explanations of giving for the specific purpose of development. Instead, an “identification” approach to individual giving is proposed here that combines the results focus of the public goods formulation with the scale of the warm-glow model. The theoretical model is used to examine the implications for public policy, including the extent to which official aid crowds out private giving and how public policy should take account of private willingness to make charitable transfers overseas.     

Modelling policy options in the Indonesian agricultural sector

This paper persents a simple model framework for quantitative multi-market agricultural sector policy analysis. Although the example refers to the Indonesian case, the model structure is also applicable for other country studies. Since either prices or trade requirements can be set exogenously, the model is particularly useful for policy analysis in countries using trade controls to pursue food self-sufficiency targets. Data requirements are limited to supply-and-demand elasticities, some technical coefficients on the relationship between food and non-food prices, non-price induced trends in single commodity markets and in the non-food sector as an aggregate and a base-year data set. The model was developed to be relatively transparent to policy-makers and to allow for an easy revision of the magnitude of policy parameters or trend estimates if so needed. For the case study, econometric estimates, which are consistent with the requirements of neoclassical theory, have been used to parameterize the model. Model simulations have been run for the price run-up period of 1986 to 1988 and also for the Fifth Plan period 1988 to 1993. The results show that the model is a useful instrument to investigate in multi-market and multi-sector interrelationships of a country focussing on agriculture. For the Indonesian setting moel results suggest that during the Fifth Plan period rice self-sufficiency targets are easily met without the need of a particular investment or subsidy scheme. However, rice self-sufficiency and on-target performance of other important agricultural commodity markets in Indonesia will not come along automatically with the creation of jobs up to an amount needed to fight increasing rural underemployment.     

Microfinance institutions and public policy

Many governments and nongovernmental organizations have adopted policies to promote the growth of microfinance institutions (MFIs). The appropriate level and form of support for MFIs are discussed in this paper on the basis of a review of key MFI characteristics. Governments are also responsible for the regulation of MFIs; here, some principles concerning the extent and coverage of MFI regulation and supervision are developed.     

Warranty markets and public policy

Search equilibrium models in the Economics of Information concern themselves exclusively with consumer ignorance of the prices that different firms charge. Legal regulation dealing with information, on the other hand, concerns itself primarily with contact terms. In particular, firms are often required to warrant against product related defects on the supposed ground that firms respond to consumer ignorance only by degrading contract quality. This paper is the beginning of an attempt to make the Economics of Information useful to policymakers. It models a market for warranties under imperfect information and shows that firms are more likely to respond to consumer ignorance by raising prices for the warranties that consumers prefer rather than deleting warranties from consumer contracts. Hence, policymakers should be concerned more with reducing supracompetitive prices than with “improving” contract quality.     

Economics of externalities and public policy

In this paper we study a particular case of “multiple” externalities associated to the production of a good/activity, whose external effects can change from positive to negative depending on the level of output (intersecting externalities). To analyze their impact on the public policy we propose a very simple two-agent partial equilibrium model in the technological context of externalities. In a static framework, the centralized solution always implies an optimal policy, which may consist of taxation or subsidization depending on the individual optimum and on the technology parameters. In a dynamic model with local knowledge of the efficiency function and instantaneous output adjustments, such an optimal policy can be structurally stable or unstable. In the latter case, under small changes of the parameters the policy may switch from low taxation/subsidization to high taxation/subsidization or vice versa, or even jump discontinuously from taxation to subsidization or vice versa. Furthermore, the decentralized solution based upon “tradable rights” can be economically equivalent to the centralized solution in the form of taxation policy but the two solutions may be not politically equivalent.

Coexistence of nonprofit, for-profit and public sector institutions

If nonprofit organizations are superior institutions in resolving informational asymmetry and resulting contract failure, why do nonprofit (NPs), for-profit (FPs) and government/public institutions (GPs) survive in the same industry? This article explicitly models the nonconvex budget set for the consumer that arises through the juxtaposition of the inefficiencies and contract failures that occur in the three sectors. Because the consumer is willing to trade quality for efficiency and price, varying market shares for NPs, FPs and GPs can exist in the same industry. The theory offered complements the functionalist explanation of the existence of nonprofits advanced by Weisbrod and Hansmann using a micro-analysis.     

Private and public sector regulation of competitively tendered contracts

This paper addresses two contractual issues using a sample of competitively tendered contracts for cleaning services. First, the paper considers the characteristics that distinguish private from public sector organisations in their methods of selection and regulation of contractors. Secondly, the paper examines the perceived effectiveness of such regulatory mechanisms in terms of compliance with contract specifications and overall assessment of quality. Econometric analysis reveals that private sector organisations differ from their public sector counterparts in the selection procedures of contractors. Moreover, significant differences emerge in the apparent efficacy of a range of regulatory instruments in assuring contractual performance.We are grateful to Jörg Finsinger and participants at the Industrial Organization Conference in Vienna (1992) for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Political frictions and public policy outcomes

We study the role of political frictions in public policy outcomes. We propose a simple model of fiscal policy that combines a lack of commitment by the government, political turnover, and another political friction that can be interpreted either as political polarization or as public rent-seeking. We show that political turnover increases public debt levels, while political polarization or public rent-seeking leads to higher public spending. We evaluate the importance of different political frictions for fiscal policy outcomes using a sample of twenty developed countries. We find that the data on political instability combined with the data on public rent-seeking explain 25% of the variation in public debt levels.     

Endogenous public policy and multiple equilibria

One of the well known roles of public policy in models with indeterminacy is to reduce the set of equilibria. However, agents' expectations regarding future policy may be self fulfilling when public policy is endogenized. We show that a simple overlapping generations economy with public education may yield multiple equilibria. Under a laissez-faire system, our model has a unique equilibrium. Thus, the presence of public policy may generate, rather than eliminate, multiple equilibria.     

Misallocations and policy constraints on mergers in the modern manufacturing sector

Resource misallocation has resulted in differences in inter-economy total factor productivity (TFP). However, the factors driving different levels of resource misallocation still need to be investigated. This paper argues that firm exits through mergers can be an important source of change in the level of resource misallocation. Traditional policy regulations for the key manufacturing sectors are based on either the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) or the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), which measure the market concentration. This paper takes a different approach. It first deduces the optimal input allocation by measuring aggregate resource misallocation; this approach allows us to identify productivity-improving merger events and complements the market concentration indexes, which have traditionally been the focus of attention. We then construct a unique dataset in the TFT-LCD industry to analyze the change in productivity resulting from the merger between two major TFT-LCD producers, Chimei and Innolux, in the first quarter of 2010. The proposed and actual team of Chimei and Innolux record a remarkable efficiency jump by achieving optimal input allocation immediately after this merger. We further interpret this scenario as a firm that is smaller and more efficient pre-merger, acquiring a larger weaker producer in a prominent IT manufacturing sector.