What Have We Learned about the Employment Effects of Severance Pay? Further Iterations of Lazear Et al.

In this study we examine the effect of severance pay on employment and unemployment, using data on industrialized OECD countries. Our starting point is Lazear’s [(1990) Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 699–726] dictum that severance payment requirements unfavorably impact the labor market. We extend his sample period and add to his parsimonious specification a variety of fixed and time-varying labor market institutions. While the positive effect of severance pay on unemployment garners some support, there is no real indication of adverse effects in respect of the other employment outcomes identified here, namely, the employment-population ratio, the labor force participation rate, and long-term unemployment. Moreover, with the possible exception of collective bargaining coordination, the role of institutions is also more muted than suggested in the literature. We thank, without implicating, an anonymous referee for most helpful comments on the first draft of this paper.     

Dissertation abstract: Contribution to a public good - Theoretical analysis and experimental evidence

The work undertook is located between Public Economic Theory and Experimental Economics. The object of the thesis consists in analysing the aggregate behavior and the individual heterogeneity in a voluntary contribution game. The thesis defended here is that overcontribution in comparison to the Nash equilibrium of the game, can not be explained neither by judgement errors, nor by the information on the individual behaviour of the members in a one given group. The level of contribution observed remains nevertheless inferior to the one simulated using the E.W.A. learning model. The dissertation is composed of three parts and six chapters. The first chapter expresses the various theoretical mechanisms of production of a public good, while the second one presents an overview of the experimental literature using voluntary contribution mechanisms. The second part carries on the introduction of an interior solution in a public good game in order to distinguish an explanation of overcontribution in terms of mistakes or strategies. While chapter three presents the most important works in literature that use an interior solution, the fourth chapter constitutes a personal contribution consisting in an experiment with an interior optimum. Our main result is that individuals contribute a constant part of their social optimum and that overcontribution is not explained by error. We test then the simple learning model R.L. using the observed data on the aggregate level. This model predicts well the observed behaviour. The third part is composed of two experiments where the environment of players is modified. We introduce in chapter five promises as cheap talk and find that they increase contributions at the aggregate level. In chapter six, various conditions of information on individual contributions are tested. The parameter tested is the level of information on “neighbours” contributions given to players. One of the treatments presents full information about individual contributions of the members of the group, while this information is incomplete in the other treatments. Our results show that information has no effect on the level of contribution. We simulate then the EWA learning model both at the aggregate and the individual levels and compare the simulated data to the experimental one. These simulations predict a level of contribution that is higher that the one observed in the experiment. JEL Classification C91, C92, H41 Dissertation Committee: Alan Kirman (Ph.D. Advisor), Université d’Aix-Marseille III Marie-Claire Villeval (Chair), GATE, Lyon, France Jordi Brandts, Universitat Autonoma Barcelona, Spain Charles Noussair, Emory University, Alanta, GA, U.S.A. Sylvie Thoron, GREQAM & Université du Var, France Marc Willinger, Université de Montpellier I, France     

Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with semipublic firms

An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed market where a firm jointly owned by the public sector and private domestic shareholders (a semipublic firm) competes with n private firms. We show that there is an equilibrium in which firms take production decisions simultaneously. This result is strikingly different from that obtained by Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998), who shows that when a public firm competes with n private firms all firms producing simultaneously in the same period cannot be sustained as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium outcome. Our result differs from that of Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) for two reasons: firstly, we consider that there is a semipublic firm rather than a public firm. Secondly, Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) considers that the public firm is less efficient than private firms while in our paper all firms are equally efficient.     

Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”

Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent. Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments. First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on corruption. Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’ practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians. Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability, strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions. We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions. Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable. JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91     

Dissertation abstract: Voting in the laboratory

Almost every week national elections are held somewhere in the world. Many more elections take place at federal and local levels of government. Surely, these are important events to many of us. This thesis aims at providing a better understanding of why and how people vote in elections. Three original modifications of Palfrey and Rosenthal’s (1983) participation game are used to study voter turnout theoretically and experimentally.¹ In the basic game, each voter supports (i.e., prefers) one of two exogenous candidates and privately decides between voting at a cost and abstaining (without costs). The candidate who receives more votes wins the election (ties are broken randomly) and each supporter of this candidate receives an equal reward, independent of whether or not she voted. The first study (published in the American Political Science Review 100, pp. 235–248) analyzes the effects of social embeddedness on turnout, assuming that voters may be influenced by observing the decisions of other voters around them (e.g., a family or working place). Our experimental results show that the social context matters: this information increases turnout by more than 50%. The increase is greater when neighbors support the same candidate rather than when they support opponents. The second study investigates the effects of public opinion polls on voter turnout and welfare. Poll releases resolve uncertainty about the level of support for each candidate caused by `floating’ voters, whose preferences change across elections. This information increases turnout in the laboratory by 28–34%, depending on the fraction of floating voters in the electorate. If polls indicate equal levels of support for both candidates—in which case aggregate benefits for society are not affected by the outcome—welfare decreases substantially due to costs from excessive turnout. In the final study, elections are preceded by the competition between two candidates: they simultaneously announce binding policy offers in which some voters can be favored at the expense of others through inclusion and exclusion in budget expenditure (Myerson 1993).² We observe that policy offers include 33% more voters—yielding a smaller budget share for each—when voting is compulsory rather than voluntary. Moreover, we find evidence of political bonds between voters and long-lived parties. Overall, in all three experiments many subjects strongly react to economic incentives (i.e., benefits, costs, and informational clues), often in line with what is observed outside of the laboratory. JEL Classification C72, C92, D72 Dissertation Committee: Arthur Schram, University of Amsterdam (advisor) Axel Ockenfels, University of Cologne Thomas Palfrey, California Institute of Technology Cees van der Eijk, University of Nottingham Frans van Winden, University of Amsterdam ¹Palfrey, T.R., & Rosenthal, H. (1983). A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice, 41, 7–53. ²Myerson, R.B. (1993). Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems. American Political Science Review, 87, 856–869.     

Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach

In most experimental studies of tax evasion, participants are instructed that they may report any amount of income from zero up to the amount they actually earned or received. This amounts to an invitation to gamble. In contrast, real-world tax authorities unambiguously demand compliance. We develop two new settings for conducting tax experiments. Both involve an explicit demand for compliance. Thus, we can determine whether knowing that the experimental authority would regard evasion as wrongful disobedience will influence compliance decisions. We demonstrate that simply telling people that they are required to pay a “participation fee” analogous to a tax produces remarkably high compliance rates and less sensitivity to changes in economic variables than in the earlier experimental literature using invitation-to-gamble language. This suggests that many people pay taxes despite the financial attraction of non-compliance because they are strongly inclined towards obeying authority. Furthermore, we show that giving participants a week to make their reporting decisions at home without an authority figure physically present overcomes the inclination to obey for some people, significantly lowering compliance rates. However, the majority still complies, even after the audit rate falls from 25% to 1%, which would make non-compliance extremely attractive if it were viewed only as a simple matter of risk and expected return. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, H26     

Optimal pricing and capacity choice for a public service under risk of interruption

We develop rules for pricing and capacity choice for an interruptible service that recognize the interdependence between consumers’ perceptions of system reliability and their market behavior. Consumers post ex ante demands, based on their expectations on aggregate demand. Posted demands are met if ex post supply capacity is sufficient. However, if supply is inadequate all ex ante demands are proportionally interrupted. Consumers’ expectations of aggregate demand are assumed to be rational. Under reasonable values for the consumer’s degrees of relative risk aversion and prudence, demand is decreasing in supply reliability. We derive operational expressions for the optimal pricing rule and the capacity expansion rule. We show that the optimal price under uncertainty consists of the optimal price under certainty plus a markup that positively depends on the degrees of relative risk aversion, relative prudence and system reliability. We also show that any reliability enhancing investment—though lowering the operating surplus of the public utility—is socially desirable as long as it covers the cost of investment.     

A within-trial cost-effectiveness analysis of panitumumab compared with bevacizumab in the first-line treatment of patients with wild-type RAS metastatic colorectal cancer in the US

Abstract

Aims: This analysis investigated the cost-effectiveness of panitumumab plus mFOLFOX6 (oxaliplatin, 5-fluorouracil, and leucovorin) compared with bevacizumab plus mFOLFOX6 in the first-line treatment of patients with wild-type RAS metastatic colorectal cancer (mCRC).

Materials and methods: The cost-effectiveness analysis was developed from a third-party payer perspective in the US and was implemented using a partitioned survival model with health states for first-line treatment (progression-free), disease progression with and without subsequent active treatment, and death. Survival analyses of patients with wild-type RAS mCRC from the PEAK head-to-head clinical trial of panitumumab vs bevacizumab were performed to estimate time in the model health states. Additional data from PEAK informed the amount of each drug consumed, duration of therapy, subsequent therapy use, and toxicities related to mCRC treatment. Literature and US public data sources were used to estimate unit costs associated with treatment and duration of subsequent active therapies. Utility weights were calculated from patient-level data from panitumumab trials in the first-, second-, and third-line settings. A life-time perspective was taken with future costs and outcomes discounted at 3% per annum. Scenario, one-way, and probabilistic sensitivity analyses were performed.

Results: Compared with bevacizumab, the use of panitumumab resulted in an incremental cost of US $60,286, and an incremental quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) of 0.445, translating into a cost per QALY gained of US $135,391 in favor of panitumumab. Results were sensitive to wastage and dose rounding assumptions modeled.

Limitations: Progression-free and overall survival were extrapolated beyond the follow-up of the primary analysis using fitted parametric curves. Costs and quality of life were estimated from multiple and different data sources.

Conclusions: The efficacy of panitumumab in extending progression-free and overall survival and improving quality of life makes it a cost-effective option for first-line treatment of patients with wild-type RAS mCRC compared with bevacizumab.     

Enumeration of Nash equilibria for two-player games

This paper describes algorithms for finding all Nash equilibria of a two-player game in strategic form. We present two algorithms that extend earlier work. Our presentation is self-contained, and explains the two methods in a unified framework using faces of best-response polyhedra. The first method lrsnash is based on the known vertex enumeration program lrs, for “lexicographic reverse search”. It enumerates the vertices of only one best-response polytope, and the vertices of the complementary faces that correspond to these vertices (if they are not empty) in the other polytope. The second method is a modification of the known EEE algorithm, for “enumeration of extreme equilibria”. We also describe a second, as yet not implemented, variant that is space efficient. We discuss details of implementations of lrsnash and EEE, and report on computational experiments that compare the two algorithms, which show that both have their strengths and weaknesses.     

Cost effectiveness of transcatheter aortic valve replacement compared to medical management in inoperable patients with severe aortic stenosis: Canadian analysis based on the PARTNER Trial Cohort B findings

Abstract

Objective:

The only effective treatment for severe aortic stenosis (AS) is valve replacement. However, many patients with co-existing conditions are ineligible for surgical valve replacement, historically leaving medical management (MM) as the only option which has a poor prognosis. Transcatheter Aortic Valve Replacement (TAVR) is a less invasive replacement method. The objective was to estimate cost-effectiveness of TAVR via transfemoral access vs MM in surgically inoperable patients with severe AS from the Canadian public healthcare system perspective.

Methods:

A cost-effectiveness analysis of TAVR vs MM was conducted using a deterministic decision analytic model over a 3-year time horizon. The PARTNER randomized controlled trial results were used to estimate survival, utilities, and some resource utilization. Costs included the valve replacement procedure, complications, hospitalization, outpatient visits/tests, and home/nursing care. Resources were valued (2009 Canadian dollars) using costs from the Ontario Case Costing Initiative (OCCI), Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care and Ontario Drug Benefits Formulary, or were estimated using relative costs from a French economic evaluation or clinical experts. Costs and outcomes were discounted 5% annually. The effect of uncertainty in model parameters was explored in deterministic and probabilistic sensitivity analysis.

Results:

The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) was $32,170 per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) gained for TAVR vs MM. When the time horizon was shortened to 24 and 12 months, the ICER increased to $52,848 and $157,429, respectively. All other sensitivity analysis returned an ICER of less than $50,000/QALY gained.

Limitations:

A limitation was lack of availability of Canadian-specific resource and cost data for all resources, leaving one to rely on clinical experts and data from France to inform certain parameters.

Conclusions:

Based on the results of this analysis, it can be concluded that TAVR is cost-effective compared to MM for the treatment of severe AS in surgically inoperable patients.     

Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381]

Ma (in Econ. Theory 8, 377–381, 1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (Econometrica 58, 1475–1480, 1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented – and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 – is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as “symmetric.” We thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. B. Klaus’s and F. Klijn’s research was supported by Ramón y Cajal contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The work of the authors was also partially supported through the Spanish Plan Nacional I+D+I (BEC2002-02130 and SEJ2005-01690) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR2005-00626 and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA).     

The value and consequences of using public health technology assessments for private payer decision-making in Canada: one size does not fit all

Background: Both public and private insurers provide drug coverage in Canada. All payers are under pressure to contain costs. It has recently been proposed that private plans leverage the public health technology assessment (HTA) evaluation process in their decision-making.

Objectives: The objectives of the current study were to examine use of public health technology assessments (HTAs) for private payer decision-making in the literature, to gather the perspectives of experts from both public and private insurers on this practice, and to summarize which value parameters of public evaluations can be used for private payer decision-making.

Methods: A targeted literature review was conducted to identify publications on the use of public HTA or cost-effectiveness data for private payer decision-making on pharmaceutical reimbursement. Concurrently, a roundtable meeting was organized with invited panelists, including private payer representatives and health economic consultants (total n?=?9). The findings from both were synthesized and expressed in qualitative terms using the PICO framework.

Results: The targeted review identified 20 studies meeting the inclusion criteria, primarily originating from the US and Canada. The panelists felt that, despite some similarities, there were substantial differences between both systems. The PICO framework highlighted the issues with transferability between the two systems. Most of the value parameters were either not applicable, needed to be added, needed to be adjusted, or their applicability to private payer systems needed to be confirmed.

Conclusion: Some components of public HTA may be relevant for private payers, however there are reservations that still exist on whether the HTA process in Canada, designed for a public system, can address the informational needs of private payers. Private insurers need to use caution in assessing which value parameters from public HTAs can be used and which need to be confirmed, ignored, enhanced, or adjusted. One size HTA does not fit all applications.     

Dissertation abstract: The effect of involvement, time, and vividness on consumers’ value judgments: A test of prospect theory

The literature in psychology and behavioral economics offers abundant instances of anomalies to the rational choice paradigm. One of the most prominent works attempting to reconcile these is Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory. Its well-known S-shaped value function accounts for some of the anomalies such as reference dependence, loss aversion, and diminishing sensitivity. Although Prospect Theory describes the manner in which individuals are loss averse, it does not explain why people show loss aversion. This dissertation investigates the factors that affect the cognitive processes behind loss aversion. We find an anomaly in the S-shaped value function. Specifically, the studies demonstrate that the degree of involvement affects the slope of the value curve both for atemporal and intertemporal choices. In addition, we also test the relationship between loss aversion and involvement with varying vividness of outcomes (i.e., when outcomes are related to more versus less vivid stimuli). Testing the vividness effects further extends and confirms our proposed relationship between involvement and loss aversion. The data from several experiments show that there is a difference in the slopes of the value function for low and high involvement decisions. For low involvement conditions, the value curve has roughly the same steepness for losses as for gains close to the neutral reference point (i.e., contrary to the diminishing sensitivity characteristic). By contrast, in the high involvement conditions this is not the case: there is a distinct difference in the slopes of the loss and gain curves. This leads us to propose that different value functions exist for people in the low and high involvement conditions. This important finding suggests that in cases where people are not highly involved with a product, they display significantly less loss aversion than predicted by Prospect Theory. Three experiments investigate the relationship of loss aversion to subjects’ level of involvement in atemporal choice, intertemporal choice, and differential vividness of stimuli situations, respectively. The first study uses a 2 (involvement: low and high) by 2 (outcome: gain and loss) between subjects design. The results show that loss aversion significantly attenuates in the low involvement condition for atemporal choice. Study two replicates the results of study one in the context of intertemporal choice, where timing of outcomes (now versus three months) is introduced as another factor. Finally, the third study manipulates the vividness of outcomes and finds an interaction effect of vividness and involvement on loss aversion. Dissertation Committee: Norman Frohlich (Co- Chair), I.H. Asper School of Business, University of Manitoba Edward Bruning (Co- Chair), I.H. Asper School of Business, University of Manitoba Namita Bhatnagar, I.H. Asper School of Business, University of Manitoba Wayne Simpson, Department of Economics, University of Manitoba Michael Hu, Department of Marketing, Kent State University     

Cost effectiveness of liposomal doxorubicin vs. paclitaxel for the treatment of advanced AIDS–Kaposi’s sarcoma

Abstract

Objective:

Epidemic Kaposi’s sarcoma (KS) is one of the most common acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) defining malignancies, a disease with stigmatized clinical features that characterizes the diagnosis of AIDS. This study aims to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis between liposomal doxorubicin and paclitaxel in treating AIDS-KS.

Methods:

A 21 week decision tree analysis was created using a hospital perspective to compare treatment patterns with liposomal doxorubicin and paclitaxel. All costs were calculated in 2011 US dollars and obtained from an academic treatment center. Acquisition costs were obtained from public estimates using wholesale acquisition cost (WAC). Effectiveness was estimated based on a Phase 3 study of liposomal doxorubicin and paclitaxel (Von-Roenn et al.). Adverse events (AEs) associated with treatment and not the disease were included in the analysis. One-way sensitivity analysis was performed to test the robustness of the results.

Results:

Cost minimization analysis showed that treatment with liposomal doxorubicin was $18,125 whereas paclitaxel costs $12,347. After accounting for response rate, the results showed that liposomal doxorubicin costs $39,403 versus $21,661 for paclitaxel. This study has some limitations. Clinical data were derived from different clinical trials. In addition, many assumptions were made.

Conclusion:

Paclitaxel is dominant due to its lower acquisition cost and high response rate. Acquisition cost of liposomal doxorubicin and paclitaxel are significantly different. After accounting for all the factors that contribute to cost and response rate, paclitaxel is more cost effective than liposomal doxorubicin.     

Winners, Losers, and the Nuclear-Waste Dilemma

This paper explores how property-right assignment affects social efficiency when a public program has both “public good” and “public bad” components. We show that when willingness to accept a public bad exceeds the willingness to pay, the net benefit is unambiguously lower when the property right supports the status quo institutional structure. Thus, Kaldor–Hicks efficiency tests tend to favor public programs and mitigation over the status quo even when mitigation negatively affects another group. To illustrate the result, we develop social-cost estimates for moving nuclear waste from current temporary-storage facilities to a permanent central repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, USA. For a representative city with a population of 226,195, the present value of the external cost of shipping waste is $1.42 billion when those living near temporary nuclear-waste storage facilities are assigned the property right to “health and safety.” That number swells to $5.95 billion when those living near the transport route are assigned the property right. Thus, property-right assignment affects the efficient level of nuclear-waste, and thus nuclear energy, produced.     

Modelling the clinical and economic implications of galantamine in the treatment of mild-to-moderate Alzheimer's disease in Germany

Abstract

Objective:

This analysis was to assess the long-term clinical and economic implications of galantamine in the treatment of mild-to-moderate Alzheimer's disease (AD) in Germany.

Methods:

An economic model was developed using discrete event simulation to predict the course of AD through changes in cognition, behavioural disturbance, and function over time. It compares the costs and benefits of galantamine versus no-drug treatment and ginkgo biloba. Clinical data were mainly derived from analyses of pooled data from clinical trials. Epidemiological and cost data were obtained from literature and public data sources. Costs (2009 euros) from the perspective of the German Statutory Health Insurance were used.

Results:

The mean survival time for the model population is about 3.44 years over 10 years of simulation. Galantamine delays average time to severe stage of the disease by 3.57 and 3.36 months, compared to no-drug treatment and ginkgo biloba, respectively. Galantamine reduces time spent in an institution by 2.34 and 2.21 months versus no-drug treatment and ginkgo biloba, respectively. The use of galantamine is projected to yield net savings of €3,978 and €3,972 per patient versus no-drug and ginkgo biloba treatments. These results, however, may be limited by lack of long-term comparative efficacy data as well as data on long-term care costs based on multiple outcome measures.

Conclusion:

Compared to no-drug treatment and ginkgo biloba, galantamine therapy provides clinical benefits and achieves savings in healthcare costs associated with care for patients with mild-to-moderate AD in Germany.     

Financial liberalization and short-run housing price dynamics

We develop a continuous time, rational expectations, multi-cohort model of an exchange economy with housing, the purchase of which is subject to a down payment (DP) constraint. The timing of the house purchase decision is a crucial endogenous variable, and four determinants of it are identified – the housing services effect, the interest discounting effect, the consumption smoothing effect, and the rate of price increase effect. Cohort effects, and supply constraints, play crucial roles at the aggregative level. We explore in detail the effects of a discrete financial liberalization, and show that if the liberalization is not announced sufficiently far in advance, housing prices will initially overshoot the new stationary equilibrium, and vice versa. Particular attention is paid to the possibility that for a subset of cohorts along the transition path the DP constraint will not bind. An interesting ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’ is also identified, and policy implications discussedJEL Classification Numbers: E3, R21Valuable comments and suggestions from Phillip Brock, Ho Kong-Weng, Liu Haoming, David McKenzie, David Miles, Jacques Olivier, Phang Sock-Yong, J. Thampapillai, Ping Wang, Wong Wing-Keung, and Zeng Jinli are gratefully acknowledged. I am also immensely indebted to an anonymous referee, whose incisive, deep and patient comments, on successive drafts, helped greatly to sharpen and improve the paper, as well as to the Editor and the Co-Editor, Professor Mordecai Kurz, for their invaluable advice and encouragement. An earlier version was presented at a Conference in Honour of Ronald McKinnon, held at Stanford University in June 2002     

The impact of public R&D investments on patenting activity: technology transfer at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

ABSTRACT

This paper presents estimates of the impact of public R&D on patenting activity at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Using a time series of public sector agency data, we estimate the per-capita R&D elasticity of new patent applications using a knowledge production function framework model that is an expanded version of what other scholars have used with private sector data. New patent applications are an important step in the technology transfer activities of a federal agency. We estimate this elasticity to be about 2.0. This elasticity value represents an initial estimate of the impact of EPA’s R&D investments on its technology transfer activity.     

State-owned enterprises as indirect instruments of entry regulation

In the context of mixed markets, Matsumura and Kanda (J Econ 84(1): 27–48, 2005) show that social welfare in free entry equilibrium is maximized when there exists a public firm in the market. En passant, these authors state that this outcome is connected to the entry-deterring influence of a public firm. In this way, they counter-act the excess entry problem of Mankiw and Whinston (Rand J Econ 17(1): 48–58, 1986). We explain this result arguing that the state-owned firm can be an indirect instrument to regulate entry. In fact, under free entry equilibrium welfare may be greater with the presence of a public firm than with a social planner.