关于我国资金价格双轨制并轨研究——兼论民间融资问题治理

在我国,以正规金融的非市场化定价与民间融资的完全市场化定价并存的双轨制资金定价机制长期存在。虽然民间金融作为正规金融的有益补充,在解困实体经济融资难题上发挥着重要的作用,但随着市场经济改革的深入,资金价格双轨制也催生的一系列民间融资问题。从双轨制诱发的民间融资问题出发,分析双轨制演变历史与负面效应,提出将资金价格双轨制并轨的战略性思考,以期合理的统一的资金价格促进经济社会的良性发展。     

关于完善我国企业融资结构的几点思考

我国企业融资存在的问题有:金融资源流向国有企业,资金使用效率低下,导致中小企业“融资难”,抑制了中小企业成长壮大;直接融资与间接融资比例失衡,过度依赖间接融资加剧了金融体系风险;正规金融部门的低效率导致金融体系“体外循环”严重,民间金融盛行,规模庞大的民间金融扰乱了正常的金融秩序,影响了货币政策作用的发挥。为此,应采取推动金融体制的改革,消除金融抑制;发展多层次股权融资市场体系;大力发展公司债券市场;引导民间金融规范发展等措施,完善我国企业融资结构。     

民间金融发展中的问题及策略探析

随着我国市场经济的进一步深化,民间金融作为正规金融的补充,其存在和发展具有必然性。然而由于体制、政策以及市场化不完善等原因,民间金融的发展处于一种纠结的状态。这就需要多方位的采取措施,引导民间金融健康有序发展,完善我国金融体系。     

民间融资发展与合法化问题研究

在社会主义市场经济条件下,民间融资已经成为金融体系中不可或缺的重要组成部分,其运作有着正规金融所不具备的制度、信息、成本以及速度等方面的优势。在民间融资的补充作用被央行认可之后,民间融资将迎来更大的发展空间。发展民营银行及其他民营金融机构将成为今后民间融资发展的趋势。同时,应当采取一定的措施正确地引导和支持其发展,建立和完善相关法规,合理地规范其经济行为,与正规金融形成一种既互补又竞争的良好发展态势,进一步促进我国经济金融的发展。     

利率市场化下民间金融的未来

长期以来,我国正规金融市场与民间金融市场基本处于"双轨制"的状况。我国的利率管制从资金总量与结构性融资上降低了银行等正规金融机构满足社会融资需求的能力,这促进了民间金融的兴起。而随着我国利率市场化程度的不断加深,正规金融机构满足社会融资需求的能力将日益增强,民间金融的市场供需规模将被压缩,但这并不意味着民间金融会消亡,随着利率市场化程度的加深,民间金融相对于银行等正规金融机构的独特优势将被凸显出来,正规金融市场利率与民间金融市场利率将趋于统一,我国正规金融市场与民间金融市场的"双轨制"将被打破,民间金融市场作为正规金融市场的补充其市场定位将更加明确。     

正规金融与民间金融的对接研究

民间金融作为一种市场化融资制度安排为中国的渐进式经济改革提供了强大的体制外金融资源支持,对经济的发展有着积极的作用。它与正规金融各有其比较优势。文章分析了正规金融与民间金融对接的前提条件与基本路径,认为可以通过合理、合法的政策引导,实现民间金融与正规金融的有效对接。     

我国利率市场化的双轨制演进及对接

我国利率市场化改革采取双轨制进行:一方面,在正规金融体系边界上引进市场化因素,主要表现为银行间市场利率已经市场化;另一方面,在正规金融体系内部,银行存贷款利率实现了"贷款利率管下限、存款利率管上限"的阶段性目标。然而,进一步推进利率市场化,实现双轨的对接,需要从根本上解决双轨制改革带来的阶段性问题。本文回顾了我国利率市场化双轨制改革的进程,深入分析了信贷市场和货币市场之间的数量和价格决定关系,明确了利率市场化改革的阶段性困境,进而提出了扩大市场化利率体系覆盖范围和实现双轨制利率体系对接的几点建议。     

农村二元金融结构的主要症结及其化解

农村正规金融与民间金融"二元"共存与分割的经济结构,具有理论与现实的客观必然性。由于金融抑制和制度安排等原因,农村二元金融结构面临着正规金融机构贷款供给不足;正面联动机制低效以及农村金融市场化程度低等症结,制度安排上建议着重从民间金融产权制度,农业金融体系改革和二元结构的联动效应等方面进行分解。     

农村二元金融结构的主要症结及其化解

农村正规金融与民间金融"二元"共存与分割的经济结构,具有理论与现实的客观必然性。由于金融抑制和制度安排等原因,农村二元金融结构面临着正规金融机构贷款供给不足;正面联动机制低效以及农村金融市场化程度低等症结,制度安排上建议着重从民间金融产权制度,农业金融体系改革和二元结构的联动效应等方面进行分解。     

民间标会效应及规范民间标会运作的对策分析

民间标会作为一种传统的融资方式,游离于正规的金融体系之外,其长期存在有其合理性.总结民间标会的运作模式及其运作特点,分析其赖以存在的深层经济、社会原因及其正负两方面效应,对民间标会运作进行规范,扬其长、避其短,十分必要.     

Irrevocable Commitments,Going Private and Private Equity

This paper adds to growing interest in public to private buy‐outs and mechanisms to ensure bid success. Using a unique, hand‐collected dataset of 155 public to private buy‐outs we provide one of the first examinations of the determinants of irrevocable commitments. Irrevocable commitments involve undertakings given by existing shareholders to agree to sell their shares to the bidder before the bid to take the company private is announced. We find that, for management buy‐outs, the level of irrevocable commitments is increased by the bid premium, the reputation of the private equity backer and board shareholdings. The level of irrevocable commitments is reduced by rumours of a takeover bid and bid value. We therefore find evidence that management and private equity firms' activity prior to the bid's announcement can have an important impact on the process of going private.     

Private matters

Why do private firms stay private? Empirical evidence on this issue is sparse, as most private firms in the U.S. do not report their financial results. We investigate why private status matters by taking advantage of a unique dataset of large, leveraged private firms with SEC filings. Unlike a number of other studies, we find that neither the existence of growth opportunities, nor the desire of firm founders to diversify, is a principal determinant of the decision whether or not to retain private status. Rather, the existence of private benefits of control appears to serve as the most significant incentive to stay private. Family-controlled firms have significantly lower probabilities of filing for an IPO, while a board structure that grants management relatively more autonomy lowers the probability of an IPO filing as well. Cross-sectional analysis of profitability and ex post performance suggests that while private benefits of control may encourage firms to stay private, they do not have detrimental effects on firm efficiency. In contrast, firms controlled by private equity specialists appear to place a low value on control benefits and are likely to go public as a means of cashing out.     

“权贵”的私家别墅

相比褐石系、名仕系、天境系的客户定位,世家系产品的目标客户群主要是钟情于欧陆建筑风格,对家族荣誉感强烈,同时享受高层级休闲方式的社会高层人群。作为金地集团旗下高端产品系列,世家系具有浓重的欧陆风情,其项目名称大多含有＂湾＂、＂府＂的字样,如金地大悦湾、金地紫乐府等。这些别墅产品具有精装修、智能化、注重服务等特点。在不少人眼中,世家系的产品拥有欧陆贵族庄园风格,依山傍水、恢弘庄重的低密度家族别墅,在浓密的高大树木丛中,时不时地透露别墅独立花园中的小水池或者类似雪花石的欧式雕塑。     

民营控制、政治关系与企业融资约束——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据

融资难是制约民营企业发展的关键因素,而这种金融困境从根本上讲是一种信用困境。本文构建的理论模型论证了民营企业的政治关系对其融资中的作用,并以中国民营上市公司2002～2005年的经验数据为样本,实证检验了民营企业的政治关系对减轻融资约束的作用。研究发现,相对于没有参与政治的民营企业来说,有政治关系的民营企业其外部融资时所受的融资约束更少;同时,越在金融发展水平低的地区,民营企业的政治关系对其融资的帮助越明显。     

银行保管箱艰难空降

8月中旬以来,中国银行总行营业部颇有声势地向社会推介出了全新的"指纹电控保管箱"业务.由此,一个目前国内最大规模、最高科技规格的保管箱库从中银大厦地下二层"浮现水面".     

The Future of Private Equity

After a period of robust growth, the private equity industry has experienced a marked decline. In the wake of the 2008 economic crisis, the future of the venture and buyout industries seems unclear. This speech discusses four possible scenarios for the future of the private equity industry by examining the short‐ and long‐run determinants of private equity supply and demand. Possible scenarios include Recovery, Back to the Future, The Limited Partners' Desertion, and A Broken Industry. Although support is given for each of the scenarios, a clear prediction for the future remains difficult. The future of the private equity market is likely to be the subject of debate for some time to come.     

私营部门如何获得亚行的支持

亚行发展中成员体越来越注重私营经济的发展,亚行也向这些私营部门提供各式直接支持     

The Future of Private Equity

A distinguished University of Chicago financial economist and longtime observer of private equity markets responds to questions like the following:

• ? With a track record that now stretches in some cases almost 30 years, what have private equity firms accomplished? What effects have they had on the performance of the companies they invest in, and have they been good for the economy?
• ? How will highly leveraged PE portfolio companies fare during the current downturn, especially with over $400 billion of loans coming due in the next three to five years?
• ? With PE firms now sitting on an estimated $500 billion in capital and leveraged loan markets shut down, are the firms now contemplating new kinds of investment that require less debt?
• ? If and when the industry makes a comeback, do you expect any major changes that might allow us to avoid another boom‐and‐bust cycle? Have the PE firms or their investors made any obvious mistakes that contribute to such cycles, and are they now showing any signs of having learned from those mistakes?

Despite the current problems, the operating capabilities of the best PE firms, together with their ability to manage high leverage and the increased receptiveness of public company CEOs and boards to PE investments, have all helped establish private equity as “a permanent asset class.” Although many of the deals done in 2006 and 2007 were probably overpriced, the “cov‐lite” deal structures, deferred repayments of principal, and larger coverage ratios have afforded more room for reworking troubled deals. As a result of that flexibility, and of the kinds of companies that get taken private in leveraged deals in the first place, most troubled PE portfolio companies should end up being restructured efficiently, thereby limiting the damage to the overall economy. Part of the restructuring process involves the use of the PE industry's huge stockpile of capital to purchase distressed debt and inject new equity into troubled deals (in many cases, their own). At the same time the PE firms have been working hard to rescue their own deals, some have been taking significant minority positions in public companies, while gaining some measure of control. Finally, to limit overpriced and overlev‐eraged deals in the future, and so avoid the boom‐and‐bust cycle that appears to have become a predictable part of the industry, the discussion explores the possibility that the limited partners and debt providers that supply most of the capital for PE investments will insist on larger commitments of equity by sponsors to their own funds and individual deals.     

民间借贷风控手段:“制度”胜于“数量”

正民间借贷和小微企业融资,一直是难以分开的话题。小微企业自身特征与商业银行风险防范之间的悖论,使民间借贷拥有了需求的土壤;而正规金融体系所能提供的有限资金回报,使民间借贷的资金供给方逐渐形成。当经济快速增长、资金供给充足时,民间借贷风险可以隐藏,而当经济内在增长动力不足、需要稳健货币政策调控时,一系列问题便显现出来。