Piecewise linear incentive scheme and participative budgeting

This paper studies the economic incentives of participative budgeting through the design of incentive schemes within the agency theory framework. In particular, a piecewise linear incentive scheme (PLIS), an optimal version of Weitzman's New Soviet Incentive Scheme (NSIS), is derived. The characteristics of PLIS are: first, unlike NSIS, the bonus (penalty) rates of the optimal PLIS vary according to the agent's type in order to improve the principal's welfare, second, a penalty may be imposed on the overfulfillment of the agent's performance in order to maintain incentive compatibility, and finally, it is shown that if the coefficients are constant as in NSIS, there is no need for participative budgeting. Also, PLIS is compared with a quadratic incentive scheme. Both incentive schemes achieve the optimal solution, but each incentive scheme has its own advantage over the other depending on the situation.     

Slack in participative budgeting: The joint effect of a truth-inducing pay scheme and risk preferences

An incentive problem in participative budgeting occurs when a worker has private information about factors that influence his or her performance and the pay scheme is budget- or standard-based. This information, if communicated accurately by the worker, may be valuable to a manager for planning and control purposes. However, the worker has an incentive to bias its communication such that a relatively easy standard is set, thereby creating slack. To alleviate this problem, analytical research has proposed truth-inducing pay schemes that provide incentives for accurately communicating private information and maximizing performance. A conventional assumption underlying these schemes is worker risk neutrality, despite the wide-spread belief that risk aversion is more typical in organizational settings. This paper reports an experiment demonstrating that, when a (conventional) truth-inducing scheme is introduced, slack decreases for risk-neutral subjects but not for risk-averse subjects.     

Variance analysis and linear contracts in agencies with distorted performance measures

This paper investigates the role of variance analysis procedures in aligning objectives under the condition of distorted performance measurement. A risk-neutral agency with linear contracts is analyzed, whereby the agent receives post-contract, pre-decision information on his productivity. If the performance measure is informative with respect to the agent’s marginal product concerning the principal’s objective, variance investigation can alleviate effort misallocation. These results carry over to a participative budgeting situation, but in this case the variance investigation procedures are less demanding.     

Effects of budgetary participation conflict on job performance of Mexican and US managers

This study extends the stream of participative budgeting literature by introducing a new variable, Budgetary Participation Conflict (BPC). BPC occurs when the level of budget participation experienced by a manager differs from a desired level. We propose a model where BPC is the independent variable to further evaluate the effect of budget participation on job performance. Using path analysis, we measure the direct effect of BPC on job performance, and the indirect effects between BPC and performance that run through job satisfaction and job tenure in two countries, Mexico and the US.While the results do not indicate that BPC either directly or indirectly affects the performance of US managers, the results indicate that BPC negatively affects the job performance of Mexican managers indirectly through the effects of BPC on job satisfaction and job tenure. The relationship between tenure and performance is much stronger among the Mexican managers than among their US counterparts, which is the largest single difference between the Mexican and US results.     

参与式预算行为实验研究

本文介绍了序贯的讨价还价理论,并通过分析企业参与式预算活动与讨价还价行为的相似性,利用讨价还价模型,构建了本实验的基本模型。依据序贯理论研究参与式预算活动,设定了国有企业与民营企业背景下管理者角色的支付函数,与传统预算激励制度相比,对下属实行真实导向的预算激励制度时,会产生更高的预算值和更低的预算松弛,且预算成本小、效率高。     

Managerial attitude,motivation and the effectiveness of budget participation

This study empirically examined the effect of budget participation on managerial performance using a contingency theory approach. Contingent variables investigated included managerial attitude (towards their job and company) and motivation (to work). The results indicated that both variables moderated the effect of budget participation. Specifically, participation in the budgeting process by managers who reported a more favourable attitude or motivation, was associated with improved performance; whereas participation by managers exhibiting a less favourable attitude or motivation, was associated with hampered performance. These results support the fundamental argument that an organization may be better off following a budgeting style (participative or non-participative) that is congruent with its employee attitude and motivation.     

Relating Context Variables to Participative Budgeting and Evaluative Use of Performance Measures: A Meta‐analysis

Extant findings regarding how context variables relate to participative budgeting and the evaluative use of accounting performance measures (APM) are contradictory. Unlike previous reviews of such findings, this empirical article uses a meta‐analysis to examine the relations of context variables with participative budgeting or evaluative use of APM to determine (i) how the variables relate and (ii) which factors might cause between‐correlation variance, such as statistical artefacts or moderating influences of variable measures, sample selection, or industry differences. All meta‐analyses are based on rather small samples. Three groups of context variables emerge. First, some relate significantly and homogeneously to participative budgeting or evaluative use of APM; these direct relations should be considered explicitly in further studies. Second, for some variables, the relations are homogeneous but not significant, such that they are neither simple nor direct. Third, substantial variance exists in the correlations for some context variables; these relations are contingent on other influences. Industry differences and sample selection explain some inconsistencies in exploratory moderator analyses and should receive additional research attention.     

Flexible Budgets for Cellular Manufacturing Systems

A flexible budgeting method based on relationships amongst the products manufactured in a cellular manufacturing system and the stochastic nature of expenditures is developed. Differential penalty costs for budget variances specified by the user determine an optimal ratio which is used in developing the flexible budget. The budget uses direct materials cost as the base, and is particularly well-suited for just-in-time operation in manufacturing.     

Participation in budgeting: A critical anthropological approach

Accounting researchers adopting structural and post-structural interpretive approaches have long criticized mainstream assumptions about the enduring economic aspects of accounting systems, highlighting their roles in reflecting and shaping social realities that are contradictory, diverse, and changing. The paper aims to develop this critique by inquiring empirically and philosophically into the roles that constructing participation in budgeting might play in enhancing ‘ontological plurality’, that is, supporting actors’ perspectives, abilities and concerns which are generally excluded by structuring action to maximize private profits. It defines and elaborates a critical anthropological approach using Marx’s notion of ‘social praxis’ and Latour’s idea of ‘modes of existence’ to highlight the theoretical contribution of anthropologists exploring beyond traditional divides over social agency through studies of grassroots participative responses to contemporary socio-economic crises. Drawing on ethnographic data collected through a multiple site case study of eight worker cooperatives in Argentina, the paper analyses how reciprocal relations between the actors’ levels of agency in wider associative actions, and their degrees of participation in budgeting, caused gradual expansions in ontological plurality, moving the actors beyond their particular tensions and broader structural conflicts. Exploring the notion of ‘ontological movements’, the paper develops a continuum of participation and ontological pluralism in budgeting, which it argues contributes to the structural and post-structural interpretive accounting literatures through historical, constructive, and participative components.     

Bonus schemes and trading activity

Little is known about how different bonus schemes affect traders' propensity to trade and which bonus schemes improve traders' performance. We study the effects of linear versus threshold bonus schemes on traders' behavior. Traders buy and sell shares in an experimental stock market on the basis of fundamental and technical information (past share price evolution, realized earnings, analysts' earnings forecasts, and evolution of the market index). We find that linear and threshold bonus schemes have different effects on trading behavior: traders make more transactions but of a smaller size under the threshold than under the linear bonus scheme. Furthermore, transaction frequency significantly decreases when bonus thresholds are reached but only after building in a safety margin. Under the threshold scheme, the traders' performance is lower (even when there are no transaction costs) than under the linear bonus scheme as a consequence of poorer market timing. This is especially the case when earning money by trading is relatively difficult (i.e., under low profitability conditions). Nevertheless, under low profitability conditions, traders seem to collect more information about the relationships between share price and market returns, earnings, and earnings forecasts, put more effort into understanding those relationships, and thus eventually learn to perform better.     

The Federal Government of Germany's circumspection concerning accrual budgeting and accounting

In 2010, the German federal government, renowned for its fiscal rectitude, abandoned its accrual-based budgeting and accounting reform, certainly the output-based budgeting component of it and possibly the rest. While the German federal ministry of finance supported the reform, parliamentarians feared that the change from an input to an output orientation to the budget, together with the reduction of the number of individual appropriations, would result in a loss of their control over the budget and the government's finances. The global banking crisis certainly increased, and may well have triggered, these fears.     

论中国政府预算管理改革的优先序--兼议绩效预算在中国的适用性

绩效预算是西方国家实践证明了的先进的预算管理模式。但绩效预算的实行需要社会相关制度环境的配套。中国目前尚不具备实施绩效预算的基本条件。中国预算制度改革的当务之急是建立控制取向的预算管理模式,解决财务合规性问题。待相关条件具备后,再选择绩效预算管理模式。     

Pricing of swaps with default risk

In this paper, I study the valuation of interest rate and currency swaps with default risk under the contingent claim analysis framework. I demonstrate that the traditional approach of pricing swap contracts as exchanges of loans underestimates the value of such contracts to the counterparty with higher credit rating and exaggerates the credit spread required to guard against default risk. Numerical simulations show that the swap rate is not sensitive to counterparty credit rating: for a ten year interest rate swap, a one hundred basis point increase in counterparty bond yield spread results in only about one basis point increase in the swap rate. (JEL G10, G12, G13)This paper is based on Chapter 2 of my Ph.D. dissertation at Yale University. I would like to thank my dissertation committee, Kenneth French, Roger Ibbotson, and Jonathan Ingersoll, Jr. (chairman), for helpful advice and guidance. I would also like to thank Keny Back, Richard Lindsey, N. R. Prabhala, Ming Huang, Marti Subrahmanyam, three anonymous referees and especially Bob Jarrow, the editor, for helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors that remain are solely mine. This paper won the 1996 Trefftzs Award for best student paper from the Western Finance Association.     

经理人长期激励方案与股东利益的一致性研究

基于EVA(经济增加值)设计长期激励契约和激励比率,引导经理适度举债经营和投资决策能使双方利益趋于一致问题而建立的3个命题进行的逻辑推理证明:(1)在新兴的中国资本市场,高管激励机制不要盲目搬用西方激励方法,长期激励方案具有引导经理准确应用融资优序理论并适度举债,既能激励经理更为努力工作,又能将经理利益与股东利益更紧密融合在一起;(2)合理确定长期激励比率和建立适当的奖励薪酬金额上下限模型,为具体设计激励方案提供理论依据;(3)长激励方案能引导经理的投资决策选择投资项目的条件与股东财富最大化一致.     

Managing budget emphasis through the explicit design of conditional budgetary slack

Budgetary slack plays an important role in the functioning of budgets in organizations. While theory has found negative as well as positive elements associated with its presence, the empirical literature has interpreted it as being dysfunctional to organizations. In this paper, we present empirical evidence on how a company purposefully budgeted additional financial resources with a motivation intention (Lukka. Budgetary biasing in organizations: Theoretical framework and empirical evidence. Accounting, Organizations and Society 13 (1998) 281–302) to facilitate the managers’ task in achieving the goals of the company. Using quantitative and qualitative data from four logistic sites of a disk drive manufacturer for 24 months, we examine how the company accepted more slack as the demand on business processes increased and goals other than budget targets––in particular, service quality––became harder to achieve. By allowing this practice, headquarters made it clear to local managers that product quality and service were at least as important as meeting budget objectives. We also find that not only was budgetary slack purposefully built during the budgeting process but also in the budgeting system itself through the underlying cost accounting assumptions. The results of this paper provide empirical evidence on the positive aspects of budgetary slack and on the role of cost accounting models used in the budgeting system to facilitate managerial work.     

Cost uncertainty and budget overspending: A safety-first perspective

In this study we model a cost center manager's decision about how to achieve a required level of output. The spending plan that the manager adopts is expected to result in successful performance, but at an uncertain cost. The uncertainty associated with the spending plan is inversely related to the expected cost. The analysis presented in this article suggests that a manager who exhibits Safety-First behavior and wishes to avoid large budget deviations is more likely to exceed what he or she perceives to be the overspending limit rather than the underspending limit. That manager will tend to incur costs in excess of the budget. This mathematical result has an intuitive appeal; a manager is willing to pay a certain “risk premium” to avoid the risk of large budget deviations and accompanying adverse consequences. This result has implications for both performance evaluation and budget setting, particularly in the public sector. Under the circumstances that we describe, using budgets in evaluating managerial performance may be misleading. Another application of our study relates to the “budget creep” phenomenon and how, under particular circumstances, its size can be reduced.     

Activity-Based Costing for Economic Value Added®

Economic value added, which is the currently popular term for the traditional accounting concept of residual income (RI), subtracts from operating income an interest charge for invested capital. This paper provides an activity-based cost system that supports RI maximization. We construct a model of participative budgeting for a multi-activity firm in which the cost system allocates plant and equipment cost to products using a formula that includes the interest charge. The budget system we design enables decision makers to identify RI-improving opportunities for outsourcing and dropping unprofitable products. The budget system also has the open-architecture property that additional informal communication among activity managers can only serve to increase RI.     

An empirical study of interest rate swap usage by nonfinancial corporate business

This study examines the relationship between the probability and extent of a firm's participation in interestrate swap markets and the magnitude of some of its operating and financial ratios. These ratios are selected to proxy incentives to reduce agency costs of leverage and information asymmetry in credit markets. The data on swap usage are obtained from disclosures mandated by SFAS 105. The results suggest that fixed-rate payers, compared to non-swap-users, have more leverage, greater profitability, more growth options, less operating risk, lower ratios of fixed to total assets, and more divergent earnings estimates. On the other hand, floating-rate payers do not seem to have financial and operating characteristics significantly different from non-swap-users, although they do have less divergent earnings estimates.This study is based, in part, on one of the essays in my doctoral dissertation at Indiana University. Further research was supported by a grant from the Western Michigan University Faculty Research and Creative Activities Support Fund. The study has also benefited from comments on an earlier version by participants at the Eastern Finance Association Annual Meetings, 1993.     

转型期行政事业单位预算绩效评价规则研究

剖析财政部近期预算绩效评价部署与远期绩效预算改革定位的政策基调,提出面向绩效预算改革的行政事业部门预算绩效评价规则定位问题,整合涵盖评价视角观、范畴观与指标观的预算绩效评价规则体系,促进绩效预算改革实践的深入拓展。     

Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process

This paper analyzes the counterproductive effects associated with using budgets or targets in an organisation's performance measurement and compensation systems. Paying people on the basis of how their performance relates to a budget or target causes people to game the system and in doing so to destroy value in two main ways: (a) both superiors and subordinates lie in the formulation of budgets and, therefore, gut the budgeting process of the critical unbiased information that is required to coordinate the activities of disparate parts of an organisation, and (b) they game the realisation of the budgets or targets and in doing so destroy value for their organisations. Although most managers and analysts understand that budget gaming is widespread, few understand the huge costs it imposes on organisations and how to lower them. My purpose in this paper is to explain exactly how this happens and how managers and firms can stop this counter‐productive cycle. The key lies not in destroying the budgeting systems, but in changing the way organisations pay people. In particular to stop this highly counter‐productive behaviour we must stop using budgets or targets in the compensation formulas and promotion systems for employees and managers. This means taking all kinks, discontinuities and non‐linearities out of the pay‐for‐performance profile of each employee and manager. Such purely linear compensation formulas provide no incentives to lie, or to withhold and distort information, or to game the system. While the evidence on the costs of these systems is not extensive, I believe that solving the problems could easily result in large productivity and value increases – sometimes as much as 50–100% improvements in productivity. I believe the less intensive reliance on such budget/target systems is an important cause of the increased productivity of entrepreneurial and LBO firms. Moreover, eliminating budget/target‐induced gaming from the management system will eliminate one of the major forces leading to the general loss of integrity in organisations. People are taught to lie in these pervasive budgeting systems because if they tell the truth they often get punished and if they lie they get rewarded. Once taught to lie in this system people generally cannot help but extend that behaviour to all sorts of other relationships in the organisation.