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1.
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1996,8(3):315-330
This paper continues a line of research begun in Batabyal (1995a). I model the interaction between a regulator and a monopolistic, polluting firm as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firm creates pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under dynamically consistent policies. 相似文献
2.
Transboundary air pollution is analysed as a dynamic game between Finland and the nearby areas of the Soviet Union. Sulphur emissions are used as the environmental control variables and the acidities of the soils as the state variables. Acidification is consequently considered to be a stock pollutant having long-lasting harmful effects on the environment. The state dynamics consist of two relationships: first, of a sulphur transportation model between the regions and, second, of a model describing how the quality of the soil is affected by sulphur deposition. The countries are assumed to be interested in maximizing the net benefits from pollution control as measured by the impacts on the values of forest growth net of the abatement costs. Cooperative and noncooperative solutions of the game are compared to assess the benefits of bilateral cooperation. Using empirical estimates of abatement costs, acidification dynamics and impacts on forest growth it is shown that cooperation is beneficial to Finland but not to the Soviet Union. Consequently, Finland has to offer monetary compensation to induce her neighbor to invest in environmental protection. 相似文献
3.
The study provides a game theoretic exploration of firms’ decisions on whether to compete or collaborate in the generation and adoption of a sequence of new technologies. Different from models proposed by previous studies, which concentrates on process innovation and a two-strategy set (innovation or do nothing), the present game theory model emphasises product innovation and a three-strategy set (innovation, collaboration, or do nothing). The study makes three contributions. The proposed game theory model extends current understanding of the impacts of collaboration possibilities and collaboration cost in a dynamic game theory. Further, the model clarifies the impact of transaction costs on the outcome. Finally, the study finds that the relationship between collaboration costs is not univariate, but depends on the market type and various market characteristics, such as technology gap, technology level, the product substitution index, transaction costs, and the discount rate of price sensitiveness. 相似文献
4.
The authors present a semester-long game to teach the role of economics in natural resources management. The game is framed within a fisheries context: multiple student fisheries harvest fish to maximize yield/profit, which is measured using a piecewise linear function. There are prizes for both the student and the group with the highest semester-long catch, which brings forth the social dilemma associated with dynamic stock externalities in fisheries. The game can be played in large classes, is robust to student attrition, and requires 5–10?minutes per class period. Given its features, it can be used to teach behavioral economic principles in resource management, incentives versus command-and-control regulations, role of cheap talk, social preferences, punishment, and community management as well as solutions such as aquaculture. 相似文献
5.
Summary. We introduce strategic waiting in a global game setting with irreversible investment. Players can wait in order to make a better informed decision. We allow for cohort effects, which arise endogenously in technology adoption problems with positive contemporaneous network effects. Formally, cohort effects lead to intra-period network effects being greater than inter-period network effects. Depending on the nature of the cohort effects, our game may or may not satisfy dynamic increasing differences. If it does, our model has a unique rationalizable outcome. Otherwise, multiple equilibria may exist as players want to invest at the same point in time others do.Received: 13 July 2004, Revised: 20 May 2005, JEL Classification Numbers:
C72, C73, D82, D83.We thank George-Marios Angeletos, Helmut Bester, Andreas Blume, Estelle Cantillon, Frank Heinemann, Christian Hellwig, Larry Karp, Tobias Kretschmer, In Ho Lee, Robin Mason and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. We also thank seminar participants at the EEA-meeting in Stockholm 2003, ESRC Workshop in Warwick 2004, Free University Berlin, IAE (Barcelona), Keele, MIT, Southampton, University of Pittsburgh, and at a CEPR-conference in Brussels 2002 for comments, and the European Union for providing financial support through the TMR network on network industries (Contract number FMRX-CT98-0203). This paper was completed while the first author visited the Department of Economics at MIT, whose hospitality he gratefully acknowledges. 相似文献
6.
Yan Zheng 《Applied economics》2013,45(49):5411-5419
The current state of corruption in China is still worrisome. Corruption among public officials depends not only on their subjective will, but also on the success rate of government investigations and public whistleblowing. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study constructs an evolutionary game model with the government, the people, and public officials and solves the dynamic model. The authors also provide a numerical simulation of the proposed model to confirm theoretical predictions. The results reveal that when the government’s success rate reaches a certain threshold, public officials will trend to a strategy of no bribery, and at this threshold, raising the cost of bribing public officials can quickly prevent them from corruption. At the equilibrium, the public will trend toward a strategy of no whistleblowing. The findings of this study are of great significance to the current anti-corruption debate in China. 相似文献
7.
市场化改革、财政分权以及政绩考核等制度,进一步引发了我国政府间税收竞争。横向税收竞争实际上是政府间的一种博弈,是一国范围内不同辖区政府之间为了各自利益最大化而采用税收手段进行的角逐行为及其博弈过程。利用面板数据分析东、中、西部地区税收竞争与经济发展的关系,表明税收竞争对不同地区的经济发展有着不同的效应。所以,规范税收竞争,应从适当赋予地方税权、完善转移支付体系、改革政府绩效考核制度等方面入手。 相似文献
8.
随着市场经济的快速发展,世界各国对竞争政策、竞争法的关心度也明显提高.作者力图通过法与经济学的相关理论,对竞争政策、竞争法的目的、规制对象、规制的设定方法等诸问题进行解剖、分析,以阐明竞争政策、竞争法律规制的理论基础与发展趋势. 相似文献
9.
In this study we analyse the role of the storageregulation in a fishery's production process when theresource exploited and the market to which theproduction is exported are characterized by seasonaldephased oscillations. For this purpose we built up adynamic model drawn from the French Guyana shrimpfishery example. The underlying objective of the modelis not the maximisation of a given criterion (as wouldbe in the optimal control approach), but merely themaintenance of the fishery's economical viability. Thefundamental principle is here to try to preserve asmany as possible viable control options. Theconditions to achieve and maintain this viability arecaptured in a certain number of constraints. Theanalysis points out periods and situations within theseason where the fishermen must anticipate theevolution of their storage to avoid violating thoseviability constraints. The study also indicates howthe fishery's viability can be ensured even if theexploitation costs exceed the commercial value of thelandings for a finite part of the year. However, whenthe resource's and/or market's oscillations are toolarge, the fishery may be not viable any longer and itappears that the crisis can not be removed byinvesting in larger storage capacities. 相似文献
10.
文章通过引入土地国有制,土地再开发等因素建立了符合我国土地市场制度特征的土地开发和物业税模型,然后以比较静态分析和数值模拟为主要研究手段,考察了物业税对土地利用效率的影响。结论是开征物业税对土地利用效率存在负面的影响。 相似文献
11.
In nonpoint source pollution problems, the regulator does not observe each polluters individual emission, which prevents him from using the conventional policy instruments. Therefore, new instruments have been designed to regulate this type of pollution. In an experiment, we compare the efficiency of some of these instruments: an input-based tax, an ambient tax/subsidy, an ambient tax, and a group fine. We assume that polluters themselves are affected by environmental damages. A control session without any regulation is also carried out in order to study the status quo situation. Our experimental data show that the input tax and the ambient tax are very efficient and reliable, and the group fine is fairly efficient and reliable. These instruments improve social welfare with respect to the status quo. On the contrary, the ambient tax/subsidy decreases social welfare with respect to the status quo, and its effect is very unreliable. 相似文献
12.
陈浩 《生态经济(学术版)》2006,(2):38-41
环境管制与企业竞争力的关系近年来成为各界争论的焦点。传统观点认为环境管制降低企业竞争力,修正学派则认为环境管制有利于企业创新,使企业受益于“创新补偿”和“先动优势”,从而有利于企业竞争力。本文从演化经济学的有限理性、多样化、随机因素和时间等基本假设出发,认为以组织能力为核心的动态演化观点有利于更好地理解和分析环境管制与企业竞争力的关系。 相似文献
13.
Doede Wiersma 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1991,1(1):63-82
A great deal of the economic literature on pollution control strategies concentrates on the efficiency of environmental policy instruments. Most analytical studies in this field show that market instruments are more efficient with respect to the cost of pollution abatement of a given number of polluters than non-market instruments. According to several analytical studies, market instruments should also be more efficient with respect to innovation in pollution abatement equipment than non-market instruments. In the empirical literature a great number of case studies exist with estimations of the savings of abatement costs of market instruments in a situation without technological progress. Empirical studies about the impact of environmental policy market instruments on the abatement costs in situations with technological progress are lacking.The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. The paper deals with an empirical estimation of abatement costs for the emission of SO2 of coal-fired electricity units in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2000. First, the working of market instruments and non-market instruments (the existing environmental policy of the Dutch government) is simulated in a static situation. Second, we analyse the learning effects of flue gas desulphurization. The efficiency advantage of market instruments turns out to be larger in a situation of technological progress than in a static situation. 相似文献
14.
环境偏好和环境税视角下企业技术决策博弈分析 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
构建双寡头垄断市场下企业技术决策的博弈模型,并将消费者环境偏好和环境税引入模型。首先分析消费者的环境偏好对市场需求的影响;然后运用逆向归纳法探讨企业在环境税约束下的两阶段博弈;最后分析消费者环境偏好和环境税对企业技术决策的综合影响。研究表明:消费者的环境偏好降低了双寡头垄断企业的市场需求,激发了企业在没有环境税下采纳绿色技术的动机;当征收环境税时,企业采纳绿色技术的效益与环境税率的关系曲线呈倒U型,消费者的环境偏好与环境税引发的效益区间正比变动。 相似文献
15.
利用1992-2008年中国31个省级面板数据,检验了环境规制竞争对生产率增长及其构成的影响。结果发现,SO2减排对生产率增长及其构成有正向影响,说明SO2的减排竞争将会促进经济增长效率的提高。相反,工业COD减排对生产率增长及其构成存在不利的作用。这种不利影响不是由省际间环境规制竞争引起,而是由废水治理策略不当造成的。这些研究结果似乎表明,环境规制竞争并非是发展地方经济的"良策"。 相似文献
16.
In this paper, we examine which auction format, first-price or second-price, a seller will choose when he can profitably cheat
in a second price auction by observing all bids by possible buyers and submitting a shill bid as pretending to be a buyer.
We model this choice of auction format in seller cheating as a signaling game in which the buyers may regard the selection
of a second price auction by the seller as a signal that he is a shill bidder. By introducing trembling-hand perfectness as
a refinement of signaling equilibrium, we find two possible strictly perfect signaling equilibria. One is a separating equilibrium
in which a noncheating honest seller selects a first price auction and a cheating seller does a second price auction. In another
pooling equilibrium, however, both cheating and non-cheating sellers select a second price auction. The conclusion that a
seller chooses a second price auction even if he cannot cheat is in contrast to the previous literature, which focused on
the case of independent values.
We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments that have improved the paper. This research was partially supported by the
Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) 15310023 and (C) 18530139. 相似文献
17.
Traditional fiscal federalism theory holds that decentralization may improve the provision of public goods and services. However, the social welfare field with strong externalities may face different incentives and behavioural logics. This paper provides novel empirical evidence for the causal relationship between decentralization and local pollution. In this paper, we focussed on China's widely spread decentralization reform, which substantially expanded the economic and social management autonomy of county governments. Using the difference-in-differences method and a panel dataset from 1998 to 2007, we found that the reform would compel affected counties to loosen environmental regulation, adopt financial and fiscal policies that would actually support heavy-pollution industries' rapid economic growth. Overall, the reform led to a significant increase in local pollution, thus worsening the overall environmental quality. Moreover, cost-benefit analysis indicated that the reforms generated net gains in social welfare, but the substantial environmental costs cannot be ignored. 相似文献
18.
Anastasios Xepapadeas 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1995,5(4):375-391
The simultaneous management, in an international context, of free-access renewable resources and transboundary pollution, is examined in a dynamic game framework. First-best outcomes under international cooperation are determined and compared to noncooperative outcomes when countries follow linear Markov strategies. An international policy consisting of taxes on emissions and harvesting, with international redistribution of tax receipts, is used to achieve the cooperative solution. In addition, side payments may be required to prevent free riding and thus make the international policy implementable.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the International WorkshopEconomic Aspects of International Water Resources Utilization in the Mediterranean Basin, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei, Milan, October 1993, and the Fifth Annual Conference of EAERE, Dublin, June 1994. I would like to thank Peter Berck, Charles Kolstad, Mordechai Schechter, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. 相似文献
19.
Masayuki Shimizu 《Review of Development Economics》2020,24(2):668-690
Since the 2000s, China has been trying to strengthen emission controls in response to increasing pollution problems. However, strict implementation of emission controls generates pollution abatement costs. Using regional data for 29 provinces in the Chinese industrial sector from 1995 to 2010, this study estimated the pollution abatement costs for each province through the measurement of environmental efficiency, by applying a directional distance function approach. Moreover, using panel data analysis, this study clarified whether there is a nonlinear relationship between pollution abatement costs and environmental regulations. The empirical results are as follows. The study confirmed that the burden of abatement costs tended not only to occur in the central and western regions but also to increase in the eastern region. Moreover, the nonlinear relationship is inverted U‐shaped; thus, pollution abatement costs increase, as a negative effect of environmental regulations, until a certain inflection point, after which they decrease. 相似文献
20.
The aim of this paper is to analyze if cooperation can be the product of cultural evolution in a two-stage coordination game, consisting of a production stage followed by a negotiation phase. We present an overlapping generations model with cultural transmission of preferences where the distribution of preferences in the population and the strategies are determined endogenously and simultaneously. There are several groups in the society; some of them play cooperatively and others do not. Socialization takes place inside the group, but there is a positive rate of migration among groups which parents anticipate. Our main result shows that all groups converge to the cooperative equilibrium. 相似文献