CEO传记特征对盈余管理的影响

本文基于2009²010年中国上市公司制造业数据,探讨CEO传记特征对盈余管理的影响。研究发现任期即将结束的CEO与盈余管理存在显著的负相关性,早前CEO任职经历与盈余管理程度正相关,我们未发现年龄、MBA学历与盈余管理间的相关性。     

CEO任期与盈余管理相关性的实证研究

文章选择A股上市公司2004—2011年的数据,结合CEO声誉机制理论对CEO任期及盈余管理的影响进行实证研究。研究结果表明,CEO任期与盈余管理程度显著负相关,CEO任期越长,企业的盈余管理程度越大。在CEO任期的初期,盈余管理程度增加。随着任期的增加,在CEO任期的中间时期盈余管理的程度有所下降。而在CEO离任的前一年,盈余管理程度较大。文章最后针对研究结果提出了改善盈余管理程度的政策建议。     

高管团队异质性、CEO权力与企业成本粘性的实证分析

企业成本粘性正成为实证会计领域一个重要关注的话题,过高的企业成本粘性不利于企业价值极大化。以我国上市公司为样本,对高管特质、CEO权力与成本粘性间的关系进行实证分析。研究发现：团队年龄异质性、教育水平异质性、任期异质性会显著增加企业成本,但专业背景异质性有利于降低企业成本;在考虑CEO权力后,CEO权力的扩大有利于协调高管团队意见,降低成本;其在与高管特质四大因素交互后,团队年龄异质性、教育水平异质性、任期异质性、专业背景异质性受到了削弱或强化。要降低企业的成本粘性,应多注意团队成员的年龄差异、高管的受教育水平、任期以及团队的专业背景;同时也要重视对CEO的赋权,除重视与考察其个人履历与能力外,还应通过契约的方式赋予其管理企业更合适的权力。     

企业CEO权力强度会加剧股价崩盘风险吗?

本文探讨了企业CEO权力强度与股价崩盘风险之间的内在关系,并考察企业的监督机制能否缓解CEO权力对股价崩盘风险的影响,研究发现:CEO权力强度对企业股价崩盘风险有显著的正向影响;相比非国有企业,国有企业CEO权力对股价崩盘风险的影响更大;企业的监事会规模会加剧CEO权力和股价崩盘之间的正相关关系,而独立董事对两者关系有着负向影响,但统计上并不显著.     

CEO任期与企业资本投资

本文基于管理者在一定约束条件下追求自身利益最大化的逻辑思路,分析管理者任期与企业资本投资之间的关系,重点检验我国上市公司CEO的既有任期和预期任期对企业投资水平和投资效率的影响。研究结果发现,在管理者任期与投资水平的关系上,国有企业与非国有企业表现一致:CEO的既有任期越长,企业的投资水平越高;CEO的预期任期越短,企业的投资水平越低。在管理者任期与投资效率的关系上,国有企业与非国有企业表现不同:非国有企业的过度投资程度与CEO的既有任期及预期任期无关,而国有企业CEO的既有任期越长,过度投资问题越严重;CEO的预期任期越短,过度投资问题越能得到缓解。     

上市公司高管腐败对经营业绩的危害及鉴证研究

选取2013~2014年发生高管腐败的49家上市公司作为相关样本和未发生高管腐败的49家上市公司作为配对样本,运用二元逻辑回归模型和多元线性回归模型进行实证研究后发现：高管腐败对经营业绩有显著危害。CEO 权力强度、股权分散性、股权流动性与高管腐败显著正相关,股权制衡度与高管腐败显著负相关,董事会规模、独立董事占比与高管腐败低度正相关,股权集中度、监事会规模、CEO 相对薪酬与高管腐败低度负相关。     

银行董事会特征、CEO报酬与银行绩效——基于对11家股份制银行的数据分析

本文通过采集2005～2008年11家已上市的全国股份制商业银行的数据,实证分析了银行董事会独立性与CEO报酬之间的关系,并在考虑银行CEO报酬内生性基础上,进一步检验了银行董事会独立性、CEO报酬和银行绩效的关系。研究结果显示:长任期的CEO、CEO兼任董事长、较大比例的内部董事和较大的董事会规模构成了中国上市银行的监管障碍。银行CEO的高薪酬是不足为奇的,因为高薪酬对应的是银行业绩的显著增长。CEO报酬是银行公司治理的强化机制,授予银行CEO合理的激励报酬可以克服银行监管障碍,提高银行治理水平。     

高管任期与公司坏消息的隐藏北大核心CSSCISSCI

"职业生涯忧虑"(Career Concerns)如何影响高管管理公司信息流尤其是坏消息是当前财务学研究的一个热点。本文使用1999-2014年中国A股上市公司的数据,考察CEO在任期不同阶段如何隐藏公司坏消息和其手段,以及产权性质如何影响上述关系。研究发现:(1)CEO在任职初期(前三年)和离任前一年会更多地隐藏坏消息,且上述效应在非国有企业中更为显著;(2)CEO上任第一年会集中披露前任CEO隐藏的坏消息;(3)"盈余管理"是CEO隐藏坏消息的一种手段;(4)家族企业中,只有非家族成员CEO有出于职业生涯考虑而隐藏坏消息的动机。本文的研究结论揭示了CEO在任期内对公司坏消息管理的动态演变过程,对于深入认识CEO如何管理公司信息流、如何约束CEO管理信息披露的行为以及降低股价崩盘风险具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

临时CEO与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

我国大部分企业缺乏接班人计划,现任CEO突然离职导致企业不得不任命临时CEO代为行使职权。本文以我国资本市场非金融类上市公司聘任的临时CEO为研究对象,发现出于转正预期,临时CEO有较强的动机进行盈余管理,并且更多地表现为正向盈余管理行为。进一步考察CEO个体特征后发现,临时CEO是内部委任和在上市公司领取薪水的情况下更倾向于进行盈余管理。此外,有效的公司治理机制对临时CEO的盈余管理行为存在抑制作用。研究结论对于我国企业制定接班人计划具有重要的指导意义。     

所有权性质、CEO任期与会计稳健性

以高阶理论为基础,运用声誉机制理论、任期五阶段模型、任职期限理论、职业生涯关注等相关理论,以我国2010~2014年 A 股上市公司为样本,实证研究了 CEO 现有任期和预期任期对会计稳健性的影响,并进一步研究了产权性质差异对两者关系的调节效应。研究发现,CEO 现有任期与会计稳健性呈倒U 型关系,CEO 预期任期与会计稳健性正相关。与非国有上市公司相比,在国有上市公司中,CEO 现有任期和预期任期对会计稳健性的影响都更强。     

CEO职业关注与企业会计信息披露质量

依据2001-2019年沪深两市A股上市公司数据,以C EO年龄水平作为职业关注水平的代理变量,考量CEO职业关注对企业会计信息披露质量的影响.结果表明:CEO职业关注降低了企业的会计信息披露质量,CEO职业关注水平较高时,企业盈余管理倾向更强,应计质量更差,发生盈余粉饰的可能性更高.进一步分析发现,企业正向盈余管理倾向是C EO职业关注影响会计信息披露质量的渠道,职业关注与会计信息披露质量的关系受到财务业绩压力的干扰.     

Powerful CEOs and stock price crash risk

We find that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) are associated with higher crash risk. The positive association between CEO power and crash risk holds when controlling for earnings management, tax avoidance, chief executive officer's option incentives, and CEO overconfidence. Firms with powerful CEOs have higher probability of financial restatements, lower proportion of negative to positive earnings guidance, and lower ratio of negative to positive words in their financial statements. The association between powerful CEOs and higher crash risk is mostly evident among firms with higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock prices and when CEOs have lower general skills. External monitoring mechanisms weaken but do not eliminate the association between powerful founder CEOs and higher crash risk.     

Do Publicly Signalled Earnings Management Incentives Affect Analyst Forecast Accuracy?

Using a panel of listed Australian firms for the years 1999–2007, this paper investigates whether analysts' forecast efficiency is improved by the occurrence of a publicly observable event, such as a CEO appointment, which signals a firm's earnings management incentives. Two supporting hypotheses are also tested: first, that CEO appointments are associated with income‐decreasing earnings management; and second, that analyst forecast errors increase with the level of earnings management present in current period financial statements. Consistent with prior literature, we find income‐decreasing earnings management in the year of CEO appointment. Earnings management, as a general phenomenon, is found to be significantly related to analyst forecast errors in the period in which the earnings management occurs. However, we present evidence that analyst forecasts for current year earnings are significantly more accurate with respect to earnings management in cases where a CEO is appointed during the current financial period.     

CEO power and annual report reading difficulty

We examine the impact of CEO power on reading difficulty of corporate annual reports. We find that CEO power is positively related to reading difficulty, implying that annual reports of corporations with powerful CEOs are difficult to read and understand. More importantly, we find that the relation between CEO power and reading difficulty is moderated by earnings performance or corporate governance. Additional findings suggest that this relation becomes stronger for firms with lower financial reporting quality or for CEOs with shorter tenure. Our study not only joins the debate on the consequences of powerful CEOs but also uncovers several factors that moderate the relation between CEO power and annual report reading difficulty.     

Earnings Management Surrounding CEO Turnover: Evidence from Korea

This article examines the empirical relation between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and earnings management in Korea using a sample of 403 CEO turnovers and 806 non‐turnover control firms during the period 2001–2010. We classify CEO turnovers into four types depending on whether the departure of the outgoing CEO is peaceful or forced and whether the incoming CEO is promoted from within or recruited from outside the firm. We measure earnings management by both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also control for the endogeneity of CEO turnover and a potential selection bias using 2SLS and Heckman's two‐stage approach. After controlling for corporate financial performance and governance structure, we find upward earnings management by the departing CEO only when the departure is forced and the new CEO is an insider. In this case, the new CEO also engages in downward earnings management using both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also find some evidence that the new CEO recruited from outside the firm manages discretionary accruals upward following the peaceful departure of his predecessor. In all other types of CEO turnover, we do not find evidence of significant earnings management by either CEO.     

Earnings management around founder CEO reappointments and successions in family firms

This paper studies reappointment of a chief executive officer (CEO) and succession events in listed family firms with an incumbent family CEO. We explore whether family firms with a founder CEO are more likely to engage in earnings management preevent than other family firms. We find evidence of preevent upward earnings management for firms that reappoint their founder CEO but no for other family firms. These findings suggest that the costs and benefits from earnings management change around founder CEO reappointments in family firms. Investors, auditors, policymakers and regulators should be aware of the temptation of founder CEOs to inflate earnings preceding their reappointment.     

The differential CEO dominance-compensation and corporate governance-compensation relations: Pre- and post-SOX

We examine the relationship between corporate governance (as measured by traditional corporate governance variables and a new measure of corporate governance, called CEO dominance) and executive compensation, pre- and post-SOX. We conceptualize CEO dominance as a measure of a CEO's power and define it as the difference between CEO pay and the next highest executive's pay divided by the CEO's pay. We argue that for traditional corporate governance variables, the inverse governance-compensation relation that exists pre-SOX will improve post-SOX. On the other hand, we expect a strong and positive CEO dominance-compensation relation to exist both pre- and post-SOX. Consistent with expectations, our results indicate that SOX has changed the relationship between CEO duality and compensation relation, but it has not changed the CEO dominance-compensation relation. This suggests that SOX regulatory reforms do not limit the ability of CEO power to obstruct traditional corporate governance mechanisms in extracting compensation-related rents.