流动性冲击,银行重要性差异与中央银行救助策略

央行能否正确分配救助的流动性供给直接关系到应对金融危机的成效。本文将银行的系统重要性纳入央行流动性救助决策函数中,将商业银行分为系统重要性银行和非系统重要性银行,应用不完全合约模型分析央行的流动性救助策略,结果表明:相对于非系统重要性银行,中央银行应对系统重要性银行采取较为宽松的紧急贷款标准;政府应当根据流动性短缺规模的不同改变央行由于银行倒闭需承担政治成本的权重。     

A Non-Random Walk Down Wall Street

Book reviewed in this article:
Andrew J. Lo and A. Craig MacKinlay, A Non‐Random Walk Down Wall Street     

Solutions to the Moral Hazard Problem Arising from The Lender-of-last-resort Facility

The provision of liquid funds via a lender‐of‐last‐resort facility has been the chief means by which governments have chosen to prevent or stay bank runs. The introduction of such a facility, however, leads to a moral hazard problem which weakens each financial manager's commitment to sound banking, and hence may ultimately make the few bank runs which do occur more dramatic in both size and seriousness. In this paper I provide a survey of the various policy measures which have been proposed to mitigate the effects of the moral hazard problem arising from the introduction of a lender‐of‐last‐resort facility.     

MODELS OF BANKING INSTABILITY: A PARTIAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Abstract. This paper critically examines the theoretical literature on banking instability that has followed Diamond and Dybvig (1983). It explores the extent to which it (a) explains banking instability within a theoretical context in which financial intermediaries improve on unintermediated markets, and (b) justifies government involvement in the financial intermediation industry. It suggests that the literature has yet to provide a satisfactory theoretical basis for banking instability as such since the intermediaries which arise from it are peculiar mutual funds that bear little resemblance to real-world banks. In addition, the paper challenges the widespread belief that this literature provides a sound foundation for government involvement in the industry. It suggests that arguments for government intervention are open to objection on various grounds, the most important one being that they are inconsistent with the existence of properly motivated financial intermediation in these models.     

Too Big to Fail: UK Financial Services Reform in History and Policy

Previous banking crises have been used as opportunities for new and beneficial developments in regulation and in the market itself. The global financial crisis should be seen as such an occasion. There is a need to refine the role of the central bank as lender of last resort and also to reform deposit insurance so that it only applies to a limited range of bank accounts.     

A New Index of Independence of 12 European National Central Banks

Abstract

Many countries have recently strengthened the autonomy of their central banks in the effort to protect central bankers from government influences. This article reviews and extends the relevant literature to propose a new ranking of central bank independence in contrast to those originated by Bade and Parking, and Cukierman. The analysis shows a bivariate relationship between independence and inflation rates in 12 European Union countries in the EMS era. However, neither inflation nor its standard deviation had any statistical significance effect on real GDP growth. The procedure reveals that findings are, sometimes, index-specific.     

INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A META‐REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Abstract Using 59 studies, we perform a meta‐regression analysis of studies examining the relationship between inflation and central bank independence (CBI). The studies considered are very different with respect to the CBI indicator used, the sample of countries and time periods covered, model specification, estimators used and publication outlet. We conclude that there is a significant publication bias. However, we also find a significant genuine effect of CBI on inflation. Differences between studies are not caused by differences in CBI indicators used.     

货币政策透明度:基于中央银行视角的文献解读

货币政策透明度是指非对称信息在政策制定者与其他经济主体之间的披露程度,包括中央银行对政策相关信息的披露程度以及公众对政策信息的理解程度二层内涵;在实践中,政策制定者选择多大程度的透明度主要取决于实际的经济环境和政策目标,从纯经济学的角度来讲,政策有效性是决定是否要提高货币政策透明度的唯一原因;而从实践中来看,无论是透明还是隐秘的货币政策,都有可能实现比较理想的调控结果。     

The design and communication of systematic monetary policy strategies

The efficacy of central bank communications is inextricably linked to the characteristics of the monetary policy framework. Therefore, this paper presents a set of fundamental principles regarding the joint design of monetary policy strategy and communications. The practical implications of these principles are illustrated by considering a number of significant policy challenges faced by central banks in the advanced economies.     

When should central bankers be fired?

In recent years, a number of countries have changed their central banking institutions. Often these reforms involve granting long terms of office to central bankers. This threatens to limit the extent to which the central bank can be held accountability. Dismissal rules can help ensure accountability, and, in the presence of inflation shocks, the socially optimal commitment policy is supported by a dismissal rule similar to a modified nominal income rule. The government's promise to follow the rule is shown to be credible in a trigger strategy equilibrium for reasonable parameter values. Received: March 26, 1999 / Accepted: September 20, 2001     

DO WE REALLY NEED CENTRAL BANKS?

An analysis of economic theory and economic history suggests that central banks, with a monopoly of money-issuing services, are not necessary. The often-levelled arguments against private banks issuing money in competition with each other and with central banks do not stand up to close scrutiny.     

Insuring Banks Against Liquidity Shocks: The Role of Deposit Insurance and Lending of Last Resort

Abstract.  It has long been recognized that banks' simultaneous provision of monitoring and liquidity services is advantageous but leaves them susceptible to liquidity shocks that may culminate in a system failure. Because a system failure is costly, this provides a rationale for adopting arrangements, including a lender of last resort and deposit insurance (DI), to insure banks against liquidity shocks. These arrangements have proven themselves very successful, but they have also been the source of problems. Researchers have identified some of the main sources of these problems and have suggested ways to improve the design of these arrangements, but there are still many issues that remain unaddressed. This paper reviews the literature on the two arrangements that most countries have adopted to insure banks against liquidity shocks, a lender of last resort and DI, and compares the design of these arrangements across countries. The paper ends with a brief summary of the key lessons learned about the design of these arrangements and the issues related to them that remain unaddressed.     

Rules versus discretion - A disinflation case

This paper compares a strict inflation target regime to a conservative central bank regime to determine the monetary regime appropriate for a disinflation process. The analysis shows that in a two-period model, in which policymakers face given first-period inflationary expectations, a strict inflation target could be preferred to the appointment of a conservative central banker who has discretion. The result differs from that of Rogoff (1985), who assumed rational expectations and concluded that a conservative central banker is always preferable. The disadvantage of the conservative central banker derives from his tendency to accelerate disinflation relative to rate that maximizes social welfare.JEL Classification: E52, E58The authors are grateful to Alex Cukierman, Nissan Liviatan, Allan Drazen, Amit Friedman and Yoav Friedmann for their useful suggestions. We also thank the anonymous referees for helpful comments. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Tel Aviv University macroeconomic workshop, at the Research Department seminar, Bank of Israel, and at the Bank of Israels conference on Macroeconomic Policy, October 2002.     

金融危机背景下美联储的非常规货币政策操作

面对金融危机,关联储不仅非常规地使用传统货币政策工具,而且还采取大量激进的非常规措施,通过购买各种证券向市场注入流动性以及运用信息沟通引导市场预期降低长期借贷成本的方式缓解金融市场紧缩局面。非常规货币政策是应对非常时期的非常措施,随着经济的复苏,各国经济刺激政策如何寻找安全退出路径是这一时期全球央行的主要任务。     

国际货币政策协调:理论研究、实践进展及中国的选择

开放经济下一国货币政策会产生溢出效应,因此各国需要通过货币政策的国际协调来增进共同福利;目前,国际货币政策协调的实践已形成了几种重要的区域协调模式,并在解决国际经济事务中发挥关键作用;对于我国而言,在新一轮汇率制度改革后,也更加需要通过货币政策的国际协调来解决与其他国家或经济区的政策冲突。     

央行数字货币的国际竞争格局及中国式现代化因应

在区块链技术的驱动下,非央行数字货币给国家货币主权与安全带来较大威胁,而且央行数字货币在货币竞争格局中展现了竞争吸引力与竞争地位的优势,因此众多经济体加强央行数字货币(CBDC)的研发。不过,央行数字货币在发展中面临违法犯罪、货币金融、技术与国际化风险等困境。根据央行数字货币不同的流通框架,可以将其国际竞争发展路径分为三类：采用单层流通框架的乌拉圭数字比索、采用双层流通框架的美国数字美元以及采用混合流通框架的欧盟数字欧元。总结其国际竞争共识与启示,中国式现代中央银行数字货币的高质量发展路径为：坚持法治化发展原则,推动央行数字货币的法律监管;完善现代化发展原则,通过现代金融监管防范金融风险;秉承技术化发展原则,助推央行数字货币的技术保护与国际化。