Corporate Governance, Ethics, and the Backdating of Stock Options

Backdating of stock options is an example of an agency problem. It has emerged despite all the measures (i.e., new regulations and additional corporate governance mechanisms) aimed at addressing such problems? Beyond such negative controlling measures, a more positive empowering approach based on ethics may also be necessary. What ethical measures need to be taken to address the agency problem? What values and norms should guide the board of directors in protecting the shareholders’ interests? To examine these issues, we first discuss the role values and norms can play with respect to underlying corporate governance and the proper role of directors, such as transparency, accountability, integrity (which is reflected in proper mechanisms of checks and balances), and public responsibility. Second, we discuss various stakeholder approaches (e.g., government, directors, managers, and shareholders) by which conflicts of interest (i.e., the agency problem) can be addressed. Third, we assess the practice of backdating stock options, as an illustration of the agency problem, in terms of whether the practice is legally acceptable or ethically justifiable. Fourth, we proceed to an analysis of good corporate governance practice involving backdating options based on a series of ethical standards including: (1) trustworthiness; (2) utilitarianism; (3) justice; and (4) Kantianism. We conclude that while executive compensation schemes (e.g., stock options) were originally intended to help remedy the agency problem by tying together the interests of the executives and shareholders, these schemes may have actually become “part of the problem,” and that the solution ultimately depends upon whether directors and executives accept that all of their actions must be based on a set of core ethical values.     

Corporate Governance and Business Ethics

"It is this distancing of personal relationships, combined with their replacement by written contractual terms and conditions, which make the discussion of ethics within a corporate institutionalised context highly limited and problematic.' The challenge is to find means of personalising modern corporations so as to encourage ethical behaviour. Atul K. Shah PhD (Econ) ACA gained his doctorate from the London School of Economics and is Lecturer in the Department of Accounting and Financial Management, at the University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ; e-mail ashah@essex.ac.uk . This article was conceived while he was Visiting Assistant Professor at the College of Business, University of Maryland, USA. The author wishes to thank Dan Ostas, Lee Preston and Stephen Loeb for helpful comments on earlier drafts.     

Corporate Governance and Codes of Ethics

As a result of recent corporate scandals, several rules have focused on the role played by Boards of Directors on the planning and monitoring of corporate codes of ethics. In theory, outside directors are in a better position than insiders to protect and further the interests of all stakeholders because of their experience and their sense of moral and legal obligations. Female directors also tend to be more sensitive to ethics according to several past studies which explain this affirmation by early gender socialization, the fact that women are thought to place a greater emphasis on harmonious relations and the fact that men and women use different ethical frameworks in their judgments. The goal of this paper is to determine the influence of these characteristics of the Board in terms of promoting and hindering the creation of a code of ethics. Our findings show that a greater number of female directors does not necessarily lead to more ethical companies. Moreover, within Europe as a continent, board ownership leads to an entrenchment of upper-level management, generating a divergence between the ethical interests of owners and managers. In light of this situation, the presence of independent directors is necessary to reduce such conflicts.     

Corporate Governance,Commitment to Business Ethics,and Firm Valuation: Evidence from the Korean Stock Market

A variety of stakeholders have long been interested in the factors that are related to firm valuation. This article investigates why companies with more comprehensive corporate governance (CG) have a value premium over companies with less comprehensive CG. We posit and find that the cost of equity capital (COC) decreases with the strength of CG, suggesting that the value premium stems from the lower COC for more comprehensive CG. We also find that the COC is lower for companies with strong commitment to business ethics (BE) than for those with weak commitment to BE and that the beneficial effect of CG on the COC is more pronounced for companies with weak commitment to BE than for those with strong commitment to BE. Companies with more comprehensive CG tend to exhibit strong commitment to BE, but the beneficial effect of corporate ethical commitment is not completely subsumed by CG. Our results suggest that companies could lower their cost of equity capital and increase firm value by adopting more comprehensive CG practices and committing to higher standards of BE.     

Corporate Governance and Ethics: A Feminist Perspective

The mainstream literature on corporate governance is based on the premise of conflicts of interest in a competitive game played by variously defined stakeholders and thus builds explicitly and/or implicitly on masculinist ethical theories. This article argues that insights from feminist ethics, and in particular ethics of care, can provide a different, yet relevant, lens through which to study corporate governance. Based on feminist ethical theories, the article conceptualises a governance model that is different from the current normative orthodoxy.     

Monitoring Costs,Managerial Ethics and Corporate Governance: A Modeling Approach

This article evaluates effectiveness and costs of external regulation, in particular the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in restricting managerial malfeasance and safeguarding shareholder interests. It discusses the role of managerial ethics as an alternative corporate governance mechanism to protect shareholder value. This article builds a mathematical model to illustrate shareholders’ choices of best corporate governance mechanisms, taking into account the influence of managerial ethics, effectiveness and costs of monitoring. We suggest that the best corporate governance design and the optimal monitoring expenses are influenced by managerial types, monitoring efficiency, and effectiveness of ethics education. We conclude that stringent regulation and monitoring may not always enhance shareholder value. When managerial ethics could be improved by ethics education or social norms, ethics education may be a better alternative than stringent regulation.     

Ethics Programs, Board Involvement, and Potential Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Governance

Board composition, insider participation on compensation committees, and director compensation practices can potentially cause conflicts of interest between directors and shareholders. If these corporate governance structures result in situations where actions beneficial to directors do not also benefit shareholders, then shareholders may suffer.Corporate ethics programs usually address conflicts of interest that may arise in the firm's activities. Some boards of directors take active roles in their firms' ethics programs by actively overseeing the programs. This paper empirically examines the relationship between ethics programs and potential conflicts of interest and the relationship between board involvement in a firm's ethics program and potential conflicts of interest.Evidence in this paper shows that firms with ethics programs have a lower percentage of inside directors on their compensation committees than do firms without ethics programs. Firms in which boards are actively involved in the programs have more independent boards (higher percentage of independent directors and lower percentage of inside directors) and are more likely to compensate outside directors with equity than are firms in which boards are not actively involved in the programs. Supplemental analyses show that the incidence of potential conflicts of interest is not significantly different between firms without ethics programs and firms in which boards are not actively involved in the programs. Taken together, the evidence in this paper indicates that a board actively involved in an ethics program, and not the simple existence of an ethics program, is related to the incidence of potential conflicts of interest.     

商业伦理的构建——公司治理的一个视角

在经济飞速发展的今天,商业伦理正越来越受到高度重视。商业伦理本身并不具有法律意义上的强制性,但它具有道德意义上的导向性和自我约束性,是一个企业乃至一个商业社会和谐、长远发展的基石。同时,商业伦理也是人们在追求商业利益过程中应当遵循的道德原则。     

The Ethics of Managerial Compensation: The Case of Executive Stock Options

This paper examines the ethics of contemporary managerial compensation in the context of executive stock options. Economic considerations would dictate that executive stock options should be adjusted to eliminate the effect of overall stock market movements which are beyond the control of the executive. However, in practice, most executive stock options are not adjusted to control for these outside factors. Agency considerations are the most likely culprit. Adjusting for the influence of outside factors, such as a generally rising stock market, from executive stock options sets a higher bar for managers to reach. Furthermore, traditional accounting standards permitted firms that did not adjust options to avoid reporting options as expenses. This presents CEOs and boards of directors with a major ethical dilemma. On the one hand, their duty to their shareholders and stakeholders dictates that executive stock options should be adjusted to eliminate outside noise from unrelated movements in the overall stock market. However, financial statements are presented in the language of accounting. If the overwhelming majority of the users of a language define a particular item in one way, then to deviate from the norm implies that the recipient of such a deviant statement may not properly interpret the statement. Likewise, if the standard practice is for firms to use unadjusted options and thus under-report expenses, to deviate from this industry norm risks that users of financial statements would not properly interpret the financial statements, with perhaps negative consequences for the shareholders. In short, if “everyone else does it,” then it could be wrong for an individual firm to deviate from the norm as that would harm the shareholders. James J. Angel is an Associate Professor of Finance at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University. He is a financial expert whose research focuses on the operation of financial markets in the United States and other countries. He currently serves on the OTCBB Advisory Board, and he has served as Chair of the Nasdaq Economic Advisory Council. He earned his undergraduate degree from the California Institute of Technology, his MBA from the Harvard Business School, and he earned his Ph.D. in Finance from the University of California at Berkeley. Douglas M. McCabe is a Professor of Management at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University. He serves on the Editorial Boards of 20 scholarly journals, including Research on Ethical Issues in Organizations, JAI Press as well as the Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal. Considered by the media to be an expert in his field, he has appeared more than 200 times on international (CNN), national (ABC, NBC, and CBS), and local television and radio. He holds a Ph.D. from Cornell University and is a member of Phi Beta Kappa.     

公司治理影响资本结构吗

本文以2004-2007年A股非金融类上市公司非平衡面板数据为研究对象,在我国特殊的制度环境下分析上市公司的公司治理与资本结构之间的关系.研究发现公司治理结构对资本结构有着十分重要的影响.该结论基本符合债务控制理论,但与西方现有文献相比仍有所不同;该结论丰富了企业融资理论,对完善我国公司治理制度和资本结构有很大意义.     

Ethics,Corporations, and Governance

Corporate governance has resurfaced as a topic in the ongoing financial crises. This article frames the debate on corporate governance within the ongoing concerns about the corporate role in wider societal governance. It then maps out the context of the six scholarly contributions in this special issue by highlighting how the current debate moves towards a closer integration of governance at corporate and societal level.     

The Effect of Corporate Governance on Firm Stock Volatility in Asia

The authors examine whether firm corporate governance (CG) contributes to lower stock-return volatility. Using the panel data of 1,252 public listed firms in Asia across 11 countries for 15 years, the authors document international evidence that CG has a stabilizing effect on firm stock-return volatility. The authors further examine whether increasing information efficiency, reducing foreign exposure, and a lower cost of capital contribute to the stabilizing effect of firm CG on stock-return volatility. The result implies that better CG will only reduce stock-return volatility for firms that have less foreign exposure.     

优化公司治理结构 提高公司治理效率

公司治理结构是公司的核心制度,建立良好的治理结构可以提供有效的监督,从而激励公司更有效地利用资源,保证公司高效运行和良性循环,提高公司治理效率。通过分析公司治理结构构成的股权结构、资本结构和委托代理三要素与公司治理效率的相互影响、互为因果关系,并从三要素详细阐述了如何最大程度降低公司治理成本,同时获得最大的公司治理收益,进而保护股东、债权人和其他利益相关者的利益,以实现公司的高效运行和可持续发展。     

Ethics Audits and Corporate Governance: The Case of Public Sector Sports Organizations

This article presents a theorized and conceptually informed method for the undertaking of an ethics audit organization. At an operational level, the overall integrity of an organization, it is argued, may be evaluated through the application of a conceptual framework that embraces the inter-related themes of individual responsibility, social equity and political responsibility. Finally, a method is presented for ethics audit which was developed in the auditing of a national public sector sports organization: sportscotland. This emphasizes the significance of key personnel (individuals and in groups) in producing and reproducing the organizational ethos, whilst recognizing the importance of anonymity and confidentiality throughout the process. The theoretical terrain of the ethics audit is articulated through a consideration of ethics as applied moral philosophy, equity as social justice and corporate governance as the moral health (or otherwise) of a public sector sports organization.     

我国证券交易所的组织结构与公司治理:现状与未来

自20世纪90年代以来,世界范围内的证券交易所纷纷从会员制的组织结构转变为营利性的公司,这种转变有利于减少会员对交易所的不当控制,改善交易所的公司治理.现阶段,我国的证券交易所并非会员制,改革的方向是对交易所实行股份制改造.同时,应通过改善交易所的理事会、经理制度,提高交易所运营的透明度,完善交易所的治理结构.     

Risk Management,Real Options,Corporate Social Responsibility

The relationship of corporate social responsibility to risk management has been treated sporadically in the business society literature. Using real options theory, I develop the notion of corporate social responsibility as a real option its implications for risk management. Real options theory allows for a strategic view of corporate social responsibility. Specifically, real options theory suggests that corporate social responsibility should be negatively related to the firm’s ex ante downside business risk.     

Intragroup Transactions,Corporate Governance,and Corporate Philanthropy in Korean Business Groups

This study examines how the corporate philanthropy decisions of group-affiliated firms in Korea (Chaebol firms) are made. Based on the attention-based view, we argue that when corporate decision makers at group-affiliated firms focus their attention more (less) on internal markets than external stakeholders because of the firm’s high (low) reliance on intragroup transactions, the firm will decrease (increase) its level of corporate philanthropy. We further argue that the relationship will be stronger when governance mechanisms focus on the instrumental value of corporate philanthropy. Using a panel sample of group-affiliated firms in Korea from 2011 to 2015, we find that as intragroup sales increase, the level of corporate philanthropy decreases, and such a negative relationship is stronger when outside director representation and foreign investor ownership are high. Our study suggests that internal dependence and corporate governance mechanisms jointly affect the level of corporate philanthropy at firms in a business group. Thus, this study contributes to the literature on corporate philanthropy, business group, and corporate governance.