Variable Labor Supply,Terms of Trade Shocks,and Domestic Prices: A Note

This paper develops a two-good, small-country, general-equilibrium trade model with endogenous labor supply, where trade is restricted by a tariff or an import quota. Within this framework, it is shown that, contrary to Anam (1989), under an import quota domestic and world prices may vary in the same direction. This is due to the possibly positive employment effects of terms of trade shocks. In such a case, compared to fixed labor supply, variable labor supply is likely to make the domestic prices less sensitive to foreign price volatility. Received June 13, 2001; revised version received November 14, 2001     

Consumption choice and asset pricing with a non-price-taking agent

Summary. This paper develops a pure-exchange model to study the consumption-portfolio problem of an agent who acts as a non-price-taker, and to analyze the implications of his behavior on equilibrium security prices. The non-price-taker is modeled as a price leader in all markets; his price impact is then recast as a dependence of the Arrow-Debreu prices on his consumption, allowing a tractable formulation. Besides the aggregate consumption, the endowment of the non-price-taker appears as an additional factor in driving equilibrium allocations and prices. Comparisons of equilibria between a price-taking and a non-price-taking economy are carried out. Received: March 29, 1996; revised version October 29, 1996     

Multiple unit auctions with strategic price-quantity decisions

Summary. I study a multiple unit auction where symmetric risk-neutral bidders choose prices and quantities endogenously. In the model, bidders (a) may place non-linear valuations on the auctioned units, and (b) bid for several units at the same price (“lumpy” bids). I characterize quantity-symmetric and strictly monotone-increasing price equilibria for discriminatory and competitive auctions, and show that (i) if quantity strategy profiles are equal across auctions revenue- equivalence holds, (ii) expected revenue is higher if bidders bid for the entire supply rather than for shares of it, and (iii) equilibrium allocations may fail to be Pareto-optimal. Received: April 14, 1995; revised version: September 3, 1997     

The optimality of nominal contracts

Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive cash balances. Received: March 29, 1996; revised version: February 25, 1997     

Equilibrium interest rate and liquidity premium with transaction costs

Summary. In this article we study the effects of transaction costs on asset prices. We assume an overlapping generations economy with two riskless assets. The first asset is liquid while the second asset carries proportional transaction costs. We show that agents buy the liquid asset for short-term investment and the illiquid asset for long-term investment. When transaction costs increase, the price of the liquid asset increases. The price of the illiquid asset decreases if the asset is in small supply, but may increase if the supply is large. These results have implications for the effects of transaction taxes and commission deregulation. Received: December 5, 1997; revised version: March 19, 1998     

Product Variety and Real Exchange Rates: The Balassa-Samuelson Model Reconsidered

This paper introduces product variety into the Balassa-Samuelson model in order to extend the model of real exchange rate determination. With product differentiation, real exchange rates depend not only on the relative price of nontradables to tradables but also on relative prices among tradables. This paper identifies a new factor that determines the extent of variety, termed Infrastructural Technology, and that affects real exchange rates not through the relative price of nontradables but through relative prices among tradables. This paper also conducts empirical tests, and the results of these tests support the model. Received May 31, 2001; revised version received March 20, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003     

Bertrand versus Cournot revisited

Summary. Bertrand criticized Cournot's analysis of the competitive process, arguing that firms should be seen as playing a strategy of setting price below competitors' prices (henceforth, the Bertrand strategy) instead of a strategy of accepting the price needed to sell an optimal quantity (the Cournot strategy). We characterize Nash equilibria in a generalized model in which firms choose among Cournot and Bertrand strategies. Best responses always exist in this model. For the duopoly case, we show that iterated best responses converge under mild assumptions on initial states either to Cournot equilibrium or to an equilibrium in which only one firm plays the Bertrand strategy with price equal to marginal cost and that firm has zero sales. Received: December 11, 1995; revised version October 2, 1996     

Rationing rule, imperfect information and equilibrium

Summary. The impact of imperfect information on the price setting behaviour of firms is analysed. Specifically, consumers support an information cost to become informed about prices. Firms are endowed with U-shaped average cost curves. If a firm does not supply more than its competitive supply as determined by its marginal cost schedule, then we show that the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is conditional on the rationing rule employed. If uninformed consumers are served first then the monopoly price is the sole equilibrium whenever consumers' information costs are high enough. Otherwise, a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist contrary to the results of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) or Braverman (1980) who implicitly suppose that firms supply all the demand at a given price. Received: May 17, 1999; revised version: September 15, 2000     

Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: Reexamining the implications of rational expectations

Summary. We examine price formation in a simple static model with asymmetric information, an infinite number of risk neutral traders and no noise traders. Here we re-examine four results associated with rational expectations models relating to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium prices, the advantage of becoming informed, the costly acquisition of information, and the impossibility of having equilibrium prices with higher volatility than the underlying fundamentals. Received: August 27, 1997; revised version: February 11, 1998     

Accommodation,supply shocks,and sluggish real wages

This paper analyzes the policy dilemmas posed by supply shocks in a rational expectations model featuring sluggish real wages. A discrete time version of the model is used to calculate the variances for prices, wages, and output for alternative policy rules and speeds of adjustment for real wages. The conventional tradeoffs between output and price variability in the model do not always exist.     

The three regimes of the IS-LM model: A non-Walrasian analysis

Three different versions of the IS-LM model are generally found in the literature: A first version assumes both price and wage rigid, and excess supply on the two markets. A second version assumes a rigid wage, but a flexible price clearing the goods market. Finally, a third version assumes that both markets are cleared. We develop in this paper a synthetic model which displays the three above cases as particular regimes of the same model, by formalizing the implicit assumption of Keynesian models that the price and wage levels are rigid downwards, but flexible upwards. The resulting non-Walrasian equilibria can be of three types, which correspond to the three versions of the IS-LM model described above. In each case we show how production and employment are determined, and compute the multipliers for fiscal and monetary policy. Finally, the parameter space is partitioned into three subregions corresponding to each regime.     

Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices

Summary. Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria for the uniform price auction. Received: July 31, 1995; revised version: May 28, 1997     

Learning and Equilibrium Selection in a Monetary Overlapping Generations Model with Sticky Prices

We study adaptive learning in a monetary overlapping generations model with sticky prices and monopolistic competition for the case where learning agents observe current endogenous variables. Observability of current variables is essential for informational consistency of the learning setup with the model setup but generates multiple temporary equilibria when prices are flexible and prevents a straightforward construction of the learning dynamics. Sticky prices overcome this problem by avoiding simultaneity between prices and price expectations. Adaptive learning then robustly selects the determinate (monetary) steady state independent from the degree of imperfect competition. The indeterminate (non-monetary) steady state and non-stationary equilibria are never stable. Stability in a deterministic version of the model may differ because perfect foresight equilibria can be the limit of restricted perceptions equilibria of the stochastic economy with vanishing noise and thereby inherit different stability properties. This discontinuity at the zero variance of shocks suggests one should analyse learning in stochastic models.     

Strategic pricing of equity issues

Summary. Consider a general equilibrium model where agents may behave strategically. Specifically, suppose some firm issues new shares. If the primary market price is controlled by the issuing institution and investors' expectations on future equity prices are constant in their share purchases, the share price on the primary market cannot exceed the secondary market share price. In certain cases this may imply strict underpricing of newly issued shares. If investors perceive an influence on future share prices overpriced issues may occur in equilibrium. This provides an example of strategic price manipulation in general equilibrium models with sequential markets. Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: May 15, 2001     

Bertrand vs. Cournot equilibrium with risk averse firms and cost uncertainty

Summary. In an oligopoly game with cost uncertainty and risk averse firms, we show that Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium have different convergence properties when the market is replicated. The Cournot equilibrium price converges to the competitive price. Under very typical and somewhat general conditions, the highest Bertrand equilibrium price converges to one higher than the competitive equilibrium. We also give examples to show how to compute the limit of the highest Bertrand equilibrium prices and illustrate the ideas of the proof. We explore conditions under which the supply curve is upward sloping, a useful condition for our results. Received: April 20, 2000; revised version: May 10, 2001     

A graphical exposition of a more complete Keynesian system

This paper uses an expanded version of the widely cited Smith model to show the classical natural rate of interest and employment results as a special case of a more general Keynesian model. The model's equilibrium level of employment and real interest rate depend on the inflation rate. The classical results apply to changes in the price level while the Keynesian results apply to changes in the inflation rate. The model assumes inflation is anticipated in equilibrium. Violation of the classical results does not depend on market imperfections such as sticky prices or information costs.     

House price dynamics: Evidence from Beijing

To study the house price dynamics in China, this paper extends the traditional life-cycle model by incorporating land supply, regime shifts and government regulation factors. The models are estimated with an error correction framework using quarterly data from 2000 to 2007 in Beijing. The conclusions are as follows. (1) There exits a stable co-integration relationship between house price and fundamentals; land supply and financial regimes are also important determinants of long-run equilibrium house prices. (2) Short-run dynamics depend on changes of fundamentals and the adjustment process of housing market. Land supply has a significant impact on house price fluctuations while demand factors such as user costs, income and residential mortgage loan have greater influences. The adjustment speed of real house prices to the long-run equilibrium has been reduced significantly since 2005 which means exogenous shocks can cause prolonged deviation of real house prices from the equilibrium level.     

How Long is a Piece of Cable? Equilibrium Determination of Local Telephone Areas

This paper studies the endogenous determination of telephone local calling areas. In many telephone systems, calls between users in the same calling area are local; calls to outside the calling area are long distance and priced differently. We allow the extension of this area to be treated as a strategic variable. We show the extension of the calling areas which maximizes the carrier's profit to be the same which a welfare maximizing regulator would choose. Under a price cap regime in which prices are required to meet an average price constraint, the firm manipulates strategically the extension of the local calling areas. We end the paper by considering the case of a competitive market. In this case, again, the owner of the local loop extends the local calling areas in response to decreased efficiency or increased competition of its competitors. Received April 25, 2002; revised version received September 9, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003     

Heterogeneous beliefs, price dispersion, and welfare-improving price controls

Summary. We consider a search market model where agents have heterogeneous beliefs about the distribution of prices. A suggestive example shows that Jevon's Law of One Price and standard welfare results are not robust to small heterogeneous errors in beliefs. In particular we show that a price ceiling above marginal cost can reduce price dispersion and improve welfare (by lowering aggregate search costs) without decreasing quantity supplied. These results are broadly consistent with the empirical evidence. Received: July 27, 1999; revised version: May 24, 2000     

Some Evidence on the Adjustment of Producer Prices*

We document producer price adjustment using a low‐inflation micro price dataset. On average 24% of prices adjust each month, with an average increase/decrease of 6%. Producer prices adjust more frequently than consumer prices, but their size of adjustment is typically smaller. Sectoral heterogeneity in the frequency of price adjustment is strongly related to heterogeneity in the cost structure. Fluctuations in aggregate producer price inflation occur to a large extent through variation in the relative share of upward and downward price adjustment.