Inequalities and fluctuations in a dynamic general equilibrium model

   Summary. In the present paper a tractable two-sector neo-classical growth model with heterogeneous agents is considered. The local dynamic properties of the equilibrium path are analyzed in relation with the underlying characteristics of the economy. In particular, the existence of fluctuations is related to the degree of heterogeneity in labor and in capital endowments. When applied to international trade theory, the analysis shows that free trade may distabilize a world economy that is originally stable under the regime of autarky. Received: December 28, 1998; revised version: October 29, 1999     

A simple dynamic general equilibrium model

We analyse a single sector economy with H > 1 infinitely-lived agents that operate in a continuous-time framework. Utility functions are recursive but not additive. Both efficient and perfect foresight competitive equilibrium allocations are considered. The existence and stability of such allocations are investigated locally, i.e., in a neighbourhood of steady-state allocations. The model is shown to be useful for explaining the distribution of wealth and consumption across agents, and for analysing the way in which wealth redistribution can affect the dynamics of aggregate economic variables.     

Tax incentives for investment: A dynamic general equilibrium perspective

Zusammenfassung In einem einfachen dynamischen Gleichgewichtsmodell mit überlappenden Generationen werden die Wachstumswirkungen von Investitionsförderungsmaßnahmen simuliert. Dabei stellt sich heraus, daß die Wirkung des Steuersatzes von den anderen Bestimmungen der Unternehmenssteuer abhängt. Wenn die Steuer bereits in der Ausgangslage durch großzügige steuerliche Absetzbarkeit der Investitionsausgaben investitionsfördernd ist, dann kann nur eine Erhöhung des Steuersatzes zusätzliche Investitionen induzieren. Der höhere Steuersatz steigert den Wert der Absetzbarkeit von Investitionsausgaben und schafft damit den Investitionsanreiz.Außerdem erweist sich die Erhöhung des Absetzbetrages als eine Investitionsförderungsmaßnahme, die sich selbst finanziert. Dennoch ist die Erhöhung des Absetzbetrages kein free lunch, weil die Reduktion der Anschaffungskosten für neues Kapital aufgrund einer einfachen Arbitrage-Bedingung auch das alte Kapital entwertet. Dieser Kapitalisierungseffekt von Investitionsförderungsmaßnahmen belastet die Kapitaleigner und wirkt daher wie eine versteckte Vermögenssteuer.

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An earlier version of the paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Austrian Economic Association 1988. I am indebted to J. R. Chen and the referees for valuable comments.     

Optimal labor income taxation in a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper presents a new approach to the two-sector optimal taxation problem. We derive the optimal labor income tax rate which depends on factor intensity across sectors. It is the labor intensity that determines the initial wage rate, and therefore the optimal labor tax rate. We show that an increase in the initial relative price of consumption goods decreases the optimal tax rate on labor income in the case that the consumption goods sector is capital-intensive while it increases the optimal tax rate on labor income in the case that the investment goods sector is capital-intensive.     

Potential economic reforms in North Korea: a dynamic general equilibrium model

We use a dynamic general equilibrium model to examine hypothetical market reforms in North Korea. We model partial reform, in which producers choose capital allocations across sectors, with the government still fixing total capital. We also consider two full market reform scenarios. In one, public infrastructure investment remains unchanged, while, in the other, it increases substantially. In all scenarios, we assume a closed economy and a constant military size. Our simulations show little hope for the North Korean economy without boosting infrastructure. Although all of the reforms raise consumption, only significant increases in infrastructure investment bring positive economic growth.     

Destabilization effect of international trade in a perfect foresight dynamic general equilibrium model

In the present paper, we consider a two-country, two-good, two-factor general equilibrium model with CIES nonlinear preferences, asymmetric technologies across countries and decreasing returns to scale. It is shown that aggregate instability and endogenous fluctuations may occur due to international trade. In particular, we prove that the integration into a common market on which countries trade the produced good and the capital input may lead to period-two cycles even when the closed-economy equilibrium is saddle-point stable in both countries.     

Capital taxation in a dynamic general equilibrium setting

The familiar two-factor, two-commodity incidence model is extended to a dynamic setting in which the supply of capital is variable and the government can use money or bonds to balance its budget in addition to neutral lump sum taxation. The dynamic incidence effects of a sectoral tax on capital are qualitatively similar to the static incidence effects when the government balances its budget with neutral taxes, but are qualitatively different when the government uses money or bonds. In this case, while capital bears the burden of the tax in the short run, it is able to shift it in the long run.     

Time-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium model

This paper introduces time-inconsistent preferences in a multicommodity general equilibrium framework with incomplete markets. The standard concept of competitive equilibrium is extended in order to allow for changes in intertemporal preferences. Depending on whether or not agents recognize that their intertemporal preferences change, agents are called sophisticated or naïve. This paper presents competitive equilibrium notions for economies with naïve agents and economies with sophisticated agents and provides assumptions under which both types of equilibria exist. Surprisingly, the set of naïve equilibria in societies populated by time-consistent households is not allocationally equivalent to the set of competitive equilibria. For sophisticated equilibria, the equivalence holds. Time-inconsistency also raises conceptual issues about the appropriate concept of efficiency. Choices have to be made concerning the incorporation of future preferences and the appropriate instruments to create Pareto improvements. For both naïve and sophisticated societies, we present four possible efficiency concepts. Suitable conditions are specified for which both naïve and sophisticated equilibria satisfy appropriate efficiency concepts.     

Endogenous innovation under New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model

This paper constructs an endogenous growth model using the framework of New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. We incorporate the Schumpeterian approach that generates seemingly sticky prices and reinterpret the Calvo mechanism from the perspective of Bertrand competition and successful entrepreneurs. Our results demonstrate that both positive productivity shocks and endogenous innovation have a negative effect on subsequent endogenous innovation. These self-destructive effects of endogenous innovation might account for the IT productivity paradox and productivity slowdown seen in advanced countries. Furthermore, it is shown that there are both neutral and non-neutral properties of monetary policy shocks. They are neutral in terms of the growth effect, but non-neutral in terms of the level effect. In particular, expansionist monetary policies are desirable to facilitate endogenous innovation.     

Foreign direct investment subsidy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms

This study analyzes the macroeconomic impacts of subsidies to attract multinational corporations when firms are determining whether to enter or how to serve foreign markets. We show that a small FDI subsidy scheme induces consumption gains and delivers short‐term welfare improvement for the FDI host country if firms differ in productivity. However, the subsidy generates a new problem and results in the wealth reallocation effect, leading to welfare deterioration for the host country in the long run. Moreover, we find that a subsidy program induces a welfare improvement for the host country if it is offered to all domestic producers instead of foreign producers only in the host country.     

Introduction to dynamic general equilibrium

This introduces the symposium on dynamic general equilibrium.     

International linkage of inflation rates in a dynamic general equilibrium

This paper uses the Neumeyer?CYano??s monetary dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate the inter-connectivity of the world economy through bond holding beyond national borders. The possibility that unexpected inflation in one country transmits to another is demonstrated within a framework in which the nominal exchange rate is flexibly determined so that the purchasing power parity holds. Deflation can also be imported through the same channel. Whether inflation or deflation diffuses internationally depends on the level of fiscal deficit. Although a country may suffer from monetary disturbances from abroad, each country can completely defend itself by implementing appropriate fiscal policies.     

简化一般均衡模型中一般均衡点的确定

经济学教材在讨论一般均衡的时候,往往以两个人、两种生产要素、两种产品这种最简单的社会作为研究对象,它们通常只阐述了一般均衡的存在,但都没有说明这种最简单的社会一般均衡点的确定即以此作为研究对象。     

Non-parametric counterfactual analysis in dynamic general equilibrium

In this paper, we examine non-parametric restrictions on counterfactual analysis in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Under the assumption of time-separable expected utility and complete markets all equilibria in this model are stationary. The Arrow-Debreu prices uniquely reveal the probabilities and discount factor. The equilibrium correspondence, defined as the map from endowments to stationary (probability-free) state prices, is identical to the equilibrium correspondence in a standard Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with additively separable utility. We examine possible restriction on this correspondence and give necessary as well as sufficient conditions on profiles of individual endowments that ensure that associated equilibrium prices cannot be arbitrary. Although restrictions on possible price changes often exist, we show that results from a representative-agent economy usually do not carry over to a setting with heterogeneous agents.     

A dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution abatement under learning by doing

In 2013, Beladi et al. constructed a dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution, and characterized a steady-state equilibrium. In this paper, we extend Beladi et al.’s model to an even more general model in which the pollution abatement costs under learning by doing are taken into account. In our model, the instantaneous abatement costs depend on both the rate of abatement and the experience of using a technology. Our objective is to apply optimal control theory to investigate the dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution abatement, and derive the steady-state equilibrium properties and optimal levels of emission permits and pollution treatment.     

A dynamic general equilibrium model for public R&D investment in Taiwan

In terms of economic development policies, public research and development (R&D) investment may be one of the most critical and useful tools in Taiwan, having frequently played a role in leading related overall investment in Taiwan. Although the impact channels of R&D investment are varied and complex, its benefits in terms of the development of human capital, industrial productivity, and basic research are clear. With the rapid growth of the private sector in the Taiwan economy, it is, however, debatable whether the government should continue to use the public financial budget to invest in R&D. By using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate the impact of public R&D investment on the economy in Taiwan, the empirical evidence of the present paper is that public R&D investment gives rise to different short-term and medium-term impacts on real GDP that are mostly felt in the third or fourth years of their implementation among different industries. These impacts then gradually converge back to equilibrium in the long run. Public R&D investment boosts the technology of high-tech industries and increases exports, but it also crowds out the output of primary industries. Although the public R&D investment has a positive effect on the real wage, its effect on inflation should not be overlooked. Because of the pros and cons surrounding the impact of public R&D investment on industries and the economy, the study provided by the present paper can serve as valuable reference not only to decision-makers in government agencies but also to academic researchers.     

The value of money in a dynamic equilibrium model

Summary. This paper studies the pricing of money in an infinite-horizon economy with heterogeneous agents, incomplete financial markets and arbitrary borrowing restrictions. Purchases of the consumption good are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. Under general conditions I show that the price of money is equal to its fundamental value, where this value is defined over all state-price processes that are compatible with the existence of no-arbitrage opportunities. This equality implies that the cash-in-advance constraint is binding infinitely often for all agents in the economy. The analysis highlights certain differences in the determination of the price of money with respect to models with money in the utility function that bear on the optimal implementation of economic policies.Received: 23 October 2003, Revised: 26 August 2004 JEL Classification Numbers: D52, E44, G12.M.S. Santos: This paper is an outgrowth of an earlier collaboration with Michael Woodford. I have also benefitted from various discussions with Eduardo Gimenez, Alejandro Hernandez, and Miguel Iraola. Some very useful comments by an anonymous referee are greatly appreciated.     

Forecasting South African macroeconomic variables with a Markov-switching small open-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model

This paper seeks to identify evidence of regime-switching behaviour in the monetary policy response function and the variance of the shocks. It makes use of various specifications of a small open-economy Markov-switching dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that is applied to South African data from 1989 to 2014. While the in-sample statistics suggest that some of the regime-switching models may provide superior results, the out-of-sample statistics suggest that the inclusion of various forms of regime-switching does not significantly improve upon the forecasting performance of the model. The results also suggest that the central bank response function has been consistently applied over the sample period.     

A bargaining model in general equilibrium

The goal of the paper is to present a simple model of rational endogenous household formation in a general equilibrium framework in which Pareto optimality at the economy level is not necessarily obtained. The simplest example of household formation is the case in which pairs of individuals engage themselves in a bargaining process on the division of some wealth: if an agreement on the distribution is (not) reached, we can say that the household is (not) formed. The vast majority of existing bargaining models predicts agreements on an efficient outcome. A seminal paper by Crawford (Econometrica 50:607–637, 1982) describes a very simple game with incomplete information in which, even with rational agents, disagreement causes welfare losses. We embed that model in a general equilibrium framework and present some results on equilibria both in the bargaining game and the associated exchange economy. Crawford’s results support Schelling’s intuition on the reasons of disagreement: it may arise if players’ commitments are reversible. Crawford shows that high probabilities of reversibility tend to favor the bargaining impasse, in fact with low probability. We prove that even if those probabilities are arbitrarily close to zero, disagreement is an equilibrium outcome, with high probability. That conclusion seems to be an even stronger support to Schelling’s original viewpoint. In the exchange economy model with that noncooperative bargaining game as a first stage, we present significant examples of economies for which equilibria exist. Because of disagreement, Pareto suboptimal exchange economy equilibria exist for all elements in the utility function and endowment spaces and they may coexist with Pareto optimal equilibria even at the same competitive prices.