Patent office in innovation policy: Nobody's perfect

The number of patent applications and “bad” patents issued has been rising rapidly in recent years. Based on this trend, we study the overload problem within the Patent Office and its consequences on the firms' R&D incentives. We assume that the examination process of patent applications is imperfect, and that its quality is poorer under congestion. Depending on policy instruments such as submission fees and the toughness of the non-obviousness requirement, the system may result in a high-R&D equilibrium, in which firms self-select in their patent applications, or in an equilibrium with low R&D, opportunistic patent applications and the issuance of bad patents. Multiple equilibria often co-exist, which deeply undermines the effectiveness of policy instruments. We investigate the robustness of our conclusions as to how the value of patent protection is formalized, taking into consideration the introduction of a penalty system for rejected patent applications, as well as the role of commitment to a given patent protection policy.     

To join or not to join: Examining patent pool participation and rent sharing rules

In recognition that participation in modern patent pools is voluntary, we present empirical evidence on participation rates and the factors that drive the decision to join a pool, including the profit sharing rules adopted by the pool's founders. In most participation contexts, the at-risk group is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify. For pools centered on technologies that result from a standard-setting process, in contrast, we are able to identify a relatively unambiguous population of patents eligible for inclusion but that have not been included in the pool. We find that vertically integrated firms, with patents and downstream operations, are more likely to join a patent pool and among those firms that do join, those with relatively symmetric patent contributions (in terms of value) to a standard appear more likely to accept numeric patent share rules for dividing royalty earnings.     

Dynamic competition in technological investments: An empirical examination of the LCD panel industry

When are technological laggards more likely to try to catch up with leaders? We offer empirical evidence on firm-level data of plant investments in the TFT-LCD panel industry, where technological competition has been intense and dynamic. We find that the followers' level of technology has a non-monotonic effect on technology-improving investments, with intermediate followers the most apt to invest in catch-ups. This result is a puzzle given the existing theory on technology race. We also find that followers' catch-up investments increase with the capacity of the leader that employs the state-of-the-art technology. These results are robust to variations in specification and alternative accounts of effects. We discuss our findings and contributions in light of the technology race literature.     

Is there a U-shaped relation between competition and investment?

We consider a two-stage game with cost-reducing investments followed by a linear differentiated Cournot duopoly. With competition inversely parameterized by the extent of product differentiation, investment in the subgame perfect equilibrium is typically minimal for intermediate levels of competition. Laboratory experiments partly confirm the U-shape in a reduced one-stage version of the game. In the two-stage version, there is no evidence for positive effects of moving from intermediate to intense competition.     

Strengthening intellectual property rights: Experience from the 1986 Taiwanese patent reforms

Do stronger intellectual property rights spur inventive activity and foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries? What are the characteristics of industries where strengthening patent rights has the most favorable impact? In an attempt to answer these questions, this paper uses the 1986 Taiwanese patent reforms to examine the effects of strengthening patent rights in a developing economy. I find that the reforms encouraged R&D effort across industries. In addition, industries that were highly R&D intensive witnessed a marked increase in their patenting in the United States. The reforms also induced additional FDI.     

Timing of technology adoption and product market competition

This paper examines how product market competition affects firms' timing of adopting a new technology, as well as whether the market provides sufficient adoption incentives. It demonstrates that adoption dates differ, not only among symmetric firms, but also among markets with different market features. More specifically, technology adoption can occur earlier in a market with Cournot competition than in a market with Bertrand competition. It can also occur earlier in a market in which goods are not too close substitutes. Therefore, this paper shows that competition toughness does not always reinforce adoption incentives. When goods are sufficiently differentiated, adoption occurs later than is socially optimal.     

Unionization structure, licensing and innovation

We show the effects of the unionization structure (viz., decentralized and centralized unions) on a firm's incentive for technology licensing and innovation. The incentive for technology licensing is stronger under decentralized unions. We identify circumstances under which the benefit from licensing creates a stronger incentive for innovation under decentralized unions. If the union's preference for employment is high, the benefit from licensing may create higher incentive for innovation under decentralized unions. However, if the union's preference for wage is high enough, the incentive for innovation is higher under a centralized union irrespective of licensing ex-post innovation. If the centralized union decides whether or not to supply workers to all firms, the possibility of higher innovation under decentralized unions increases. We further show that perfectly substitutable workers can be better off under decentralized unions if the labor productivity depends on the unionization structure, which occurs in our analysis when, e.g., licensing after innovation occurs only under decentralized unions or innovation (with no licensing) occurs only under a centralized union.     

Linking smallholder farmers to markets on extensive and intensive margins: Evidence from Nicaragua☆

Access to modern commercialization channels is key for smallholder farmers to move away from subsistence farming and overcome poverty. However, achieving that goal is challenging for smallholders given their lack of appropriate managerial practices, production technology and infrastructure. This paper examines the association between receiving trainings in two distinct entrepreneurial practices, one direct at the individual and farmer-association level and another indirect at the community level, and commercialization in non-local markets at the extensive and intensive margins. We exploit a panel dataset of bean producers in Nicaragua that participated in an NGO program implemented between 2007 and 2012. We find opposite results for the two market-linkage activities, especially on the intensive margin or volume of sales. While reciving direct training on entrepreneurial practices (EP) is positively associated with commercialization, training on municipality engagement (ME) activities is negatively associated. These correlation patterns are mainly observed among entrant farmers as opposed to those already participating in commercial markets prior to the program implementation. We also find varying results for ME activities by plot size and leadership position. Additional estimations show that training activities that are positively correlated with bean commercialization are not necessarily correlated with the commercialization of other crops, and vice versa.     

Auctions with toeholds: An experimental study of company takeovers

We run experiments on English Auctions where the bidders already own a part (toehold) of the good for sale. The theory predicts a very strong (“explosive”) effect of even small toeholds. While asymmetric toeholds do have an effect on bids and revenues in the lab, which gets stronger the larger the asymmetry, it is not nearly as strong as predicted. We explain this by analyzing the flatness of the payoff functions, which leads to large deviations from the equilibrium strategies being relatively costless. This is a general fundamental weakness of this type of explosive equilibria, which makes them fail when human players are involved. Our analysis shows that a levels of reasoning model explains the results better where this equilibrium fails. Moreover, we find that although big toeholds can be effective in a takeover battle, the cost to acquire them might be higher than the strategic benefit they bring.     

Total factor productivity enablers in the ICT industry: A cross-country firm-level analysis

Advancements in productivity in the digital economy constitute an important engine for economic growth. What drives productivity dynamics in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector? This study examines the productivity dynamics of ICT firms across countries from the perspective of corporate balance sheets. We study the effects of intangible assets and leverage on productivity growth using firm-level panel data from five industrialized countries. We find that intangible assets positively affect the total factor productivity in the ICT sector. The positive effect of intangible assets on total factor productivity growth is larger for ICT manufacturing firms than for ICT service firms. We also find that leverage has a positive relationship with total factor productivity development in the ICT sector. In addition, our empirical results substantiated that productivity is catching up to the technological frontier. Furthermore, larger firms and/or younger firms generally show higher total factor productivity growth than their peers. Economies of scale are more prominent in the ICT service sector than in the ICT manufacturing sector. Our findings contribute to the understanding of cross-country productivity dynamics in the ICT sector at the firm level in the digital economy.     

The independent and joint effects of the skill and physical bases of relatedness in diversification

By examining the independent and joint effects of the skill and physical bases of relatedness, this study develops a multidimensional view of relatedness in diversification. The paper compares the ways the two bases identify relatedness, and examines empirically the relationship between relatedness and performance for a sample of 158 large diversified manufacturing firms. Each base of relatedness alone had no significant effect on financial performance. However, when the two approaches were combined, there was a strong positive effect on most indicators of performance. The findings demonstrate how different bases of relatedness complement and extend one another, and they clarify findings of previous studies that used a single base of relatedness. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Get Ready for Innovation by Invasion

From many years of field research in West Germany and the United States, and especially from a recent study of relatively mature firms in Ohio, Gerhard Mensch has become aware of the disruption caused by the invasion of industries by new technologies from the outside. He sees the frequency of these invasions increasing in coming years for reasons that go beyond technological matters to the pressures for change coming from the capital markets. In this Perspective , he suggests the invasions can be countered and the capital markets satisfied by giving a more prominent role to the innovation manager in the strategy development process.