Quality of judicial institutions,crimes, misdemeanors,and dishonesty

We investigate the extent to which quality of judicial institutions has an impact on individuals’ propensity for criminal and dishonest behavior and on their views regarding the acceptability of dishonesty and law-breaking. We use micro data on residents of 25 European countries and employ alternative measures of judicial quality as perceived by the residents of these countries. As an instrument for judicial quality we employ the procedures with which prosecutors and judges are appointed to their posts in each country. As alternative instruments, we employ an index of de jure institutional quality as well as its components, which provide similar results. The findings show that an increase in the perception of the quality of judicial institutions, such as an improvement in judicial independence or the impartiality of the courts, has a deterrent effect on dishonest and criminal acts. A higher perceived quality of the judicial system also makes individuals less likely to find acceptable a variety of dishonest and illicit behaviors, suggesting that institutions help shape the beliefs of the society. We obtain the same results when we analyze the sample of immigrants, whose cultural attributes should be (more) related to their countries of origin, rather than their countries of residence, and thus should be arguably uncorrelated with the factors that can impact the instrument. We show that people’s beliefs in the importance of the family, in the fairness of others, and the importance of being rich are not impacted by judicial quality, suggesting that judicial quality is not a blanket representation of underlying cultural norms and beliefs in the society.     

Rules versus norms: How formal and informal institutions shape judicial sentencing cycles

Existing research on electoral sentencing cycles consistently finds that elected judges levy longer sentences when they are up for re-election. However, this research finding had previously drawn exclusively on data from four states. Using newly collected sentencing data on seven additional states, we find substantial, and previously un-noted, heterogeneity in the strength of sentencing cycles. This heterogeneity appears to be explained by cross-state differences in informal norm of whether incumbent judges get challenged in judicial elections. We show that variation is explain by the baseline probability of having a challenger and the number of donations per electoral race. That variation, in turn, is not well explained by observable formal electoral institutions.     

Deliberation,learning, and institutional change: the evolution of institutions in judicial settings

Institutional change entails institutional design, assessment, and modification, which necessarily take place within the constraints and opportunities afforded by existing institutional arrangements. Viktor Vanberg has made major contributions to our understanding of how institutions evolve. We wish to contribute to this symposium in honor of Vanberg by analyzing how institutions for the management of water institutions in Southern California evolved primarily through the use of the courts as settings for deliberation, learning and institutional change.

Economic growth and judicial independence,a dozen years on: Cross-country evidence using an updated Set of indicators

Over 10 years ago, Feld and Voigt (2003) introduced an indicator for objectively measuring the actual independence of the judiciary and demonstrated its utility in a large cross-section of countries. The indicator has been widely used, but also criticized. Many new indicators for judicial independence have been developed since. Yet, all of them are based on subjective evaluations by experts or confined to measuring the legally prescribed level of independence. This paper presents more recent objective data on de jure and de facto judicial independence (JI) and strongly confirms previous results that de jure JI is not systematically related to economic growth, whereas de facto JI is highly significantly and robustly correlated with growth. In addition, we show that the effect of de facto JI depends on the institutional environment, but not on a country’s initial per capita income.     

The projective independence axiom

Summary A new axiom for preference orderings over lotteries, called the projective independence axiom, is formulated. Given suitable continuity and monotonicity assumptions, the axiom implies that utility is either in the weighted utility class or is quadratic in probabilities. The betweenness axiom is used to distinguish between these two classes of functions.We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.     

The pricing of time-varying beta

We generalize an asset pricing model based on the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) allowing beta to be time-varying. Making beta a random variable adds flexibility to the model because permits a non-linear relation between individual returns and the set of factors, and accounts for the effect of possible omitted variables. We integrate the conditional APT with a general linear stochastic process for beta. We analyze the behavior of the conditional expected return, the conditional variance and conditional covariance of individual asset returns as functions of the conditional moments of beta. On considering time-varying betas we introduce another source of uncertainty (risk) independent of the factors. We need to disentangle if this extra risk is systematic or non-systematic. To this end, we introduce a modified conditional APT model that rationalizes why the time variation of beta may represent extra systematic risk. For a sample of individual stocks, we test the hypothesis of time-varying beta and the feasibility of the modified conditional APT. We present a test for time-varying beta based on the conditional second moments of returns. We find that there is strong evidence against constancy of betas in favor of a random coefficient model, and that the time variation of beta is due to non-systematic behavior of the firms and investors should be able to diversify this risk away.     

The benefits of central bank's political independence

We consider a two-tier model of monetary policy where the central banker is both subject to the explicit influence of elected political principals through contracts and the implicit influence of interest groups willing to capture monetary policy. We analyze the impact of granting independence to the central banker on the scope for capture and the agency costs of delegating the monetary policy to a central banker. Political independence increases those agency costs but significantly stabilizes the politically induced fluctuations of inflation and improves ex ante social welfare.     

The independence transformation under almost additivity

When the consumer's tastes are close to preference independence, each transformed good is uniquely associated with one observed good. The off-diagonal elements of the composition matrix of the transformation are equal apart from sign and are inversely proportional to the difference between the income elasticities of the corresponding observed goods.     

The time-varying degree of inflation expectations anchoring

Well-anchored inflation expectations have become a key indicator for the credibility of a central bank’s inflation target. Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, the (de-)anchoring of long-term U.S. inflation expectations has been under debate. We propose a time-varying parameter (TVP) model in order to explore gradual changes in central bank credibility and the corresponding degree of inflation expectations anchoring. Our results confirm that inflation expectations have been partially de-anchored during the financial crisis. However, the TVP model reveals that inflation expectations have been successfully re-anchored ever since.     

The time-varying effect of monetary policy in China

A sound understanding of monetary transmission mechanism is valuable because it helps the central bank to determine the proper course of monetary policy to balance growth and inflation. As China’s domestic financial markets deepen and develop further towards a market-based system, the country’s monetary policy instrument and transmission should continue to improve for managing economic conditions. Using a short-term key interest rate as standard monetary policy tool and time-varying parameter techniques, this study empirically demonstrates that China’s monetary policy framework is in the midst of transitioning to a market-based approach.     

The Pricing of Italian Equity Returns

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between common risk factors and average returns for Italian stocks. Our research has identified the Italian stock market's economic variables by using the results from factor analyses and time series regressions. We study several multi‐factor models combining the relevant macroeconomic variables with the mimicking equity portfolios SMB (small minus big) and HML (high minus low) proposed by Fama and French (1993). The key question we want to ask ourselves, is whether the influential role of the size and book‐to‐market equity factors in explaining average stock returns can stand up well when competing with some macroeconomic factors. In other words, do stock returns carry some risk premium that is independent of either the market return or the economic forces that underlie the common variation in returns? Our empirical work estimates risk premiums using both traditional two‐pass procedures and one‐pass (full information) methodologies. We show that only the market index and variables linked to interest rate shifts are consistently priced in the Italian stock returns. The role of other factors, and in particular both the size and the price‐to book ratio, are crucially dependent on the estimation procedure. (J.E.L.: G11, G12).     

The independence transformation of specific substitutes and specific complements

When all n observed goods are specific substitutes (complements) in Houthakker's (1960) sense, the independence transformation yields one transformed good in which all observed goods are positively represented, viz., the transformed good with the smallest (largest) income elasticity. The n – 1 other transformed goods are all contrasts between observed goods.     

The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model

Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences—and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient allocation whether first-best or not. The crucial assumption is independence.     

The information-aggregation approach to political institutions

This paper offers a short survey of recent contributions about the information-aggregation role of political institutions. We argue that these recent developments represent a promising come-back to the Condorcet's original approach to political economy and allow to renew the efficiency analysis of alternative political institutions. In the same way as in the economic literature on the price system and the informational rationale for non-market insitutions such as firms, this recent literature that the basic efficiency of majority-rule voting and other electoral systems needs to be complemented by non-voting political institutions such as political parties, public debate and polls.     

The effect of remittances on democratic institutions

Do remittances promote stronger democratic institutions in developing countries? We study the effect of workers’ remittances on the quality of democracy in developing countries, and examine how government spending mediates the effect of workers’ remittances on the quality of democratic institutions. Using a dynamic panel estimator on data from 133 developing countries over 1972–2012, we find that workers’ remittances improve the quality of democratic institutions. We also find that workers’ remittances are more effective in promoting democratic institutions in developing countries with low government spending.     

The transition of corruption institutions and dynamics

The paper analyzes the strong but complex relation between corruption and development. The corruption/honesty index is explained by three variables measuring aspects of development: Income, Polity and Fraser (for Economic Freedom). The last two indices represent the political and the economic system. Two problems arise: (i) Development is a common factor in all four variables, giving the variables strong confluence, so it is difficult to sort out the contribution of each explanatory variable. However, kernel regressions on the corruption/income scatter give a well-defined long-run transition path, which permits an identification of the specific contributions of institutions to corruption. (ii) The correlation of corruption to the first difference of the three development variables is negative. This gives a substantial lag in the corruption/income relation in the form of wide J-curves, but the main direction of causality is still from development to corruption. High income and modern institutions cause low corruption after some time. The corruption/development-relation is a fuzzy but strong long-run connection.     

The time-varying integration of euro area government bond markets

We derive a model in which a standard international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) for government bonds is nested within an ICAPM with impediments to invest in the local government bond markets. Excess returns or risk premiums are then driven by a country-specific or idiosyncratic stochastic factor on top of the common factor which has a time-varying idiosyncratic impact on the premiums. With this model we investigate the financial integration of government bond markets over time through two channels. First, we allow for gradual convergence from the full ICAPM with impediments to the standard model through the vanishing of the idiosyncratic factors. Second, we allow for gradual equalization of the country-specific impacts of the common factor. State space methods are used to estimate the model with weekly government bond risk premiums for Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands over the period 1995–2009. Our results suggest, first, that the idiosyncratic factors were almost eliminated by 2006 in all countries but Italy but then reappeared due to the financial crisis that started in 2007. Second, the country-specific exposures to the common international risk factor have converged across countries, with no setback during the crisis.     

检察权配置的合理构建与司法体制改革

检察权即法律监督权,是检察机关在国家政治体制和司法体制中所承担的特定职能和责任。目前,我国检察权的配置还存在较多的缺陷,如何完善检察权的合理配置,是当前司法改革和发展的重要课题。党的十七大提出了让＂让权力在阳光下运行＂的最新要求,这也对我们从事检察工作的同志提出了新的标准,其实也就是进一步明确了权力的透明度问题。因此,合理构建检察权配置,进行司法体制改革,让检察权更加公开、公正、透明成为必要。