大股东控制、市场化程度与公司现金持有水平

运用2003～2008年我国所有非金融类A股上市公司的样本数据,从大股东控制视角出发,重点关注第一大股东持股比例、实际控制人性质和公司所在地区市场化程度对于公司现金持有水平的共同作用。结果表明,第一大股东持股比例与公司现金持有量水平正相关,实际控制人为国有的比非国有的上市公司的现金持有量高;公司外部治理环境的改善,有助于减轻由第一大股东持股比例以及实际控制人性质对公司现金持有量造成的负面影响。     

我国上市公司融资效率对其现金持有的影响研究

本文以2007-2011年沪深两市非金融类A股上市公司作为分析样本,运用数据包络分析法(DEA),定义了基于公司资本结构和资金使用率的融资效率变量,在此基础上研究了融资效率对现金持有水平的影响.实证结果显示,融资效率与现金持有具有显著的负相关关系,其中,国有上市公司融资效率较低,现金持有水平较高,与国有上市公司相比,民营上市公司融资效率对现金持有的影响并不显著.     

企业性质与多元化经营对现金持有水平的影响

使用制造业上市公司2009-2011年数据,根据企业控股股东性质分组,对多元化经营与现金持有水平的关系进行了回归分析,探寻多元化经营对企业现金持有水平的影响。研究发现,国有控股的企业进行多元化经营,其现金持有水平较专业化公司更低,而且多元化经营水平越高的上市公司现金持有水平越低。非国有控股企业则与此相反。     

经济周期波动与上市公司现金持有行为研究

本文以中国第十轮经济周期(2000～2009年)为研究背景,通过对1184家上市公司8718个样本数据的实证研究,检验了宏观经济因素对公司现金持有行为的影响。本文的实证证据表明,相对于经济繁荣时期,公司在经济衰退时期具有更高的现金持有水平,并且民营公司的现金持有量显著高于国有公司。同时,在经济衰退时期,上市公司具有较高的现金积累倾向。实证证据不能支持如下假设,即在经济衰退时期,融资约束公司比非融资约束公司具有更高的现金积累倾向。本文的研究有助于政府部门提高宏观调控水平和决策指导能力,有利于企业把握宏观经济发展规律,科学制订并合理实行现金持有政策。     

上市公司现金持有水平的影响因素：财务特征、股权结构及治理环境

本文研究了1999—2003年间中国上市公司现金持有水平的影响因素,包括财务特征、股权结构和治理环境。就全部样本来说,我们发现,(1)上市公司的现金持有水平与规模和财务杠杆负相关,与资产周转效率、现金流量、成长性／投资机会、股利支付需要和融资需要等正相关。(2)第一大股东持股比例与超额现金持有水平之间存在着显著的U型非线性关系,外部大股东持股比例与超额现金持有水平之间存在着显著的正相关关系;治理环境基本上与超额现金持有水平之间呈现出明显的负相关关系。同时,我们还根据控股股东性质对四个子样本进行了分析,发现在不同子样本的实证结果之间存在着一些比较明显的差异。     

利率市场化与公司现金持有

利率市场化作为我国一项重要的金融改革对微观企业的现金持有决策产生了重要的影响。本文以2007～2017年我国非金融类上市公司为研究样本,考察了利率市场化对公司现金持有的影响,研究发现:利率市场化与公司现金持有水平呈正相关关系;利率市场化没有通过融资约束路径影响公司现金持有,而是经由公司治理效应路径在抑制超额持现的过度投资、增加公司现金持有水平的同时,增加了企业的研发投入;利率市场化对公司现金持有的影响在非国有企业、成长性高的企业和违约风险高的企业中更加明显,并且利率市场化下的现金持有行为对企业价值的提升作用主要存在于现金持有水平较低的样本。     

企业内部资本市场对现金持有及其价值的影响——基于我国上市公司面板数据的实证分析

本文以2005-2011年中国A股上市公司为样本,实证分析内部资本市场对企业现金持有量的影响,并在此基础上进一步研究集团多元化和国有控股是如何影响企业现金持有及其价值.研究结果显示：内部资本市场增加了上市公司的现金持有量,但却显著折损了公司价值,内部资本市场加剧了企业持有现金的代理动机;国有控股集团在一定程度上缓解了上市公司的融资约束,但却未能提升公司的价值;多元化经营的集团公司现金持有量也偏低,但并非出于其缓解融资约束的作用,且呈现出显著的现金持有“多元化折价效应”.     

公司治理环境、控制权和现金流权分离与现金持有量价值——基于我国上市公司的实证分析

公司治理环境、控制权和现金流权分离度共同影响着企业的现金持有量,实证研究发现:我国公司治理环境与现金持有量之间为正相关关系;控股股东控制权和现金流权偏离度与现金持有量之间为负相关关系,但是公司治理环境的改善对这种关系有抑制作用;与国有企业相比,治理环境和上市公司现金持有量之间的正相关关系在私营企业中表现得更为明显。     

投资者保护与公司现金持有北大核心CSSCISSCI

本文以2001～2005年沪深两市非金融类A股上市公司作为分析样本,基于终极控股股东行为的视角,研究了投资者保护对公司现金持有水平和现金价值的影响。研究发现,在投资者保护较好的情况下,公司现金持有水平较高,并且现金价值并没有因为公司持有的现金水平较高而降低。我们还发现,投资者保护缓解公司投资不足并且抑制公司过度投资,较高的现金持有水平并非公司资本投资无效率的结果。本文研究结果表明,较好的投资者保护限制了终极控股股东对公司现金资产的滥用和转移,公司所持有的较高水平现金被投资者赋予了较高的价值评估,投资者保护较好的情况下公司持有较高水平的现金并不意味着代理问题更加严重。     

CFO地位对企业现金持有的影响研究

CFO作为高管团队中极为重要的一个角色,在企业现金持有决策中具有核心地位,其个人特质对现金持有的影响一直是学术界的研究热点.本文以2015—2019年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,基于固定效应模型实证检验了CFO地位对企业现金持有水平的影响以及风险文化和机构投资者对二者关系的调节作用.研究发现,CFO地位越高,企业现金持有水平越高.随着地区风险文化程度的加强,CFO地位对企业现金持有水平的正向影响也会增强.而机构投资者持股比例的提高会在一定程度上削弱CFO地位对企业现金持有水平的正向影响.本文不仅从理论上拓宽了CFO对公司现金持有决策影响的研究,也为完善公司的治理结构及决策程序提供了参考,有利于企业优化现金类资金的管理.     

Does economic policy uncertainty raise corporate precautionary cash holdings? Evidence from China

Using China as the research setting, this paper investigates the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and corporate precautionary cash holdings. Empirical results show a U-shaped relation between economic policy uncertainty and corporate precautionary cash holdings. Empirical analysis, in terms of ownership structure, firm size, corporate competitiveness and geographical location, further shows that (i) the effects for economic policy uncertainty in both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises are significant, but the effect is stronger for state-owned enterprises; (ii) such significant effect is also found more strongly in small and medium-sized enterprises and highly competitive enterprises; and (iii) the effects for eastern, central and western China are all statistically significant, but the effect is strongest for eastern China.     

中国上市公司高管学术经历对企业现金持有的影响

依据沪深A股上市公司2008-2017年数据,考量高管学术经历对企业现金持有的影响。结果表明：高管学术经历通过风险特质和创新活动影响现金持有水平;高管学术经历与现金持有水平正相关,行业竞争的缓和会削弱二者的正相关关系;相对于国有企业,高管学术经历对非国有企业现金持有水平的影响更显著。     

Local corruption and corporate cash holdings: Sheltering assets or agency conflict?

This study investigates the impact of corruption on corporate cash holdings in China. The political extraction argument predicts that firms might shelter liquid assets to avoid extraction by corrupt officials. Using data on A-shared listed firms between 2007 and 2012, we find that firms located in more corrupt regions hold less cash, supporting this hypothesis. Political resources help to diminish the risk of exploitation, reducing the extent to which liquid assets are sheltered. We find that the negative association between corruption and cash holding is more significant for non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs) than for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, the cash holdings of Non-SOEs without political connections are more sensitive to corruption than those of Non-SOEs with political connections. These findings demonstrate that expropriation by corrupt officials is an important factor driving firms to manage liquidity.     

Grabbing hand or financial constraint mitigation effect? A reexamination of the relationship between institutional development and cash holdings

This study reexamines the impact of institutional development on corporate cash holdings. Our findings confirm that institutional development has a negative effect on corporate cash holdings, which may be partially explained by the financial constraint mitigation effect of institutional development. Our empirical evidence also shows that the corruption index, used as a proxy for the grabbing hand effect, does not mediate the negative effect of institutional development on corporate cash holdings. Furthermore, the impact of institutional development on corporate cash holdings is not significant for large firms and state-owned enterprises. These results are robust to different measures of cash holdings.     

Foreign residency rights and corporate cash holdings

Based on the privately owned enterprises in China's A-share stock market from 2007 to 2017, we investigate the relation between foreign residency rights and corporate cash holdings. The empirical results show that privately owned enterprises whose controlling persons have foreign residency rights may hold more cash. Our conclusions are robust when considering the endogeneity concerns, alternative measures of cash holdings and foreign residency rights, additional control variables, the effect of financial crisis. In further analyses part, we discuss the effect of extradition agreements, residency countries' institutional environment, law enforcement efficiency in China, political connections, verifying that the positive relation remains when: (a) controlling persons obtain foreign residency rights from countries that have no extradition agreements with China, (b) residency countries have weak institutional environment, (c) privately owned enterprises are in regions with better law enforcement efficiency, (d) privately owned enterprises have no political connections. Moreover, we explain the reason that why privately owned enterprises with foreign residency rights hold more cash from the perspective of precautionary motive, transaction motive, speculative motive, corporate governance. At last, we find that foreign residency rights are negatively associated with the market value of cash holdings.     

Economic policy uncertainty and corporate inventory holdings: evidence from China

We investigate the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on corporate inventory holdings in China over the period 2007–2017. We find that EPU leads firms to significantly reduce inventory holdings and this effect is particularly pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises. The adjustment of inventory holdings enhances firms’ operating and market performance consequently. In addition, firms with greater financial constraints or stronger external governance are more affected by EPU. Further exploration shows that EPU induces high precautionary cash holdings, which crowds out inventories. Our results illustrate that firms reallocate between inventories and cash to cope with uncertainty associated with economic policy changes.     

Bank discrimination, holding bank ownership, and economic consequences: Evidence from China

This paper finds that compared with Chinese state-owned firms, non-state-owned firms have a greater propensity to hold significant ownership in commercial banks. These results are consistent with the notion that because non-state-owned firms are more likely to suffer bank discrimination for political reasons, they tend to address their financing disadvantages by building economic bonds with banks. We also find that among non-state-owned firms, those that hold significant bank ownership have lower interest expenses, and are less likely to increase cash holdings but more likely to obtain short-term loans when the government monetary policy is tight. These results suggest that the firms building economic bonds with banks can enjoy benefits such as lower financial expenses and better lending terms during difficult times. Finally, we find that non-state-owned firms with significant bank ownership have better operating performance. Overall, we find that firms can reduce discrimination through holding bank ownership.     

管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效

合理的高管人力资本激励机制是发挥高管人力资本效用进而提高企业绩效的有效途径。本文通过实证检验管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效的关系,结果表明:高管货币薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关,与国有企业相比,非国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管货币薪酬对企业绩效的激励作用。国有企业的在职消费与企业绩效显著负相关,但非国有企业其二者之间的相关性并不显著;管理层权力加大了在职消费对企业绩效的负向影响。高管团队内部薪酬差距与企业绩效显著正相关,且非国有企业比国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管团队内部薪酬差距对企业绩效的激励作用。     

The effect of market competition on corporate cash holdings: An analysis of corporate innovation and financial constraint

This study investigates the impact of market competition on corporate cash holdings. Specifically, we focus on the corporate innovation and financial constraint channels. Based on a sample of the Chinese stock market from 1998 to 2019, our empirical results show that cash holdings are negatively impacted by market competition, corporate innovation partially mediates this effect, and financial constraint exhibits full mediation. Moreover, the mediating effect of corporate innovation is moderated by financial constraints. Furthermore, the impact of market competition reveals an increasing trend as cash holdings increase with quantile regression. In addition, this impact is mitigated for state-owned enterprises, and firms with larger total assets are impacted to a lesser degree.     

Financialization and Corporate Performance in China: Promotion or Inhibition?

Using a sample of Chinese listed firms for the period 2009 to 2018, we analyze the relationship between the financialization of non-financial corporations (NFCs) and corporate performance from both long-term and short-term perspectives. Our results show that the impact of financialization on firm performance is not simply a crowding-out or pulling effect but rather depends on the type of financial assets held by the firms. The holdings of investment financial assets generally have a pulling effect on both the short-term performance and market expectations of a firm's future profits as proxied by Tobin's Q, but they crowd out the innovation activities that are critical to long-term performance. Although monetary financial assets positively affect corporate profitability, they inhibit the increase of return on invested capital and long-term performance. Additionally, compared with monetary financial assets, investment financial assets play a more important role in promoting short-term performance, although the crowding-out effect on innovation activities is more prominent for investment financial assets. Furthermore, this paper also concludes that compared with manufacturing and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), the role of financialization in promoting the performance of non-manufacturing and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is more significant.